'•/*'3 


■.^r.ni 


/3.~i^ 


ALUMNI  LIBRARY, 
THEOI,pGieAL  SEMINARY, 

PRINCETON,  N.  J. 


.,  BT    1101    .L44    1818   v. 2 

Leland,    John,    1691-1766. 
-^'^^^'^J     .  .  .    The   advantage   and 
Bool       necessity  of    the   Christian 


^ 


'\  IJ? 


THE 

ADVANTAGE  AND  NECESSITY 

OF   THE 

CHRISTIAN  REVELATION, 

SHEWN  FROM  THE 

STATE  OF  RELIGION 

IN"  THE 

ANTIENT  HEATHEX  WORLD: 


ESPECIALLY  WITH  RESPECT  TO  THE  KNOWLEDGE  AND  WORSHIP  OF   TH^ 

ONE  TRUE  GOD:  A  RULE  OF  MORAL  DUl'Y:  AND  A  SI' ATE 

OF  FUTURE  REWARDS  AND  PUNISHMENTS. 


TO  WHICH  IS  PREFIXED, 

A  Preliminary  Discourse  on  JSTcitural  and 
Mevealed  Religion^ 


IN  TWO  VOLUMES. 
BY  JOHN  LELAND,  D.  D. 

AUTHOR  OF  THE  VIEW  OF  THE  DEISTICAL  WRITERS,  Ssc 

'W\VWVWVW 

VOLUME  XL 


PHILADELPHIA: 

PUBLISHED  BY  ANTHONY  FTNLEY, 

AT  THE  N.  E.  CORNER  OF  CHESNUT   AND  FOURTH  STREEt^,- 

William  Fry,  Printer, 


^        V 


x«s   C^ 


>»     >*        f 


PREFACE 


TO 


THE  SECOND  VOLUME. 


Although  in  the  general  preface  prefixed  to  the  for- 
mer volume,  I  have  given  an  account  of  the  nature  and  de- 
sign of  this  work,  yet  I  think  it  not  amiss  to  say  something 
farther  iii  the  beginning  of  this  volume,  for  removing  or  ob- 
viating some  prejudices,  which  might  be  conceived  against 
the  plan  I  have  formed,  and  the  manner  in  which  it  is  exe- 
cuted. 

Some  learned  persons  seem  not  willing  to  admit,  that  the 
main  principles  of  religion  and  morality  were  originally 
communicated  by  Divine  Revelation  to  the  first  parents  of 
mankind,  and  from  them  conveyed  by  tradition  to  their  pos- 
terity. They  think  it  more  probable,  that  they  were  led  by 
their  own  natural  sense  and  reason  to  the  knowledge  of  those 
pAiciples.  I  readily  own,  that  those  principles,  when  once 
discovered,  will  be  found  upon  examination  to  be  perfectly 
agreeable  to  the  best  reason  of  mankind;  but  I  think  enough 
is  offered  in  this  treatise  to  shew,  that  in  fact  the  first  notices 
of  these  things  were  communicated  to  the  first  ancestors  of 
the  human  race  by  a  revelation  from  God.  And  in  this  I 
have  the  satisfaction  of  agreeing  with  many  eminent  divine^, 
and  with  those  two  great  masters  of  reason,  and. who  are 
justly  reckoned  among  our  best  writers  on  the  law  of  nature, 


iv  PREFACE. 

Grotius  and  PufFendorff.  The  supposing  the  knowledge  of 
the  main  principles  of  religion  to  have  been  originally- 
owing  to  a  Divine  Revelation,  docs  not  at  all  deny  that  those 
principles  are  really  founded  in  the  nature  of  things,  and 
confirmed  by  the  dictates  of  pure  and  unprejudiced  reason. 
These  things  are  perfectly  consistent;  and  when  taken  toge- 
ther, give  one  a  more  extensive  view  of  the  wisdom  and 
goodness  of  God  in  his  dispensations  towards  mankind,  and 
the  various  ways  that  have  been  taken  for  leading  men  into 
the  knowledge  of  religion  and  morals.  That  this  is  most 
agreeable  to  the  Mosaic  accounts,  is  sufficiently  shewn  both 
in  the  former  volume  and  in  this.  Ana  that  there  were  very 
^ntient  traditions  among  the  Heathen  nations,  concerning 
some  of  the  main  principles  of  religion,  though  in  process 
of  time  grccttly  depraved  and  corrupted,  appears  from  the 
accounts  that  are  given  us  by  the  Heathen  writers  them- 
selves. 

But  there  is  another  objection  which  I  have  met  with, 
and  which  deserves  to  be  more  particularly  considered.  It 
is  this,  That  the  making  such  a  representation  as  I  have 
done,  of  the  state  of  the  Pagan  world,  may  possibly  be  turn- 
ed to  the  disadvantage  of  natural  religion  itself,  and  may 
tend  to  the  weakening  those  principles  which  lie  at  the  foun- 
dation of  all  religion  and  morality. 

If  by  natural  religion  be  meant  religion  as  it  is  founded 
%n  nature,  and  which  may  be  proved  to  be  agreeable  to  the 
best  and  soundest  principles  of  human  reason,  there  is  no- 
thing in  this  work  that  can  bring  any  real  prejudice  to  it. 
And  though  I  am  far  from  thinking  that  the  Gospel  is  mere- 
ly a  republication  of  the  law  of  nature,  yet  this  may  be  safe- 
ly affirmed,  and  is  what  I  have  endeavoured  in  the  course 
oi  this  work  to  shew,  that  it  is  one  excellent  design  of  the 
Chriscian  Revelation  to  confirm  and  establish  it,  to  place  it 
|n  the  properest  light,  and  to  clear  it  from  that  amazing  load 
of  rubbish  which  had  been  heaped  upon  it  in  a  long  succes- 


PREFACE.  y 

sion  of  ages.  Nowhere  is  natural  religion,  taken  in  the 
sense  I  have  mentioned,  so  well  understood,  so  clearly  ex- 
plained, and  so  strongly  asserted,  as  where  the  Christian 
Religion  is  duly  entertained  and  professed. 

But  if  by  natural  religion  be  understood  religion  as  it 
stands  merely  on  the  foot  of  the  powers  of  unassisted  rea- 
son, entirely  independent  on  Divine  Revelation,  and  as  it  was 
actually  taught  and  professed  by  those  who  made  the  high- 
€st  pretences  to  reason  and  religion  in  the  Pagan  world,  I 
confess  it  has  been  one  principal  part  of  my  design  in  this 
work  to  shew  its  weaknesses  and  defects.  And  as  a  high 
admiration  of  the  antient  philosophers,  especially  those  who 
flourished  in  the  celebrated  nations  of  Greece  and  Rome, 
has  inspired  many  with  a  contempt  of  the  Holy  Scriptures, 
and  caused  them  to  entertain  mean  and  undervaluing  thoughts 
of  the  Gospel  of  Christ,  I  cannot  but  think  it  a  real  service 
to  religion,  to  shew  how  unfit  those  boasted  lights  of  the 
Pagan  world  were  to  be  the  guides  of  mankind;  and  that 
they  fell  vastly  short  of  the  first  teachers  and  publishers  of 
Christianity,  mean  and  illiterate  as  some  have  esteemed  them. 

The  Scriptures  make  the  most  striking  representations  of 
the  darkness  and  corruptions  of  the  Heathen  world.  And 
the  antient  apologists  for  Christianity  give  the  same  account 
of  the  state  of  the  Pagan  nations.  They  set  themselves  to 
expose  their  gross  idolatry  and  polytheism,  the  impurities 
and  abominations  of  their  religion  and  worship,  their  great 
corruption  and  dissoluteness  of  morals,  and  the  uncertain- 
ties and  contradictions  of  their  best  writers,  and  thence  ar- 
gue the  great  usefulness  and  necessity  of  the  Christian  Re- 
velation, and  the  advantage  it  was  of  to  mankind.  And  who- 
ever would  have  a  just  and  full  view  of  the  inestimable  be- 
nefits and  privileges  we  are  made  partakers  of  by  the  Gospel, 
ought  by  no  means  to  lose  sight  of  this.  ^ 

It  is  not  the  intention  of  any  thing  that  is  said  in  this 
book  to  degrade  and  vilify  human  reason,  as  if  it  were  of 


I 


vi  PREFACE. 

no  use  in  religion,  and  only  fit  to  lead  men  astray.  I  ana 
fully  persuaded  that  reason,  duly  exercised  and  improved, 
is  very  friendly  to  religion  and  morals:  and  that  the  main 
principles  of  the  Christian  Religion,  if  set  before  men  in  a 
proper  light,  will  approve  themselves  to  right  reason,  when 
freed  from  vicious  and  sinful  prejudices*  it  is  by  reason 
that  we  are  enabled  to  detect  false  revelations,  and  to  dis- 
cern the  proofs  and  evidences  of  the  true,  and  the  glorious 
characters  of  wisdom  and  goodness,  of  purity  and  truth, 
which  shine  in  it  Bat  I  confess  I  am  far  from  conceiving 
so  high  an  opinion  of  reason,  if  left  merely  to  itself  in  the 
present  state  of  mankind,  as  some  have  entertained  of  it.  I 
am  fully  convinced  by  arguments  drawn  from  undeniable 
fact  and  experience,  that  reason,  when  puffed  up  with  a  pre- 
sumptuous conceit  of  its  own  ability  and  strength,  and  ne- 
glecting or  despising  proper  assistances,  or  when  boldly  in- 
truding into  things  too  high  for  it,  or  led  aside  by  corrupt 
custom  and  mere  human  authority,  by  vicious  prejudices 
and  passions  and  carnal  interests,  is  often  apt  to  pass  very- 
wrong  judgments  on  things,  especially  in  divine  matters.  Nor 
do  I  apprehend,  that  it  is  any  disparagement  to  reason,  to 
lay  open  the  faults  and  errors  of  those  who  have  made  the 
greatest  pretensions  to  it,  or  that  it  follows  from  this,  that 
reason  is  a  vain  thing,  and  has  no  certain  foundations  to 
rely  upon.  Thus,  e.  g.  if  some  that  have  professed  to  go- 
vern themselves  by  reason,  have  entertained  very  wrong  no- 
tions of  God,  of  his  perfections,  attributes,  and  providence, 
it  by  no  means  follows,  that  the  proofs  of  the  divine  nature 
and  perfections,  or  of  God's  governing  providence,  are  not 
built  upon  sure  and  solid  grounds,  or  that  reason  is  not  able 
to  discern  the  force  of  those  proofs,  when  clearly  set  before 
it.  In  like  manner  with  regard  to  morals,  it  would  be  wrong 
to  conclude  that  there  is  no  certainty  in  any  moral  principles, 
because  some  persons  of  great  name  have  passed  very  false 
judgments  in  matters  which  appear  to  be  of  great  impor- 


PREFACE.  yii 

tance  in  morality:  or  that  there  is  nothing  base  or  deformed 
in  vicious  actions  or  affections,  because  in  some  nations  and 
ages,  and  in  the  opinion  of  persons  pretending  to  superior 
wisdom,  they  have  been  regarded  as  matters  of  indifferency, 
and  as  either  no  faults  at  all,  or  very  slight  ones. 

In  the  course  of  this  work,  especially  in  that  part  of  it 
which  relates  to  the  state  of  morality  in  the  Heathen  world, 
I  have  been  under  a  necessity  of  taking  notice  of  several 
things  which  can  scarce  be  mentioned  without  being  offen- 
sive to  virtuous  minds,  though  frequently  practised  among 
those  that  have  passed  for  the  most  learned  and  polite  of 
the  Heathen  nations,  and  even  by  many  of  the  philosophers 
themselves.  The  subject  was  so  disagreeable  to  me,  that  I 
intended  more  than  once  to  have  passed  it  over  altogether, 
or  to  have  mentioned  it  very  slightly,  and  only  in  a  general 
way.  But  what  determined  me  to  insist  upon  a  full  proof  was, 
that  otherwise  the  charge  might  have  been  looked  upon  to 
be  groundless  and  calumnious.  And  not  only  have  some 
real  friends  to  Christianity  attempted  to  clear  them  from  it, 
but  others  of  a  different  character  have  taken  occasion  to 
censure  the  apostle  Paul,  as  having  made  an  unjust  and  odi- 
ous representation  of  the  state  of  the  Gentile  world,  beyond 
what  can  be  justified  by  truth  and  fact.  The  proofs  I  have 
brought  are  from  the  antient  Heathen  writers  themselves, 
and  not  from  any  Christian  authors,  except  as  far  as  they 
are  supported  by  the  former.  Nor  can  I  think  there  is  any 
danger  of  what  some  good  persons  might  possibly  be  appre- 
hensive of,  that  this  might  tend  to  diminish  the  horror  of 
vices,  which  are  justly  accounted  most  detestable  and  odi- 
ous. The  only  inference  that  can  justly  be  drawn  from  it  is, 
that  the  bias  of  corrupt  customs,  and  vicious  appetites  and 
passions,  are  apt  to  over-rule  the  moral  sentiments  of  the 
human  mind,  and  tend  to  stifle  the  remonstrances  of  con- 
science, and  even  to  bribe  reason  to  judge  too  favourably 
concerning  practices  which  it  would   otherwise  reject  with 


VUl 


MEFACE. 


abhorrence.  It  also  shews,  that  a  Divine  Revelation,  and  art 
express  law  of  God,  enforced  by  the  strongest  sanctions, 
may  be  of  great  use  in  point  of  morals,  even  with  respect 
to  the  restraining  men  from  those  things,  the  evil  and  turpi- 
tude of  which  seem  to  be  most  apparent  to  reason  and  na- 
ture. Notwithstanding  the  corruptions  that  have  prevailed 
among  many  who  have  taken  upon  them  the  name  of  Chris- 
tians, and  which  some  have  taken  pains  to  exaggerate,  the  most 
abominable  vices  have  been  far  from  being  so  general  among 
them,  as  they  were  in  those  that  have  been  esteemed  the 
most  reiined  nations  of  Paganism.  It  is  not  to  be  doubted, 
but  that  vast  numbers  of  those  who  believe  the  Gospel  have 
been  and  are  preserved  by  the  purity  of  its  precepts,  and 
the  power  of  its  sanctions,  from  vices  to  which  otherwise 
thev  would  have  given  a  boundless  indulgence.  Nor  can  any 
who  believe  the  Christian  religion  allow  themselves  in  vi- 
cious practices,  without  sinning  against  the  clearest  light,  and 
breaking  through  the  strongest  engagements.  I  do  not  see, 
therefore,  how  they  can  be  accounted  real  friends  to  the  puri- 
ty of  morals,  who  are  for  taking  away  or  diminishing  the  force 
of  those  motives  and  sanctions  which  the  Gospel  proposes, 
and  which,  where  they  arc  really  believed,  tend  both  to  ani- 
mate good  men  to  a  holy  and  virtuous  practice  by  the  most 
glorious  hopes  and  prospects,  and  to  deter  the  wicked  from 
their  evil  courses  by  the  most  amazing  denunciations  of 
God's  righteous  vengeance. 

When  we  consider  the  strange  fluctuations  of  persons  of 
the  greatest  abilities  in  the  Pagan  world,  with  respect  to 
several  important  points  of  religion  and  morality,  and  to  the 
retributions  of  a  future  state,  it  ought  surely  to  make  us 
highly  thankful  that  we  have  a  written  well-attested  Reve- 
lation in  our  hands,  to  which  we  may  have  recourse,  both 
for  assisting  us  to  form  a  right  judgment  in  matters  of  the 
greatest  consequence,  and  for  regulating  our  practice.  And 
it  has  pleased  God  in  his  great  wisdom  and  goodness  to  es- 


PREFACE.  ix 

tablish  its  divine  authority  by  such  an  abundance  and  va- 
riety of  proofs,  as  are  every  way  suitable  to  the  importance 
of  the  case,  and  are  amply  sufficient  to  engage  though  not  to 
constrain  the  assent.  Christianity  is  not  afraid  of  the  light, 
or  of  a  free  and  impartial  examination  and  inquiry.  It  has 
always  met  with  the  best  reception  from  those  who  have  ex- 
amined it,  in  the  integrity  of  their  hearts,  with  that  serious- 
ness and  attention  which  the  great  importance  of  it  well  de- 
serves. Let  us  therefore,  with  minds  freed  as  far  as  possible 
from  vicious  prejudices,  consider  the  nature  and  excellency 
of  the  Christian  religion,  the  spirittiaiiiy  and  heavenliness 
of  its  doctrines,  the  discoveries  that  are  there  rt\ade  to  us  of 
those  things  which  it  is  of  the  highest  concernment  to  us  to 
know,  especially  relating  to  the  wonderful  methods  of  the 
Divine  Wisdom  and  Grace  for  our  redemption  and  salva- 
tion, the  unquestionable  excellency  of  its  morals,  and  purity 
of  its  laws,  the  power  of  those  motives  by  which  the  prac- 
tice of  them  is  enforced,  and  the  admirable  tendency  of  the 
whole  to  promote  the  glory  of  God,  and  the  cause  of  right- 
eousness, piety,  and  virtue  in  the  world:  let  us  then  make 
proper  reflections  on  the  holy  and  spotless  life,  and  most 
perfect  and  sublime  character  of  the  great  Founder  of  our 
religion,  and  also  on  the  character  of  his  disciples,  who  pub- 
lished it  to  the  world  in  his  name:  that  they  appear  to  have 
been  persons  of  great  probity  and  simplicity,  incapable  of 
carrying  on  an  artful  imposture,  or  of  being  themselves  the 
inventors  of  that  scheme  of  religion  which  they  taught,  and 
which  was  contrary  in  several  instances  to  their  own  strong- 
est prejudices;  nor  is  there  any  thing  in  their  whole  temper 
and  conduct,  in  the  doctrine  they  preached,  or  in  the  manner 
of  propagating  it,  that  savours  of  the  views  of  worldly  poli- 
cy, or  that  is  cunningly  accommodated  to  humour  men's  pre- 
judices and  vicious  passions,  and  gratify  their  a^Tibition  and 
sensuality.  But  especially  let  us  consider  the  ilUistrious  at- 
testations given  from  heaven  to  the  divine  mission,  both  of 
Vol.  II.  '      b 


X  PREFACE. 

the  first  Author  and  publishers  of  the  Christian  religion,  by 
a  series  of  the  most  wonderful  works,  done  in  express  con- 
firmation of  the  religion  they  taught,  and  which  manifestly 
transcended  all  human  power  or  skill,  and  bore  the  evident 
tokens  of  a  divine  interposition:  and  that  the  truth  of  these 
facts  is  ascertained  to  us  with  all  the  evidence  that  can  be 
reasonably  desired  in  such  a  case,  and  which,  all  things  con- 
sidered, is  as  great  as  could  be  expected  concerning  any 
facts  whatsoever  done  in  past  ages.  To  all  this  may  be  added 
the  evidence  arising  from  clear  and  express  prophecies,  re- 
lating to  events  which  no  human  sagacity  could  foresee, 
some  of  them  undeniably  delivered  and  committed  to  writ- 
ing many  ages  before  their  accomplishment,  and  yet  in  due 
time  punctually  fulfilled.  All  these  are  of  great  force,  even 
separately  considered;  but  when  viewed  and  taken  together 
in  their  just  connection  and  harmony,  form  such  a  chain  of 
proofs,  as  carries  a  mighty  force  of  conviction  with  it  to  an 
honest  and  unprejudiced  mind,  that  is  animated  with  a  sin- 
cere love  of  truth.  The  advocates  of  Christianity  have  fre- 
quently urged  these  arguments  with  great  clearness  and 
strength;  and  whilst  these  proofs  continue  firm,  and  the  ori- 
ginal facts  are  well  supported,  the  truth  and  divine  authority 
of  the  Christian  religion  stand  upon  solid  and  immoveable 
foundations.  Nor  should  we  suffer  prejudices  arising  from 
the  ill  conduct  of  many  of  its  professors  and  teachers,  or 
from  some  particular  passages  of  Scripture  hard  to  be  un- 
derstood, or  the  difficulty  of  comprehending  some  of  its  doc- 
trines which  relate  to  things  of  a  very,  sublime  and  mys- 
terious nature,  at  all  shake  our  belief  of  true  original 
Christianity.  It  is  a  rule  laid  down  long  since  by  Aristotle, 
and  the  justness  of  which  has  never  been  controverted,  that 
we  ought  not  to  expect  in  all  things  the  same  kind  of  evi- 
dence, but  in  every  thing  content  ourselves  with  such  proofs 
as  the  nature  of  the  subject  will  bear.  To  insist  upon  mathe- 
matical demonstration  in  matters  of  religion  and  morality, 


PREFACE.  xi 

is  perfectly  absurd  and  unreasonable;  and  yet  the  evidence 
may  be  such  as  is  sufficient  to  produce  a  certainty,  though 
of  another  kind,  and  which  may  very  fully  satisfy  the  mind, 
and  make  it  reasonable  for  us  to  give  our  assent  to  it,  not- 
withstanding some  objections  that  may  be  made  against  it, 
and  from  which  scarce  any  truth  is  entirely  free. 

I  shall  on  this  occasion  consider  a  pretence  that  has  been 
often  made  use  of  by  men  of  sceptical  minds,  that  without 
an  absolute  certainty  (which  they  pretend  is  not  to  be  had 
in  what  relates  to  religion)  they  may  reasonably  and  safely 
withhold  their  assent.  But  such  persons  ought  to  consider 
that  if  there  be  a  probability  on  the  side  of  religion,  though 
short  of  an  absolute  certainty,  this  would  induce  an  obliga- 
tion upon  them  to  receive  it,  and  to  govern  their  temper  and 
conduct  by  the  rules  it  prescribes.  Where  a  thing  appears 
to  be  probable,  i.  e.  that  there  is  more  reason  for  it  than  the 
contrary,  this  does  not  leave  the  mind  in  a  perfect  equili- 
brium, and  at  liberty  absolutely  to  susp'-nd  its  assent  if  it  be 
a  matter  of  speculation,  or  to  abstain  from  acting  if  it  be  a 
matter  of  practice.  This  the  Pyrrhonists,  who  carried  scep- 
ticism to  the  greatest  height,  were  sensible  of,  and  therefore 
would  not  allow  that  anv  one  thing  is  more  probable  than 
another;  which  seems  to  me  to  be  one  of  the  greatest  extrava- 
gancies that  any  man  pretending  to  reason  can  be  guilty  of; 
nor  do  I  believe  that  any  one  man,  \\hatever  he  might  pre- 
tend in  words,  could  really  bring  himself  to  think  so.  Those 
of  what  was  called  the  New  Academy,  though  at  the  bot- 
tom little  better  than  sceptics,  saw  the  absurdity  of  this,  and 
therefore  though  they  would  not  acknowledge  a  certainty, 
yet  allowed  a  probability  in  things;  and  if  they  had  pur- 
sued this  concession  to  its  genuine  consequences,  it  would 
have  subverted  the  scheme  they  had  in  view  of  a  perpe- 
tual suspension  of  assent.  It  is  an  undeniable  maxim,  that 
we  ought  to  follow  evidence  as  far  as  it  appears  to  us, 
and  therefore  that  which    is  probable  ought  to  sway  our 


Xii  PREFACE. 

judgment,  and    influence    our    practice,  according    to  the 
measure   of  its  probability,   and  the   preponderancy  of  the 
reasons  which  are  brought  for  it.  It  is  manifest  to  every 
one  that  has  any  knowledge  of    mankind,  that  it  is  pro- 
bability which  governs  our  conduct,  if  we  act  prudently; 
and  that  the   author  of  our  beings  designed  it  should  be 
so.     We  are  so  constituted,  that  in  almost  all  cases  rela- 
ting to    practice,  we  are  obliged    to  follow  what  appears 
to  us  upon  a   proper  consideration  of   it  to  be  most  pro- 
bable; and  for  any   man  wilfully  to  neglect  a  thing  which 
would  probably  be  of    great  advantage  to  him,  or  to  do 
any   thing  ^^hich  probably  will  expose  him    to  great  loss 
and  damage,  would  be  justly  deemed  a  very  foolish  and 
unreasonable  conduct,  and  in  matters  where  duty  is  con- 
cerned a  very  guilty  one.  Some  of  those  who  were  other- 
wise much   addicted  to  sceptism    in  speculation,  have  yet 
acknowledged,  that  in  the  affairs  of  common  life,  people 
ought   to  follow  probable  appearances.    And  if  this  is  to 
be   done  in  what  relates  to  our  present  temporal  interest 
and  advantage,    why    not    in    that    which  relates   to   our 
highest  happiness?  The  more  important  any  affair  is,  and 
the  greater  the  danger  is  in  neglecting  it,  or  the  damage 
to  be  sustained  by  such  a   neglect,  the  more  we  are  obli- 
ged, by  the  soundest  maxims  of  reason  and  good  sense, 
to  govern    ourselves,  and  act  according    to  what  'appears 
to  us   upon  a  diligent  enquiry  to  be  most  probable.   And 
what  reason  can  be  assigned,  that  we  should    not  act  so 
in .  matters  of    the    greatest    consequence,  and    in    which 
our  everlasting  salvation  appears  to  be  nearly  concerned? 
In  cases  of  this  nature,  if  the  hazard    be    vastly   greater 
on  one  side  than  on  the  other;  all  the  rules  of  prudence 
lead  us  to    take    that    part,  which    has    the    least    hazard 
attending  it,  even  though  the  evidtnce  on  that  side  should 
be  supposed    to    be    no    greater,    or    perhaps     something 
less,  than   on  the  other.     But  when  both  the  evidence  is 


PREFACE.  xiii 

much  stronger  on  one  side,  and  at  the  same  time  the 
hazard  men  run  by  rejecting  it  much  greater,  to  take 
that  side  which  is  both  less  probable  and  more  danger- 
ous, would  be  the  most  foolish  and  inexcusable  conduct 
in  the  world. 

If  therefore,  upon  a  fair  enquiry,  there  is  at  least  a  great 
probability  that  the  Christian  Revelation  came  from  God, 
it  is  boih  our  wisdom  and  duty  to  embrace  it,  and  to  go- 
vern ourselves  by  its  excellent  rules.  No  man  in  that  case 
would  run  a  hazard  by  embracing  the  Gospel,  or  at  least 
a  hazard  in  any  degree  equal  to  what  he  would  expose 
himself  to  by  rejecting  it:  Let  us  suppose  that  by  com- 
plying with  the  terms  of  salvation  which  are  there  pro- 
posed, he  should  deny  himself  some  of  those  liberties 
which  he  would  otherwise  indulge,  and  controul  his  passions 
by  the  Christian  rules,  which  do  not  require  us  to  extir- 
pate the  passions  and  appetites,  but  to  govern  and  keep 
them  within  the  bounds  of  moderation  and  temperance, 
this  is  no  more  than  the  wisest  men  have  advised  as  the 
properest  way  for  securing  a  man's  own  tranquillity,  and 
for  preserving  body  and  soul  in  a  right  temper.  In  other 
cases,  men  think  it  reasonable  to  hazard  some  present 
loss,  and  to  undergo  some  present  hardships  and  inconve- 
niencies,  on  the  probable  prospect  of  avoiding  a  much 
greater  evil,  or  procuring  some  valuable  and  superior  ad- 
vantage. But  when  the  advantage  proposed  is  so  infinitely 
great  as  the  rewards  promised  to  good  men  in  the  Gos- 
pel, and  the  evils  so  great  as  the  punishments  there 
denounced  against  the  obstinately  impenitent  and  disobedi- 
ent, it  ought  certainly  to  have  proportionably  a  more  power- 
ful influence. 

1  hope  every  reader  that  brings  with  him  a  mind  sin- 
cerely disposed  to  know  the  truth  and  follow  it,  willjohi 
with  me  in  earnest  supplications  to  God,  who  is  a  lover 
of  truth  and  holiness,  that  he  would  be  graciously  pleased 


Xiv  PREFACE. 

to  clear  our  minds  from  vicious  prejudices,  and  dispel 
the  clouds  of  ignorance  and  error,  that  we  may  receive 
the  truth  in  the  love  of  it,  may  behold  it  in  its  convinc- 
ing light,  and  feel  its  transforming  power,  and  may  bring 
forth  fruits  suitable  to  it  in  a  holy  and  virtuous  life,  to 
the  glory  of  God,  and  our  own  eternal  salvation. 


CONTENTS 

OF  THE  SECOND  VOLUME. 


PART  II. 


CHAPTER  I. 

Man  appears  from  the  frame  of  his  nature  to  be  a  moral  agent,  and  designed  to 
be  governed  by  a  law.  Accordingly,  God  hath  given  him  a  law  to  be  the 
rule  of  his  duty  The  scheme  of  those  who  pretend  that  this  law  is  naturally 
and  necessarily  known  to  all  men  without  instruction,  contrary  to  fact  and 
experience.  Yet  there  are  several  ways  by  which  men  come  to  a  knowledge 
of  this  law,  and  of  the  duty  required  of  them;  viz.  by  a  moral  sense  implanted 
in  the  human  heart;  by  a  principle  of  reason  judging  from  the  natures  and 
relations  of  things;  by  education,  and  human  instruction:  besides  all  which, 
God  hath  made  discoveries  of  his  will  concerning  our  duty,  in  a  way  of  extraor- 
dinary Divine  Revelation.  Page  1. 

CHAPTER  n. 

The  principal  heads  of  moral  duty  were  made  known  to  mankind  from  the  be- 
ginning, and  continued  to  be  known  and  acknowledged  in  the  patriarchal  ages. 
When  men  fell  from  the  right  knowledge  of  God,  they  fell  also  in  important 
Instances  from  the  right  knowledge  of  moral  duty.  The  law  given  to  the  peo- 
ple of  Israel  was  designed  to  instruct  and  direct  them  in  morals,  as  well  as  in 
the  knowledge  and  worship  of  the  one  true  God.  A  great  deal  was  done  in 
the  methods  of  Divine  Providence,  to  preserve  the  sense  and  knowledge  of 
morals  among  the  heathen  nations;  but  they  did  not  make  aright  use  of  the 
helps  afforded  them.  Page  18. 

CHAPTER m. 

A  particular  enquiry  into  the  state  of  morality  in  the  Heathen  world.  A  com- 
plete rule  of  morals,  taken  in  its  just  extent,  comprehends  the  duties  relating 
to  God,  our  neighbours,  and^ourselves.  If  the  Heathens  had  such  a  rule  among 


xvi  CONTENTS. 

them,  it  would  appear  either  in  the  precepts  of  their  reheion,  or  in  the  pre- 
scriptious  of  theii-  ci\il  laws,  or  customs  which  have  the  force  of  laws,  or  in  the 
doctrines  and  instiuctions  of  their  philosophers  and  moralists.  It  is  proposed 
distinctly  to  consider  each  of  these.  As  to  what  passed  among  them  for  reli- 
gion, morality  did  not  properly  make  any  part  of  it,  nor  was  it  the  office  of  their 
priests  to  teach  men  virtue.  .\s  to  the  civil  laws  and  constitutions,  supposing 
them  to  have  been  never  so  proper  for  civil  government,  they  were  not  fitted 
to  be  an  adequate  rule  of  morals.  The  best  of  them  were,  in  several  respects, 
greatly  defective.  Various  instances  produced  of  civil  laws,  and  of  customs' 
which  had  the  force  of  laws,  among  the  most  civilized  nations,  especially 
an>ong  the  antient  Egyptians  and  Greeks,  which  were  contrary  to  the  rules  of 
morality.  Page  33. 

CHAPTER  IV. 

Farther  instances  of  civil  laws  and  customs  among  the  Pagan  nations.  Those  of 
the  antient  Romans  considered  The  laws  of  the  twelve  tables,  though  mighti- 
ly extolled,  were  far  from  exhibiting  a  complete  rule  of  morals.  The  law  of 
Romulus  concerning  the  exposing  of  diseased  and  deformed  children.  This 
continued  to  be  practised  among  the  Romans.  Their  cruel  treatment  of  their 
slaves.  Their  gladiatory  shows  contrary  to  humanity.  Unnatural  lusts  common 
among  them  as  well  as  the  Greeks.  Observations  on  the  Chinese  laws  and 
customs  Other  laws  and  customs  of  nations  mentioned,  which  are  contrary 
to  good  morals.  Page  57. 

CHAPTER   V. 

Concerning  morality  as  taught  by  the  antient  Heathen  philosophers.  Some  of 
them  said  excellent  things  concerning  moral  virtue,  and  their  writings  might 
in  several  respects  be  of  great  use.  But  they  could  not  furnish  a  perfect  rule 
of  morals,  that  had  sufficient  certainty,  clearness,  and  authority.  No  one 
philosopher,  or  sect  of  philosophers,  can  be  absolutely  depended  upon  as  a 
proper  guide  in  matters  of  morality.  Nor  is  a  complete  system  of  morals  to  be 
extracted  from  the  writings  of  them  all  collectively  considered.  The  vanity  of 
such  an  attempt  shewn.  Their  sentiments,  how  excellent  soever,  could  not 
properly  pass  for  laws  to  mankind.  Page  72. 

CHAPTER  Vr. 
Many  of  the  philosophers  were  fundamentally  wrong  in  the  first  principles  of 
morals.  They  denied  that  there  are  any  moral  differences  of  things  founded 
in  nature  and  reason,  and  resolved  them  wholly  into  human  laws  and  customs. 
Observations  on  those  philosophers  wlio  made  man's  chief  good  consist  in  plea- 
sure, and  proposed  this  as  the  highest  end  of  morals,  without  any  regard  to  a 
Divine  Law.  The  moral  system  of  Epicurus  considered.  His  high  pretences 
to  virtue  e.vamhied.  The  inconsistency  of  his  principles  shewn,  and  that,  if 


CONTENTS.  xvii 

pursued  to  their  genuine  consequences,  they  are  really  destructive  of  all  virtue 
and  good  morals.  Page  83. 

CHAPTER  VIL 

The  sentiments  of  those  who  are  accounted  the  best  of  the  Pagan  moral  philoso- 
phers considered.  They  held  in  general,  that  the  law  is  right  reason.  Bnt 
reason  alone,  without  a  superior  authority,  does  not  lay  an  obliging  force  upon 
men.  The  wisest  Heathens  taught,  that  the  original  of  law  was  from  God,  and 
that  from  him  it  derived  its  authority.  As  to  the  question,  how  this  law  comes  to 
he  known  to  us,  they  sometimes  represent  it  as  naturally  known  to  all  men.  But 
the  principal  way  of  knowing  it  is  resolved  by  them  into  the  mind  and  reasen 
of  wise  men,  or,  in  other  words,  into  the  doctrines  and  instructions  of  the  phi- 
losophers. The  uncertainty  of  this  rule  of  morals  shewn.  They  talked  highly 
of  virtue  in  general,  but  differed  about  matters  of  great  importance  relating  to 
the  law  of  nature;  some  instances  of  which  are  mentioned.  Page  107. 

CHAPTER  Vni. 

Epictetus's  observation  concerning  the  difficulty  of  applying  general  preconcep- 
tions to  particular  cases,  verified  in  the  antient  pbilosophei's.  They  Avere  gene- 
rally wrong  with  respect  to  the  duty  and  worship  proper  to  be  rendex'ed  to 
God,  though  they  themselves  acknowledged  it  to  be  a  point  of  the  highest  im- 
portance. As  to  social  duties,  some  eminent  philosophers  pleaded  for  revenge 
^nd, against  forgiveness  of  injuries.  But  especially  they  were  deficient  in  that 
part  of  moral  duty  which  relates  to  the  government  of  the  sensual  appetites 
and  passions.  Many  of  the  philosophers  countenanced  by  their  principles  and 
pi-actice  the  most  unnatural  lusts  and  vices.  Those  of  them  that  did  not  carry 
it  so  far,  yet  encouraged  an  impurity  inconsistent  with  the  strictness  and  dig- 
nity of  virtue.  Plato  very  culpable  in  this  respect,  so  also  were  the  Cynics  and 
Stoics.  Simple  fornication  generally  allowed  amongst  them.  Our  modern  deists 
very  loose  in  their  principles  with  regai^d  to  sensual  impurities.  Page  119. 

CHAPTER  IX. 

The  Stoics  the  most  eminent  teachers  of  morals  in  the  Pagan  world.  Mightily 
admired  and  extolled  both  by  the  antients  and  moderns.  Observations  on  the 
Stoical  maxims  and  precepts  with  regard  to  piety  towards  God.  Their  scheme 
tended  to  take  away,  or  very  much  weaken,  the  fear  of  God  as  a  punisher  of 
sin.  It  tended  also  to  raise  men  to  a  state  of  self-sufficiency  and  independency, 
inconsistent  with  a  due  veneration  for  the  Supreme  Being.  Extravagant  strains 
of  pride  and  arrogance  in  some  of  the  principal  Stoics.  Concession  of  sin  in 
their  addresses  to  the  Deity  made  no  part  of  their  religion.  Page  145. 

Vol.  II.  c 


xviii  CONTENTS, 

CHAPTER  X. 

The  Stoics  gave  excellent  precepts  with  regard  to  the  duties  men  owe  to  one 
another.  Yet  they  carried  their  doctrine  of  apathy  so  far,  as  to  be  in  some  in- 
stances not  properly  consistent  with  a  humane  disposition  and  a  charitable  sym- 
pathy. They  said  fine  things  concerning  forgiving  injuries  and  bearing  with  other 
men's  faults.  But  in  several  respects  they  carried  this  to  an  extreme,  and 
placed  it  on  wrong  foundations,  or  enforced  it  by  improper  motives.  This  is 
particularly  shewn  with  regard  to  those  two  eminent  philosophers  Epictetus 
and  Marcus  Antoninus  The  most  antient  Stoics  did  not  allow  pardoning 
mercy  to  be  an  ingredient  in  a  perfect  character.  Page  1G7. 

CHAPTER  XI. 

The  Stoical  precepts  with  regard  to  self-government  considered.  They  talk  in 
high  strains  of  regulating  and  subduing  the  appetites  and  passions;  and  yet 
gave  too  great  indulgence  to  the  fleshly  concupiscence,  and  had  not  a  due  re- 
gard to  purity  and  chastity.  Their  doctrine  of  suicide  considered.  Some  of  tlie 
most  eminent  wise  men  among  the  Heathens,  and  many  of  our  modern  ad- 
mirers of  natural  religion,  faulty  in  this  respect.  The  falsehood  and  pernicious 
consequences  of  this  doctrine  shewn.  Page  187. 

CHAPTER  Xn. 

The  Stoics  professed  to  lead  men  to  perfect  happiness  in  this  prcsentlife,  abstract- 
ing from  all  consideration  of  a  future  state.  Their  scheme  of  the  absolute  sufficien- 
cy of  virtue  to  happiness,  and  the  indifFerency  of  all  external  things  considered. 
They  were  sometimes  obliged  to  make  concessions  which  were  not  very  con- 
sistent with  their  system.  Their  philosophy  in  its  rigour  not  reducible  to  prac- 
tice, and  had  little  influence  either  on  the  people  or  on  themselves.  They  did 
not  give  a  clear  idea  of  the  nature  of  that  virtue  which  they  so  highly  extolled^ 
The  loose  doctrine  of  many  of  the  Stoics,  as  well  as  other  philosophers,  with 
regard  to  truth  and  lying.  Page  208, 

CHAPTER  Xm. 

The  nations  were  sunk  into  a  deplorable  state  of  corruption,  with  regard  to 
morals,  at  the  time  of  our  Saviour's  appearing.  To  recover  them  from  their 
wretched  and  guilty  stale  to  holiness  and  happiness,  one  principal  end  for  which 
God  sent  his  Son  into  the  world.  The  Gospel  Dispensation  opened  with  a 
free  offer  of  pardon  and  salvation  to  perishing  sinners,  upon  their  returning 
to  God  by  faith  and  repentance,  and  new  obediencei  at  the  same  time  the 
best  directions  and  assistances  were  given  to  engage  them  to  a  holy  and  vir- 
tuous practice.  The  Gospel  scheme  of  morality  exceeds  Avhatsoever  had  been 
published  to  the  world  before.  A  summary  representation  of  the  excellency 
«f  the  Gospel  precepts  with  regard  to  the  dutieis  we  owe   to  God,  our  neigh- 


CONTENTS.  xix 

bours,  and  ourselves.  These  precepts  enforced  by  the  most  powerful  and  im- 
portant motives.  The  tendency  of  the  Gospel  to  promote  the  practice  of  holi- 
ness and  virtue,  an  argument  to  prove  the  Divinity  of  the  Christian  Reve- 
lation. .  Page  230. 


PART  III. 

CHAPTER  I. 

The  importance  of  the  doctrine  of  a  future  state.  Tt  is  agreeable  to  right  reason. 
The  natural  and  moral  arguments  for  a  future  state  of  great  weight.  Yet  not 
so  evident,  but  that  if  men  were  left  merely  to  their  own  unassisted  reason, 
they  would  be  apt  to  labour  under  great  doubt  and  difficulties.  A  Revelation 
from  God  coucerning  it  would  be  of  great  advantage.  Page  266, 

CHAPTER  n 

Some  notions  of  the  immortality  of  the  soul  and  a  future  state  obtained  among 
mankind  from  the  most  antient  times,  and  spread  very  generally  through  the 
nations.  This  was  not  originally  the  effect  of  human  reason  and  philosophy, 
nor  was  it  merely  the  invention  of  legislators  for  political  purposes:  but  was 
derived  to  them  by  a  most  antient  tradition  from  the  earliest  ages,  and  was 
probably  a  part  of  the  primitive  religion  communicated  by  Divine  Revelation 
to  the  first  of  the  human  race.  Page  272. 

CHAPTER  HI. 

The  antient  traditions  "concerning  the  immortality  of  the  soul  and  a  future  state 
became  in  process  of  time  greatly  obscured  and  corrupted.  It  was  absolutely 
denied  by  many  of  the  philosophers,  and  rejected  as  a  vulgar  error.  Others 
represented  it  as  altogether  uncertain,  and  having  no  solid  foundation  to  sup- 
port it.The  various  and  contradictory  sentiments  of  the  philosophers  concerning 
the  nature  of  the  human  soul.  Many  of  the  Peripatetics  denied  the  subsistence 
of  the  soul  after  death,  and  this  seems  to  have  been  Aristotle's  own  opinion. 
The  Stoics  had  no  settled  or  consistent  scheme  on  this  head:  nor  v,'as  the  doc- 
trine of  the  immortality  of  the  soul  a  doctrine  of  their  school.  A  future  state 
not  acknowledged  by  the  celebrated  Chinese  philosopher  Confucius,  nor  by 
the  sect  of  the  learned  who  profess  to  be  his  disciples.  Page  283. 

CHAPTER  IV. 

Concerning  the  philosophers  who  professed  to  believe  and  teach  the  immortality 
of  the  soul.  Of  these  Pythagoras  is  generally  esteemed  one  of  the  most  emi- 
nent. His  doctrine  on  this  head  shewn  to  be  not  well  consistent  with  a  state  of 
future  rewards  and  punishments.  Socrates  believed  the  immortality  of  the  soul, 
and  a  future  state,  and  argued  for  it.  In  this  he  was  followed  by  Plato.  The 


XX  CONTENTS. 

Doctrine  of  Cicero  with  regard  to  the  immortality  of  the  soul  considered.  As 
also  that  of  Plutarch.  Page  301. 

CHAPTER  V. 

Those  of  the  antient  philosophers  who  argued  for  the  immortality  of  the  soul, 
placed  it  on  wrong  foundations,  and  mixed  things  Avith  it  which  weakened  the 
belief  of  it.  Some  of  them  asserted,  that  the  soul  is  immortal,  as  being  a  por- 
tion of  the  Divine  Essence.  They  universally  held  the  pre-existence  of  the  hu- 
man soul,  and  laid  the  chief  stress  upon  this  for  proving  its  immortality.  Their 
doctrine  of  the  transmigration  of  souls  was  a  great  corruption  of  the  true  doc- 
trine of  a  future  state.  Those  who  said  the  highest  things  of  future  happiness, 
considered  it  as  confined  chiefly  to  persons  of  eminence,  or  to  those  of  philoso- 
phical minds,  and  afforded  small  encouragement  to  the  common  kind  of  pious 
and  virtuous  persons.  The  rewards  of  Elysium  were  but  temporary,  and  of  a 
short  duration:  and  even  the  happiness  of  those  privileged  souls,  who  were 
supposed  to  be  admitted  not  merely  into  Elysium,  but  into  heaven,  was  not 
everlasting  in  the  strict  and  proper  sense.  The  Gospel  doctrine  of  eternal  life 
to  all  good  and  righteous  piersons  was  not  taught  by  the  antient  Pagan  philo- 
sophers. Page  324. 

CHAPTER  VI. 

Those  that  seemed  to  be  the  most  strenuous  advocates  for  the  immortality  of  the 
soul  and  a  future  state  among  the  antients,  did  not  pretend  to  any  certainty 
concerning  it.  The  uncertainty  they  were  under  appears  from  their  way  of 
managing  their  consolatory  discourses  on  the  death  of  their  friends.To  this  also 
it  was  owing,  that  in  their  exhortations  to  virtue  they  laid  little  stress  on  the 
rewards  of  a  future  state.  Their  not  having  a  certainty  concerning  a  future 
state,  put  them  upon  schemes  to  supply  the  want  of  it.  Hence  they  insisted 
upon  the  self-sufficiency  of  virtue  for  complete  happiness  without  a  future  re- 
corapence:  and  asserted,  that  a  short  happiness  is  as  good  as  an  eternal  one. 

Page  343. 
CHAPTER  YH. 

A  state  of  future  rev/ards  necessarily  connotes  future  punishments.  The  belief 
of  the  former  without  the  latter  might  be  of  pernicious  consequence.  The  an- 
tient philosophers  and  legislators  were  sensible  of  the  importance  and  necessity 
of  the  doctrine  of  future  punishments.  Yet  they  generally  rejected  and  dis- 
carded them  as  vain  and  superstitious  teri'ors.  The  maxim  universally  held  by 
the  philosophers,  that  the  gods  are  never  angiy,  and  can  do  no  hurt,  consi- 
dered. Page  sqa. 

CHAPTER  Vni. 

The  generality  of  the  people,  especially  in  the  politer  nations  of  Greece  and 
Rome,  had  fallen  in  a  great  measure  from  the  belief  of  a  future  stat.e  before  the 


CONTENTS.  ^^• 

time  of  our  Saviour's  appearing.  This  is  particularly  shewn  concerning  the 
Greeks,  by  the  testimonies  of  Socrates  and  Polybius.  The  same  thing  appears 
with  regard  to  the  Romans.  Future  punishments  were  disregarded  and  ridi- 
culed even  among  the  vulgar,  who  iti  this  fell  from  the  religion  of  their  ances- 
tors. The-  resurrection  of  the  body  rejected  by  the  philosophers  of  Greece 
and  Rome.  Page  381. 

CHAPTER  IX. 

Our  Lord  Jesus  Christ  bi'ought  life  and  immortality  into  the  most  clear  and  open 
light  by  the  Gospel.  He  both  gave  the  fullest  assurance  of  that  everlasting  hap- 
piness which  is  prepared  for  good  men  in  a  future  state,  and  made  the  most  in- 
viting discoveries  of  the  nature  and  greatness  of  that  happiness.  The  Gospel 
also  contains  express  declarations  concerning  the  punishment  which  shall  be 
inflicted  upon  the  wicked  in  a  future  state.  The  necessity  and  importance  of 
this  part  of  the  Gospel  Revelation  shewn.  The  Conclusion,  with  some  general 
reflections  upon  the  whole.  Page  399. 


THE 

ADVANTAGE  AND  NECESSITY 

OF  THE 

CHRISTIAN  REVELATION, 

STATE  OF  RELIGION 

LS  THE 

A3>rTIEXT  HEATHEJSr  WORLDs 


PART  II. 

RELATING  TO  A  RULE  OP  MORAL  DUTY. 

CHAPTER    I. 

Man  appears  from  the  frame  of  his  nature  to  be  a  moraHtgent,  ahd  designed  i& 
be  governed  by  a  law.  Accordingly,  God  hath  given  him  a  law  to  be  th6' 
rule  of  his  duty.  The  scheme  of  those  who  pretend  that  this  law  is  naturally 
and  necessarily  known  to  all  men  without  instruction,  contrary  to  feet  and 
experience.  Yet  there  are  several  ways  by  which  men  come  to  a  knowledge 
of  this  law,  and  of  the  duty  required  of  them;  viz.  by  a  moral  sense  implanted 
in  the  human  heart;  by  a  principle  of  reason  judging  from  the  natures  and 
relations  of  things;  by  education,  and  human  instruction:  besides  all  which^ 
God  hath  made  discoveries  of  his  will  eonceming  our  duty,  in  a  way  of  extraor-' 
dinary  Divine  Revelation. 

Having  considered  the  state  of  the  antient  HeatheiS 
Nations,  with  respect  to  the  knowledge  and  worship  of  the 
one  true  God,  and  shewn  the  need  they  stood  in  of  an  ex- 
traordinary Divine  Revelation,  to  recover  them  from  that^ 
amazing  ignorance  of  God,  and  that  idolatry  and  polythe- 
iism,  into  which  they  were  fallen;  I  now  proceed  to  the  iiexi 
Vol.,  II,  "A  . 


2  Man  is  a  Moral  Agent.  Part  IL 

thing  I  proposed,  which  was  to  consider  the  state  of  the 
antient  Heathen  world  with  regard  to  a  rule  of  moral  duty. 
That  it  is  of  great  importance  to  mankind  to  have  clear 
directions  given  them  concerning  moral  duty  in  its  just 
extent,  and  to  have  it  enforced  upon  them  by  a  sufficient 
authority,  and  by  proper  arguments  and  motives,  is  evident 
to  a  considering  mind.  And  many  have  been  of  opinion, 
that  this  is  so  manifest  and  obvious  to  natural  reason,  that 
there  is  no  need  of  Divine  Revelation,  either  to  teach  men 
their  duty,  or  to  enforce  upon  them  moral  obligations.  This 
seems  to  have  a  plausible  appearance,  if  we  consider  the 
matter  abstractly,  and  in  a  way  of  speculation.  But  the 
surest  way  of  judging  of  it  is  from  fact  and  experience:  for 
if  it  appears  that  in  fact  the  most  knowing  and  civilized 
nations  in  the  heathen  world,  and  the  wisest  and  ablest  men 
among  them,  have  laboured  under  great  uncertainties,  and 
even  fallen  into  dangerous  errors  with  regard  to  several 
important  branches  of  moral  duty;  and  that  they  have  also 
been  greatly  deficient  in  the  proposing  such  motives,  as 
might  be  most  proper  and  efficacious  for  enforcing  the 
practice  of  it;  this  affordeth  a  strong  presumption  of  the 
weakness  of  human  reason  in  this  respect,  when  left  merely 
to  itself  in  the  present  state  of  mankind:  and  that  an  express 
Revelation  from  God,  both  for  instructing  us  in  moral  duty 
in  its  just  extent,  and  enforcing  it  upon  us  by  the  most 
powerful  motives,  would  be  of  the  greatest  advantage  to 
mankind. 

.  To  prepare  our  way  for  a  due  consideration  of  this  sub- 
ject, it  will  be  proper,  in  the  first  place,  to  offer  some  gene» 
ral  observations  concerning  man  as  a  moral  agent,  and 
concerning  the  several  ways  by  which  he  may  be  supposed 
to  come  to  the  knowledge  of  his  duty. 

That  man  is  a  moral  agent,  the  proper  subject  of  mora! 
government,  is  as  evident  as  that  he  is  a  reasonable  crea- 
ture, or  that  he  is  capable  of  virtue  and  vice,  praise  and 


Chap.  !•     God  hath  given  a  Law  to  Mankind^  &c.  s 

blame.  And  whatever  some  persons  may  dispute  in  a  way 
of  speculation,  moral  or  free  agency,  though  it  may  be  dif- 
ficult to  settle  the  precise  metaphysical  notion  of  it,  or  to 
answer  all  the  objections  which  subtil  and  sceptical  men 
may  form  against  it,  is  what  all  men  are  intimately  con- 
scious of.  The  self-approving  and  self-condemning  reflec- 
tions of  a  man's  own  mind  plainly  shew  it  to  be  so.  God 
hath  not  only  given  man  a  body,  and  animal  powers  and 
instincts,  suited  to  the  uses  and  enjoyments  of  the  animal 
and  sensitive  life,  but  he  hath  made  him  capable  of  dis- 
cerning the  moral  differences  of  things,  and  hath  given  him 
a  sense  of  good  and  evil,  right  and  wrong,  a  self-determin- 
ing and  a  self-reflecting  power,  whereby  he  is  capable  of 
ch using  and  acting  for  himself,  and  of  passing  a  judgment 
on  his  own  actions.  There  are  few,  but  have  had  experience 
of  an  inward  self-approbation  or  disapprobation,  arising 
from  the  workings  of  a  conscious  principle  within,  accord- 
ing as  they  have  been  sensible  of  their  having  performed 
their  duty  or  the  contrary.  And  God's  having  made  them 
creatures  of  such  a  kind,  i.  e.  reasonable  and  moral  agents, 
capable  of  a  sense  of  moral  obligation,  is  a  demonstrative 
proof,  that  he  designed  them  to  be  governed  in  that  way,  in 
which  it  is  fit  for  moral  agents  to  be  governed;  i.  e.  by  giv- 
ing them  laws  to  be  the  rule  of  their  duty.  And  if  God  hath 
given  men  laws,  it  must  be  his  will  that  those  laws  should 
be  obeyed;  and  as  a  wise  and  righteous  moral  Governor, 
he  will  deal  with  them  agreeably  to  the  laws  which  he  hath 
given  them,  and  will  reward  or  punish  them  according  to 
their  obedience  or  disobedience  to  those  laws. 

But  since  no  law  is  obligatory,  except  it  be  promulgated, 
and  in  some  way  published  to  those  who  are  to  be  governed 
by  it,  we  may  reasonably  conclude,  that  if  God  hath  given 
a  law  to  mankind,  which  they  are  obliged  to  obey,  he  hath 
not  left  them  under  an  invincible  ignorance  of  that  law,  but 
hath  made  such  discoveries  of  it  to  them,  that  if  it  be  not 


4  The  Knowledge  of  Moral  Duty        Part  II, 

their  own  fault,  they  may  know  what  that  duty  is  which 
God  requireth  of  them,  as  far  as  it  is  necessary  for  them  to 
do  so. 

Some  have  carried  this  so  far  as  to  assert,  that  all  men 
have  a  natural  knowledge  of  the  whole  of  their  duty  by  an 
intimate  conscious  perception,  and  an  inward  universal 
light,  independent  of  all  outward  teaching.  To  this  they 
Sipply  the  passage  of  Lucan, 

«  -^ nee  vocibus  ullis 


Numen  eget,  dixitque  semel  nascentibus  auctor 
Quicquid  scire  licet." 

As  if  God  dictated  to  all  men  from  their  very  birth,  the 
whole  of  what  is  necessary  for  them  to  know  with  regard 
to  their  duty,  so  that  they  stand  not  in  need  of  any  farther 
vocal  or  verbal  instruction.  This  seems  to  have  been  Lord 
Herbert's  scheme,  and  is  that  of  Dr.  Tindal,  in  his  famous 
book,  intituled,  "  Christianity  as  old  as  the  Creation."  Lord 
Polingbroke  frequently  expresses  himself  to  the  same  pur* 
pose.  He  says,  that  "  natural  Revelation  (as  he  calls  it) 
produces  a  series  of  intuitive  knowledge  from  the  first 
principles  to  the  last  conclusions  («)."  Where  he  supposes, 
that  both  the  first  principles  of  the  law  of  nature,  and  all 
the  conclusions  drawn  from  them,  are  intuitively  and  infal- 
libly known  to  every  man.  Accordingly  he  declares,  that 
*'  it  is  a  perpetual  standing  Revelation  always  made,  always 
inaking,  to  all  the  sons  of  Adam,"  and  affirms,  that  "  it  is 
intelligible  at  all  times  and  all  places  alike,  and  proportion- 
ed to  the  meanest  understanding  (^)."  Or,  as  he  elsewhere 
has  it,  "  The  tables  of  the  natural  law  are  so  obvious  to  the 
gijght  of  all  men,  that  no  man  who  is  able  to  read  the  plain-^ 


(a)  Bolingbroke's  Works,  vol.  IV.  p.  276.  edit.  4to. 
(6)Ibid.  p.  93.94.  96,97, 


Chap.  I.  communicated  to  Mankind  in  various  Ways.         5 

est  characters  can  mistake  them  (c)."  According  to  this 
scheme,  there  is  not  the  least  need  of  any  extraordinary- 
external  Revelation.  And  it  would  equally  prove,  that  all 
the  endeavours  of  philosophers,  moralists,  and  legislators, 
to  instruct  mankind  in  matters  of  morality,  were  perfectly 
needless  and  superfluous.  I  have  already  offered  some  con- 
siderations to  shew  the  absurdity  of  this  scheme  (d):  and 
the  following  treatise  will  contain  the  fullest  confutation  of 
it;  by  which  it  will  appear  how  prone  mankind  have  always 
been  to  mistake  the  law  of  nature,  in  very  important  in- 
stances of  moral  duty.  It  is  indeed  so  contrary  to  the  expe- 
rience and  observations  of  all  ages,  that  one  would  be  apt 
to  wonder  that  any  men  of  sense  should  insist  upon  it:  and 
yet  the  same  pretence  is  still  repeated  by  the  enemies  of 
Revelation.  And  some  others  of  a  different  character  have 
expressed  themselves  very  inaccurately  and  unwarily  on 
this  subject. 

But  though  this  pretence  of  the  universal  clearness  of  the 
law  of  nature  to  all  mankind,  independent  of  all  farther  in- 
struction, cannot  be  admitted,  as  being  contrary  to  the  most 
evident  fact  and  experience,  yet  it  must  be  acknowledged, 
that  a  great  deal  hath  been  done  in  the  course  and  order  of 
Divine  Providence,  to  lead  men  into  the  knowledge  of  the 
duty  required  of  thtm. 

And  1.  There  is  a  moral  sense  implanted  in  the  human 
mind,  which,  if  duly  cultivated  and  improved,  might  be  of 
great  use  for  leading  men,  in  many  instances,  to  the  notion 
and  practice  of  moral  duty.  I  know  this  is  a  point  that  has 
been  contested,  and  I  shall  not  here  enter  into  the  debate. 
But  it  seems  to  me,  that  something  of  this  kind,  by  what- 


(c)  Bolingbroke's  Works,  vol.  V.  p.  153. 

(d)  See  the  first  volume  of  this  Work,  Preliminary  Discourse, 


6  The  Knowledge  of  Moral  Duty         Part  IL 

soever  name  it  is  called,  must  be  admitted.  Whosoever 
carefully  examines  his  own  heart,  will  be  apt  to  think  that 
there  are  moral  feelings,  distinct  from  mere  reasoning, 
which  incline  him  to  certain  ways  of  acting;  and  that  the 
mind  of  man  is  so  constituted,  as  to  have  an  inward  sense 
of  moral  beauty  or  deformity  in  affections  and  actions, 
which,  when  the  human  nature  is  in  its  right  state,  carries 
him  to  delight  and  take  a  complacency  in  some  actions  as 
right  and  fit,  beautiful  and  lovely,  and  to  dislike  and  disap- 
prove the  contrary.  Some  traces  of  this  are  to  be  found  in 
the  human  mind,  even  limits  most  degenerate  state,  and 
which  can  scarce  ever  be  utterly  erased.  As  there  are  natu- 
ral instincts  distinct  from  reason,  which  tend  to  the  preserva- 
tion and  convenience  of  the  animal  and  vital  frame,  so  there 
seem  to  be  instincts  of  a  moral  kind,  or  propensions  and  in- 
clinations, which,  when  duly  regulated  and  improved,  are 
of  considerable  use  for  leading  men  to  a  proper  course  of 
action.  Such  are  the  social  and  kind  affections,  so  natural  to 
the  human  heart,  that  they  have  obtained  the  name  of  hu- 
manity, and  which  shew  that  men  were  born  not  merely 
for  themselves,  but  were  designed  by  the  author  of  their 
beings  for  mutual  assistance,  and  the  offices  of  benevo- 
lence. 

But  then,  for  preventing  mistakes  in  this  matter,  there 
are  several  things  proper  to  be  here  observed.  One  is,  that 
this  moral  sense  is  not  of  equal  strength  and  force  in  all 
men.  It  is  most  conspicuous  and  eminent  in  some  noble  and 
•generpus  minds,  in  which  a  kind  of  natural  propensity  to 
justice,  benevolence,  gratitude,  &c.  remarkably  appears,  and 
powerfully  operates:  and  in  others  it  is  so  weak,  as  scarce 
to  be  perceived,  or  is  overpowered  by  vicious  habits  and 
corrupt  affections  and  appetites.  It  must  be  acknowledged 
on  the  one  hand,  that  the  moral  sense  is  capable  of  being 
improved  and  strengthened  by  reason  and  reflection:  and 
that  on  the  other  hand,  it  may  be  greatly  perverted  and  de- 


Chap.  I.  communicated  to  Mankind  in  various  Ways.         7 

praved  by  vicioU55  customs,  inordinate  lusts,  and  selfish  in- 
terests, by  false  judgments  of  things,  and  evil  examples. 
And  I  think  it  cannot  be  denied,  that  it  is  so  much  weakened 
in  the  present  state  of  the  human  nature,  that  it  is  no  way 
fit  to  be  alone  a  sufficient  guide  in  morals,  but  standeth  in 
great  need  of  farther  direction  and  assistance.  Some  have 
carried  their  notions  of  the  extent  and  efficacy  of  this  moral 
s^nse  beyond  what  reason  and  experience  will  warrant.  The 
ingenious  and  polite  Earl  of  Shaftesbury,  after  having  ob- 
served, that  there  is  a  natural  beauty  of  actions  as  well  as 
figures,  adds,  that  "  no  sooner  are  actions  viewed,  no  sooner 
the  human  affections  and  passions  discerned  (and  they  are 
most  of  them  discerned  as  soon  as  felt)  than  straight  an  in- 
ward eye  distinguishes,  and  sees  the  fair  and  shapely,  the 
amiable  and  admirable,  apart  from  the  deformed,  the  foul, 
the  odious,  and  despicable."  This  is  elegantly  expressed: 
but  I  should  think,  that  any  one  who  impartially  considers 
human  nature,  as  it  appears  in  the  generality  of  mankind, 
must  own  that  the  inward  eye,  the  eye  of  the  mind,  is  now 
very  much  vitiated  and  obscured,  and  that  there  are  many 
things  which  hinder  its  just  discernment.  The  experience 
of  all  ages  shews,  that  men  have  been  generally  apt  to  mis- 
take idolatry  and  superstition,  than  which  nothing  in  the 
opinion  of  this  noble  author  can  be  more  odious  and  des- 
picable, for  the  most  amiable  thing  in  the  world,  true  reli- 
gion and  piety.  And  even  with  respect  to  the  duties  men 
owe  to  one  another,  and  the  government  of  their  own  affec- 
tions and  passions,  how  often  have  they  been  mistaken  in 
their  notions  of  the  fair,  the  amiable,  and  admirable,  apart 
from  the  foul  and  deformed,  the  odious  and  despicable?  The 
custom  of  exposing  weak  and  helpless  children,  which,  one 
should  think,  is  contrary  to  the  most  intimate  feelings  of 
humanity,  obtained  very  generally  among  the  most  civilized 
nations;  and  yet  they  do  not  appear  to  have  been  sensible  that 
in  this  they  acted   a  wrong  and  inhuman  part,  but  rather 


8  The  Knowledge  of  Moral  Duty         PArt  it, 

looked  upon  it  to  be  a  prudent  and  jusiifiable  practice.  The 
various  tribes  of  American  savages,  whom  some  have  re- 
commended as  following  the  genuine  dictates  of  nature,  are 
so  far  from  feeling  any  remorse  for  the  most  cruel  instances 
of  revenge  on  their  enemies,  or  those  who,  they  think,  have 
injured  them,  that  they  rejoice  and  glory  in  them  as  the  no- 
blest exploits,  and  both  applaud  themselves,  and  are  ap- 
plauded by  others,  on  the  account  of  them.  Many  other 
instances  of  the  like  kind  might  be  mentioned,  some  of 
which  I  shall  have  occasion  to  take  notice  of  in  the  course 
of  this  work.  It  is  not  therefore  a  rule  to  be  depended  on, 
which  some  have  laid  down,  that  no  man  can  violate  the 
law  of  nature  without  condemning  himself.  The  pleasure 
or  remorse  men  feel  in  their  reflections  on  their  own  actions, 
is  far  ^rom  being  a  sure  mark  and  criterion  of  the  moral 
goodness  or  evil  of  an  action  in  the  present  state  of  man- 
kind. It  is  true,  that  the  mind  is  naturally  carried  to  ap- 
prove what  it  takes  to  be  right  and  fit,  and  praise-worthy, 
and  to  disapprove  and  condemn  what  it  takes  to  be  base 
and  wrong;  but  then,  in  many  instances,  it  stands  in  need 
of  direction  and  instruction  as  to  what  is  right  and  wrong. 
And  when  it  is  well  informed,  then  it  is  that  it  is  fitly 
qualified  to  approve  and  condemn  in  the  proper  place.  It 
appears,  therefore,  that  what  is  called  the  moral  sense  was 
not  designed  to  be  an  adequate  guide  in  morals;  nor  is  it 
alone  considered,  and  left  merely  to  itself,  fit  to  have  the 
supreme  direction  as  to  the  moral  conduct.  It  never  was  in- 
tended to  preclude  the  necessity  of  instruction,  but  to  be 
an  assistant  to  our  reason,  to  incline  the  mind  more  readily 
to  its  duty,  and  produce  a  complacency  in  it;  and  to  create 
a  dislike  and  abhorrence  of  that  which  is  evil  and  base,  and 
to  restrain  us  from  committing  it. 

This  leads  me  to  observe, 

2dly,  That  there  is  in  man  a  principle  of  reason,   which 


Gil AP.  I.  communicated  to  Mankind  'in  various  Ways.         % 

is  designed  to  preside  over  the  propeasions  and  affections^ 
and  to  direct  the  moral  temper  and  conduct.  Man  has  an  un- 
derstanding given  him,  by  which  he  is  capable  of  enquiring? 
into  the  natures  and  relations  of  things,  and  considering  what 
those  relations  require.  And  whatsoever  clearly  appeareth 
from  the  very  nature  and  relations  of  things  to  be  fit  and  right 
for  reasonable  creatures  to  perform,  we  may  justly  conclude^ 
that  it  is  the  will  of  God  who  constituted  that  nature  and 
those  relations  they  should  perform;  and  when  once  it  is 
considered  as  the  will  of  God,  the  supreme  universal  Lord 
and  moral  governor,  then  it  is  regarded  not  merelv  as  fit 
and  reasonable  in  itself,  but  as  a  divine  law,  in  the  strictest 
and  properest  sense. 

This  way  of  discovering  our  duty  by  searching  into  the 
nature  and  relations  of  things,  when  rightly  performed,  is 
of  great  extent.  It  signifiies,  that  we  must  form  just  and 
worthy  notions  of  God,  and  of  his  glorious  attributes  and 
perfections,  and  the  relations  between  him  and  us:  that  w© 
must  know  ourselves,  and  the  frame  and  constitution  of  our' 
own  natures,  as  also  the  relations  we  stand  in  towards  our' 
fellow-creatures:  that  we  must  carefully  consider  and  com-- 
pare  all  these,  and  the  fitnesses  and  obligations  arising  from- 
them;  and  thence  collect  our  duty  towards  God,  our  neigh- 
bours, and  ourselves.  There  are  many  who  represent  this 
not  only  as  the  surest  way  of  coming  to  the  right  knowledge 
of  the  duty  which  God  requireth  of  us,  but  as  easy  and  ob-' 
vious  to  all  mankind.  Lord  Bolingbroke  frequently  talks,- 
as  if  every  man  was  able  in  this  way  to  fonii  a  complete 
system  of  Religion  and  Morals  for  himself,  without  the 
least  difficulty.  He  says,  that  "  we  more  certainly  know  the 
will  of  God  in  this  way,  than  we  can  know  it  in  any  otheri*^ 

VoL.IL  B 


10  The  Knowledge  of  Moral  Duty        Part  II. 

and,  "  that  it  admits  of  no  doubt (^)."  And  that,  "by  env- 
ploying  our  reason  to  collect  the  will  of  God  from  the  fund 
of  our  nature  physical  and  moral,  and  by  contemplating  fre- 
quently and  seriously  the  laws  that  are  plainly  and  necessa- 
rily deducible  from  them,  we  may  acquire  not  only  a  parti- 
cular knowledge  of  those  laws^  but  a  general,  and  in  short  an 
habitual  knowledge  of  the  manner  in  which  God  is  pleased 
to  exercise  his  supreme  power  in  this  system,  beyond  which 
we  have  no  concern  (/ )•"  I  readily  own,  that  this  searching 
into  the  relations  and  constitution  of  things,  when  carried 
on  in  a  proper  manner,  may  be  of  great  use  for  coming  at  the 
knowledge  of  the  law  of  nature,  and  for  shewing,  that  the 
main  principles  of  moral  duty  are  founded  in  the  nature  of 
things,  and  are  what  right  reason,  duly  exercised,  will  ap- 
prove, when  fairly  explained  and  set  in  a  proper  light.  But 
cenainly  this  is  not  the  ordinary  way  for  the  bulk  of  man- 
kind to  come  to  the  knowledge  of  their  duty.  There  are  few 
who  have  leisure  or  capacity,  or  inclination  for  profound 
enquiries  into  the  natures  and  reasons  of  things,  and  for 
drawing  proper  conclusions  from  them  concerning  the  will 
of  God.  That  which  the  ingenious  and  noble  author  now 
now  mentioned  seems  to  lay  the  principal  stress  upon,  viz* 
the  employing  our  reason  to  collect  the  will  of  God  from 
the  fund  of  our  nature  physical  and  moral,  is  far  from  being 
so  easy  a  task  as  he  represents  it.  The  knowledge  of  the  hu- 
man constitution,  taken  in  a  physical  and  moral  view,  in- 
cludes a  knovrledge  of  body  and  soul  in  man,  of  the  dis- 
tinction between  them,  and  the  union,  of  both,  from  whence 
duties  result  relating  to  the  welfare  of  the  whole  compound: 
it  takes  in  the  knowledge  of  our  appetites  and  passions,  our 


(e)  BoUngbrokc's  Works,   Vol.  IV.  p.  287.  and  Vol.  V.  p. 
196.  edit.  4to. 
(/)  Ibid.  Vol.  V.  p.  100.   See  also  p.  154.  178.  196.  271. 


Chap.  I.  communicated  to  Mankind  in  various  Ways,        ii 

affections  and  instincts,  and  of  our  rational  and  moral 
powers,  that  by  comparing  all  these,  we  •  may  know  where- 
in consisteth  the  proper  order  and  harmony  of  our  natures, 
what  are  the  just  limits  of  our  appetites  and  passions,  how 
far  they  are  to  be  gratified,  and  how  far  to  be  restrained. 
And  can  it  be  pretended,  that  every  particular  person,  if 
left  merely  to  himself,  is  able,  without  assistance  or  instruc* 
tion,  to  consider  and  compare  all  these,  and  to  deduce  from 
them  a  complete  system  of  laws  for  his  own  conduct?  The 
rule  which  a  noted  author  has  laid  down  as  sufficient  for 
the  direction  of  mankind  is  this,  that  "they  are  so  to  regu- 
late their  appetites,  as  will  conduce  to  the  exercise  of  their 
reason,  the  health  of  their  bodies,  and  the  pleasure  of  their 
senses,  taken  and  considered  together,  since  therein  their 
happiness  consists  (^)."  But  if  this  be  all  the  law  that 
any  man  has  to  govern  him  in  this  matter,  it  is  to  be  fear- 
ed, that  the  bias  of  his  appetites  and  passions,  and  the  plea« 
sures  of  his  senses,  would  generally  bring  over  his  reason 
to  judge  in  their  own  favour.  Lord  Bolingbroke,  who,  in 
the  passage  cited  above,  supposes  that  all  men  may  easily 
collect  the  will  of  God  from  the  fund  of  their  own  nature 
physical  and  moral,  gives  this  account  of  the  human  system: 
that  "man  has  two  principles  of  determination,  affections 
and  passions  excited  by  apparent  good,  and  reason,  which 
is  a  sluggard,  and  cannot  be  so  excited.  Reason  must  be 
willed  into  action:  and  as  this  can  rarely  happen,  when  the 
will  is  already  determined  by  affections  and  passions;  so 
when  it  does  happen,  a  sort  of  composition  generally  hap- 
pens between  the  two  principles:  and  if  the  affections  and 
passions  cannot  govern  absolutely,  they  obtain  more  indul- 
gence from  reason  than  they  deserve,  or  than  she  would 
shew  if  she  were  entirely  free  from  their  force  (/^).^'  And 


^g")  Christianity  as  old  as  the  Creation,  p.  14. 
(A)  Bolingbroke*s  Works,  Vol.  V.  p.  150.  See  also  ibid.  p.  1  !&, 
\S7,  22r. 


313  The  Knowledge  of  Moral  Duty         Part  II. 

he  expressly  affirms,  that  "  the  appetites,  passions,  and  im- 
jnediate  objects  of  pleasure,  will  always  be  of  greater  force 
to  determine  us  than  reason  (z)."  This,  indeed,  is  too  uni- 
versally expressed.  It  is  not  true,  that  the  appetites  and 
passions,  and  immediate  objects  of  pleasure,  will  always  be 
of  greater  force  to  determine  us  than  reason.  Many  instances 
there  have  been  of  excellent  persons,  in  whom  reason  has 
been  of  greater  prevalence  to  determine  them,  than  the  pas- 
sions or  present  sensual  pleasure.  But  it  cannot  be  denied, 
that,  in  the  present  state  of  mankind,  the  case  is  generally 
as  his  Lordship  represents  it:  and  that,  as  he  elsewhere 
speaks,  "  amidst  the  contingencies  that  must  arise  from  the 
constitution  of  every  individual,  the  odds  will  be  on  the 
side  of  appetite  (i^)."  To  set  up  every  man  therefore  for  his 
own  legislator,  as  if  he  were  fit  to  be  left  to  form  a  system 
of  law  and  duty  for  himself,  without  any  farther  instruc- 
tions, is  a  romantic  scheme,  and  would  tend  to  introduce  a 
general  confusion  and  licentiousness,  to  the  subversion  of  all 
good  order  and  morality.  As  to  the  duties  we  owe  to  God,  it 
sufficiently  appears,  from  what  was  observed  in  the  former 
part  of  this  work,  how  little  mankind  are  qualified,  if  left  to 
themselves  without  instruction,  to  form  a  right  judgment  con^- 
cerning  them.  And  with  respect  to  that  part  of  our  duty 
which  relates  to  the  government  of  our  own  appetites  and  pas- 
sions, it  will  be  easily  acknowledged,  that  the  bulk  of  mankind 
are  not  fit  to  be  left  to  indulge  them,  as  far  as  they  themselves 
think  reasonable.  If  every  man  was  to  judge  of  his  duty  by 
what,  in  his  opinion,  tends  most  to  his.  own  happiness  in  the 
circumstances  he  is  in  (which  is  the  rule  laid  down  by  those 
who  make  the  highest  pretences  to  the  Law  and  Religion 


(0  Bolingbroke's  Works,  Vol.  V.  p.  267,  268, 
\k)  Ibid.  p.  479. 


Chap.  I.    communicated  to  Mankind  in  various  Ways,      13 

of  Nature  (/)  in  opposition  to  Revelation)  it  would 
soon  bring  in  a  very  loose  morality:  since  there  is  nothing 
in  which  men  are  more  apt  to  deceive  themselves,  and  to 
form  false  judgments,  than  in  what  relates  to  their  proper 
happiness.  And  even  as  to  that  part  of  morals  which  re- 
lates to  our  duty  towards  mankind,  and  which  includes 
the  exercise  of  justice,  fidelity,  benevolence,  charity,  and 
the  various  offices  of  the  social  life,  though  there  seem  to 
be  strong  traces  of  it  in  the  human  mind,  and  it  is  what 
right  reason  must  approve  as  agreeable  to  the  relations 
we  bear  to  one  another,  yet  I  believe  it  will  be  granted, 
that  it  would  not  be  very  propfer  to  leave  every  man 
merely  to  himself,  to  fix  the  measures  of  just  and  unjust, 
of  right  and  wrong,  in  his  dealings  and  transactions 
with  other  men.  He  would  be  often  apt  to  judge  by  false 
weights  and  measures,^ and  would  be  in  great  danger  of 
being  led  aside  by  his  passions  and  selfish  affections  and 
interests,  which,  it  is  to  be  feared,  would  frequently  bribe 
his  reason  to  form  wrong  and  partial  judgments  of  things. 
No  human  government  could  be  safe  upon  this  plan,  if 
every  man  were  to  be  left  absolutely  to  his  own  direction, 
without  any  other  guide.  All  the  laws  enacted  by  states  and 
commonwealths,  and  all  books  of  morality,  written  by  the 
wisest  men  in  all  ages,  proceed  upon  this  supposition, 
that  men  stand  in  need  of  instruction  and  assistance,  in 
order  to  the  right  forming  and  regulating  their  moral  con- 
duct. 

Accordingly,  I  would  observe, 

3dly,  That  another  way  by  which  men  come  to  the 
knowledge  of  moral  duty,  is  by  the  instructions  of  others. 
This   seems   to  be   manifestly  intended   by  the  Author  of 


(/)  Dr.  Tindal,  Morgan  and  ot^iers. 


14  The  knowledge  of  Moral  Duty         Part  11. 

our  beings.  We  come  into  the  world  in  an  infant  state:  we 
receive  our  first  ideas  of  things,  the  first  rudiments  of 
knowledge,  from  our  parents,  and  those  about  us:  and  the 
notions  which  are  instilled  into  our  minds  in  our  early 
years,  often  make  a  deep  and  lasting  impression,  and  have 
no  small  influence  upon  our  after- conduct.  It  is  therefore 
one  of  the  principal  duties  of  parents  to  endeavour  to  train 
up  their  children  betimes  to  worthy  sentiments.  Thus  we 
find  that,  in  the  Jewish  law,  it  is  the  express  command  of 
God,  frequently  urged  by  the  highest  authority,  that  pa- 
rents should  take  great  and  assiduous  care  to  instruct  their 
children  in  the  statutes  and  precepts  which  God  had  given 
them,  and  in  the  duties  there  required.  It  is  mentioned  to 
the  praise  of  that  excellent  person  Abraham,  that  he  com- 
manded his  children  "  and  household  after  him  to  keep  the 
way  of  the  Lord,  to  do  justice  and  judgment  (?»)."  The 
wisest  men  in  all  ages  have  been  sensible  of  the  great  ad- 
vantage of  a  good  education  (n),  and  that  men  are  not  to 
be  left  merely  to  follow  the  dictates  of  rude,  undisciplined, 
and  uninstructed  nature.  As  to  matter  of  fact,  it  can  scarce 
be  denied,  that  no  small  part  of  the  notions  men  have  of 
right  and  wrong,  and  of  what  is  blameable  and  praise- 
worthy, comes  by  education  and  custom,  by  tradition  and 
instruction.  And  the  vulgar  almost  every  where  adopt  that 
scheme  of  religion  and  morals,  which  prevails  in  their 
respective  countries.  That  great  statesman  and  moralist 
PufFendorf,  who  was  remarkable  for  his  knowledge  of  the 
law  of  nature  and  of  mankind,  ascribes  "  the  facility  which 
children  and  ignorant  people  have  in  determining  between 
just  and  unjust,  right  and  wrong,  to  the   habitude  which 


(m)  Gen.  xviii.  19. 

(tt)  See  the  Preliminary  Discourse,  in  the  first  volume  of  this 
Work,  p.  10. 


Chap.  I.    communicated  to  Mankind  in  various  Ways,      is 

they  have  insensibly  contracted  from  their  cradles,  or  from 
the  time  they  first  began  to  make  use  of  their  reason;  by 
observing  the  good  approved,  and  the  evil  disapproved,  the 
the  one  commended  and  the  other  punished:  and  that  it  is 
owing  to  the  ordinary  practice  of  the  principal  mgixims  of 
natural  law  in  the  events  of  common  life,  that  there  are 
few  people  who  have  any  doubt  whether  these  things  might 
not  be  otherwise  (o)."  And  Mr.  Barbeyrac,  in  his  notes 
upon  it,  after  having  observed  that  "  there  is  a  manifest 
proportion  between  the  maxims  of  natural  law,  and  the 
dictates  of  right  reason;  so  that  it  is  perceived  by  the  most 
simple  people  from  the  moment  they  are  proposed  to  them, 
and  that  they  attend  and  examine  them;"  adds,  that  "per- 
haps they  could  never  have  discovered  them  of  themselves, 
and  cannot  always  comprehend  the  reasons  of  them,  or 
distinctly  explain  what  they  perceive  concerning  them;  and 
that  though  no  man  who  is  arrived  at  the  age  of  discretion 
can  reasonably  pretend  to  excuse  himself  as  to  this  matter 
by  invincible  ignorance,  yet  it  is  nevertheless  true,  that 
education,  instruction,  and  example,  arc  the  ordinary  canals 
by  which  these  ideas  enter  into  the  minds  of  men:  without 
this,  the  greater  part  of  mankind  would  either  almost  en- 
tirely extinguish  their  natural  light,  or  would  never  give 
the  least  attention  to  them.  Experience  shews  this  but  too 
plainly.  Many  things  there  are  among  savage  people,  and 
even  among  the  most  civilized  nations,  sufficient  to  justify 
this  melancholy  and  mortifying  truth.  From  whence  (saith 
he)  it  ought  to  be  concluded,  that  every  man  should  use 
his  best  endeavours  to  contribute,  as  far  as  is  in  his  power, 
to  instruct  others  in  their  duty,  to  establish,  strengthen,  and 


(o)  De  Jur.  Nat.  et  Gent.  lib.  ii.  chap.  3.  sect.  13. 


1©  The  knowledge  of  Moral  Duty         Part  II. 

propagate  so  useful  a  knowledge  (/»)."  This  is  certainly 
one  considerable  instance  in  which  the  Author  of  our  be- 
ings intended  that  men  should  be  helpful  to  one  another,  in 
proportion  to  their  abilities  and  opportunities.  But  it  is,  in 
a  particular  manner,  incumbent  upon  parents,  masters  of 
families,  legislators  and  magistrates,  the  ministers  of  reli- 
gion, and  those  who  profess  to  instruct  men  in  the  science 
of  morals.  And  such  instructions  properly  given  are,  no 
doubt,  of  great  advantage,  and  what  we  ought  to  be  very 
thankful  for.  But  it  is  manifest  from  experience,  that  mere- 
ly human  instruction  cannot  be  absolutely  depended  upon: 
and  that  men  have  been  often  led  into  wrong  notions  of 
morality,  in  very  important  instances,  by  those  who  ought 
to  have  instructed  them  better. 

I  would  therefore  observe  farther,  that  besides  the  se- 
veral ways  which  have  been  mentioned,  whereby  men 
come  to  the  knowledge  of  moral  duty,  there  is  great  need 
of  a  Divine  Revelation,  in  order  to  the  setting  their  duty 
before  them  in  its  just  extent,  and  enforcing  it  upon  them 
by  the  highest  authority.  It  cannot  reasonably  be  denied, 
that  God  can,  if  he  thinks  fit,  make  discoveries  of  his  will 
to  mankind,  in  a  way  of  extraordinary  Revelation  (^);  and 
it  is  manifest,  that  if  he  should  please  to  do  so,  such  a  Di- 
vine Revelation,  confirmed  by  sufficient  evidence,  and 
prescribing  in  his  name  the  particulars  of  our  duty  in  plain 
and  express  precepts,  would  be  of  great  use,  and  would 
come  with  much  greater  weight  and  force,  than  merely 
human  laws,    or  the  reasonings   of  philosophers   and   mo- 


(/?  )  See  Barbeyrac's  Puffendorf,  torn.  I.  p.  217.  not.  7.  edit. 
Amst. 

(y)  See  concerning  this  in  the  Preliminary  Discourse  prefixed 
to  the  former  volume,  p.  20,  et  seq. 


Chap,  h    communicated  to  Mankind  ifi  various  Ways,     if 

ralists:  and  this  method  also  hath  God  taken  in  his  deaU 
ings  with  mankind;  which  is  a  convincing  proof  of  his 
goodness,  and  the  care  he  hath  exercised  towards  them,  in 
order  to  the  leading  men  to  the  right  knowledge  and  prac^ 
tice  of  their  duty. 


VaL.  II. 


1 8  The  principal  Heads  of  Moral  Law  made  known  Part  II. 


CHAPTER  II. 

The  principal  heads  of  moral  duty  were  made  known  to  mankind  from  the  be^ 
ginning,  and  continued  to  be  known  and  acknowledged  in  the  patriarchal  ages, 
"When  men  fell  from  the  right  knowledge  of  God,  they  fell  also  in  important 
instances  from  the  right  knowledgt-  of  moral  duty.  The  law  given  to  the  peo- 
ple of  Israel  was  designed  toins-tiucl  and  direct  them  in  morals,  as  well  as  ia 
the  knowledge  and  worship  ot  the  one  true  God.  A  great  deal  was  done  ia 
the  methods  of  Divine  Providence,  to  preserve  the  sense  and  knowledge  oC 
morals  among  the  heathen  nations;  but  they  did  not  make  aright  use  of  the 
helps  afforded  them. 

IT  has  been  shewn,  in  the  former  part  of  this  work,  that 
as  the  first  man  was  formed  in  an  adult  state,  and  placed 
in  a  world  ready  prepared,  and  amply  provided  for  his  re- 
ception and  entertainment,  so  there  is  great  reason  to 
think,  that  God  communicated  to  him  the  knowledge  of 
religion,  in  its  main  fundamental  articles,  especially  relating 
to  the  existence  and  perfections  of  the  Deity,  and  the  crea- 
tion of  the  world,  that  he  might  be  in  an  immediate  capa- 
city of  serving  his  Maker,  and  answering  the  great  end  of 
his  being.  And  one  of  the  first  and  most  natural  enquiries, 
when  he  was  made  acquainted  with  the  existence  of  a 
God  of  infinite  perfections,  his  Creator  and  Sovereign 
Lord,  must  have  been  what  God  would  have  him  to  do, 
and  what  was  the  duty  required  of  him,  in  order  to  secure 
the  Divine  Favour  and  Approbation.  For  it  cannot  rea- 
sonably be  supposed,  that  he  was  left  absolutely  to  himself, 
and  to  his  own  will,  to  act  as  he  thought  fit,  without  any 
higher  direction  or  law  to  govern  him.  He  could  have  no 
human  instructor  to  teach,  or  to  advise  him:  he  had  no  pa- 
rents or  progenitors,  whose  knowledge  and  experience 
might  have  been  of  use  to  him;  and  as  he  had  no  expe- 
perience  of  his  own,  it  is  not  probable  that,  in  his  circum- 


Chap.  II.  to  Jjian  in  the  Beginning  by  Diving  Revelation.  19 

stances,  he  was  left  to  frame  a  rule  of  duty  for  himself, 
and  to  find  out  the  will  of  God  by  profound  disquisitions 
into  the  nature  and  relations,  of  things.  We  may  therefore 
justly  suppose,  that  a  wise  and  good  God,  who  designed 
him  to  be  governed  by  a  law,  gave  him  a  law  by  which  he 
should  be  governed,  and  communicated  his  will  to  him  in 
relation  to  the  duty  required  of  him.  And  that  this  wa» 
actually  the  case  in  fact,  may  be  concluded  from  the  short 
account  given  us  by  Moses  of  the  primaeval  state  of  man. 
From  that  account  it  appears,  that  man  was  not  left  at  hi» 
first  formation  merely  to  acquire  ideas  in  the  ordinary 
way,  which  would  have  been  too  tedious  and  slow  as  he 
was  circumstanced,  but  was  at  once  furnished  with  the 
knowledge  that  was  then  necessary  for  him.  He  was  imme- 
diately endued  with  the  gift  of  language,  which  necessarily 
supposes  that  he  was  furnished  with  a  stock  of  ideas;  a 
specimen  of  which  he  gave  in  giving  names  to  the  inferior 
animals,  which  were  brought  before  him  for  that  purpose. 
The  same  gift  of  lianguage  was  imparted  to  the  consort 
provided  for  him;  and  they  both  were  admitted  in  several 
instances  to  a  near  intercourse  with  their  Maker,  and  were 
immediately  favoured  with  notions  of  several  things  which 
it  concerned  them  to  know.  It  pleased  God  to  acquaint 
ihem  with  the  dominion  he  had  invested  them  with  over 
the  several  creatures  in  this  lovver  world:  they  had  a  di- 
vine allowance  and  directions  as  to  the  food  it  was  proper 
for  them  to  eat:  they  were  instructed  that  they  were  to  be 
the  parents  of  a  numerous  offspring,  and  that  they  were  to 
replenish  the  earth.  The  institution  and  law  of  marriage, 
which  was  given  them,  shews  that  they  were  made  ac- 
quainted with  the  duties  of  the  conjugal  relation;  with 
which  are  nearly  connected  the  duties  required  of  them  as 
parents  towards  the  children  which  should  proceed  from 
them,  and  the  duties  which  their  children  should  render  to 
them,  and  to  one  another.  As  God  gave  them  the  law  of 


$0  The  principal  Heads  of  Moral  Law  made  known  Part  II. 

the  Sabbath,  we  may  well  conclude  that  he  directed  them 
as  to  the  proper  way  of  sanctifying  it  by  worshipping  him 
the  great  Creator  and  Lord  of  the  universe,  and  cele- 
brating his  glory  as  shining  forth  in  the  creation  of  the 
world,  of  which  the  Sabbath  was  designed  to  keep  up  a 
religious  remembrance.  The  precept  and  injunction  which 
was  laid  upon  them  not  to  eat  the  forbidden  fruit,  compre- 
hended a  considerable  part  of  the  moral  law  under  it.  It 
was  designed  to  instruct  them  that  they  were  not  the  abso- 
lute Lords  of  this  lower  world,  but  were  under  the  do- 
minion of  an  higher  Lord,  to  whom  they  owed  the  most 
entire  subjection,  and  unreserved  obedience,  in  an  implicit 
resignation  to  his  supreme  wisdom  and  goodness:  that  they 
were  bound  to  exercise  a  government  over  their  appetites 
?ind  inclinations,  and  not  to  place  their  highest  happiness  in 
the  gratification  of  them^  and  that  they  were  not  only  to 
govern  their  bodily  appetites,  but  to  guard  against  an  in- 
ordinate ambition,  and  to  restrain  their  desires  of  know- 
ledge within  just  bounds,  without  prying  with  an  unwar- 
rantable curiosity  into  things  which  God  thought  fit  to  con- 
ceal from  them.  Upon  the  whole,  we  may  justly  conclude, 
that  the  first  parents  of  the  human  race  had  the  knowledge 
of  God,  and  of  the  main  articles  of  their  duty  divinely  com- 
fnunicated  to  them,  as  far  as  was  proper,  and  suited  to  the 
state  and  circumstances  they  were  in  (r). 


(r)  Puffendorf,  who  must  be  acknowledged  to  be  a  very  able 
judge  in  what  relates  to  the  law  of  nature,  declares,  in  a  passage 
J  cited  before,  that  *'itis  very  probable,  that  God  taus^ht  the 
first  men  the  chief  heads  of  natural  law,  which  were  afterwards 
preserved  and  spread  among  their  descendants  by  means  of 
education  and  custom."  He  adds,  that  this  does  not  hinder,  but 
that  the  knowledge  of  them  maybe  called  natural,  inasmuch  as 
the  truth  and  certainty  of  them  may  be  discovered  in  a  way  of 
reasoning, 

Grotius 


Chap.  II.  to  Man  in  the  Beginning  by  Divine  Revelation,  21 

After  the  fall  and  disobedience  of  our  first  parents,  new 
duties  arose  suited  to  the  alteration  of  their  circumstances. 
They  were  now  to  regard  God  as  their  offended  Sovereign 
and  Lord:  discoveries  were  made  to  them  both  of  his  jus- 
tice and  righteous  displeasure  against  sin,  and  of  his  placa- 
bleness  towai'ds  penitent  sinners,  and  his  pardoning  mercy; 
without  an  assurance  of  which  they  might  have  sunk  under 
those  desponding  fears  which  a  consciousness  of  their  guilt 
was  apt  to  inspire.  Repentance  towards  God,  a  submission 
to  his  justice  in  the  punishment  inflicted  upon  them  for 
their  disobedience,  hope  in  his  mercy,  and  a  reliance  on  the 
promise  he  was  graciously  pleased  to  make  to  them,  a  fear 
of  offending  him  for  the  future,  and*  a  desire  of  approving 
themselves  to  him  by  a  new  and  dutiful  obedience;  these 
were  dispositions  which  it  was  the  will  of  God  they  should 
exercise.  And  as  they  stood  in  great  need  of  a  divine  direc- 
tion in  those  circumstances,  it  is  reasonable  to  think  that 
he  signified  his  will  to  them  in  relation  to  their  future  con- 
duct, and  the  religion  required  of  fallen  creatures.  The 
history  which  Moses  has  given  of  the  antediluvian  world 
is  very  short:  but  in  the  account  given  of  Cain  and  Abel 
it  is  plainly  intimated,  that  there  was  in  those  early  ages 
an  intercourse  between  God  and  man,  that  he  did  not 
leave  them  without  discoveries  of  his  will,  that  a  law  had 
been  given  them  with  relation  to  the  external  worship  of 
God,  and  particularly  concerning  the  offering  of  sacrifice. 
Accordingly  they  both  observed  it  as  an  act  of  religion;  but 
Abel,  who  was  a  better  man,  with  a  more  pious  disposi- 
tion than  Cain.  He  is  said,  by  the  sacred  writer  to  the  He- 


Grotius  also  gives  it  as  his  opinion,  that  the  law  was  oriq^inally 
promulgated  to  Adam,  the  father  of  mankind,  and  througl.  Jiim 
to  the  human  race;  and  again  to  Noah,  the  second  father  of  man- 
kind, and  by  him  transmitted  to  his  descendants. 


22  The  Principal  Heads  of  Moral  Law  made  known  Part  H. 

brews,  to  have  oflfered  sacrifice  by  faith,  which  seems 
plainly  to  refer  to  a  divine  institution  and  appointment; 
and  that  he  well  knew  it  was  a  rite  which  God  required, 
and  would  accept.  And  its  having  spread  so  universally, 
among  all  nations  from  the  most  nntient  times,  can  scarce 
be  accounted  for  but  by  supposing  it  to  have  been  a  part 
of  Religion  transmitted  from  the  first  ages  to  the  whole 
race  of  mankind  {s).  What  was  said  to  Cain,  and  the  curse 
inflicted  upon  him,  supposed  a  divine  law  obliging  to  mu- 
tual love  and  benevolence,  and  of  which  the  violence  com- 
mitted on  his  brother  was  a  manifest  breach.  There  were 
in  the  old  world  preachers  of  righteousness,  who,  we  have 
reason  to  think,  declared  the  will  and  law  of  God  to  men, 
and  urged  it  upon  them  in  his  name,  and  by  his  authority. 
So  Noah  is  called,  2  Pet.  ii.  5.  and  such  was  that  excel- 
lent person  Enoch,  and  probably  several  others.  To  which 
it  may  be  added,  that  if  God  had  not  made  express  dis- 
coveries of  his  will  to  men,  and  given  them  laws  bound 
upon  them  by  his  own  Divine  Authority,  their  guilt  would 
not  have  been  so  highly  aggravated  as  to  draw  down  upon 
them  so  dreadful  a  ruin  and  condemnation.  But  they  sin- 
ned presumptuously,  and  with  a  high  hand:  they  allowed 
themselves  in  an  unrestrained  indulgence  of  their  lusts  and 
appetites,  and  committed  all  sorts  of  violence,  rapine,  and 
wickedness,  in  the  most  manifest  opposition  to  the  divine 
law.  They  seem  to  have  fallen  into  an  atheistical  neglect 
and  contempt  of  all  religion;  and  therefore  are  justly  called 


(s)  The  reader  may  compare  what  is  here  said  with  the  first 
chapter  of  the  former  volume,  in  which  several  of  the  things 
Jiere  mentioned  are  more  fully  insisted  upon;  but  it  was  necessary 
to  take  some  notice  of  them  in  this  place,  to  show  that  God  from 
the  beginning  made  discoveries  of  his  will  to  men  concerning 
their  duty. 


Chap.  II.  to  man  in  the  Beginning  by  Divine  Revelation.  2a 

"  the  world  of  the  ungodly,"  2  Pet.  ii.  5.  And  the  pro- 
phecy of  Enoch,  mentioned  by  St.  Jude,  seems  particularly 
to  charge  them  with  the  most  audacious  profaneness,  and 
open  contempt  of  Religion,  both  in  their  words  and  actions, 
for  which  the  divine  judgments  were  denounced  against 
them. 

Noah,  with  his  family,  who  survived  that  destruction, 
was  no  doubt  well  acquainted  with  those  divine  laws,  for 
the  transgression  of  which  the  sinners  of  the  old  world 
were  so  severely  punishedj  and  a  man  of  his  excellent 
character,  we  may  be  sure,  took  care  to  transmit  them 
to  his  children  and  descendants:  and  the  awful  proofs  of 
the  divine  justice  and  displeasure  against  the  wicked  and 
disobedient,  tended  to  give  the  instructions  and  admoni- 
tions delivered  to  them  by  this  preacher  of  righteousness 
a  peculiar  force.  It  appears  from  the  brief  hints  given  by 
Moses,  that  God  made  renewed  discoveries  of  his  will 
after  the  flood  to  this  second  father  of  mankind,  and 
gave  laws  and  injunctions  which  were  designed  to  be 
obligatory  on  the  whole  human  race.  The  tradition  of 
the  Jews  relating  to  the  precepts  delivered  to  the  sons  of 
Noah  is  well  known.  And  though  we  have  not  sufficient 
proof,  that  they  were  precisely  in  number  or  order  what 
they  pretend,  yet  that  the  substance  of  those  precepts 
was  then  given  and  promulgated  to  mankind  by  Divine 
Authority,  there  is  good  reason  to  believe.  And  consider- 
ing the  narrowness  of  the  Jewish  notions,  their  strong 
prejudices  against  the  Gentiles,  and  the  contempt  they 
had  for  them,  this  tradition  of  theirs  deserves  a  particular 
regard.  For  it  shews,  that  it  was  an  antient  tradition 
among  them,  derived  from  their  ancestors,  that  God 
was  the  God  not  of  the  Jews  only  but  also  of  the  Gentilesif 
that  he  had  not  entirely  cast  the  Gentiles  off  from  the  be- 
ginning, without  making  discoveries  of  his  will  to  them 
concerning  religion,  and  tbeir  moral  duty:  but  had   given 


24  A  great  deal  was  done  for  the  Heathen  Nations  Part  II« 

them  laws,  upon  the  observance  of  which  they  were  in  a 
state  of  favour  and  acceptance  with  God  (^).  The  moral 
laws  which  were  afterwards  published  to  the  people  of 
Israel,  a  summary  of  which  is  contained  in  the  ten  com- 
mandments, were  in  substance  known  before  in  the  patriarch- 
al times.  And  these  divine  injunctions,  which  were  regarded 
as  having  been  given  by  God  to  men,  and  enforced  by  a 
Divine  Authority,  may  justly  be  supposed  to  be  referred 
to  in  that  remarkable  passage.  Gen.  xviii.  19.  where  God 
saith  concerning  Abraham^  "  I  know  him,  that  he  will  com- 
mand his  children  and  his  household  after  him,  and  they 
shall  keep  the  way  of  the  Lord  to  do  justice  and  judgment." 
And  no  doubt  that  great  patriarch  did  what  God  knew  and 
declared  he  would  do:  and  from  him  proceeded  many  and 
great  nations.  If  we  examine  the  antient  book  of  Job,  who 
descended  from  Abraham,  and  lived  before  the  promulga- 
tion of  the  Mosaic  law,  we  shall  find  that  there  is  scarce 
any  one  of  the  moral  precepts,  which  were  afterwards  pub- 
lished to  the  people  of  Israel,  but   what   may  be   traced  in 


(^)  In  the  Talmudical  books  mention  is  made  of  "  the  pious 
among  the  nations  of  the  world,"  and  a  portion  is  assigned  to 
them,  as  well  to  as  the  Israelites,  in  the  world  to  come.  Agree- 
ably to  this  determination,  Maimonides  positively  asserts,  that 
the  pious  among  the  Gentiles  have  a  portion  in  the  world  to 
come,  De  Poenit.  cap.  3.  i  e.;  as  it  is  there  explained,  those  that 
observed  the  precepts  given  to  the  sons  of  Noah;  by  whom  they 
understood  all  mankind.  See  also  Geniar.  Babylon,  ad  titul. 
Aboda  Zara,  cap.  i.  Menasseh  Ben  Israel  de  Resur.  Mort.  lib. 
ii.  cap.  8  et  9.  These,  with  other  testimonies,  are  cited  by  Sel- 
den  de  Jure  Nat.  et  Gent.  lib.  vii.  cap.  10.  p.  877.  Edit.  Lips* 
The  passage  there  quoted  by  him  from  the  Gemara  Babylonica 
ad  titul.  Aboda  Zara,  is  remarkable;  which  he  translates  thus, 
*1  etiam  Paganum,  qui  diligenter  legem  observaverit,  voluti 
Pontificem  Maximum  habendum:"  i.  e.  as  Mr.  Selden  explains 
it,  "  inter  primaries  Ebraeorum,  quantum  ad  prsenaium  attinet? 
ceusendum." 


Chap.  11.  to  lead  them  to  the  knowledge  of  Moral  Duty,     25 

the  discourses  of  that  excellent  man  and  his  friends,  and 
which  are  there  represented  as  having  been  derived  by 
tradition  from  the  most  antient  times  (w). 

After  the  deluge,  it  is  probable  that  the  heads  and  lead- 
ers of  the  dispersion,  carried  with  them  some  of  the  main 
principles,  both  of  religion  and  law,  into  the  several  places 
where  they  respectively  settled:  from  whoih  they  were 
transmitted  to  their  descendants.  For  in  those  early  ages, 
as  Plato  observes  in  the  beginning  of  his  third  book  of  laws, 
the  people  were  wont  to  follow  the  laws  and  customs  of 
their  parents  and  ancestors,  and  of  the  most  antient  men 
among  them.  It  strengthens  this,  when  it  is  considered, 
that  the  most  important  moral  maxims  were  delivered  in 
the  earliest  times,  not  in  a  way  of  reasoning,  as  they  were 
afterwards  by  the  moralists  in  the  ages  of  learning  and  phi- 
losophy, but  in  a  way  of '  authority,  as  principles  derived 
from  the  antients,  and  which  were  regarded  as  of  a   divine 


(u)  Grotius  mentions  some  institutions  and  customs  common 
to  all  men,  and  which  cannot  be  so  properly  ascribed  to  an  in- 
stinct of  nature,  or  the  evident  conclusions  of  reason,  as  to  a  perpe- 
tual and  almost  uninterrupted  tradition  from  the  first  ages,  such  as 
the  slaying  and  otfering  up  of  sacrifices,  the  pudor  circa  res  vene- 
reas,  the  solemnities  of  marriage,  the  abhhorrence  of  inces  uous 
copulations.  De  Verit.  Rclig.  Christ,  lib.  i.  sect.  7.  See  also  De 
Jur.  Bel.  et  Pac.  lib.  ii.  cap.  5.  sect.  13.  And  Mr.  Le  Cierc, 
though  fond  of  the  hypothesis,  that  many  of  the  Mosaic  rites 
were  instituted  in  imitation  of  those  of  the  Egyptians,  yet,  speak- 
ing  of  the  offering  of  the  first-fruits  to  God,  which  was  in  use 
both  among  the  Egyptians  and  Hebrews,  says,  that  it  was  not 
derived  from  the  one  of  these  nations  to  the  oiher,  but  came  to 
both  from  the  earliest  ages,  and  probably  was  originally  of  di- 
vine appointment.  And  he  adds,  that  perhaps  from  the  «anie 
source  many  other  usages  among  both  those  people  were  deri- 
ved. See  Cleric.  Commentar.  in  Pentat.  in  his  notes  on  Levit. 
xxiii.  10. 

Vol.  ii.  D 


26  A  g-r  eat  deal  was  done  for  the  Heathen  Nations  Part  IL 

original.  It  was  a  notion  which  generally  obtained  among 
the  Heathens,  that  the  original  law  was  from  God,  and 
that  it  derived  its  obliging  force  from  a  Divine  Authority. 
The  learned  Selden  has  collected  many  testimonies  to  this 
purpose  from  poets,  philosophers,  and  other  celebrated  Pagan 
writers  (^).  It  is  probable  that  this  notion  was  owing  not 
only  to  the  belief  which  obtained  among  them  of  a  divine 
superintending  providence,  but  to  the  traditionary  accounts 
they  had  of  God's  having  given  laws  to  the  first  men  in 
the  most  antient  times.  And  so  strongly  was  a  sense  of 
this  impressed  upon  the  minds  of  the  people,  that  it  belong- 
ed to  the  Divinity  to  give  laws  to  mankind,  that  the  most 
antient  legislators,  in  order  to  give  their  laws  a  proper 
weight  and  authority,  found  it  necessary  to  persuade  them 
that  these  laws  were  not  merely  of  their  own  contriving, 
but  were  what  they  had  received  from  the  gods.  And  it  is 
probable,  that  they  took  some  of  the  chief  heads  of  moral 
law,  which  had  been  handed  down  by  antient  tradition,  into 
the  laws  of  their  respective  states  and  civil  communities, 
especially  as  far  as  they  tended  to  the  preservation  of  the 
public  order  and  good  of  the  society.  It  was  in  the  eastern 
countries,  where  men  first  settled  after  the  flood,  that  civil 
polities  were  first  formed:  there  they  were  near  the  foun- 
tain-head of  antient  tradition,  and  there  the  greatest  remains 
of  it  were   preserved  (z/).  And  from  thence  the  legislators 


.   {x)  De    Jure   Nat.   et    Gent.   lib.    i.  cap.  8.  p.  94.  et  scq. 
edit.  Lips. 

(y)  "  The  eastern  sages  were  famous  for  their  excellent  mo- 
ral maxims,  derived  by  tradition  from  the  most  antient  times. 
This  is  observable  concerning  the  antient  wise  men  among  the 
Persians,  Babylonians,  Bactrians,  Indians,  Egyptians.  That  cele- 
brated Chinese  philosopher  and  moralist  Confucius,  did  not  pre- 
tend himself  to  be  the  author  of  the  moral  precepts  he  delivered, 
but  to  have  derived  ihem  from  wise  men  of  much  greater  an» 


Chap.  II.  to  lead  them  to  the  Knowledge  of  Moral  Duty,  27 

in  Grttece  and  Italy,   and  the  western  parts,  principally  de- 
rived their  laws. 

It  appears  from  the  account  which  hath  been  given,  that 
a  great  deal  had  been  done,  in  the  course  of  the  Divine 
Providence,  for  leading  men  into  the  knowledge  of  their 
duty.  God  had  given  laws  to  mankind  from  the  beginning, 
and  made  express  discoveries  of  his  will  to  the  first  pa- 
rents and  ancestors  of  the  human  race,  concerning  the  prin- 
cipal points  of  duty  required  of  them.  They  were  bound  by 
his  authority,  and  by  all  manner  of  obligations,  to  transmit 
the  knowledge  of  them  to  their  descendants.  And  this  was 
the  more  easily  done,  as  they  were  agreeable  to  the  best 
moral  sentiments  of  the  human  heart,  and  to  the  dictates  of 
reason,  which,  if  duly  exercised,  might  see  them  to  be  con- 
formable to  the  nature  and  relations  of  things.  To  which  it 
may  be  added,  that  the^good  tendency  of  them  was  confirm- 
ed by  observation  and  experience.  And  accordingly,  the 
bulk  of  mankind,  in  all  ages  and  nations,  have  still  retained 
such  notions  of  good  and  evil,  as  have  laid  a  foundation  for 
the  approbation  and  disapprobation  of  their  own  minds  and 
consciences.  Taking  all  these  things  together,  the  laws  and 
precepts  originally  given  by  Divine  Revelation,  the  remains 
of  which  continued  long  among  the  Gentiles,  the  moral 
sense  of  things  implanted  in  the  human  heart,  and  the  dic- 


tiquity:  particularly  from  Pung,  who  lived  near  a  thousand 
years  before  him,  and  who  also  professed  to  follow  the  doctrine 
of  the  anlients;  and  especially  from  Tao  and  Xun,  two  eminent 
Chinese  legislators,  who,  according  to  the  Chinese  chronology, 
lived  above  1500  years  before  Confucius.  Or,  if  we  should  sup- 
pose their  chronology  not  to  be  exact,  yet  still  it  would  follow, 
that  the  knowledge  of  morals  was  derived  from  the  earjiest  ages, 
when  philosophy  and  sciences  had  made  but  small  progress." 
See  Navarette's  Hist,  of  China,  p.  123.  and  Scientia  Sinensis 
Latine  exposita,  p.  120. . 


29  Idolatry  had  a  bad  Effect  in  corrupting       Part  II. 

tates  of  natural  reason  and  conscience,  which  were  never 
utterly  extinguished  in  the  Pagan  world,  together  with  the 
prescriptions  of  the  civil  laws,  which  in  many  instances  ex- 
hibited good  directions  for  regulating  the  conduct;  I  say, 
taking  all  these  things  together,  it  must  be  acknowledged, 
that  the  Pagans  were  not  left  destitute  of  suitable  helps, 
which,  if  duly  improved,  might  have  been  of  great  use 
for  leading,  them  to  the  right  knowledge  and  practice  of 
moral   duty  (z).   And    undoubtedly  there    were    eminent 


(z)  St.  Paul  represents  the  Gentiles  as  having  the  "  work  of 
the  law  written  in  their  hearts."  The  expression  is  evidently  me- 
taphorical, and  not  to  be  pushed  too  far.  It  is  not  designed  to 
signify,  as  some  have  understood  it,  that  all  mankind  have  the 
whole  law  of  God,  comprehending  every  part  of  moral  duty, 
written  in  plain  characters  upon  their  hearts:  for  this  would 
prove  that  all  men  have  naturally  a  clear  knowledge  of  the  whole 
of  their  duty  without  instruction:  which  is  contrary  to  the  most 
evident  fact  and  experience,  and  to  what  the  apostle  elsewhere 
observes  concerning  the  Gentiles.  But  though  this  could  not  be 
his  meaning  in  this  manner  of  expression,  yet  it  certainly  signi- 
fies, that  the  Gentiles,  who  had  not  the  written  law  in  their 
hands,  were  not  left  entirely  destitute  of  a  law.  And  when  in  any 
instances,  they  did  some  of  the  things  contained  in  the  law  (for 
they  were  far  from  doing  all  things  therein  contained,  as  the 
apostle  proves)  they  shewed  that  in  those  instances  they  had  the 
work  of  the  law  written  in  their  hearts;  i.  e.  that  they  had  an 
inward  sense  of  the  Divine  Law  in  some  of  its  important 
branches,  so  as  to  lay  a  foundation  for  the  self-approving  or  self- 
condemning  reflections  of  their  own  minds,  and  for  their  being 
judged  by  God  on  the  account  of  them.  This  is  evidently  the  apos- 
tle's intention  in  this  passage.  And  it  must  be  acknowledged,  that 
there  were  scarce  any  of  the  Heathens,  even  in  times  of  their 
greatest  degeneracy,  but  had  in  some  respects  the  work  of  the 
law  written  in  their  hearts,  i.  e.  some  inward  sense  of  right  and 
wrong,  of  good  and  evil;  to  which  their  consciences  bore  wit- 
ness: though  undoubtedly  this  sense  of  moral  duty  was  in  some 


Chap.  II.     their  moral  Notions  and  Practices.  29 

examples  among  them  of  generosity,  patience,  fortitude, 
equanimity,  a  love  of  justice,  benevolence,  gratitude,  and 
other  virtues.  In  Greece  and  Rome,  in  their  best  times, 
there  seem  to  have  been  some  hereditary  notions,  derived 
from  their  ancestors,  and  cherished  and  confirmed  by  edu- 
cation and  custom,  of  what  is  virtuous,  honourable,  and 
praiseworthy,  and  the  contrary;  which  had  a  great  effect 
upon  their  conduct.  But,  after  all,  it  cannot  be  denied,  thaf 
the  notions  of  morality  among  them  and  the  other  Pagans, 
were  in  many  respects  greatly  defective,  and  depraved  with 
corrupt  mixtures. 

As  they  fell  from  the  right  knowledge  of  the  one  true 
God,  which,  as  a  learned  author  (a),  who  is  a  warm  advo- 
cate for  the  Morality  of  the  Pagans,  observes,  is  "  the  great 
foundation  of  morality,"  they  fell  also  from  a  just  know- 
ledge of  moral  duty  iTh  very  important  instances.  Idolatry 
not  only  introduced  a  great  corruption  into  the  worship  of 
God,  and  all  that  part  of  duty  which  immediately  relateth 
to  the  Supreme  Beifig,  but  also  into  their  moral  conduct  in 
other  respects.  Especially,  when  the  worship  of  hero  deities 


of  them  far  clearer  and  of  greater  extent  than  in  others,  and  in 
all  of  them  vastly  short  of  what  weenjoy,  who  have  the  benefit 
of  the  Christian  Revelation.  The  apostle,  speaking  of  the  Gen- 
tiles at  the  time  of  the  publication  of  the  Gospel,  represents 
them  as  amazingly  corrupted,  even  in  their  moral  notions  of 
things.  He  gives  it  as  their  general  character,  that  they  "  had 
their  understandings  darkened,  being  alienated  from  the  life  of 
God  through  the  ignorance  that  was  in  them,  because  of  the 
blindness  of  their  hearts."  And  then  he  goes  on  to  shew  the 
happy  change  that  was  wrought  in  those  of  them  who  were 
"taught  the  truth  as  it  is  in  Jesus.'V  Eph.  iv.  17,  18,  19,20, 
21,  kc. 

(a)  Sykes's  Connect,  and  Principles  of  Natural  and  Revealeel 
Religion,  p.  364. 


50      The  Law  given  to  the  People  of  Israel  of  use   Part  IL 

became  general,  many  of  whom  gave  examples  of  vicious 
conduct,  the  worship  of  such  gods  naturally  tended  to  cor- 
rupt their  moral  notions  and  sentiments,  and  to  make  them 
very  loose  and  dissolute  in  their  practice:  to  which  may  be 
added  bad  and  immoral  customs,  owing  to  various  causes. 
And  in  many  places  their  civil  laws,  though  they  were  of 
use  to  their  morals  in  several  instances,  yet  led  them  astray 
in  others.  And  even  their  wise  men  and  philosophers  fre- 
quently advanced  notions  inconsistent  with  the  truth  and 
purity  of  morals,  of  which  full  proof  will  b^  given  in  the 
ensuing  part  of  this  treatise. 

When  idolatry  and  polytheism  began  to  spread  generally 
among  the  nations,  it  pleased  God  to  select  a  peculiar  peo- 
ple, among  whom  a  polity  was  erected  of  an  extraordinary 
kind;  the  fundamental  principle  of  which  was  the  knowledge 
and  worship  of  the  one  true  God,  and  him  only,  in  opposi- 
tion to  all  idolatry.  He  also  gave  them  a  code  of  holy  and 
excellent  laws,  containing  the  main  articles  of  the  duty 
which  God  requires  of  men,  in  plain  and  express  precepts. 
The  moral  laws  obligatory  on  all  mankind  were  summarily 
comprehended  in  the  Ten  Commandments,  which  were 
promulgated  by  God  himself  with  a  most  amazing  solemnity 
at  mount  Sinai,  and  written  in  the  two  tables  of  stone,  to  be 
a  standing  law  to  that  people.  They  were  not  left  to  them- 
selves, to  work  out  a  system  of  moral  duty  merely  by  their 
own  reason.  Even  such  things  as  seemed  most  plain  to  the 
common  sense  of  mankind,  as  the  precepts  prescribing  the 
honouring  our  parents,  and  forbidding  to  kill,  steal,  and 
commit  adultery,  were  bound  upon  them  by  express  laws 
from  God  himself,  and  enforced  by  his  own  Divine  Autho- 
rity. And  he  commanded  them  to  be  very  assiduous  and 
diligent  in  teaching  those  laws  to  their  children,  and  in- 
structing them  in  the  particulars  of  the  duty  which  God 


Chap.  II.    to  preserve  the  Knowledge  of  Moral  Duty,       31 

required  of  them  (b).  And  it  is  very  probable,  that  the  fame 
of  their  laws,  and  the  glorious  proofs  of  a  Divine  Autho- 
rity bywhich  they  were  enforced,  was  spread  abroad  among 
the  nations.  This  seems  to  be  plainly  signified  in  what  Mo- 
ses declares  to  the  people  of  Israel,  when  speaking  of  the 
statutes  and  judgments  which  the  Lord  commanded  them, 
he  saith,  "  Know  therefore,  and  do  them;  for  this  is  your 
wisdom  and  your  understanding,  in  the  sight  of  the  nations, 
which  shall  hear  all  these  statutes,  and  sa\ ,  Surely  this  great 
nation  is  a  wise  and  understanding  people."  He  adds,  "And 
what  nation  is  there  so  great  that  hath  statutes  and  judg- 
ments so  righteous  as  all  this  law  which  I  set  before  you 
this  day  (c)?"  It  may  reasonably  be  supposed  that  as  the 
reputation  of  Moses  as  a  lawgiver  was  very  high  among 
the  nations,  his  la^  s  might,  in  several  instances,  serve  as  a 
pattern  to  other  lawgivers,  who  might  borrow  some  of  the 
Mosaic  precepts  and  institutions.  Artapanus,  as  cited  by 
Eusebius,  probably  speaks  the  sentiments  of  many  other 
Heathens,  when  he  so  highly  extols  the  wisdom  of  Moses 
and  his  laws,  and  saith,  that  he  delivered  many  things  very 
useful  to  mankind,  and  that  from  him  the  Egyptians  them- 
selves borrowed  tnany  institutions  (<af).  This  might  be  true 
in  several  instances,  though  he  is  mistaken  in  those  he  par- 
ticularly mentions.  Many  learned  men  have  observed  a 
great  affinity  between  some  of  the  laws  enacted  in  Athens 
and  other  states,  and  those  of  Moses,  who  published  his 
laws  before  the  most  antient  legislators  that  we  know  of 
published  theirs.  And  there  is  good  reason  to  believe,  that 
the  Mosaic  laws  were  the  first  laws  that  were  ever  commit- 
ted to  writing. 


(6)  Deut.  vi.  6,  7. 

(c)  Ibid.  iv.  6,  7,  8. 

(d)  Euseb.  Prsep.  Evangel,  lib.  ix.  cap.  27.  p.  1. 


is      The  Law  given  to  the  People  of  Israel,  Sic.  Part  IL 

But  though  it  is  probable  the  laws  given  by  Moses,  in 
the  name  of  God  himself,  were  of  advantage,  in  many  in- 
stances, to  preserve  the  sense  and  knowledge  of  moral  duty 
among  the  nations,  yet  as  those  laws  were  in  a  special  man- 
ner delivered  to  one  particular  nation,  who  were  for  wise 
ends  kept  separate  by  some  peculiar  usages  from  other  peo- 
ple, they  were  not  so  well  fitted  for  universal  use.  It  pleased 
God,  therefore,  at  the  time  which  seemed  most  fit  to  his 
infinite  wisdom,  in  compassion  to  the  wretched  state  of 
mankind,  after  having  exercised  long  patience  and  forbear- 
ance towards  them,  to  make  a  new  Revelation  of  his  Will, 
which  was  commanded  to  be  published  to  all  nations,  in 
which  their  duty  is  set  before  them  in  its  just  extent,  en- 
forced by  God's  own  express  authority,  and  by  such  argu- 
ments  and  motives,  as  are  most  proper  to  work  upon  the 
mind.  This  Revelation  and  system  of  Divine  Laws  is 
brought  us  by  the  most  illustrious  messenger  that  could  be 
sent  for  that  purpose,  the  Son  of  God  in  human  flesh.  His 
Divine  Mission  was  confirmed  by  the  most  convincing 
attestations;  and  he  hath  also  exemplified  to  us  the  Divine 
Law  in  all  its  purity  and  excellency,  in  his  own  Sacred  Life 
and  Practice,  and  hath  provided  the  most  gracious  assist- 
ances to  help  our  infirmities,  that  we  may  be  the  better  en- 
abled to  perform  the  duties  required  of  us.  And  what  great 
need  the  world  stood  in  of  such  a  Revelation,  and  conse- 
quently how  thankful  we  should  be  for  so  great  a  blessing, 
is  what  I  now  proceed  distinctly  to  shew.  . 


S3 


CHAPTER  Hi. 

A  particular  enquiry  into  the  state  of  morality  in  the  Heathen  -world.  A  ooHi- 
plete  rule  of  morals,  taken  ia  its  just  extent,  comprehends  the  duties  relating 
to  God,  our  neighbours,  and  ourselves.  If  the  Heathens  had  Such  a  rale  among 
them,  it  would  appear  either  in  the  precepts  of  their  religion,  or  in  the  pre- 
scriptions of  their  civil  laws,  or  customs  which  have  the  force  of  laws,  or  in  the 
doctrines  and  instructions  of  their  philosophers  and  moralists.  It  is  projiosed 
distinctly  to  consider  each  of  these.  As  to  what  passed  among  them  for  reli- 
gion, morality  did  not  properly  make  any  part  of  it,  nor  was  it  the  office  of  their 
priests  to  teach  men  virtue.  As  to  the  civil  laws  and  constitutions,  supposing 
them  to  have  been  never  so  proper  for  civil  government,  they  were  not  fitted 
to  he  an  adequant  rule  of  morals.  The  best  of  them  were,  in  several  respects, 
greatly  defective.  Various  instances  produced  of  civil  laws,  and  of  customs 
•which  had  the  force  of  laws,  among  the  most  civilized  nations,  especially 
among  the  antient  Egyptians  and  Greeks,  which  were  contrary  to  the  rules  of 
morality." 

jyiORAL  duty,  taken  in  its  just  extent,  is  usually  and 
justly  divided  into  three  main  branches.  The  first  relates  ta 
the  duties  of  piety  we  more  immediately  owe  to  Gody 
•which  includes  the  rendering  him  that  religious  worship 
and  adoration,  that  love  and  reverence,  that  trust  and  affi- 
ance, that  unreserved  submission,  resignation,  and  obe- 
dience, which  is  due  to  him  from  his  reasonable  creatures. 
The  second  relates  to  the  duties  we  owe  to  our  neighbours^ 
or  to  mankind,  which  takes  in  all  that  is  comprehended  in 
the  exercise  of  justice,  charity,  mercy,  benevolence,  fidelity 
toward  our  fellow-creatures,  and  all  the  various  offices  and 
virtues  of  the  social  life*  The  third  relates  more  immtdi- 
ately  to  ourselves,  and  includes  all  the  duties  of  self-go- 
vernment, the  keeping  our  appetites  and  passions  under 
proper  regulations,  and  maintaining  a  purity  of  body  and 
soul,  and  whatsoever  tends  to  the  right  ordering  of  our  own 
temper,  and  to  the  attaining  the  true  rectitude  and  perfec= 
tion  of  our  nature.  That  cannot  be  said  to  be  an  adequant 
Voh.  IL  E  * 


34  An  Enquiry  mto  the  State  of  Morality      Part  IL 

rule  of  moral  duty,  which  does  not  extend  to  all  these,  with 
sufficient  authority,  clearness,  and  certainty.  By  this  let  us 
examine  the  state  of  morality  in  the  Heathen  world:  and, 
upon  an  impartial  enquiry,  we  shall  find,  that  though  that 
part  of  moral  law,  which  relates  to  civil  dutj^  and  social  vir- 
tue, was  for  the  most  part  preserved,  as  far  as  was  neces- 
sary to  the  peace  and  order  of  society;  yet  as  to  the  other 
branches  of  duty,  that  which  relates  to  the  duties  we  more 
immediately  owe  to  God,  and  that  which  relates  to  self-go- 
vernment and  purity,  it  was  through  the  corruption  of  man- 
kind greatly  perverted  and  depraved.  If  the  Heathens  had 
among  them  a  complete  and  settled  rule  of  moral  duty  in 
its  just  ifXtent,  it  must  be  found  either  in  the  precepts  of 
their  religion,  and  instructions  of  its  ministers,  or  in  the 
prescriptions  of  the  civil  laws  and  the  institutions  of  the 
magistrates,  or  in  customs  that  had  the  force  of  laws,  or 
lastly,  in  the  doctrines  and  maxims  of  their  philosophers 
ana  moralists. 

'  There  needs  not  much  be  said  as  to  the  first  of  these. 
Religion,  when  it  is  of  the  right  kind,  and  considered  in  its 
most  comprehensive  notion,  takes  in  the  whole  of  moral 
duty,  as  necessarily  belonging  to  it,  and  both  prescribes  it  in 
its  just  extent,  and  enforces  it  by  the  highest  authority, 
that  of  God  himself,  and  by  the  most  important  motives. 
But  in  this  the  Heathen  religion  was  very  defective.  There 
were  indeed  some  general  principles  of  religion,  which 
were  in  some  measure  preserved  among  the  Pagan  nations, 
and  neVer  were  entirely  extinguished,  relating  to  the  exist- 
ence and  attributes  of  the  Deity,  and  to  a  Providence  ex- 
ercising an  inspection  over  human  actions  and  affairs,  and 
rewarding  the  virtuous  and  punishing  the  wicked.  The  no- 
tions of  these  things,  though  attended  with  much  obscurity, 
and  perverted  and  debased  with  many  corrupt  mixtures, 
yet  had  a  good  effect  in  lajing  restraints  upon  vice  and 
wickedness,  and  encouraging  virtue,  and  keeping  up  the  face 


Chap.  III.  in  the  Heathen  World,  35 

of  order  among  the  people;  and  were  actually  made  use  of 
by  the  wisest  and  ablest  legislators  for  that  purpose.  But 
what  passed  for  religion  among  the  Pagans  and  was  esta- 
blished by  their  laws,  and  administered  by  their  priests, 
neither  taught  any  scheme  of  doctrines  necessary  to  be  be- 
lieved, nor  held  forth  a  code  of  laws  or  rule  of  moral  duty 
for  regulating  and  directing  the  practice.  It  consisted  pro- 
perly in  the  public  rites  and  ceremonies  to  be  observed  in 
the  worship  of  their  deities.  "  The  priests  (as  Mr.  Locke 
observes)  made  itnottheirijusiness  toteach  men  virtue  (e)." 
Their  office  was,  according  to  the  account  Varro  gives  of  it, 
to  instruct  men  what  gods  they  were  to  worship,  what  sa- 
crifices they  were  to  offer  to  their  several  deities,  and  to 
direct  them  in  what  manner  they  were  to  observe  the  ap- 
pointed rites.  It  is  true,  that  Cicero,  in  his  Oratio  prodomo 
sua  ad  Pontifices,  represents  them  as  having  a  general  in- 
spectio!?  over  the  manners  of  the  citizens:  but  this  they  did 
not  properly  as  priests  of  religion,  but  as  ministers  of  the 
state.  For  in  the  Roman  government,  the  same  persons 
acted  in  both  capacities,  and  the  priesthood  was  so  mo- 
delled as  to  answer  the  civil  and  political  views  of  the  com- 
monwealth. It  is  a  just  observation  of  the  Baron  Puffendorf, 
that  "  what  the  Romans  called  Religion  was  chiefly  insti- 


(e)  To  the  same  purpose  Lactantius  observes,  that  those  who 
taught  the  worship  of  the  gods,  gave  no  directions  as  to  what 
related  to  the  regulation  of  men's  manners,  and  to  the  conduct 
of  life.  "  Nihil  ibi  disseritur,  quod  proficiat  ad  mores  excolendos, 
vitamque  formandam."  And  that  among  the  Pagans,  philosophy 
[or  the  doctrine  of  morals]  and  the  religion  of  the  gods,  were 
entirely  distinct,  and  separated  from  one  another.  "  Philosophia 
et  religio  deorum  disjuncta  sunt,  longeque  discr^ta."  Divin.  In- 
stit.  lib.  iv.  cap.  3.  See  also  Augustin.  de  Civit.  Dei,  lib.  ii.  cap. 
4.  6.et7. 


36  Morality  made  no  proper  part  Part  II. 

tuted  for  the  benefit  of  the  state,  that  they  might  be  the 
betttr  able  to  rule  the  minds  of  the  people,  according  to  the 
conveniencies  and  exigencies  of  the  public."  He  adds,  that 
♦'there  were  no  certain  heads  or  articles  of  religion  among 
the  Romans,  whence  the  people  might  be  instructed  concern- 
ing the  Being  and  Will  of  God,  or  how  they  ought  to  regu- 
late their  practice  and  actions  so  as  to  please  God  (7^)." 
Those  who  were  diligent  in  the  observation  of  the  sacred 
customary  rites,  and  worshipped  the  gods  according  to  the 
laws,  were  looked  upon  as  having  fulfided  the  duties  of  re- 
ligion. But  no  farther  regard  was  had  to  their  morals,  than 
as  the  interest  of  the  state  was  concerned.  If  at  any  time  the 
public  was  exposed  to  great  calamities,  and  it  was  thought 
necessary  to  appease  the  gods,  and  avert  their  displeasure, 
repentance  and  a  reformation  of  manners  was  never  pre- 
scribed by  the  priests,  as  one  of  the  means  appointed  by 
religion  for  that  purpose:  but  they  had  recourse  on  §uch  oc- 
casions to  some  odd  and  trifling  ceremonies;  such  as  the  dic- 
tator's striking  a  nail  into  a  door,  or  something  of  the  like' 
nature  (^).  So  far  was  the  Heathen  religion,  and  the  wor- 
ship of  their  deities,  from  giving  men  a  right  notion  of 
xnorality,  or  engaging  them  to  the  practice  of  it,  that  in 
many  instances  the  rites  made  use  of  in  the  worship  of 
their  gods  were  of  an  immoral  nature,  and  instead  of  pro- 
moting the  practice  of  virtue,  had  a  tendency  to  encou- 
rage vice  and  licentiousness.  This  sufficiently  appears  from 
the  instances  produced  in  the  former  volume,  chap.  vii. 
To  the  instances  there  mentioned,  I  nqw  add,  what  a  very 


(/)  Puffendorf  *s  Introduct.  to  the  Hist,  of  Europe,  chap.  1. 
sect.  10. 

{g)  Hume*s  Nat.  History  of  Religion,  p.  105.  Div.  Legation 
of  Moses,  vol.  I.  p.  97.  edit.  4th. 


Chap.  III.  of  the  Heathen  Religion.  3f 

learned  writer  has  observed,  that  Aristotle,  in  his  Politics, 
"  having  blamed  all  lewd  and  obscene  images  and  pictures, 
excepts  those  of  the  gods,  which  religion  has  sanctified  (/i)." 

It  appears  then,  that  if  a  complete  rule  of  morals  was 
to  be  found  among  the  Pagans,  we  must  not  look  for  it  in 
their  religion,  but  either  in  the  civil  laws  and  constitu- 
tions, and  customs  which  obtained  the  force  of  laws,  or  ia 
the  doctrines  and  precepts  of  the  philosophers  and  mora' 
lists. 

Many  have  spoke  with  admiration  of  the  civil  laws  and 
constitutions,  which  were  in  force  among  the  Pagan  na- 
tions, as  if  they  were  sufficient  to  direct  and  regulate  their 
moral  conduct.  Some  of  the  most  eminent  of  the  antient 
philosophers  seem  to  resolve  the  whole  duty  of  a  good 
man  into  obedience  to  the  laws  of  his  country.  Socrates  de- 
fines the  just  tnan  to  be  one  that  obeys  the  laws  of  the  re- 
public, and  that  he  becomes  unjust  by  transgressing  them  (i). 
And  Xenophon  accordingly  observes,  that  that  philosopher 
was  in  all  things  for  adhering  closely  and  inviolably  to  tha 
laws,  both  publicly  and  privately,  and  exhorted  all  men  t> 
do  so  (Ji).  And  many  passages  might  be  produced  to  shew, 
that  both  he  and  Plato,  and  the  philosophers  in  general, 
urged  it  as  the  duty  of  the  citizens  to  make  the  laws  of 
their  country  the  rule  of  their  practice,  both  in  religious 
and  civil  matters.  Some  modern  authors  have  talked  in  ths 
same  strain,  and  have  laid  the  chief  stress  on  human  laws 
and  government,  as  giving  the  best  directions,  and  furnish- 
ing the  most  effectual  means,  for  the  securing  and  im- 
proving the  moral  state  (/).  It  cannot  be  denied,  that  there 


Qi)  Hume's  Nat.  History  of  Religion,  p.  1 54. 
(?)  Xenoph.  Memor.  Socr.  lib.  iv.  cap.  4.  sect.  13. 
(Ar)  Ibid.  lib.  i.  sect.  1,  2,  et  seq. 

(/)  Lord  Bolingbroke's  Works,  Vol.  V.  p.  480,  481.  edit.  4to. 

This* 


38    Laws  and  Customs  of  the  Heathens  considered.   Part  II. 

were  many  excellent  laws  and  constitutions  among  the 
Heathen  nations,  and  which  were  of  grtat  use  in  regulating 
iIe  manners  of  men,  and  preserving  good  order  in  society: 
but  it  is  no  hard  matter  to  prove,  that  the  civil  laws  of  any 
community  are  very  imperfect  measures  of  moral  duty. 
A  man  may  obey  those  laws,  and  yet  be  far  from  being 
fuly  virtuous:  he  may  not  be  obnoxious  to  the  penalties  of 
those  laws,  and  yet  be  a  vicious  and  bad  man.  Nor  indeed 
is  it  the  proper  design  of  those  laws  to  render  men  really 
and  inwardly  virtuous,  but  so  to  govern  their  outward  be- 
haviour, as  to  maintain  public  order.  The  highest  end  they 
propose  is  the  temporal  welfare  and  prosperity  of  the  state. 
The  heart,  the  proper  seat  of  virtue  and  vice,  is  not  within 
the  cognizance  of  civil  laws  and  human  governments.  Nor 
can  the  sanctions  of  those  laws,  or  any  rewards  and  pu- 
nishments which  the  ablest  human  legislators  can  contrive, 
be  ever  applied  to  enforce  the  whole  of  moral  duty.  They 
cannot  reach  to  the  inward  temper,  or  the  secret  affections 
aid  dispositions  of  the  soul,  and  intentions  of  the  will,  on 
vhich  yet  the  morality  of  human  actions,  or  their  being 
good  and  evil  in  the  sight  of  God,  does  principally  depend. 
Seneca  says  very  well,  that  "  it  is  a  narrow  notion  of  inno- 
cence to  measure  a  man's  goodness  only  by  the  law.  Of 
how  much  larger  extent  is  the  rule  of  duty  or  of  good 
cffices,  than  that  of  legal  right?  How  many  things  are  there 
vhich  piety,  humanity,  liberality,  justice,  fidelity  require, 
vhich  yet  are  not  within  the  compass  of  the  public  statutes? 
— Quafn  angusta  innocentia  est  ad 'legem  bonum  esse? 
Quanto  latius  officiorum  patet   quam  juris  regula?  Quam 


This  also  is  the  scheme  of  the  author  of  the  book  De  TEsprit, 
who  makes  the  law  of  the  state  to  be  the  only  rule  and  measure 
of  virtue  and  duty,  and  what  he  calls  a  good  legislation  to  be 
the  only  means  of  promoting  it. 


Chap,  III.    Civil  Laws  no  adequate  Rules  of  Morals,      39 

multa  pietas,  humanitas,  liberalitas,  justitia,  fides  exigunt, 
quse  omnia  extra  publicas  tabulas  sunt  (m)?" 

But  let  us  more  particularly,  enquire  into  the  most  cele- 
brated civil  laws  and  institutions  among  those  that  have 
been  accounted  the  most  civilized  and  best  policed  nations. 

The  Egyptians  were  antiently  much  admired  for  the 
wisdom  of  their  laws,  which  were  looked  upon  to  be  well 
fitted  for  the  maintenance  of  public  order:  but  they  were 
far  from  furnishing  adequate  rules  of  virtue,  and  were, 
in  some  respects,  greatly  deficient.  There  is  a  passage  of 
Porphyry,  which  has  been  thought  to  give  an  advantageous 
idea  of  the  Egyptian  morality.  He  informs  us,  that  when 
they  embalmed  the  body  of  any  of  the  nobles,  they  were 
wont  to  take  out  the  belly,  and  put  it  into  a  chest;  and 
then  holding  up  the  chest  towards  the  sun,  one  of  the  em- 
balmers.made  an  oration  or  speech  in  the  name  of  the  de- 
funct person;  which  contained  the  dead  man's  apology  for 
himself,  and  the  righteousness  on  the  account  of  which  he 
prayed  to  be  admitted  to  the  fellowship  of  the  eternal  gods. 
"  O  Lord  the  Sun,  and  all  ye  gods  that  give  life  to  men, 
receive  me,  and  admit  me  to  the  fellowship  of  the  eternal 
gods:   for  whilst  I  lived   in  the  world,    I  religiously  wor- 


(m)  Sen.  de  Ira.  lib.  ii.  cap.  27.  The  learned  bishop  of  Glou- 
cester has  set  this  matter  in  a  very  clear  light,  in  his  Divine 
Legation  of  Moses,  vol.  I.  book  i  Sect.  2.  p.  13,  et  seq.  where 
he  shews,  that  the  laws  of  civil  society,  alone  considered,  are 
insufficient  to  prevent  or  cure  moral  disorders;  that  they  can 
have  no  further  efficacy  than  to  restrain  men  from  open  trans- 
gressions; nor  can  their  influence  be  extended  thus  far  in  all 
cases;  especially  where  the  irregularity  is  owing  to  the  violence 
of  the  sensual  passions:  they  also  overlook  what  are  called  the 
duties  of  imperfect  obligation,  such  as  gratitude,  hospitality, 
charity,  &c.  though  these  duties  are  of  considerable  importance 
in  the  moral  character- 


40  Concerning  the  Egyptian  Laws  and  Customs,  Part  II. 

shipped  the  gods  which  my  parents  shewed  me:  those  that 
generated  my  body  I  always  honoured:  I  neither  killed  any 
man,  nor  fraudulently  took  away  any  thing  that  was  com- 
mitted to  my  trust;  nor  have  I  been  guilty  of  any  other 
very  heinous  or  inexpiable  wickedness;  if  in  my  life-time 
I  offended  in  eating  or  drinking  any  of  the  things  which  it 
was  not  lawful  for  me  to  eat  or  drink;  the  offence  was  not 
committed  by  myself,  but  by  these;"  pointing  to  the  chest, 
which  contained  his  belly  and  entrails,  and  which  was  then 
thrown  into  the  river:  after  which,  the  rest  of  the  body  was 
embalmed  as  pure.  Porphyry  cites  for  this  Euphantus,  who 
translated  this  prayer  or  oration  out  of  the  Egyptian 
tongue  (n).  This  may  seem  to  have  been  well  contrived  to 
point  out  the  most  eminent  parts  of  a  virtuous  life  and 
character,  which  tended  to  recommend  a  man  to  the  divine 
favour.  But  it  is  to  be  observed,  that  the  sun  is  here  ad- 
dressed to  as  the  Sapreme  Lord,  together  with  other  gods, 
who  are  represented  as  the  authors  and  givers  of  life:  and 
that  the  first  and  principal  thing  here  mentioned  as  a  proof 
of  the  person's  piety  is,  his  having  worshipped  the  gods 
which  his  parents  had  shewn  him.  And  what  kind  of  deities 
they  were  which  the  Egyptians  worshipped  is  generally 
known.  So  that  they  were  wrong  with  respect  to  the  fun- 
damental principle  of  morality,  the  knowledge  and  worship 
of  one  true  God.  A  late  learned  and  ingenious  author  has 
shewn,  that  though  the  Egj^ptians  had  some  ver}-  good  con- 
stitutions, there  reigned  in  their  government  a  multitude  of 
abuses  and  essential  defects,  authorized  by  their  laws,  and 
the  fundamental  principles  of  their  state.  There  were  great 
indecencies  and  impurities  in  many  of  their  public  establish- 
ed rites  and  ceremonies  of  religion.  It  was  permitted  among 
them  for  brothers  and  sisters  to  marrv^  one  another.  There 


(n)  Porph.  de  Abstin.  lib.  iv.  sect.  10, 


Chap.  III.  Concerning  the  Grecian  Laws  and  Customs.    41 

is  a  law  of  theirs  mentioned  by  Diodorus  Siculus,  lib,  i, 
cap.  9.  p.  69.  edit.  Amst.  and  by  Aulus  Gellius,  lib.  ii, 
cap.  20.  which,  under  pretence  of  making  it  easy  for  the 
citizens  to  recover  what  was  stolen  from  them,  really  en- 
couraged and  authorized  theft:  it  not  only  assured  the  thieves 
of  impunity,  but  of  a  reward,  by  given  them  the  fourth  part 
of  the  prize,  upon  their  restoring  that  which  they  had 
stolen  (o).  The  same  author  observes,  that  the  Egyptians 
were  universally  cried  out  against  for  their  want  of  faith 
and  honesty,  as  he  shews  from  many  testimonies  (/?  ).  And 
Sextus  Erapiricus  informs  us,  that  among  many  of  the 
Egyptians,  for  women  to  prostitute  themselves  was  ac- 
counted evxXea^  a  glorious  or  honourable  thing  (^). 

It  is  universally  acknowledged,  that  the  Greeks  were 
amongst  the  most  knowing  and  civilized  nations  of  anti- 
quity. There  ^  the  most  celebrated  philosophers  and  mo- 
ralists opened  their  schools,  and  among  them  learning,  and 
the  arts,  eminently  flourished.  Accordingly,  they  had  a 
very  high  opinion  of  their  own  wisdom,  and  looked  upon 
the  rest  of  the  world  as  much  inferior  to  them,  and  to 
whom  they  gave  the  common  title  of  Barbarians.  Let  us 
see  therefore  whether  their  laws  and  constitutions  bid  fair- 
er for  improvement  in  morals,  than  those  of  other  nations. 
Some  of  their  wisest  men  and  legislators  travelled  into 
Egypt,  and  other  parts  of  the  east,  to  observe  their  laws, 
and  transplant  such  as  they  most  approved  into  their  own. 
It  has  been  already  hinted,  that  the  learned  have  observed 
a  near  affinity  in  some  remarkable  instances  between  the 
anticnt  Attic  laws,  as  also  those  of  the   twelve  tables,  and 


(o)  De  rOrigine  des  Loix,  des  Arts,  &c.  torn.  I.  liv.  i.  art.  4. 
p.  49,  et  torn.  III.  p.  28.  et  p.  352.  a  la  Haye  1758? 
(A)  Ibid.  p.  354. 

(y)  Pyrrh.  Hypotyp.  lib.  iii.  cap.  24. 
Vol.  II.  "  F 


42  The  Grecian  Laws  and  Customs  in  Part  II. 

those  of  Moses  (r);  which  makes  it  probable,  that  the  laws 
delivered  to  the  Israelites,  which  were  of  a  divine  original, 
and  were  of  greater  antiquity  than  any  of  the  laws  of  the 
Grecian  states,  were  in  several  respects  of  great  advantage 
to  other  nations.  Excellent  laws  and  constitutions  there 
undoubtedly  were  in  several  of  the  Grecian  republics: 
but  if  the  best  of  them  were  selected,  and  formed  into  one 
code,  they  would  be  far  from  exhibiting  a  complete  rule 
of  morals.  They  were  all,  like  the  laws  of  other  nations, 
fundamentally  wrong  in  all  that  part  of  moral  duty  which 
relates  to  the  service  and  adoration  we  owe  to  the  one  true 
God;  and  in  several  respects  also  in  granting  too  great  an 
indulgence  to  the  sensual  passions,  and  in  making  some  im- 
portant points  of  morality  give  way  to  what  they  looked 
upon  to  be  the  interest  of  the  state. 

The  laws  of  Lycurgus  have  been  highly  celebrated  both 
by  antients  and  moderns.  Plutarch  observes,  that  this  law- 
giver was  pronounced  by  the  oracle  the  beloved  of  God, 
and  rather  a  god  than  a  man:  that  he  stands  an  undeni- 
able proof,  that  a  perfect  wise  man  is  not  a  mere  notion 
and  chimera,  as  some  have  thought,  and  has  obliged  the 
world  with  a  nation  of  philosophers.  He  expresses  a  high 
admiration  of  the  Lacedaemonian  institutions,  as  excellent- 
ly fitted  to  form  men  to  the  exercise  of  virtue,  and  to 
maintain  and  to  promote  mutual  love  among  the  citizens. 


(r)  ^ee  Sam  Petit.  Comment,  in  Leg.  Attic,  printed  at  Paris 
1635.  See  also  Grot,  in  Matt.  v.  28.  et  de  Verit.  Rel.  Christ, 
lib.  i,  sect.  15.  p.  28.  edit.  Cleric.  It  is  true,  i hat  Mr.  Le  Clerc, 
in  a  note  which  he  has  there  added,  supposes,  after  Dr.  Spenser, 
that  both  the  Athenians  and  the  Hebrews  derived  the  laws  Gro- 
tius  refers  to  from  the  Egyptians.  But  no  authorities  can  be  pro- 
duced to  shew  that  the  E.i^yptians  had  such  laws,  but  what  are 
much  posterior  to  the  time  of  Moses. 


Chap.  III.     many  instances  contrary  to  g-ood  Morals,     43 

He  prefers  them  to  the  laws  of  all  the  other  Grecian  states, 
and  observes,  that  all  those  who  have  written  well  of  poli- 
tics, as  Plato,  Diogenes,  Zen©,  and  others,  have  taken  Ly- 
curgus  for  their  model:  and  that  Aristotle  himself  highly 
extols  him,  as  having  deserved  even  greater  honours  then 
the  Spartans  paid  him,  though  they  offered  sacrifices  to  him 
as  to  a  god  (*).  Many  of  the  moderns,  and  among  others  the 
celebrated  Mons.  de  Montesquieu  professeth  himself  a 
great  admirer  of  the  laws  of  Lycurgus.  He  observes,  that 
he  promoted  virtue  by  means  which  seemed  contrary  to  it 
(t).  But  I  think  there  are  several  of  his  laws  and  institu- 
tions to  which  this  observation  cannot  justly  be  applied;  and 
which,  instead  of  promoting  the  practice  of  virtue,  counter- 
acted it  in  important  instances.  Some  of  his  admirers  have 
acknowledged,  that  his  laws  vvere  all  calculated  to  establish 
a  military  con^monwealth,  and  that  every  thing  was  looked 
upon  as  just,  which  was  thought  to  contribute  to  that  end. 
Plato  observes,  in  his  first  book  of  laws,  that  they  were  fit- 
ted rather  to  render  men  valiant  than  just.  Aristotle  makes 
the  same  observation  (w).  And  Plutarch  owns,  that  some 
person  blamed  the  laws  of  Lycurgus  as  well  contrived  to 
make  men  good  soldiers,  but  very  defective  in  civil  justice 
and  honesty.  It  appears  from  the  testimony  of  several  au- 
thors, as  well  as  from  some  remarkable  facts,  that  they 
were  for  sacrificing  probity  and  every  other  consideration, 
to  what  they  thought  the  good  of  the  state  required;  and 
judged  every  method  lawful  which  might  procure  them  suc- 


(s)  See  Plutarch's  Life  of  Lycurgus,  especially  at  the  latter 
end. 

(/)  L'Esprit  des  Loix,  vol.  i.  livre  iv.  ch.  6.  p.^49,  50.  Edit. 
Edinb. 

(w)  Arist.  PoliUc.  lib.  ii.  cap.  9.  p.  331.  et  lib.  vii.  cap.  \4.  p. 
443.  Oper.  torn.  II.  edit.  Paris, 


44  The  Grecian  Laws  and  Customs  in        Part  II* 

cess.  The  breach  of  faith  cost  them  nothing.  Herodotus 
says,  that  they  who  were  acquainted  with  the  genius  of 
of  that  people  knew  that  their  actions  were  generally  contrary 
to  their  words,  and  that  they  could  not  depend  upon  them 
in  any  matter  {x).  And  though  they  were  undoubtedly  very 
brave,  yet  they  valued  a  victory  more  which  was  gained 
by  deceit  and  guile,  than  one  that  was  obtained  by  open 
valour.  How  haughtily  and  cruelly,  as  well  as  perfidiously, 
did  they  behave  towards  Athens  and  Thebes,  and  all  those 
whom  they  thought  it  their  interest  to  oppress! 

Many  of  their  laws  and  customs  were  contrary  to  hu- 
manity. And  the  rigour  of  their  discipline  tended  in  seve- 
ral instances  to  stifle  the  sentiments  of  tenderness  and  bene- 
volence, of  mercy  and  compassion,  so  natural  to  the  human 
breast.  I  have  in  the  former  part  of  this  Work,  chap.  vii. 
taken  notice  of  their  custom  of  whipping  boys,  even  to 
death,  at  the  altar  of  Diana  Orthia.  To  which  it  may  be 
added,  that  their  young  men  and  boys  were  wont  to  meet 
and  fight  with  the  utmost  rage  and  fierceness  on  certain 
days  of  the  year;  of  which  Cicero  says  he  himself  was 
witness  (?/).  But  nothing  ccnild  exceed  their  cruelty  to 
their  slaves,  the  helotes,  as  they  called  them,  who  laboured 
the  ground  for  them,  and  performed  all  their  works  and 
manufactures.  These  slaves  could  have  no  justice  done 
them,  whatever  insults  or  injuries  they  suff'ered.  They  were 
regarded  as  the  slaves  not  merely  of  one  particular  mas- 
ter, but  of  the  public,  so  that  every  one  might  injure  them 
with  irhpunity.  Not  only  did  they  treat  them  in  their  gene- 
ral conduct  with  great  harshness  and  insolence,  but  it  was 
part  of  their  policy  to  massacre  them,  on  several  occasions, 
in  cold  blood,  and   without  provocation.  Several   authors 


(x)  Herod,  lib.  ix.  n.  51.  Francof.   1605. 

(y)  Tuscul.  Disput.  lib.  v.  cap.  27.  p.  401.  edit.  Davis. 


Chap.  III.  in  many  instances  contrary  to  good  Morals,    45 

have  mentioned  their  k^vk^iu^  so  called  from  their  lying  in 
ambuscade,  in  thickets  and  clefts  of  rocks,  from  which  thev 
issued  out  upon  the  helotes,^and  killed  all  they  met;  and 
sometimes  they  set  upon  them  in  the  open  day,  and  mur- 
dered the  ablest  and  stoutest  of  them,  as  they  were  at  work 
in  the  fields.  The  design  of  this  was  to  prevent  their  slaves 
from  growing  too  numerous  or  powerful,  which  might  en- 
danger the  state.  But  as  M.  de  Montesquieu  very  proper- 
ly observes,  the  danger  was  only  owing  to  their  cruel  and 
unjust  treatment  of  them;  whereas  among  the  Athenians, 
who  treated  their  slaves  with  great  gentleness,  there  is  no 
instance  of  their  proving  troublesome  or  dangerous  to  the 
public  (2).  Plutarch  is  loth  to  believe  that  this  inhuman 
custom  was  instituted  by  Lycurgus,  though  he  does  not  de- 
ny that  it  was  in  use  among  the  Lacedaemonians.  But  Aris- 
totle says,  it  was  an  institution  of  Lycurgus.  And  who- 
ever duly  considers  the  spirit  of  several  of  his  laws,  will 
not  think  him  incapable  of  it.  And  from  the  same  cruel 
policy  it  was,  that,  as  Thucydides  informs  us,  they  destroy- 
ed two  thousand  of  the  helotes,  whom  they  had  armed, 
when  the  exigences  of  the  state  required  it,  and  who  had 
served  them  bravely  and  faithfully  in  their  wars. 

Anotlier  instance  of  the  inhumanity  of  the  laws  of  Ly- 
curgus was  this.  The  father  was  obliged  bv  the  laws  to 
bring  his  child  to  a  certain  place  appointed  for  that  purpose, 
to  be  examined  by  a  committee  of  the  men  of  that  tribe  to 
which  he  belonged.  Their  business  was  carefully  to  view  the 
infant,  and  if  they  found  it  deformed,  and  of  a  bad  constitu- 
tion, they  caused  it  to  be  cast  into  a  deep  cavern  near  the 
mountain  Taygetus,  as  thinking  it  neither  good  for  the  child 
itself,  nor  for  the  public,  that  it  should  be  brought  up. 


(2)  L'Esprit  des  Loix,  vol.  i,  liv.  xy.  chap.  16.  p.  356f  357. 


46  The  Grecian  Laws  and  Customs  in     Part  II. 

Plutarch,  who  takes  notice  of  this,  passes  no  censure  upon 
it.  And  he  pronounces  in  general,  at  the  conclusion  of  his 
life  of  Lycurgus,  that  he  could  see  no  injustice,  or  want  of 
equity,   in   any   of  that  lawgiver's  institutions. 

Many  have  taken  notice  of  that  constitution  of  his,  by 
which  the  Spartan  boys  were  trained  up  to  dextrous  thiev- 
ing. They  were  obliged  to  steal  their  victuals,  or  be  without 
them;  which  put  them  upon  watching  oppoitunities,  and 
seizing  what  they  could  lay  their  hands  on.  It  behoved 
them  to  do  this  with  dexterity  and  activity;  for  if  they  were 
taken  in  the  fact,  they  were  whipped  most  unmercifully;  not 
for  stealing,  as  Sextus  Empiricus  observes,  but  for  being 
catched  (a).  This  was  designed  to  sharpen  their  invention, 
and  to  exercise  their  agility  and  courage.  Some  authors, 
and  among  others,  the  celebrated  Mr.  Rollin,  in  his  An- 
tient  History,  are  of  opinion,  that  this  could  not  be  called 
theft,  because  it  was  allowed  by  the  state.  But,  I  think,  it 
cannot  be  denied,  that  in  this  method  the  youth  were  early 
enured  to  arts  of  rapine,  and  were  taught  to  think  there  was 
no  great  hurt  in  invading  another  man's  property,  and  to 
form  contrivances  for  that  purpose. 

Notwithstanding  all  the  austerity  which  appeared  in  the 
laws  of  Lycurgus,  there  were  some  of  his  constitutions, 
which  seemed  to  be  very  little  consistent  with  modesty  and 
decency.  There  were  common  baths  in  which  the  men  and 
women  bathed  together.  And  it  was  ordered,  that  the  young 
maidens  should  appear  naked  in  the  public  exercises,  as 
well  as 'the  young  men,  and  that  they  should  dance  naked 
with  them  at  the  solemn  festivals  and  sacrifices  (b)-.  and  as 


(a)  Pyrrhon.  Hypotyp.  lib.  iii.  cap.  24. 

{b)  That  eminent  philosopher  Plato,  in  forming  the  model  of  a 
perfect  commonwealth,  proposed  the  laws  of  Lycurgus,  in  this 
and  other  instances,  for  his  pattern,  as  I  shall  have  occasion  to 


Chap.  III.  many  instances  contrary  to  good Mordh.         4,f 

to  married  women,  Lycurgus  allowed  husbands  to  impart 
the  use  of  their  wives  to  handsome  and  deserving  men,  in 
order  to  the  begetting  healthy  and  vigorous  children  for  the 
commonwealth.  It  is  a  little  odd  to  observe  that  learned  and 
grave  philosopher  Plutarch  endeavouring  to  justify  these 
constitutions,  in  his  Life  of  Lycurgus.    That  lawgiver  was 


observe  afterwards.  Thus  neither  the  philosopher  nor  lawgiver 
shewed  any  great  regard  to  the  rules  of  modesty  and  purity.  A 
remarkable  proof  this,  that  the  erieatesi  men  among  the  Pagans, 
when  left  to  their  own  judgments  in  matters  of  morality,  were 
apt  to  form  wrong  notions  concerning  it,  even  in  instances  where 
one  should  think  the  dictates  of  nature  and  reason  might  have 
given  them  better  directions.  It  may  not  be  improper,  on  this 
occasion,  to  mention  an  observation  of  an  eminent  political  wri- 
ter, Mons.  de  TMontesquieu.  He  observes,  that  all  nations  are 
agreed  in  looking  upon  the  incontinence  of  women  as  a  thing 
that  deserves  contempt:  and  he  supposes  that  "  a  natural  mo- 
desty is  implanted  in  women,  as  a  defence  and  preservative 
against  incontinence:  that  therefore  it  is  not  true,  that  inconti- 
nence follows  the  laws  of  nature:  i;  violates  those  laws:  and  on 
the  contrary,  it  is  modesty  and  reservedness  that  follows  those 
laws."  He  adds,  that  "  where  the  physical  force  of  certain  cli- 
mates carries  persons  to  violate  the  natural  law  of  the  two  sexes, 
and  that  of  intelligent  beings,  it  is  the  business  of  the  magistrate 
to  make  civil  laws,  which  may  overcome  the  nature  of  the  cli- 
mate, and  re-establish  the  primitive  laws  of  nature*.*'  According 
to  this  way  of  reasoning,  a  legislator  is  much  to  be  blamed,  who, 
like  Lycurgus,  establishes  constitutions  which  tend  to  break 
down  that  natural  fence  of  modesty,  which  is  designed  as  a  pre- 
servative against  incontinence.  In  this  certainly  M.  de  Mon- 
tesquieu has  judged  much  better  than  another  writer  of  the  same 
nation,  the  author  of  the  book  De  TEsprit,  who  seems  to  make 
the  great  art  of  legislation  to  consist  in  giving  a  loose  to  the  most 
licentious  inclinations,  and  proposes  the  indulgence  of  them  as  a 
reward  to  merit,  and  an  incentive  to  the  noblest  actions. 

*  L'Esprit  des  l^oix,  vol.  I.  liv.  xvi.  chap.  12.  p.  S73,  374. 


48  Some  of  the  Grecian  Laws  and  Customs    Part  II. 

for  sacrificing  modesty,  and  the  sanctity  of  the  marriage- 
bed,  to  what  he  thought  was  for  the  benefit  of  the  state. 
But  these  constitutions  had,  as  might  reasonably  have  been 
expected,  a  very  bad  influence  upon  their  morals.  The  Spar- 
tan women  were  accounted  the  most  immodest  and  licen- 
tious of  any  in  Greece,  as  Aristotle  observes  (c). 

I  shall  conclude  this  account  of  the  Lacedaemonians,  and 
of  their  laws  and  customs,  with  the  account  given  of  them 
by  a  late  ingenious  author:  that  they  were  a  people  proud, 
imperious,  deceitful,  perfidious,  capable  of  sacrificing  every 
thing  to  their  ambition  and  their  interest,  and  who  had  no 
esteem  of  the  liberal  arts  and  sciences.  And  after  some 
other  strokes  of  the  like  nature,  he  concludes,  "  Such  were 
the  manners  and  the  genius  of  a  people  admired  and  pro- 
posed by  all  profane  antiquity  as  a  pattern  of  wisdom  and 
virtue. — Telles  etoient  les  mceurs  et  le  genie  d'un  peuple 
admire,  ei;  propose,  par  toute  I'antiquite  profane,  comme  un 
modele  de  sagesse  et  de  vertu  (^)." 

The  law  and  custom  of  exposing  children,  so  contrary  to 
the  dictates  of  nature  and  humanity,  was  not  peculiar  to 
Lacedaemon,  but  was  common  in  other  parts  of  Greece,  as 
well  as  among  other  nations.  And  it  is  reckoned  as  a  sin- 
gular thing  among  the  Thebans,  that  the  law  forbade  any 
Theban  to  expose  his  infant  under  pain  of  death  (e).  Even 
the  most  eminent  philosophers,  in  their  treatises  of  laws, 
prescribed  or  approved  this  unnatural  practice.  Plato  would 
have  it  ordered  by  law,  that  men  or  women,  who  are  past 
the  age  of  getting  and  conceiving  strong  children,  should 
take  care  that  their  offspring,  if  they  should  have  any, 
should  not  come  to  the  birth,  or  see  the  light;  or  if  that 


(c)  Arisi.  Politic,  lib.  ii.  cap.  9. 

(rf)  De  I'Origine  des  Loix,  des  Arts,  &c.  torn.  III.  p.  380. 

(e)  iElian.  Histor.  var.  lib.  ii.  cap.  7. 


Chap.  III.  in  many  instances  contrary  to  good  Morals,  49 

should  happen,  they  should  expose  them  without  nourish- 
ment (/).  Aristotle  expressly  says,  that  it  should  be  a  law 
not  to  bring  up  or  nourish  any  child  that  is  weak  or  maimed: 
and  that  when  the  law  of  the  country  forbids  to  expose  in- 
fants, it  is  necessary  to  limit  the  number  of  those  that  should 
be  begotten:  and  if  any  one  begets  children  above  the  num- 
ber limited  by  the  laws,  he  advises  to  procure  abortion 
before  the  foetus  has  life  and  sense  (^).  Justly  is  this  men- 
tioned by  Mr.  Locke,  as  a  remarkable  instance  to  shew, 
that  reason  had  failed  mankind  in  a  perfect  rule,  and  resolv- 
ed not  the  doubts  that  had  risen  amongst  the  studious  and 
thinking  philosophers;  nor  had  been  able  to  convince  the 
most  civilized  parts  of  the  world,  that  they  had  not  given^ 
nor  could  without  a  crime  take  away  the  lives  of  their  chil- 
dren, by  exposing  them  (/^)." 

But  what  I  would  especially  take  notice  of  as  a  palpable 
proof  of  the  great  corruption  of  the  Greeks,  both  in  their 
notions  and  practice,  with  regard  to  morals,  is,  that  the 
most  unnatural  filthiness  was  countenanced  and  encouraged 
in  several  places,  by  their  public  laws,  and  almost  every 
where  by  their  known  customs. 

It  is  a  charge  that  has  been  often  brought  against  them, 
that  they  were  very  much  addicted  to  the  impure  love  of 
boys.  I  am  sensible  there  is  a  great  authority  against  it. 
The  learned  Doctor,  afterwards  Archbishop  Potter,  in  his 
excellent  Greek  Antiquities,  has  taken  great  pains  to  clear 
them  from  that  charge;  and  seems  willing  to  have  it  thought, 
that  the  love  of  boys,  so  generally  allowed  and  practised 


(/)  Plato  Republ.  lib.  v.  Oper.  p.  461.  edit.  Lugd. 

^)  Arist.  Politic,  lib.  vii.  cap.  16.  Oper.  torn.  II.  p.  447.  edit. 
Paris. 

Qi)  Locke's  Reason,  of  Christ,  in  his  Works,  vol.  II.  p.  534. 
edit.  3d. 

Vot.  IL  G 


50  The  Grecian  Laws  and  Customs  in      Part  II. 

among  them,  was  perfectly  innocent  and  virtuous.  And  it 
were  to  be  wished,  for  the  honour  of  human  nature,  that  it 
could  be  proved  to  be  so.  I  am  far  from  saying,  that  the 
love  of  boys,  for  which  the  Greeks  were  so  noted,  was  uni- 
versally of  the  criminal  and  vicious  kind.  But  that  this 
most  abominable  and  unnatural  vice  was  very  common 
among  them,  and,  in  some  of  their  cities  and  states,  encou- 
raged by  their  laws,  admits  of  a  clear  proof.  There  need  no 
other  vouchers  for  it,  than  the  authors  produced  by  this 
learned  writer  himself.  One  of  these  authors  is  Maximus 
Tyrius.  And  it  is  observable,  that,  at  the  end  of  his  tenth 
dissertation,  he  celebrates  it  as  a  most  heroic  act  of  Agesi- 
laus,  a  more  glorious  conquest  than  any  he  had  achieved 
against  the  Persians,  and  as  more  to  be  admired  than  the 
fortitude  of  Leonidas,  who  died  for  his  country,  that  being 
in  love  with  a  beautiful  Barbarian  boy,  he  suffered  it  to  go 
no  farther  than  looking  at  him,  and  admiring  him  (?).  No- 
thing could  be  more  impertinent  and  absurd  than  this  en- 
comium on  Agesilaus,  if  the  Spartan  love  of  boys  was  ge- 
nerally as  pure  and  innocent  as  the  same  author  in  that  very 
dissertation  represents  it.  The  testimonies  of  Xenophon  and 
Plutarch  are  produced  to  shew  that  the  love  of  boys  at 
Sparta,  and  which  was  prescribed  by  the  laws  of  Lycur- 
gus,  was  pure  and  laudable.  But  the  prejudices  these  two 


(?)  Epictetus  has  a  passage  not  unlike  this  in  commendation 
of  Socrates*s  extraordinary  virtue. "  Go  to-  Socrates  (says  he)  and 
see  him  lying  by  Alcibiades,  yet  slighting  his  youth  and  beauty. 
Consider  what  a  victory  he  was  conscious  of  obtaining!  What  an 
Olympic  prize!  So  that,  by  heaven,  one  might  justly  salute  him; 
Hail!  incredibly  great,  universal  victor!**  If  this  shameful  vice 
had  not  been  extremely  common,  even  at  Athens,  Socrates's  ab- 
staining from  it  could  not  have  been  celebrated,  as  it  is  here  by 
Epictetus,  as  an  act  of  virtue  that  deserves  the  highest  admira* 
tion.  See  Epictetus's  Dissert,  book  ii.  ch.  18.  sect.  4. 


Chap.  III.  many  instances  contrary  to  ^ood Morals.         51 

great  authors  had  in  favour  of  the  Lacedjemonians,  the  high 
opinion  they  entertained  of  their  laws  and  customs,  and 
their  willingness  to  put  the  fairest  colours  upon  them,  is 
well  known,  and  does  not  a  little  weaken  the  force  of  their 
testimony.  It  will  soon  appear,  that  Plutarch  is  not  very 
consistent  with  himself  in  what  he  advances  on  this  head. 
As  to  Xenophon,  it  is  to  be  observed,  that  at  the  same 
time  that  he  vindicates  the  Lacedaemonians,  he  represents 
that  criminal  love  as  very  common  among  the  Greeks,  and 
in  many  places  authorized  by  the  laws:  "  I  know  (says  he) 
that  there  are  many  who  will  believe  nothing  of  this;"  i.  e. 
that  the  love  of  boys  among  the  Spartans  was  innocent  and 
virtuous;  "  nor  do  I  wonder  at  it,  the  unnatural  love  of 
boys  is  become  so  common,  that  in  many  places  it  is  esta- 
blished by  the  public  laws."  This  testimony  of  Xenophon  is 
very  remarkable  with  regard  to  others  of  the  Greeks, 
though  he  will  not  allow  that  the  Lacedaemonians  were 
guilty  of  it.  But  Plato,  his  contemporary,  whose  testimony 
must  be  allowed  to  be;  of  great  weight,  in  his  eighth  book 
of  laws,  supposes  that  the  masculine  love,  which  he  there 
condemns  as  contrary  to  nature,  was  allowed  both  among 
the  Lacedaemonians  and  the  Cretans  (i).  The  excellent 
writer  above-mentioned  will  by  no  means  allow  that  the 
love  of  boys  usual  among  the  Cretans  was  criminal;  and 
asserts,  that  nothing  passed  between  them  and  their  lovers 
that  was  contrary  to  the  strictest  rules  of  virtXie:  for  which 
he  quotes  Maximus  Tyrius  and  Strabo,  who  tells  us,  that 
the  Cretans  professed  that  it  is  was  not  so  much  the  exter- 
nal beauty  of  a  boy,  as  his  virtuous  disposition,  his  courage 
and  conduct,  that  recommended  him  to  their  love.  And 
this  might  be  the  pretence  they  alleged;   and  in  some  in- 


{k)  Plato  de  Leg.  lib.  viii.  Oper.  p.  645.  G.  H.  edit.  Lugd. 


52  The  Laws  and  Customs  among  the  Greeks  Part  II. 

Stances  might  really  be  the  case.  But,  I  think  whosoever 
impartially  examines  what  Strabo  says  concerning  it,  will 
not  be  apt  to  look  upon  the  love  he  there  speaks  of  as  very 
innocent.  The  whole  turn  of  the  passage  seems  to  me  to 
have  a  contrary  appearance.  And  I  find  the  learned  and 
ingenious  author  De  I'Origine  des  Loix,  &c.  looks  upon  it 
in  the  same  light,  and  cites  this  very  passage  of  Strabo  to 
shew  that  unnatural  lust  was  encouraged  by  the  Cretan  law. 
And  Plutarch,  at  the  same  time  that  he  represents  the  love 
of  boys  in  use  at  Athens  and  Sparta  as  having  nothing 
blameable  in  it,  expressly  condemns  that  sort  of  it  in  Crete, 
which  they  called  by  the  name  of  u^TFuyfAoi  (/),  which  is  that 
very  love  which  Strabo  speaks  of  in  the  passage  referred 
to  (w).  Plato,  not  only  in  the  eighth  bock  of  laws  already 
cited,  but  in  his  first  book  of  laws,  blames  the  Cretans  for 
masculine  mixtures;  and  intimates,  that  they  were  wont  to 
justify  themselves  by  the  example  of  Jupiter  and  Gany- 
mede (n).  Aristotle  tells  us,  that  to  prevent  their  having 
too  many  children,  there  was  a  law  among  the  Cretans, 
for  encouraging  that  sort  of  unnatural  love  (o). 

It  appears  from  some  passages  of  Plutarch,  that  he  was 
willing  to  liave  it  thought  that  the  love  of  boys  in  use 
among  the  Greeis  was  a  pure  and  generous  affection: 
but  at  other  times  he  makes  acknowledgments  which 
plainly  shew  the  contrary.  In  his  life  of  Pelopidas,  he 
tells  us,  that  the  legislators  encouraged  the  love  of  boys, 
to  temper  the  manners  of  their  youth,  and  that  it  produced 
excellent  effects,  and  particularly  among  the  Thebans.  But 


(/)  Plutarch,  de  liber,  educandis,  Oper.  torn.  II.  p.  1 1.  edit.  Xyl. 
(m)  Strabo,  lib.  x.  p.  739,  740.  edit.  Amst. 
(n)  Plato  de  Leg.  lib.  i.  Oper.  p.  569.  G.  edit.  Lugd.  1590. 
(o)  Arist.  Politic,  lib.  ii.  cap.  10.  Oper.  torn,  II.  p.  333.  A.  edit. 
Paris.  1629. 


Chap.  III.  contrary  to  ^ood  Morals.  58 

the  same  great  philosopher,  who  undoubtedly  was  inclined 
to  give  a  favourable  account  of  the  Thebans  whose  coun- 
tryman he  was,  in  his  treatise  De  liberis  educandis,  ex- 
pressly declares,  that  such  masculine  loves  were  to  be 
avoided,  as  were  in  use  at  Thebes  and  Elis  {p).  And  his 
joining  Thebes  with  Elis  shews  that  it  is  a  very  criminal 
passion  he  speaks  of.  For  we  have  the  testimony  of  Maxi- 
mus  Tyrius,  in  that  dissertation  in  which  he  endeavours 
to  vindicate  some  of  the  Grecian  states  from  the  charge, 
that  the  Elians  encouraged  that  licentiousness,  as  he  calls 
it,  by  a  law  (q).  Nothing  can  be  more  evident  than  it  is 
from  Plutarch's  treatise  called  'e^^t/xo?  or  Amatorius,  that 
this  abominable  vice  had  made  a  great  progress  among  the 
Greeks,  and  was  openly  countenanced  and  pleaded  for. 
One  of  his  dialogists  there  argues  for  it  at  large,  and  highly 
commends  it.^  He  represents  th«  Lacedaemonians,  Bseotians, 
Cretans,  and  Chalcidians,  as  much  addicted  to  it.  And  ano- 
ther of  his  dialogists,  who,  it  is  to  be  supposed,  expresses 
Plutarch's  own  sentiments,  condemns  it  in  very  strong 
terms,  and  shews  its  pernicious  effects.  Athenseus  tells  us, 
that  it  was  not  only  practised,  but  encouraged  and  promoted 
in  many  of  the  cities  of  Greece  (r).  At  Athens  indeed 
there  was  a  law  against  it.  And  Plutarch  seems  to  recom- 
mend the  love  of  boys  in  use  at  Sparta  and  Athens  as  vir- 
tuous, and  worthy  to  be  emulated,  though  he  condemns 
that  at  Thebes  and  Elis  (*).  As  to  Sparta,  the  accounts 
^iven  of  it  by  antient  authors,  and  by  Plutarch  himself, 
seem  to  vary.  But,  whatever  might  have  been  the  ori- 
ginal design  of  the  constitution  established  by  Lycurgus, 


(/z)  Plutarch,  ubi  supra,  p.  1 1. 
[    {q)  Max.  Tyr.  Dissert.  10.  p.  128.  Oxon.  1677. 
(r)  Deipnosoph.  lib.  xiii.  p.  602.  edit.  Lugd. 
(s)  Plutarch,  ubi  supra. 


54       The  Laxvs  and  Customs  among  the  Greeks     Part  II. 

with  respect  to  it,  these  is  too  much  reason  to  think,  that, 
as  it  was  generally  practised  among  the  Lacedaemonians,  it 
was  not  very  innocent.  With  regard  to  the  Athenians,  Plu- 
tarch tells  us  concerning  their  great  lawgiver  Solon,  that 
it  appears  from  his  poems,  that  he  was  not  proof  against 
beautiful  boys,  and  had  not  courage  enough  to  resist  the 
force  of  love.  He  observes,  that  he  was  in  love  with  Pisis- 
tratus,  because  of  his  extraordinary  handsomeness:  and  that 
by  a  law  he  forbade  paederasty  or  the  love  of  boys  to  slaves; 
making  that,  as  Plutarch  observes,  an  honourable  and  repu- 
table action;  and  as  it  were  inviting  the  worthy  to  the  prac- 
tice of  that  which  he  commanded  the  unworthy  to  for- 
bear (^).  And  in  his  Amatorius  above  referred  to,  he 
introduces  Protogenes,  one  of  his  dialogists,  arguing  in 
favour  of  that  practice,  from  this  constitution  of  Solon  (u), 
Maximus  Tyrius,  who  takes  a  great  deal  of  pains  to  vindi- 
cate Socrates  from  that  charge,  owns,  that  at  the  time  when 
this  philosopher  flourished,  this  vicious  passion  had  arrived 
to  the  greatest  height,  both  in  the  other  parts  of  Greece,  and 
particularly  at  Athens;  and  that  all  places  were  full  of  unjust 
or  wicked  lovers,  and  boys  that  were  enticed  and  delud- 
ed (;c).  So  that  if  there  was  a  law  against  it  at  Athens,  it 
seems  to  have  been  little  regarded. 

To  the  testimonies  which  have  been  produced  may  be 
added  that  of  Cicero,  who  represents  that  practice  as  very 
common  among  the  Greeks:  and  that  what  helped  to  intro- 
duce and  spread  it,  was  the  custom  of  the  youths  appearing 
ivaked  in  the  public  exercises.  And  he .  observes,  that  their 
poets,  great  men,  and  even  their  learned  men  and  philoso- 


Q)  Plutarch.  See  Plutarch's  Life  of  Solon,  at  the  beginning, 
(w)  Plutarch.  Oper.  torn.  II.  p.  751.  edit.  Xyland. 
(x)  Max.  Tyr.  dissert.  10.  initio. 


Chap.  III.  contrary  to  ^odd  Morals.  SS 

phers,  not  only  practised,  but  gloried  in  it  (i/).  And  accord- 
ingly he  elsewhere  represents  it  as  the  custom,  not  of  parti- 
cular cities  only,  but  of  Greece  in  general.  Speaking  of  the 
things  that  might  be  thought  to  contribute  to  Dionysius'a 
happiness,  he  mentions  his  having  paramours  of  that  kind 
"  according  to  the  custom  of  Greece. — Habebat,  more 
Graecise,  quosdam  adolescentes  amore  conjunctos  (2)."  And 
in  a  passage  cited  by  Lactantius,  he  mentions  it  as  a  bold 
and  hazardous  thing  in  the  Greeks,  that  they  consecrated 
the  images  of  the  Loves  and  Cupids  in  the  places  of  their 
public  exercises  (cr). 

I  have  insisted  the  more  largely  upon  this,  because  there 
cannot  be  a  more  convincing  proof,  that  the  laws  and  cus- 
toms, even  in  the  most  learned  and  civilized  nations,  are 
not  to  be  depended  upon  as  proper  guides  in  matters  of  mo- 
rality. The  Greeks  are  regarded  and  admired  as  the  most 
eminent  of  the  Pagan  nations,  for  their  knowledge  in  phi- 
losophy, and  especially  in  morals,  and  as  having  cultivated 
their  reason  in  an  extraordinary  degree.  They  valued  them- 
selves mightily  upon  their  wisdom,  and  the  excellency  of 
their  laws;  and  yet  their  laws  or  generally  allowed  customs, 
shewed  that  they  were  become  amazingly  corrupt,  both  in 
their  notions  and  practices,  with  regard  to  morals;  and  that 
in  instances,  as  to  which  one  would  have  thought  the  light 
of  nature  would  have  given  them  a  sufficient  direction.  I 
say,  they  were  beccme  very  corrupt  in  their  notions  as  well 
as  practices.    For  though  some   of  them   acknowledge   the 


(y)  Tuscul.  Disput.  lib.  iv.  cap.  33. 

(2)  Ibid.  lib.  V.  cap.  20.  p.  385.  edit.  Davis. 

(a)  "  Magnum  Cicero  audaxque  consilium  susccpisse  Grae- 
ciam  dicit,  quod  Cupidinum  et  Amorum  simulachra  in  gymnasiis 
consecrasset,"  Lactant.  Divin.  Instit.  lib.  i.  cap,  20.  p.  106. 
luUgd.  Bat.  1660. 


$9  The  Laws  and  Customs,  £s?c.  Part  IL 

evil  and  turpitude  of  that  unnatural  vice,  yet,  in  the  general 
opinion,  it  seems  to  have  passed  among  them  for  no  fault 
at  all,  or  a  very  light  one.  And  many  of  their  philosophers 
and  moralists,  as  I  shall  have  occasion  to  shew  afterwards, 
represented  it  as  a  matter  perfectly  indifferent.  Barolesanes, 
an  antient  and  learned  writer,  in  a  large  extract  quoted 
from  him  by  Eusebius,  after  having  mentioned  some  bar- 
barous nations,  which  were  much  addicted  to  that  vice,  and 
others  who  had  it  in  abhorrence,  observes,  that  in  Greece 
such  kind  of  masculine  loves  were  not  accounted  disgrace- 
ful, even  to  the  wise  (<^).  St.  Paul,  therefore,  in  drawing  up 
the  charge  of  an  amazing  corruption  of  morals  in  the  Hea- 
then world,  very  justly  put  this  in  the  first  place,  as  being 
both  of  the  highest  enormity,  and  very  common  not  only 
among  the  people,  but  the  philosophers  themselves.  Nor 
is  it  probable,  that  any  thing  less  than  a  Divine  Law,  en- 
forced by  the  authority  of  God  himself,  and  by  the  most  ex- 
press denunciations  of  the  Divine  Wrath  and  Vengeance 
against  such  crimes,  could  have  over-ruled  the  force  of 
such  inveterate  custom  and  example,  countenanced  by  the 
maxims  and  practice  of  those  who  made  high  pretences  to 
wisdom  and  reason. 


(d)  Euseb.  Prgep.  Evangel,  lib.  vi.  cap.  10.  p.  276.  D, 


57 


CHAPTER  IV. 


Farther  instances  of  civil  laws  and  customs  among  the  Pagan  nations.  Those  of 
the  antient  Romans  considered.  The  laws  of  the  twelve  tables,  though  mighti- 
ly extolled,  were  far  from  exhibiting  a  complete  rule  of  morals.  The  law  of 
Romulus  concerning  the  exposing  of  diseased  and  <leformed  children.  This 
continued  to  be  practised  among  the  Romans.  Their  cruel  treatment  of  their 
slaves.  Their  gladiatory  shows  contrary  to  humanity.  Unnatural  lusts  common 
among  them  as  well  as  the  Greeks.  Observations  on  the  Chinese  laws  and 
customs.  Other  laws  and  customs  of  nations  mentioned,  which  are  contrary 
to  good  morals. 

From  the  Greeks  let  us  pass  to  the  Romans,  whose  good 
policy  and  gdvemment  has  been  greatly  admired,  and  who 
have  been  regarded  as  the  most  virtuous  of  all  the  Pa- 
gan nations.  And  it  must  be  owned,  that  in  the  most  antient 
times  of  the  Roman  state,  they  were  free  from  those  vices 
which  luxury  and  efFeminancy  are  apt  to  produce.  There 
were  shining  examples  among  them  of  probity,  justice, 
fidelity,  fortitude,  a  contempt  of  pleasures  and  riches,  and 
love  to  their  country.  But  the  body  of  the  people  were  rude 
and  ignorant  to  a  great  degree,  and  sunk  in  an  idolatry  and 
superstition,  than  which  nothing  could  be  more  gross  and 
stupid.  Their  virtue  was  rough  and  savage:  they  made  glory 
to  consist  chiefly  in  military  bravery:  and  their  love  to  their 
country  was,  for  the  most  part,  only  a  strong  passion  for 
rendering  it  the  mistress  of  all  others.  To  this  they  made 
every  thing  give  way;  and  often  broke  through  the  rules  of 
justice  and  equity,  to  promote  what  they  thought  the  inte- 
rest of  the  state;  jealous  of  any  people,  that  were  for  pre- 
serving themselves  in  a  state  of  liberty  and  in'Hependency. 
To  which  it  may  be  added,  that  they  were  for  a  long  time 
without  a  written  code  of  laws.  And  the  people  suffered  69 
Vol.  II.  H 


58  The  Immoral  Laws  and  Customs  Part  IL 

much  by  the  injustice,  insolence,  and  arbitrary  oppression 
of  their  magistrates  and  great  nnen,  even  in  what  are  ac- 
counted the  most  virtuous  times  of  the  republic,  that  they 
insisted  very  justly  upon  having  a  written  body  of  laws, 
which  should  be  the  standing  rule  of  judgment.  This  was 
accordingly  accomplished.  Select  persons  were  chosen  to 
collect  and  compile  laws  for  the  commonwealth,  who  tra- 
velled into  Greece  for  that  purpose;  and  with  great  sagacity 
chose  the  best  institutions  of  the  Grecian  states,  and  other 
nations.  Hence  came  the  famous  laws  of  the  twelve  tables, 
which  have  been  so  much  celebrated  both  by  antients  and 
moderns.  Cicero,  who  was  certainly  a  very  able  judge,  fre- 
quently speaks  of  them  in  terms  of  the  highest  approbation. 
And  particularly,  in  his  first  book  De  Oratore,  in  the  person 
of  that  great  lawyer  and  orator  L.  Crass  us.  He  not  only 
prefers  them  to  all  other  civil  laws  and  constitutions,  par- 
ticularly to  those  of  the  Greeks,  but  to  all  the  writings  of 
the  philosophers.  He  makes  no  scruple  to  declare,  that 
though  all  men  should  be  displeased  at  him  for  it,  he 
would  freely  own  it  as  his  opinion,  "That  the  single  book 
of  the  twelve  tables  was  superior  to  the  libraries  of  all  the 
philosophers,  both  in  the  weight  of  its  authority,  and  in  the 
abundant  utility  arising  from  it  (c)." 

But  however  those  laws  might  deserve  great  praise, 
considered  as  good  civil  constitutions,  I  believe  there  are 
few  that  will  pretend,  that  they  exhibited  a  perfect  rule  of 
morals,  or  gave  men  a  clear  and  full  direction  as  to  every 
branch  of  their  duty.  That  part  of  those  laws  which  related 


(c)  "  Fremant  omnes  licet,  dicam  quod  sentiam,  bibliothecas 
omnium  philosophorum,  unus  mihi  videtur  duodecim  tabularum 
libellus,  siquis  legum  fontes  et  capita  viderit,  et  auihoritatis  pon- 
dere  et  ulilitatis  ubertate  superare."  Cic.  de  Orat.  lib.  i.  cap, 
42,  43. 


Chap.  IV.  amoxig  the  antient  Romans.  59 

to  sacred  things,  was  evidently  calculated,  like  the  laws  of 
other  Heathen  nations,  to  uphold  the  public  idolatry  and 
polytheism.  The  body  of  these  laws  was  designed  to  regu- 
late the  conduct  of  the  citizens  towards  the  public,  and  to- 
wards one  another,  to  settle  men's  private  righis,  and  to  be 
the  rule  of  judgment  for  the  regulation  of  the  civil  policy, 
and  for  the  security  and  advantage  of  the  state.  And  many 
of  their  constitutions  were  undoubtedly  excellent,  taken  in 
this  view;  but,  like  other  civil  laws,  could  be  of  no  great 
force  tor  regulating  the  inward  temper  and  dispositions  of 
the  mind.  Mons.  de  Montesquieu  observes,  that  there  was 
an  extreme  severity  in  several  of  their  laws,  suitable  to  the 
rudeness  and  rigidity  of  the  antient  Romans.  The  law  con- 
cerning debtors  is  mentioned  by  several  authors,  and  was 
remarkable  for  its  inhumanity.  The  creditor  was  allowed  to 
keep  the  debtor  in  close  confinement  sixty  days;  and  after- 
wards, in  case  he  did  not  pay  the  debt  within  the  time 
prescribed  by  the  law,  or  find  sufficient  security,  he  was 
condemned  to  lose  his  head,  or  to  be  sold  as  a  slave.  This 
might  seem  to  be  severe  enough,  but  the  law  went  farther 
still,  and  permitted  the  creditors,  if  there  were  several  of 
them,  to  cut  the  dead  body  of  the  debtor  in  pieces,  and 
divide  it  among  them.  Nothing  can  excuse  the  barbarity 
of  this  law,  even  supposing  it  to  have  been  designed  only 
in  terrorem.  And  indeed  the  last  part  of  it  was  so  shocking 
that  we  are  told  there  was  no  instance  of  its  being  put  in 
execution,  but  it  fell,  and  was  abrogated  by  disuse  (^). 

Dionysius  Halicarnasseus,  who  was  a  great  admirer  of 
the  institutions  ot  the  antient  Romans,  informs  us,  that 
Romulus  obliged  the  citizens  to  bring  up  all  their  male 
children,  and  the  eldest  of  the  females.  They  were  allowed, 


( c/)  Quintilian  takes  notice  of  this  law,  lib.  v.  cap.  6.  So  does 
A.  Gellius.  And  Tertullian  refers  to  it,  Apol.  cap.  4. 


€0  The  immoral  Laws  and  Customs         Part  I L 

therefore,  to  destroy  all  their  female  children  but  the  eldest. 
And  even  Avith  regard  to  their  male  children,  if  they  were 
deformed  or  monstrous,  he  permitted  the  parents  to  expose 
them,  after  having  shewn  them  to  five  of  their  nearest 
neighbours  (e).  There  is  a  passage  in  Cicero's  third  book 
of  laws,  from  which  it  has  been  concluded,  that  the  law  of 
Romulus  with  regard  to  the  exposing  and  destroying  male 
children  that  were  remarkably  deformed,  was  confirmed  by 
a  constitution  of  the  twelve  tables  (/").  A  very  learned 
writer  has  taken  notice  of  a  remarkable  passage  in  Terence, 
from  which  it  appears,  that  this  inhuman  custom  of  exposing 
and  destroying  children,  especially  females,  was  not  un- 
common, even  among  parents  of  the  best  characters.  After 
having  observed,  that  "  of  all  the  moral  painters,  Terence 
is  he  who  seems  to  have  copied  human  nature  most  ex- 
actly," he  adds,  that  "  yet  his  man  of  universal  benevo- 
lence, whom  he  draws  with  so  much  life  in  that  masterly- 
stroke.  Homo  sum,  humani  nihil  a  me  alienum  puto,  is  the 
same  person  who  commands  his  wife  to  expose  his  new- 
born daughter,  and  flies  into  a  passion  with  her,  for  having 
committed  that  hard  task  to  another,  by  which  means  the 
infant  escaped  death.-— Si  meum  imperium  exequi  voluisses, 
interemptam  oportuit. — And  he  [Chremes]  characterizes 
such  who  had  any  remains  of  this  natural  instinct  as  persons 
—qui  neque  jus,  neque  bonum  atque  sequum  sciunt  (^)." 
Such  were  the  sentiments  published  with  applause  on  the 
Roman  theatre.  And  it  appears  from  a  passage  of  Seneca, 
that  s6  late  as  in  his  time,  it  was  usu-al  among  the  Romans 


(e)  Dion.  Halic.  Roman  Antiquities,  lib.  ii. 

(/)  Cic.de  Leg.  lib.  iii.  cap.  8.  p.  207.  where  see  Dr.  Davis's 
note. 

(^r)  Divine  Legation  of  Moses,  vol.  L  book  i.  sect.  4.  p.  58. 
xnarg.  note,  edit.  4th. 


Chap.  IV.  among  the  antient  Romans,  61 

to  destroy  weak  and  deformed  children.  "  Portentosos  foetus 
extinguimus:  liberos  quoque,  si  debiles  monstrosique  editi 
sunt,  mergimus  (^)." 

The  cruelty  of  the  Lacedaemonians  towards  their  slaves 
has  been  taken  notice  of.  The  laws  and  customs  of  the  Ro- 
mans, with  respect  to  them,  were  little  better.  It  was  not 
unusual  for  the  masters  to  put  their  old,  sick,  and  infirm 
slaves  into  an  island  in  the  Tyber,  where  they  left  them  to 
perish.  And  so  far  did  some  of  them  carry  their  luxury 
and  wantonness,  as  to  drown  their  slaves  in  the  fish-ponds, 
that  they  might  be  devoured  by  the  fish,  to  make  their  flesh 
more  delicate  (i).  The  custom  of  gladiatory  shows,  which 
obtained  universally  among  the  Romans,  even  when  they 
were  famous  for  the  politer  arts,  and  were  thought  to  give 
a  pattern  of  good  government  to  other  nations,  was  also 
contrary  to  tlie  rules  of  humanity.  They  were  exhibited  at 
the  funerals  of  great  and  rich  men,  and  on  many  other  oc- 
casions, by  the  Roman  consuls,  praetors,  aediles,  senators, 
knights,  priests,  and  almost  all  that  bore  great  offices  in  the 
state,  as  well  as  by  the  emperors;  and  in  general  by  all  that 
had  a  mind  to  make  an  interest  with  the  people,  who  were 
extravagantly  fond  of  those  kind  of  shows.  Not  only  the 
men,  but  the  women  ran  eagerly  after  them,  who  were,  by 
the  prevalence  of  custom,  so  far  divested  of  that  compas- 
sion and  softness  which  is  natural  to  the  sex,  that  they  took 
a  pleasure  in  seeing  them  kill  one  another,  and  only  desired 
that  they  should  fall  genteelly,  and  in  an  agreeable  attitude. 
Such  was  the  frequency  of  those  shows,  and  so  great  the 
number  of  men  that  were  killed  on  these  occasions,  that 
Lipsius  says,  no  war  caused  such  slaughter  of  mankind, 


(A)  Sen.  de  Ira,  lib.  i.  cap.  15. 
(t)  See  L'Esprit,  disc.  2.  chap.  24. 


62  The  immoral  Laws  and  Customs         Part  II. 

as  did  these  sports  of  pleasure,  throughout  the  several  pro- 
vinces of  the  vast  Roman  empire. 

That  odious  and  unnatural  vice,  which  (as  has  been 
shewn)  prevailed  so  much  in  Greece,  was  also  common 
among  the  Romans,  especially  in  the  latter  times  of  their 
state.  Many  passages  might  be  produced  from  their  poets, 
which  plainly  refer  to  it.  To  which  I  shall  add  what  a 
learned  author  observes,  that  "  Cicero  introduces,  without 
any  mark  of  disapprobation,  Cotta,  a  man  of  the  first  rank 
and  genius,  freely  and  familiarly  owning  to  other  Romans 
of  the  same  quality,  that  worse  than  beastly  vice,  as  prac- 
tised by  himself,  and  quoting  the  authority  of  antient  phi- 
losophers in  vindication  of  it  (>^)."  It  appears  from  what 
Seneca  says,  in  his  95th  epistle,  that  in  his  time  it  was 
practised  at  Rome  openly,  and  without  shame.  He  there 
speaks  of  flocks  and  troops  of  boys,  distinguished  by  their 
colours  and  nations;  and  that  great  care  was  taken  to  train 
them  up  for  that  detestable  employment  (/). 

It  is  not  necessary  to  add  any  thing  more  to  shew,  that 
among  the  Greeks  and  Romans,  the  most  celebrated  nations 
in  the  antient  Pagan  world,  their  laws  and  constitutions, 
though  in  many  respects  excellent,  were  far  from  exhibiting  a 


(k)  Dr.  Tailour*s  Notes  and  Paraphrase  on  the  Epistle  to  the 
Romans,  on  chap.  i.  26.  "  Quotus  enim  quisque  formosus  est? 
Athenis  cum  essem,  e  gregibus  Ephseborum  vix  singuli  reperie- 
bantur^  Video  quid  subriseris.  Sed  tamen  ita  se  res  habet. 
Deinde  nobis,  qui  concedentibiis  philosophis  adolesceniulis  de- 
lectamur,  etiam  vitia  ssepe  jucunda  sunt."  And  he  immediately 
after  mentions  Alcgeus's  being  pleased  with  a  blemish  in  the 
boy  he  was  in  love  with;  and  Q.  Catulus's  being  in  love  with 
Roscius,  who  had  distorted  eyes.  Cic,  de  Nat.  Deor.  lib.  i. 
cap.  28. 

(/)  "  Puerorum  infelicium  greges,  agmina  exoletorum,  per 
nationes  coloresque  descripta,"  &c.  Ep.  95. 


Chap.  IV.  among"  the  antient  Romans.  ©3 

proper  rule  of  morals  to  guide  the  people:  they  failed  in  very 
important  instances:  and  some  of  the  customs,  which  at 
length  became  very  prevalent  among  them,  were  of  a  most 
immoral  nature  and  tendency,  and  shewed  them  to  be 
sunk  into  an  amazing  corruption  and  depravity  of  manners. 
It  may  not  be  improper^  on  this  occasion,  to  take  notice 
of  the  Chinese,  who  have  been  mightily  extolled  for  their 
antiquity,  the  extent  of  their  empire,  the  wisdom  and  ex- 
cellency of  their  laws  and  constitutions,  and  the  goodness 
of  their  morals.  A  noted  author,  who  has  distinguished 
himself  by  asserting  the  clearness  and  sufficiency  of  the 
Law  and  Religion  of  nature  in  opposition  to  Revelation, 
lays  a  particular  stress  upon  this.  He  represents  *'  the  in- 
fidels of  China  (as  he  calls  them)  as  having  the  preference 
to  Christians  in  regard  to  all  moral  virtues."  And  he  tells 
us,  from  the  famous  Mr.  Leibnitz,  that  "  such  is  our 
growing  corruption,  that  it  may  almost  seem  necessary  to 
send  some  Chinese  missionaries  to  teach  us  the  use  and 
practice  of  Natural  Theology,  as  we  send  missionaries  to 
them  to  teach  them  revealed  Religion  (?«)."  But  if  we 
take  their  laws  and  constitutions  in  the  most  advantageous 
light,  it  must  be  owned,  indeed,  that  they  are  well  calcu- 
lated for  preserving  external  public  order  and  decency,  and 
for  the  regulation  of  the  civil  polity,  but  are  altogether  in- 
sufficient to  furnish  a  complete  rule  of  morals,  or  to  lead 
men  into  the  practice  of  real  piety  and  virtue,  considered 
in  its  just  extent.  F.  Navarette,  who  lived  many  years  in 
China,  and  was  well  acquainted  with  their  language,  their 
laws,  and  books,  and  who  seems  to  have  given  an  honest 
and  impartial  account  of  them  (n),  says,  that  "  he  believes 


(w)  Christianity  as  old  as  the  Creation,  p.  366,  3^67.  edit.  8vo. 

(n)  I  do  not  find  that  Father  Navarette's  name  appears  in  the 

list  of  the  authors,  whose  names  are  prefixed  to  F.  Du  Haiders 


64  Immoral  Customs  among  the  Chinese     Part  II, 

the  outward  behaviour  is  not  taken  care  of  so  much  in  any 
part  of  the  world,  as  it  is  in  China:  that  whatever  they  do 
or  say  is  so  contrived,  that  it  may  have  a  good  appear- 
ance, please  all,  and  offend  none:  and  that  doubtless  that 
nation  excels  all  others  in  outward  modesty,  gravity,  good 
words,  courtesy,  and  civility  (o)."  Yet  what  he  says  of 
them  in  several  parts  of  his  book,  gives  one  a  very  disad- 
vantageous idea  of  their  morals.  He  represents  the  sin 
against  nature  as  extremely  common  among  them;  and  that 
in  the  time  of  the  former  Chinese  emperors,  there  were 
public  stews  of  this  kind  at  Pequin,  though  not  allowed  by 
the  Tartars  (/>).  That  they  do  not  look  upon  drunkenness 
to  be  a  crime  (^).  That  every  one  takes  as  many  concu- 
bines as  he  can  ketp  (r).  That  many  of  the  common  peo- 
ple pawn  their  wives,  and  that  some  lend  them  for  a 
month,  or  more,  or  less,  according  as  they  agree  (5).  That 
there  are  many  things  in  China  which  make  matrimony 
void,  some  of  them  very  trifling.  He  quotes  a  book  of 
great  authority  among  them,  in  which  it  is  said,  concern- 
ing the  antient  wise  men  of  China,  who  are  there  celebrated 
as  men  of  greater  sincerity  and  virtue  than  the  moderns, 
that  they  turned  away  their  wives,  because  the  house  was 


History  of  China,  and  out  of  whose  accounts  he  compiled  his  his- 
tory. But  as  he  found  fault  with  the  wron^  and  partial  accounts 
given  by  several  authors  of  the  society,  I  suppose  it  was  thought 
proper  to  take  no  notice  of  him;  though  he  well  deserved  to 
have  been  mentioned  among  the  best  of-  those  who  have  given 
accounts  of  China. 

(0)  See  Navarette's  Account  of  the  Empire  of  China,  book  ii. 
chap.  6.  p.  122,  123.  in  the  first  volume  of  Churchiirs  Collec- 
tion. 

{fi )  ibid,  book  i.  chap.  13.  p.  29.  and  book  ii.  p.  68. 

(g)  Ibid,  book  i.  chap.  14. 

(r)  Ibid,  book  ii.  chap  7.  p.  68, 

\s)  Ibid. 


CiiAP.  IV.      and  othef-  antient  Heathen  Nations.  65 

full  of  smoke,  or  because  they  frightened  the  dog  With 
their  disagreeable  noises  And  that  the  antients  dissolved 
the  knot  of  matrimony  without  a  word  speaking.  In  the 
same  book  it  is  determined,  that  when  the  wife  is  turned 
off,  the  husband  may  marry  another  (?).  F.  Navarettei 
farther  observes,  that  the  Chinese  sell  their  sons  and 
daughters  when  they  please,  and  do  it  frequently  (w).  But 
what  is  still  worse,  very  many  of  them,  rich  as  well  as 
poor,  when  they  are  delivered  of  daughters,  stifle  and  kill 
them.  Those  who  are  more  tender-hearted  leave  them  un- 
der a  vessel,  where  they  let  them  die  in  great  misery:  of 
which  he  gives  a  most  affecting  instance  to  his  own  know- 
ledge. And  he  says  it  was  the  common  opinion  that  there 
were  about  ten  thousand  female  children  murdered  every 
year  within  the  precincts  of  the  City  Lao  Ki,  where  he 
lived  some  time.  "  How  many  then  (says  he)  must  we 
imagine  perished  throughout  the  whole  empire  (^)?"  Yet^ 
he  says,  "  all  the  sects  among  them,  except  that  of  the 
learned,  think  it  a  siii  to  kill  living  creatures:  they  plead 
humanity  and  compassion,  thinking  it  a  cruel  thing  to  take 
that  life  which  they  cannot  give.  But  it  is  very  well  worth 
remarking  (says  he)  that  they  should  endeavour  to  shew* 
themselves  merciful  to  beasts,  yet  murder  their  own  daugh- 
ters." He  adds,  that  "  in  India  they  have  hospitals  for  all 
sorts  of  irrational  creatures,  and  yet  they  let  men  die  with-* 
out  assisting  them  in  their  sickness  («/)."  Many  have  talked 
of  the  brotherly  affection  and  benevolence  of  the  Chinese 
towards  one  another;  but  it  appears  from  the  same  writer^ 


(?)  Navarette*s  Account  of  the  Empire  of  Chink,  book  ii.  chaf^^ 
7.  p.  67. 
{u)  Ibid,  book  i.  chap.  20.  p.  47. 
(a?)  Ibid,  book  ii.  chap-l  0.  p.  77, 
(y)  Ibid,  book  ii.  chap.  10.  p.  77, 
Vol..  IL  *  I 


66  Immoral  Customs  among  the  Chinese      Part  II. 

that  though  they  carry  a  fair  appearance,  and  "  are  exqui- 
site at  concealing  the  mortal  hatred  they  bear  any  man  for 
several  years,  yet,  when  an  opportunity  offers,  they  give 
full  vent  to  it.  It  often  happens,  that  in  law  suits,  the  de- 
fendant hangs  himself,  only  to  ruin  and  avenge  himself  of 
the  plaintiff:  for  when  he  is  hanged,  all  his  kindred  repair 
to  the  judge,  complaining  that  he  hanged  himself  to  avoid 
the  trouble  and  vexation  the  plaintiff  put  him  to,  having  no 
other  remedy  left  him.  Then  all  join  against  the  plaintiff, 
and  the  judge  among  them;  and  they  never  give  over,  till 
they  ruin  him  and  his  family  (2)."  Father  Trigaltius,  and 
from  him  Cornelius  a  Lapide,  say,  concerning  the  Chinese, 
that  "they  wonderfully  follow  the  track  of  nature  and  rea- 
son, and  are  courteous,  and  apt  to  learn,  as  well  as  ingeni- 
ous and  great  politicians,  and  therefore  very  capable  of 
Christian  wisdom,'*  &c.  F.  Navarette,  who  mentions  this, 
remarks  upon  it,  that  "  if  their  being  so  addicted  to  super- 
stitions, sodomy,  fraud,  lying,  pride,  covetousness,  sensu- 
ality, and  other  vices,  is  following  the  course  of  nature  and 
reason,  then  that  father  was  in  the  right  («)."  To  what  has 
been  produced  from  F.  Navarette,  I  would  add,  that  an 
author  of  great  reputation  for  political  knowledge  has  ob- 
served, that  "  the  Chinese,  whose  whole  life  is  entirely  go- 
verned by  the  established  rites,  are  the  most  void  of  com- 


(2)  Navarette's  Account  of  the  Empire  of  China,  book  i.  chap. 
20.  p.'  47.  What  Navarette  here  says  concerning  the  litigiousness 
of  the  Chinese,  is  confirmed  by  the  testimony  of  the  Jesuits,  who 
compiled  the  Scientia  Sinesis  Latine  exposita.  They  observe 
that  there  is  an  infinite  numi3er  of  law  suits  in  China,  and  every 
where  a  thousand  arts  of  cheating,  of  which  all  the  tribunals  are 
full.  "  Infinitus  litium  et  uiigantium  in  Chin^  hodie  est  nu- 
merus;  mille  passim  failendi  fingendive,  artes,  quibus  tribunalia 
omnia  plena  sunt."  Scient.  Sin.  lib.  i.  p.  12. 

(a)  Ibid,  book  v.  p.  173. 


I 


Chap.  IV.     and  other  antient  Heathen  Nations.  67 

mon  honesty  of  any  people  upon  earth;— le  peuple  le  plus 
fourbe  de  la  terre;"  and  that  the  laws,  though  they  do  not 
allow  them  to  rob  or  to  spoil  hy  violence,  yet  permit  them 
to  cheat  and  to  defraud  (^).  Agreeable  to  this  is  the  charac- 
ter given  of  them  in  Lord  Anson's  Voyages,  where  there 
are  striking  instances  of  the  general  disposition  that  is 
among  them  to  commit  all  kinds  of  fraud. 

It  were  easy  to  produce  several  other  laws  and  customs 
of  different  nations  contrary  to  the  rules  of  morality.  Some 
nations  there  have  been,  among  whom  theft  and  robbery 
were  accounted  honourable.  Others  gave  a  full  indulgence 
by  law  to  all  manner  of  impurity  and  licentiousness,  both  in 
men  and  women.  Others,  as  the  Persians,  allowed  the  most 
incestuous  mixtures.  And  there  were  several  nations,  among 
whom  it  was  usual  to  expose  and  destroy  their  nearest 
friends  and  relatives,  and  even  their  parents,  when  they 
grew  old  and  very  sick,  esteeming  those  to  be  most  misera- 
ble that  died  a  natural  death  (c).  Eusebius  gives  several 
other  instances  of  absurd  and  immoral  laws  and  customs, 
which  obtained  among  many  people  before  the  light  of  the 


(b)  L'Esprit  des  Loix,  vol.  I.  liv.  xix.  chap.  17.  p.  437.  et  ibid, 
chap.  20.  p.  440,  441.  edit.  Edinb. 

(c)  The  author  of  a  late  periodical  paper,  published  at  Paris, 
entituled,  Le  Conservateur,  pleads  in  favour  of  the  laws  of  those 
nations,  which  ordered  old  and  infirm  persons  to  be  put  to  death. 
He  pretends,  that  there  is  nothing  in  this  but  what  is  conform- 
able to  reason,  though  he  owns  it  is  not  reconcileable  to  the 
Gospel.  And  he  thinks  it  would  be  fit  and  reasonable,  to  deter- 
mine by  law  the  term  beyond  which  persons  should  not  be  suf- 
fered to  live.  Le  Conservateur  for  March  1757,  as  cited  by  the 
Abbe  Gauchet,  in  his  Lettres  Critiques.  An  instancejhis,  among 
many  others  that  might  be  mentioned,  of  the  extravagances  men 
are  apt  to  fall  into,  through  a  high  opinion  of  ^heir  own  reason. 


08  Farther  Instances  of  immoral  Laws  and    Part  II. 

Gospel  shone  amongst  them.  But  he  observes,  that  no 
sooner  did  any  of  them  embrace  Christianity',  but  they 
abandoned  those  laws  and  customs,  which  nothing  could 
prevail  with  them  to  do  before.  And  this  he  justly  men^ 
tions  as  a  proof  of  the  happy  effects  produced  by  the  Gos^ 
pel,  in  reforming  the  manners  of  men  (d)» 

The  same  learned  father  has  a  long  extract  from  Barde* 
panes,  an  eminent  antient  writer,  concerning  the  various 
customs  and  laws  in  different  nations,,  partly  written,  and 
partly  unwritten,  some  of  which  were  good  and  laudable, 
others  of  an  immoral  nature  and  tendency.  It  is  too  long  to 
be  transcribed  here,  but  may  be  seen  in  the  sixth  book  of 
Eusebius's  Evangelical  Preparation,  cap.  10.  p.  175.  etseq. 
The  reader  may  also  consult  Sextus  Empiricus,  Pyrrhon* 
Hypotyp.  lib.  iii.  cap.  24.  and  a  modern  author,  who  has 
made  a  large  collection  of  absurd  and  shameful  laws  and 
customs  in  several  nations,  antient  and  modern,  especially 
such  as  tend  to  encourage  all  manner  of  lewdness  and  de- 
bauchery (e).  It  is  easy  to  observe  that  this  last -mentioned 
writer  enlarges  upon  some  of  those  laws  and  customs  which 
are  contrary  to  all  the  rules  of  modesty  and  purity,  in  a 
manner  which  shews  that  he  is  far  from  disapproving  them, 
^nd  seems  rather  to  recommend  them  as  models  of  a  wise 
legislation.  We  may  see  by  this  what  fine  systems  of  legis- 
lation might  be  expected  from  some  of  those,  who  make 
the  highest  pretences  to  an  extraordinary  sagacity;  and  what 
an  advantage  it  is,  not  to  be  left  merely  to  what  men's  boast- 
ed reason,  which  is  too  often  guided  and  influenced  by  their 
passions,  would  be  apt  to  dictate  in  morals. 
'    J  shall  conclude  what  relates  to  the  laws  and  customs  of 


(d)  Praepar.  Evangel,  lib.  i.  cap.  4.  p.  11,  12.  edit.  Paris. 
(^e)  L'Esprit,  tome  I.  disc.  2.  chap.  14  et  15, 


Chap.  IV.     Customs  among  the  Pagan  Nations,  6^ 

the  Pagan  nations,  with  observing,  that  Lord  Bolingbroke, 
who,  as  hath  been  already  hinted,  seems  to  lay  the  principal 
stress  on  human  laws,  as  furnishing  the  most  effectual  means 
for  promoting  and  securing  the  practice  of  virtue,  yet  has 
thought  fit  to  own,  that  "  the  law  of  nature  has  been  blend- 
ed with  many  absurd  and  contradictory  laws  in  all  ages  and 
countries,  as  well  as  with  customs,  which,  if  they  were  in- 
dependent on  laws,  have  obtained  the  force  of  laws  (y)." 
The  same  noble  writer,  who  frequently  represents  the  law 
of  nature  as  universally  clear  and  obvious  to  all  mankind, 
has  made  this  remarkable  acknowledgment,  that  "  the  law 
of  nature  is  hid  from  our  sight  by  all  the  variegated  clouds 
of  civil  laws  and  customs.  Some  gleams  of  true  light  may 
be  seen  through  them,  but  they  render  it  a  dubious  light, 
and  it  can  be  no  better  to  those  who  have  the  keenest  sight, 
till  those  interpositions  are  removed  (^)»"  It  may  not  be 
improper  here  to  add  a  passage  or  two  from  a  celebrated 
antient,  relating  to  civil  laws.  Cicero  declares,  that  "  the 
commands  and  prohibitions  of  human  laws  have  not  a  suf- 
ficient force,  either  to  engage  men  to  right  actions,  or  avert 
them  from  bad  ones. — Intelligi  sic  oportet,  jussa  ac  vetita 
populorum  vim  non  habere  ad  recte  facta  vocandi,  et  a 
peccatis  avocandi  (A)."  And  he  pronounces,  that  "  it  would 
be  the  greatest  folly  to  imagine,  that  all  those  things  are 
just  which  are  contained  in  popular  institutions  and  laws.-^ 
lUud  stultissimum  existimare  omnia  justa  esse,  quae  sita 
sunt  in  populorum  institutis  aut  legibus  (?)." 

Thus  it  appears,  with  great  evidence,  that  the  civil  laws 


(/)  Bolingbroke's  Works,  vol.  V.  p.  15.  edit.  4to, 
\g)  Ibid.  vol.  V.  p.  105.  edit.  4to. 
(/j)  De  Leg.  lib.  ii.  cap.  4. 
{i)  Lib.  i.  cap.  15. 


70  Farther  Instances  of  immoral  Laws  and    Part  II. 

and  constitutions  in  the  Pagan  world  were  far  from  afford- 
ing a  safe  and  certain  rule,  which  might  be  depended  upon, 
for  the  direction  of  the  people  in  moral  duty. 

As  to  the  mysteries  of  which  a  very  eminent  writer  has 
made  a  beautiful  representation,  as  an  excellent  expedient 
contrived  by  the  legislators  and  civil  magistrates,  for  re- 
claiming the  people  from  their  idolatry  and  polytheism,  and 
engaging  them  to  a  life  of  the  strictest  virtue,  I  need  nof 
here  add  any  thing  to  what  is  offered  on  this  subject  in  the 
former  volume  (i).  It  is  there  shewn,  that  there  is  no  suf- 
ficient reason  to  think  that  the  mysteries  were  intended  to 
detect  the  error  of  the  vulgar  polytheism,  but  rather,  on  the 
contrary,  by  striking  shows  and  representations,  to  create  a 
greater  awe  and  veneration  for  the  religion  of  their  country.  - 
And  as  to  morals,  notwithstanding  the  high  pretensions  of 
some  Pagan  writers,  especially  after  Christianity  had  made 
some  progress,  it  does  not  appear,  that  the  original  design 
of  them  went  farther,  than  the  humanizing  and  civilizing 
the  people,  and  encouraging  tht-m  to  the  practice  of  those 
virtues,  and  deterring  them  from  those  vices,  which  more 
immediately  affect  society.  It  will  scarce,  I  believe,  be  pre- 
tended, that  admitting  the  most  favourable  account  of  the 
mysteries,  the  people  were  there  instructed  in  a  complete 
body  of  morals.  But  the  truth  is,  there  were  great  defects 
and  faults  in  the  original  constitution  of  them,  which  na- 
turally gave  occasion  to  corruptions  and  abuses,  which  be- 
gan early,  and  continued  long;  so  that  it  is  to  be  feared,  the 
mysteries,  as  they  were  managed,  greatly  contributed  to  that 
amazing  depravation  of  manners,  which,  like  a  deluge, 
overspread  the  Pagan  world.  It  is  observed  by  the  cele- 
brated author  above  referred  to,  that  "  God,  in  punishment 


(At)  See  vol.  I.  chap.  viii.  and  ix. 


Chap.  IV.     Customs  among  the  Pagan  Nations.  71 

*  for  their  turning  his  Truth  into  a  lie,'  suffered  their  mys- 
teries, which  they  erected  for  a  school  of  virtue,  to  dege- 
nerate into  an  odious  sink  of  vice  and  immorality,  giving 
them  up  unto  all  uncleanness  and  vile  affections  (/)." 


(/)  Divine  Legation  of  Moses,  vol.  I.  book  ii,  sect.  4.  p.  196, 
marginal  note,  edit.  4th. 


72  Concerning  Morality  PartIL 


CHAPTER  V. 

Concerning  morality  as  taught  by  the  antient  Heathen  philosophers.  Some  of 
them  said  excellent  things  concerning  moral  virtue,  and  their  writings  might 
in  several  respects  be  of  great  use.  But  they  could  not  furnish  a  perfect  rule 
of  morals,  that  had  sufficient  certainty,  clearness,  and  authority.  No  one 
philosopher,  or  sect  of  i)hilosoi)hcrs,  can  be  absolutely  depended  upon  as  a 
proper  guide  in  matters  of  morality.  Nor  is  a  complete  system  of  morals  to  be 
extracted  from  the  writings  of  them  ali  collectively  considered.  The  vanity  of 
such  an  attempt  shewn.  Their  sentiments,  how  excellent  soever,  could  not 
properly  pass  for  laws  to  mankind. 

T  HOUGH  the  civil  laws  and  constitutions,  or  those  cus- 
toms which  obtained  the  force  of  laws,  in  the  Heathen 
world,  could  not  furnish  out  a  rule  of  morality,  which 
might  be  depended  upon,  to  guide  men  to  the  true  know-= 
ledge  and  practice  of  moral  duty  in  its  just  extent;  yet  it 
may  be  alleged,  that  the  instructions  and  precepts  of  the 
philosophers  were,  if  duly  attended  to,  sufficient  for  that 
purpose.  This  is  what  many  have  insisted  on,  to  shew  that 
there  was  no  need  of  an  extraordinary  Divine  Revelation  to 
give  men  a  complete  rule  of  moral  duty.  It  is  well  known 
what  praises  many  of  the  antients  have  bestowed  on  philo- 
sophy, and  that  they  have  particularly  extolled  its  great 
usefulness  and  excellency  with  regard  to  morals.  Cicero  has 
several  remarkable  passages  to   this  purpose  (w).  He  says 


(m)  «  Cultura  animi  philosophia  est,  haec  extrahit  vitia  radi- 
citus:  est  profecto  animi  medicina  philosophia,  medetur  animis: 
ab  ea,  si.et  boni  et  beati  volumus  esse,  omnia  adjumenta  et  aux- 
ilia  petemus  bene  beateque  vivendi:  vilioruni  peccatorumque 
nostrorum,  omnis  a  philosophia  petenda  correciio  est.  O  vitae 
philosophia  dux!  virtutis  indagatrix,  expultrixque  vitiorum! 
Quid  non  modo  nos,  sed  omnino  vita  hominum,  sine  te  esse  po- 
tuissetl  Tu  inventrix  legum,  tu  magistra  morum  et  disciplinag 


Chap.  V.     as  taught  by  the  Heathen  Philosophers,  73 

that  "  philosophy  is  the  culture  of  the  mind,  and  plucketh 
up  vice  by  the  roots;  that  it  is  the  medicine  of  the  soul,  and 
healeth  the  minds  of  men:  that  from  thence,  if  we  would 
be  good  and  happy,  we  may  draw  all  proper  helps  and  as- 
sistances for  leading  virtuous  and  happy  livest  that  the  cor- 
rection of  all  our  vices  and  sins  is  to  be  sought  for  from 
philosophy."  And  he  breaks  forth  into  that  rapturous  en 
comium  upon  it:  "  O  philosophy,  the  guide  of  life!  the 
searcher  out  of  virtue,  and  expeller  of  vice!  What  should 
we  be,  nay,  what  would  the  human  life  be  without  thee! 
Thou  wast  the  inventress  of  laws,  the  mistress  or  teacher  of 
manners  and  discipline.  To  thee  we  flee:  from  thee  we  beg 
assistance.  And  one  day  spent  according  to  thy  precepts  is 
preferable  to  an  immortality  spent  in  sin."  Seneca  says,  that 
*'  philosophy  is  the  study  of  virtue  (72)."  And  some  of  the 
moderns  have'  come  little  behind  the  antients,  in  the  admi- 
ration they  have  expressed  for  the  Heathen  moral  philoso- 
phy. 

I  am  far  from  endeavouring  to  detract  from  the  praises 
which  are  justly  due  to  the  antient  philosophers  and  moral- 
ists among  the  Pagans.  Admirable  passages  are  to  be  found 
in  their  writings.  They  speak  nobly  concerning  the  dignity 
and  beauty  of  virtue,  and  the  tendency  it  hath  to  promote 
the  perfection  and  happiness  of  the  human  nature:  and  con- 
cerning the  turpitude  and  deformity  of  vice,  and  the  misery 
that  attends  it.  They  give  useful  and  excellent  directions 
as  to  many  particular  virtues,  and  shew  the  reasons  upon 


fuisti.  Ad  te  confugimus:  a  te  opem  petemus.  Est  autem  unus 
dies  bene  et  ex  praeceptis  tuis  actus,  peccanti  inimortalitati  an- 
teponendus."  See  Cicero  Tuscul.  Dibput.  lib.  ii.  cap.  4  et  5.  lib. 
iii.  cap.  3.  lib.  iv.  cap.  38.  but  especially  ibid.  lib.  v.  cap.  2. 

(n)  "  Philosophia   studium  virtutis   est."  Sen.   epist.   89.  et 
epist.  90. 

Vol.  II.  K  ' 


74      Pretence  that  the  Gospel  Moral  Duty  was      Part  II. 

which  they  are  founded,  in  a  manner  which  tends  to  recom- 
mend them  to  the  esteem  and  practice  of  mankind.  And  I 
doubt  not  some  of  them  were  useful  instruments  under  the 
direction  and  assistance  of  Divine  Providence,  for  preserv- 
ing among  men  an  esteem  and  approbation  of  virtue,  for 
strengthening  and  improving  their  moral  sense,  and  giving 
them,  in  many  instances,  a  clearer  discernment  of  the  moral 
reasons  and  differences  of  things. 

But  it  will  by  no  means  follow  from  this,  that  therefore 
mankind  stood  in  no  need  of  a  Divine  Revelation,  to  set  be- 
fore them  a  clear  and  certain  rule  of  duty,  in  its  just  extent, 
and  enforce  it  upon  them  by  a  Divine  Authority.  It  hath 
been  confidently  asserted,  by  those  that  extol  what  they  call 
Natural  Religion  in  opposition  to  Revelation,  that  *'  there 
is  no  one  moral  virtue,  which  has  not  been  taught,  explained 
and  proved  by  the  Heathen  philosophers,  both  occasionally 
and  purposely."  And  that  "  there  is  no  moral  precept  in  the 
whole  Gospel,  which  was  not  taught  by  the  philosophers 
(o)."  The  same  thing  has  been  said  by  other  writers  of  a 
different  character,  and  who  assert  the  Divine  Original  and 
and  Authority  of  the  Gospel  Revelation.  The  learned  Dr. 
Meric  Casaubon,  in  his  preface  to  his  translation  of  Antoni- 
nus's  Meditations,  expresses  himself  thus:  ''  I  must  needs 
sav,  that  if  we  esteem  that  natural,  which  natural  men  of 
best  account,  by  the  mere  strength  of  human  reason,  hav^e 
taught  and  taken  upon  them  to  maintain  as  just  and  reason- 
able, I  know  not  any  evangelical  precept  or  duty,  belonging 
to  a  Christian's  practice  *  (even   the  harshest,   and   those 


(o)  Bolingbroke's  Works,  Vol.  V.  p.  205,  206.  218.  Edit. 
4to. 

(*)  I  cannot  but  regard  it  as  a  rash  thing  in  any  Christian 
Divine  to  say,  as  Df.  Casaubon  here  does,  that  "  there  is  not  one 
evangelical  precept  or  duty  belonging  to  a  Christian's  practice" 


Chap.  V.     taught  by  the  Philosophers  examined,  tS 

that  seem  to  ordinary  men  most  contrary  to  flesh  and  blood 
not  excepted)  but  upon  due  search  and  examination  will 
prove  of  that  nature."  In  like  ^manner,  another  learned  and 
ingenious  writer  has  lately  asserted,  that  "  there  is  not  any 
one  principle,  or  any  one  practice  of  morality,  which  may 
not  be  known  by  Natural  Reason  without  Revelation.  By 
Reason  we  may  come  at  a  certainty  of  the  existence  of  God, 
and  of  his  Providence,  his  Justice,  Mercy,  and  Truth:  by 
that  we  may  trace  out  our  duty  to  him,  and  may  discover 
a  future  state  of  rewards  and  punishments:  by  that  we  may 
come  at  the  knowledge  of  such  truths  as  relate  to  our 
neighbours,  and  the  corresponding  duties  to  them:  what  we 
are  to  do  in  social  life;  how  we  are  to  behave  towards  go- 


but  what  natural  men,  by  the  mere  strength  of  human  reason, 
have  taught  and  taken  upon  them  to  maintain  as  just  and  reason- 
able; since  all  that  believe  the  Gospel  must  own,  that  there  is  a 
part  of  duty  which  necessarily  enters  into  the  evangelical  moral- 
ity, and  belongs  to  the  Christian  practice,  which  yet  cannot  be 
pretended  to  have  been  taught  by  the  antient  Pagan  Moralists; 
and  that  is,  that  part  of  Christian  practice  which  immediately 
ariseth  from  the  discoveries  made  to  us  in  the  Gospel  of  the 
Work  of  our  Redemption:  e.g.  the  duties  of  Love,  Affiancci 
Subjection,  and  Obedience,  which  we  owe  to  our  Lord  and  Sa- 
viour Jesus  Christ,  and  which  are  of  such  importance,  that  the 
Christian  life  is  represented  as  a  living  to  him  who  died  for  us 
and  rose  again.  To  which  it  may  be  added,  that  the  living  by 
that  faith  which  is  the  substance  of  things  hoped  for,  and  the 
evidence  of  things  not  seen,  and  the  seeking  and  minding  the 
thint^s  which  are  above,  did  not,  in  any  of  the  Pagan  systems  of 
morality,  before  the  coming  of  our  Saviour,  necessarily  enter 
into  a  good  man*s  character;  whereas  it  must  be  now  acknow- 
ledged to  be  essential  to  the  Christian  life,  and^a  necessary 
branch  of  Gospel  holiness.  Some  other  instances  of  evangelical 
duty  will  come  to  be  considered  afterwards,  which  were  riot  pre- 
scribed by  the  best  moralists  among  the  antient  Pagans. 


7Q        Pretence  that  the  Gospel  Moral  Duty  xvas     Part  II. 

vernors,  and  what  obedience  is  to  be  paid  in  the  civil  state; 
wherein  true  happiness  consists,  and  what  it  is  that  must 
lead  to  it;  and  what  we  ought  to  do  in  our  private  relations. 
These  and  such  like  points  may  be  traced  out  by  Natural 
Reason;  nor  do  I  know  of  any  one  point  of  duty  towards 
God  or  man,  but  what  reason  will  suggest,  and  supply  us 
with  proper  motives  to  do  it  (/>)."  He  afterwards  observes, 
that  "  as  the  powers  of  reason  are  sufficient  in  themselves 
to  discover  all  and  every  duty,  and  likewise  to  discover 
proper  and  sufficient  motives  to  do  them.  Revelation  may- 
add  many  more;  and  if  so,  it  must  be  deemed  by  them  that 
have  it  a  singular  advantage  (^)."  We  see  here,  that  this 
learned  writer  asserts,  that  the  powers  of  reason  alone,  with- 
out any  assistance  from  Revelation,  are  sufficient  to  discov- 
er all  and  every  duty  towards  God,  our  neighbours,  and 
ourselves,  and  also  to  supply  proper  and  sufficient  motives 
to  do  them:  and  all  that  he  leaves  to  Divine  Revelation,  is 
not  to  make  a  discovery  of  any  part  of  our  duty,  but  only 
to  furnish  some  additional  motives  to  duty,  besides  what 
the  light  of  our  own  unassisted  reason  is  able  of  itself  to 
discover.  I  readily  allow,  that  if  Revelation  did  no  more 
than  this,  it  would  yet  be  of  great  advantage  to  those  that 
have  it,  and  what  they  ought  to  be  very  thankful  to  the  Di- 
vine Goodness  for.  But  I  cannot  think  this  is  all  the  bene- 
fit we  have  by  Divine  Revelation,  and  that  it  gives  us  no 
knowledge  or  information  with  respect  to  any  part  of  the 
duty  required  of  us,  but  what  the  light  of  Natural  Reason 
was  able  clearly  and  certainly  to  discover,  and  actually  did 
discover  by  its  own  unassisted  strength.  I  join  with  the 
learned  Doctor  in  the  declaration  he   makes,   that   "  there 


(fi)  Dr.  Sykes's  Principles  and  Connection  of  Natural  and  Re- 
vealed Religion,  p.  108,  109. 
(q)  Ibid.  p.  110. 


Chap.  V.      taught  by  the  Philosophers  examined,  *;i*j 

can  be  no  surer  way  of  knowing  what  Reason  can  discover, 
and  what  not,  than  by  examining  what  proficiency  was  ac- 
tually made  in  moral  knowlrfdge,  by  those  who  lived  where 
Revelation  was  unknown  (r)."  Let  us  therefore  put  it  to 
this  issue.  But  then  it  is  to  be  observed,  that  there  is  one 
capital  mistake,  which  runs  through  all  that  this  very  in- 
genious and  able  writer,  and  others  of  the  same  sentiments, 
have  advanced  on  this  head;  and  that  is,  that  they  take  it 
for  granted,  that  whatever  the  Heathen  moralists  and  phi- 
losophers have  taught  with  regard  to  religion,  or  any  part 
of  duty,  they  discovered  it  merely  by  an  effort  of  their  own 
reason,  without  any  light  derived  from  Revelation  at  all. 
But  this  is  impossible  for  them  to  prove.  There  is  just 
ground  to  believe,  as  has  been  shewn,  that  the  knowledge 
of  the  one  true  God,  the  Creator  of  the  World,  and  of  the 
main  principles  of  religion  and  morality,  were  originally 
communicated  by  Divine  Revelation  to  the  first  parents  and 
ancestors  of  the  human  race,  and  from  them  transmitted 
to  their  descendants;  some  traces  of  which  still  continued, 
and  were  never  utterly  extinguished  in  the  Heathen  world. 
Besides  which,  the  chief  articles  of  moral  duty  were  deli- 
vered and  promulgated  with  a  most  amazing  solemnity,  by  an 
express  Divine  Revelation,  to  a  whole  nation,  and  commit- 
ted to  writing,  before  any  of  those  philosophers,  who  are  so 
much  admired,  published  their  moral  discourses.  And  it 
is  well  known,  that  many  of  those  great  men  travelled  into 
countries  bordering  upon  Judea,  in  order  to  gain  knowledge, 
especially  in  matters  of  religion  and  morality.  And  those 
of  that  nation  were  pretty  early  spread  abroad  in  several 
parts  of  the  Pagan  world.  This  learned  author  himself  ac- 


(r)  Dr.  Sykes's  Principles  and  Connexion  of  Natural  and  Re- 
vealed Religion,  p.  109. 


7S       Pretence  that  the  Gospel  Moral  Duty  was     Part  II. 

knowledges,  that  the  wisest  men  in  Greece  travelled  into 
Egypt,  that  they  might  come  at  the  knowledge  of  the 
unity  of  God;  so  that  they  did  not  attain  merely  by  the 
force  of  their  own  unassisted  reason,  to  the  knowledge  of 
that  which  he  himself  affirms  to  be  the  fundamental  princi- 
ple of  all  morality  (s).  To  which  it  may  be  added,  that 
some  of  the  most  eminent  of  those  philosophers  were  sen- 
sible of  the  great  need  they  stood  in  of  a  Divine  Assistance, 
to  lead  them  into  the  right  knowledge  of  religion  and  their 
duty,  and  frequently  take  notice  of  antient  and  venerable 
traditions,  to  which  they  refer,  and  which  they  suppose  to 
have  been  of  divine  original. 

But  if  we  should  grant  that  they  had  all,  which  they 
taught  in  relation  to  religion  and  morals,  purely  by  their 
own  reason,  it  is  far  from  being  true  that  there  is  not  any 
any  one  evangelical  precept,  or  point  of  moral  duty,  taught 
and  enforced  in  the  Gospel,  that  was  not  taught  by  the  Hea- 
then philosophers.  I  shall  at  present  only  instance  in  one, 
which  is  of  very  great  importance;  it  is  that  precept  men- 
tioned by  our  Saviour,  "  Thou  shalt  worship  the  Lord  thy 
God,  and  him  only  shalt  thou  serve."  Matt.  iv.  10.  The 
philosophers  were  universally  wrong,  both  in  conforming 
themselves,  and  urging  it  as  a  duty  upon  the  people  to  con- 
form in  their  religious  worship,  to  the  rites  and  laws  of 
their  several  countries,  by  which  polytheism  was  establish- 
ed, and  the  public  worship  was  directed  to  a  multiplicity  of 
deities.  This  was  a  grand  defect,  and  spread  confusion  and 
error  'through  that  part  of  duty  which  relates  to  the  exer- 
cises of  piety  towards  God,  which  some  of  the  philosophers 
themselves  acknowledged  to  be  an  essential  branch  of  mo- 


(5)  Dr.  Sykes's  Principles  and  Connection  of  Natural  and 
Revealed  Religion,  p.  383. 


Chap.  V.     taught  by  the  Philosophers  examined.  79 

rality.  I  shall  have  occasion  afterwards,  in  the  course  of  this 
work,  to  take  notice  of  some  other  evangelical  precepts 
which  were  not  taught  by  the  philosophers. 

But,  not  to  insist  upon  this  at  present,  I  would  observe, 
that  it  cannot  reasonably  be  pretended,  that  a  complete  sys- 
tem of  morality,  in  its  just  extent,  and  without  any  mate- 
rial defect,  is  to  be  found  in  the  writings  of  any  one  phi- 
losopher, or  sect  of  philosophers.  The  utmost  that  can  be 
alleged  with  any  shew  of  reason  is,  that  there  is  no  one 
moral  duty  prescribed  in  the  Gospel,  but  which  may  pos- 
sibly be  found  in  the  writings  of  some  or  other  of  the  an- 
tient  Pagan  philosophers.  But  if  this  were  so,  what  use  or 
force  could  this  be  supposed  to  have  with  respect  to  the 
people,  or  the  bulk  of  mankind?  Must  they  be  put  to  seek 
out  their  duty  amidst  the  scattered  volumes  of  philosophers 
and  moralists,  and  to  pick  out,  every  man  for  himself,  that 
which  seemeth  to  him  to  be  the  best  in  each  of  them?  Or,  if 
any  one  philosopher  should  undertake  to  do  it  for  the  peo- 
ple, and  select  out  of  them  all  a  system  of  morals,  which  in 
his  opinion  would  be  a  complete  rule  of  duty,  upon  what 
foundation  could  this  pass  for  a  code  of  laws,  obligatory  on 
all  mankind,  or  even  on  any  particular  nation  or  person,  un- 
less enforced  by  some  superior  authority?  Mr.  Locke  has 
expressed  this  so  happily,  that  I  cannot  give  my  sense  of  it 
better  than  in  his  words.  Speaking  of  moral  precepts,  he 
saith,  "  Supposing  they  may  be  picked  up  here  and  there, 
some  from  Solon  and  Bias  in  Greece,  others  from  Tally  in 
Italy,  and  to  complete  the  whole,  let  Confucius  as  far  as 
China  be  consulted,  and  Anacharsis  the  Scythian  contribute 
his  share;  what  will  all  this  do  to  give  the  world  a  complete 
morality,  that  may  be  to  mankind  the  unqut-stionable  rule 
of  life  and  manners?  Did  the  saying  of  Aristippus  or  Con- 
fucius give  it  an  authority?  Was  Zeno  a  lawgivt-r  to  man- 
kind? If  not,  what  he  or  any  other  philosopher  delivered 


80  The  Sentiments  of  the  Philosophers     Part  IL 

was  but  a  saying  of  his.  Mankind  might  hearken  to  it  or 
reject  it  as  they  pleased,  or  as  suited  their  interests,  pas- 
sions, inclinations,  or  humours,  if  they  were  under  no  obli- 
gation {t)y 

Let  us  suppose  that  the  lessons  and  instructions  given  by 
philosophers  and  moralists,  with  respect  to  any  particular 
duty,  appear  to  be  fit  and  reasonable,  this  is  not  alone  suffi- 
cient to  give  them  a  binding  force.  A  thing  may  appear  to 
be  agreeable  to  reason,  and  yet  there  may  be  inducements 
and  motives  on  the  other  side,  which  may  keep  the  mind 
suspended,  except  there  be  an  higher  authority  to  turn  the 
scale.  The  observation  which  Grotius  applies  to  a  particular 
case,  holds  of  many  others.  That  "that  which  has  less 
utility  is  not  merely  for  that  reason  unlawful:  and  it  may 
happen  that  a  more  considerable  utility  may  be  opposed  to 
that  which  we  have  in  view,  whatever  we  suppose  it  to  be. — 
Neque  enim  quod  minus  utile  est  statim  illicitum  est,  adde 
quod  accidere  potest;  ut  huic  qualicunque  utilitati  alia  ma- 
jor utilitas  repugnet  (m)."  In  matters  of  practice,  a  thing 
may  seem  to  be  reasonable,  and  yet  cannot  be  proved  to  be 
certainly  and  necessarily  obligatory.  So  much  may  be  said 
in  opposition  to  it,  as  may  very  much  weaken  the  force  of 
what  was  offered  to  recommend  it:  and  a  prevailing  appe- 
tite  or  worldly  interest  has  often  a  great  influence  on  the 
mind,  and  hinders  it  from  passing  an  impartial  judgment. 
But  a  divine  revelation,  clearly  ascertaining  and  determining 
our  duty  in  those  instances,  in  plain  and  express  terms,  and 
enforcing  it  by  Divine  Authority,  and  by  sanctions  of  re- 
wards and  punishments,  would  decide  the  point,  and  leave 
no  room  to  doubt  of  the  obligation.  A  noble  author,  speak- 


(j)  Locke's  Reasonableness  of  Christianity,  See   his  Works, 
vol.  II.  p.  533.  edit.  3d. 

(m)  Grotius  de  Jure  Belli  et  Pacis,  lib.  ii.  cap.  5.  sect.  12. 


Chap.  V.     were  not  Lazvs  obligatory  upon  Mankind,       81 

ing  of  the  philosophers,  saith,  that  "  some  few  particular 
men  may  discover,  explain,  and  press  upon  others  the  mo- 
ral obligations  incumbent  upon  all,  and  our  moral  state  be 
little  improved  {x)^  And  therefore  he  lays  the  principal 
stress  upon  the  institutions  of  civil  laws  and  governments, 
and  the  various  punishments  which  human  justice  inflicts  to 
enforce  those  laws.  But  how  little  fitted  those  institutions 
are  to  enforce  morality  and  virtue,  taken  in  its  true  notion 
and  proper  extent,  has  been  already  shewn.  The  greatest 
men  of  antiquity  seem  to  have  been  sensible,  that  neither 
bare  reason  and  philosophy,  nor  a  mere  human  authority, 
is  sufficient  to  bind  laws  upon  mankind.  Accordingly,  the 
last  mentioned  author,  who  was  eminent  for  his  political 
knowledge,  has  observed,  that  "  the  most  celebrated  philo- 
sophers and  lawgivers  did  enforce  their  doctrines  and  laws 
by  a  Divine  Authority,  and  call  in  an  higher  principle 
to  the  assistance  of  philosophy  and  bare  reason.  He  instances 
in  Zoroaster,  Kostanes,  the  Magi,  Minos,  Numa,  Pytha- 
goras, and  all  those  who  framed  and  formed  religions  and 
commonwealths,  who  made  these  pretensions,  and  passed 
for  men  divinely  inspired  and  commissioned  (?/)."  And 
these  pretensions,  though  not  vouched  by  sufficient  creden- 
tials, gave  their  laws  and  institutions  a  force  with  the  peo- 
ple, which  otherwise  they  would  not  have  had.  But  as  the 
several  sects  of  philosophers  in  succeeding  ages,  among 
the  Greeks  and  Romans,  only  stood  upon  the  foot  of  their 
own  reasoning,  and  could  not  pretend  to  a  Divine  Autho- 
rity, this  ver}^  much  weakened  the  effect  of  their  moral  les- 
sons and  precepts.  And,  indeed,  the  best  and  wisest  among 
them  acknowledged  on  several  occasions,  the  need  they 
stood  in  of  a  Divine  Revelation  and    Instruction.  That  the 


{x)  Bolinghroke's  Works,  Vol.  V.  p.  480. 

(v)  Ibid.  p.  227. 

Vol.  II.  L 


$?         The  Sentiments  of  the  Philosophers^  £s?c.     Part  IL 

philosophers  in  general  had  no  great  weight  with  the  people, 
appears  from  what  is  observed  in  the  first  volume  of  this 
work,  chap.  10.  To  which  it  may  be  added,  that  Cicero, 
after  having  given  the  highest  encomiums  on  philosophy, 
especially  as  the  best  guide  in  morals,  adds,  that  "  it  is  so 
far  from  being  esteemed  and  praised,  according  to  what  it 
merits  of  human  life,  that  it  is  by  the  mobt  of  mankind  ne- 
glected, and  by  many  even  reproached. — Philosophia  qui- 
dem  tantum  abest,  ut  proinde  ac  de  hominum  est  vita  me- 
rita,  laudetur,  ut  a  plerisque  neglecta,  a  multis  etiam  vitu- 
peretur  (2)." 


(2)  Tuscul.  Disput.  lib.  v.  cap.  2.  p.  344.  edit.  Davis. 


u 


CHAPTER  VI. 

Many  of  the  philosophers  were  fundamentally  wrong  in  the  first  principles  of 
morals.  They  denied  that  there  are  any  moral  differences  of  things  founded 
in  nature  and  reason,  and  resolved  them  wholly  into  human  laws  and  customs. 
Observations  on  those  philosophers  who  made  man's  chief  good  consist  in  plea- 
sure, and  proposed  this  as  the  highest  end  of  morals,  without  any  regard  to  a 
Divine  Law.  The  moral  system  of  Epicurus  considered.  His  high  pretences 
to  virtue  examined.  The  inconsistency  of  his  principles  shewn,  and  that,  if 
pursued  to  their  genuine  consequences,  they  are  really  destructive  of  all  virtue 
and  good  morals. 

JMORAL  philosophy,  properly  speaking,  had  its  beginning^ 
among  the  Greeks  with  Socrates.  Cicero  says,  "  he  was  the 
first  that  called  down  philosophy  from  heaven,  and  intro- 
duced it  into  cities  and  private  houses,  and  obliged  it  to 
make  life  and  manners  the  subject  of  its  enquiries.— Primus 
philosophiam  devocavit  a  coelo,  et  in  urbibus  coUocavit,  et 
in  domus  etiam  introduxit,  et  ccegit  de  vita  et  moribus,  re-* 
busque  bonis  et  malis  quserere  («)•"  Not  that  he  was  the 
first  philosopher  that  ever  treated  of  morals,  but,  as  the 
same  great  man  elsewhere  observes,  Socrates  was  the  first 
that,  quitting  abstruse  disquisitions  into  natural  things,  and 
curious  speculations  about  the  heavenly  bodies  (which  had 
principally  employed  all  the  philosophers  before  him)  as 
being  things  too  remote  from  our  knowledge,  or  if  known, 
of  little  use  to  direct  men's  conduct,  brought  philosophy 
into  common  life,  and  made  virtues  and  vices,  things  good 
and  evil,  the  only  object  of  his  philosophy  (b).  From  his 
time  the  science  of  morals  was  cultivated.  All  the  different 


(a)  Tuscul.  Disput.  lib.  v.  cap.  4, 
(6)  Academic,  lib,  ir  cap,  4. 


84  Many  of  the  Philosophers  were  wrong     Part  II. 

sects  of  philosophers  treated  of  morality,  but  they  went 
upon  very  different  principles. 

Some  of  the  philosophers  were  wrong  in  the  very  funda- 
mental principles  of  morals.  And  since  the  foundation  was 
wrong,  they  could  not  build  upon  it  a  proper  system,  nor  be 
depended  upon  for  leading  mankind  into  right  notions  of 
their  duty.  Such  were  those  who  maintained,  that  nothing 
is  just  or  unjust  by  nature,  but  only  by  law  and  custom. 
This  was  the  opinion,  as  Laertius  informs  us,  of  Theodorus, 
Archelaus,  Aristippus,  and  others.  This  way  also  went 
Pyrrho,  and  all  the  sceptics,  who  denied  that  any  thing  is 
in  itself,  and  by  its  own  nature,  honest  or  dishonest,  base 
or  honourable,  but  only  by  virtue  of  the  laws  and  customs 
which  have  obtainLcl  among  men:  for  which  they  are  de- 
servedly exposed  by  Epictetus  (c).  Plato  represents  it  as  a 
fashionable  opinion,  which  very  much  prevailed  in  his  time, 
and  was  maintained  and  propagated  by  many  that  were  es- 
teemed wise  men  and  philosophers,  "  That  the  things  which 
are  accounted  just,  are  not  so  by  nature:  for  that  men  are 
always  differing  about  them,  and  making  new  constitutions: 
and  as  often  as  they  are  thus  constituted  they  obtain  autho- 
rity, being  made  just  by  art  and  by  the  laws,  not  by  any 
natural  force  or  virtue  (^)." 

Thus  did  many  of  the  philosophers  resolve  all  moral  ob- 
ligations into  merely  human  laws  and  constitutions,  making 
them  the  only  measure  of  right  and  wrong,  of  good  and  evil. 


(c)  Epictet.  Dissert,  lib.  ii.  cap.  20.  sect  6.  Our  modern  scep- 
tics, as  well  as  the  ancient,  set  themselves  to  shew  the  uncer- 
tainty of  morals.  Mr.  Bayle  has  many  passages  which  look  that 
way.  And  this  particularly  is  what  the  author  of  a  late  remark- 
able tract,  intituled,  Le  Pyrrhonisme  du  Sage,  has  attempted  to 
shew. 

.{d)  Plato  de  Leg.  lib.  x.  Oper.  p.  666.  C.  edit.  Lugd. 


Chap.  VI.     in  the  fundamental  PrincijAes  of  Morals,       85 

So  that  if  the  people  had  a  mind  to  be  instructed  what  they 
should  do  or  forbear,  they  sent  them  to  the  laws  of  their 
several  countries,  and  allowed  them  to  do  whatsoever  was 
not  forbidden  by  those  laws.  And  in  this  those  philosophers 
agreed  with  the  politicians.  When  Alcibiades  asked  Peri- 
cles, What  is  law?  he  answered,  That  all  those  are  laws 
which  are  prescribed  with  the  consent  and  approbation  of 
the  people,  declaring  what  things  ought  to  be  done,  or 
ought  not  to  be  done:  and  intimated,  that  whatsoever  things 
are  appointed  by  legal  authority,  are  to  be  regarded  as  good, 
and  not  evil  (e).  And  indeed  Socrates  himself,  and  the  most 
celebrated  philosophers  and  moralists,  though  they  acknow- 
ledged a  real  foundation  in  n'tture  for  the  moral  differences 
of  things,  yet  every  where  inculcate  it  as  a  necessary  ingre- 
dient in  a  good  man's  character,  to  obey  without  reserve 
the  laws  of  his  country.  But  what  uncertain  rules  of 
morality  the  civil  lav.s  and  constitutions  are,  and  that 
they  might  often  lead  men  into  vicious  and  immoral  prac- 
tices, sufficiently  appears  from  what  hath  been  already  ob- 
served. 

Some  of  the  philoscphers,  as  Laertius  tells  us  of  Theo- 
dorus,  declared,  without  disguise,  that  "  a  wise  man  might, 
upon  a  fit  occasion,  commit  theft,  adultery,  and  sacrilege, 
for  that  none  of  these  things  are  base  in  their  own  nature, 
if  that  opinion  concerning  them  be  taken  away,  which  was 
agreed  upon  for  the  sake  of  restraining  fools."   Tov  <77r»5^/o» 

ttta^^oq  (pv(Tet,  TKi  l^r'  ciVT<{ii  ^d|jj5  «/go^8vjj?)  ?  O'vytcUTeci  'ivtKX  rtii  rat 
i(p^ovojv  a-vfox.'Hi  (f^»  Aristippus,  who  also  held  that  "nothing 
is  by  nature  just,   or  honourable,  or   base,  but  by  law  and 


(e)  Xenoph.   Memor.  Socr.  lib.  i.  cap.  2.  sect.  42. 
(/)  Diog.  Laert.  lib.  ii.  segm.  99. 


86  The  Morality  of  Epicurus  considered.      Part  11. 

custom,"  yet  is  pleased  to  declare,  that  a  prudent  man  will 
not  do  an  absurd  thing,  «Sev  etrovai\  any  thing  out  of  the 
common  usage,  because  of  the  dangers  it  might  bring  upon 
him,  and  the  censures  it  might  expose  him  to  (^).  And  hovV 
weak  a  tie  this  would  be  to  a  man  that  had  nothing  else  to 
restrain  him,  I  need  not  take  pains  to  shew.  It  is  evident 
that,  upon  this  scheme  of  things,  there  can  be  no  such  thing 
as  conscience,  or  a  fixed  notion  of  virtue.  It  opens  a  wide 
door  to  licentiousness,  and  to  the  perpetrating  all  manner  of 
vice  and  wickedness  without  scruple,  if  they  can  but  escape 
public  notice,  and  the  punishments  of  human  judicatories. 
What  fine  instructors  in  morals  v/ere  those  philosophers 
who  taught  such  maxims! 

Among  those  antient  philosophers  who  were  wrong  in 
the  fundamental  principles  of  morals,  they  may  be  justly 
reckoned  who  laid  this  down  as  a  foundation  of  their  moral 
system,  that  a  man's  chief  good  consists  in  sensual  pleasure, 
and  that  this  is  the  supreme  end  he  is  to  propose  to  him- 
self, to  which  every  thing  else  should  be  subordinate.  There 
is  a  remarkable  passage  of  Cicero  in  his  first  book  of  laws 
relating  to  this  subject,  in  which  he  represents  pleasure 
as  an  enemy  within  us,  "  which  being  intimately  complicat- 
ed with  all  the  senses,  lays  all  kinds  of  snares  for  our  souls: 
that  it  hath  a  semblance  of  good  or  happiness,  but  is  really 
the  author  of  evils:  and  that  being  coiTupted  by  its  blandish- 
ments, we  do  not  sufficiently  discern  the  things  which  are 
in  their  own  nature  good,  because  they  want  that  sweetness 
and  tickling  or  itching  kind  of  sensation  it  affords. — Animis 
omnes  tenduntur  insidise  ab  e^,  quse  penitus  omni  sensu  im- 
pljcata  insidet  imitatrix  boni  voluptas,  malorum  autem  autor 
omnium,  cujus  blanditiis   corrupti    quse  natura  bona  sunt. 


(g)  Diog,  Laert.  lib.  ii.  segm.  93. 


Chap.  VI.     The  Morality  of  Epicurus  considered,  gr 

quia  dulcedine  hac  et  scabie  carent,  non  cernimus  satis  (/i)." 
And  again,  speaking  of  those  who  stiffly  maintained  that 
pleasure  is  the  greatest  good,. he  says,  that."  this  seems  to 
be  rather  the  languages  of  beasts  than  of  men: — quae  quidem 
mihi  vox    pecudum  videtur  esse   non  hominum  (?)."  Aris- 


{li)  De  Leg.  lib.  i.  cap.  17. 

(0  De  Parad.  cap.  1.  Some  of  our  modern  admirers  of  reason 
differ  very  much  from  Cicero  in  their  sentiments  on  this  sub- 
ject. 1  he  author  of  Les  six  Discours  sur  THomme,  said  to  be 
written  by  the  celebrated  M.  de  Voltaire,  who  sets  up  for  a  zeal- 
ous advocate  for  natural  rehgion,  says,  that  "  nature  attentive 
to  fulfil  our  desires,  callelh  us  to  God  by  the  voice  of  plea- 
sures." 

'*  La  nature  attentive  a  remplir  nos  desirs, 
Nous  rappelle  au  Dieu  par  le  voix  des  plaisirs." 

At  this  rate,  men  will  be  apt  to  regard  all  their  inclinations  and 
appetites,  as  the  significations  of  the  will  of  God  concerning  the 
the  duties  he  requireth  of  them.  This  is  also  the  prevailing  max- 
im of  the  author  of  the  famous  book  De  TEsprit,  who  observes, 
that  "  since  pleasure  is  the  only  object  which  men  seek  after,  all 
that  is  necessary  to  inspire  them  with  the  love  of  viriue  is  to 
imitate  nature.  Pleasure  pronounces  what  nature  wills,  and  grief 
or  pain  shews  what  nature  forbids,  and  man  readily  obeys  it.  The 
love  of  pleasure,  against  which  men,  more  respectable  for  their 
probity  than  their  judgment,  have  declaimed,  is  a  rein,  by  which 
the  passions  of  particular  persons  may  be  always  directed  to  the 
general  good. — Si  le  plaisir  est  I'lmique  objet  de  la  recherche 
des  hommes,  pour  lui  inspirer  Pamour  de  la  vertu,  il  ne  faut  qu* 
imiter  la  nature:  le  plaisir  en  annonce  les  volontes,  le  douleur  les 
defenses;  et  Phomme  lui  obeVt  avcc  docilite.  L'amour  du  plaisir 
contre  lequel  se  sont  eleves  des  gens  d'une  probiie  plus  respect- 
able qu'  eclaircee,  est  un  frein,  avec  lequel  on  peut  toujours  di- 
riger  au  bien  general  les  passions  des  particulicrs."^De  PKsprit, 
disc.  3.  chap.  16.  tome  II.  p.  67.  Amst.  And  what  kind  oi  plea- 
sure he  intends,  clearly  appears  from  the  latter  end  of  the  13th 
chapter  of  his  3d  discourse,  where  he  says,  that  *'  there  are  only 


^  The  Morality  of  Epicurus  conaidered.     Part  1 1. 

tippus,  and  his  followers  of  the  Cyrenaic  sect,  taught  this 
doctrine  in  the  grossest  sense,  and  without  disguise.  They 
held  corporeal  pleasure  to  be  our  ultimate  end;  that  pleasure 


two  kinds  of  pleasures:  the  pleasures  of  the  senses,  and  the 
means  of  obtaining  them;  which  may  be  ranked  among  plea- 
sures; because  the  hope  of  pleasure  is  the  beginning  of  plea- 
sure." And  this  is  agreeable  to  the  general  scheme  of  his 
book,  which  goes  upon  this  principle,  that  physical  sensibi- 
lity is  the  source  of  all  our  ideas,  and  that  man  is  not  capable 
of  any  other  motive  to  determine  him  than  the  pleasures  of  the 
senses:  and  these  are  all  expressly  reduced  by  him  to  love,  the 
love  of  women.  And  he  makes  the  perfection  of  legislation  to 
consist  in  exciting  men  to  the  noblest  actions,  by  fomenting  and 
gratifying  those  sensual  passions.  He  says,  "  If  the  pleasure  of 
love  be  the  most  lively  and  vigorous  of  all  human  pleasures, 
what  a  fruitful  source  of  courage  is  contained  in  this  pleasure? 
and  what  ardor  for  virtue  may  not  the  love  of  women  inspire?" 
Ibid,  tome  II.  disc.  3.  chap.  15.  p.  51.  And  accordingly  he  pleads 
for  gallantry  in  a  nation  where  luxury  is  necessary,  (and  it  is  well 
known,  that  under  the  name  of  gallantry,  especially  in  that  na- 
tion to  which  this  gentleman  belongs,  is  comprehended  an  unlaw- 
ful commerce  with  married  women).  He  thinks,  "  that  it  is  not 
agreeable  to  policy  to  regard  it  as  a  vice  in  a  moral  sense:  or,  if 
they  will  call  it  a  vice,  it  must  be  acknowledged  that  there  are 
vices  which  are  useful  in  certain  ages  and  countries."  And  to 
to  say  that  those  vices  are  useful  in  certain  countries,  is,  ac- 
cording to  this  scheme,  to  say,  that  in  those  countries  they  are 
.virtues:  for  he  holds,  that  every  action  ought  to  be  called  virtu- 
ous, which  is  advantageous  to  the  public.  "  C'est  une  inconse- 
quence politique  que  de  regarder  la  galanterie,  comme  un  vice 
moral:  et  si  Ton  veut  lui  conserver  le  nom  de  vice,  il  faut  con- 
venir,  qu*il  en  estd'utiles  dans  certains  siecles,  et  certains  pays." 
Ibid,  tome  I.  disc.  2.  chap.  15.  p.  176.  et  seq. 

The  author  of  Le  Discours  sur  la  Vie  Heureuse,  printed  at 
the  end  of  Pensees  Philosophiques,  carries  it  still  farther.  The 
design  of  that  whole  treatise  is  to  shew,  that  happiness  consists 
only  in  sensiaal  pleasure,  and  in  the   gratification  of  the  fleshly 


Chap.  Vl.     The  Morality  of  Epicurus  considered,  8$> 

which  actually  moves  and  strikes  the  senses:  and  they  round- 
ly affirmed,  that  the  pleasures  of  the  body  are  much  better 
than  those  of  the  soul,  and  its  pains  and  griefs  much  worse. 
See  Laert.  lib.  ii.  segm.  87.  et  90.  Epicurus,  who  held  the 
same  principle,  that  pleasure  is  the  chief  good  and  hit(hest  end 
of  man,  endeavoured  to  explain  it  so  as  to  shun  the  odious 
Gonsequences  which  are  charged  upon  it.  His  morality  was 


appetite,  and  that  wisdom  consists  in  pursuing  it.  From  this 
principle,  that  the  actual  pleasurable  sensation  of  the  body  is 
the  only  true  happiness,  he  draws  conclusions  worthy  of  such  a 
principle:  that  '^  we  ought  to  take  care  of  the  body  before  the  soulj 
to  cultivate  the  mind  only  with  a  view  to  procure  more  advantat^e^ 
for  the  body;  to  deny  ourselves  nothing  that  can  give  us  plea- 
sure; to  use  nature  (by  which  he  means  the  bodily  appetites)  as  a 
guide  to  reason.'*  It  is  no  wonder  that  he  asserts,  that  '*  the  law 
of  nature  directs  us  to  give  up  truth  to  the  laws,  rather  than  oui* 
bodies;  and  that  it  is  naturaf  to  treat  virtue  in  the  same  way  as 
truth. — Ues  lors  il  faut  songer  au  corps,  avant  que  de  songerst 
Fame;  ne  cultiver  son  ame,  que  pOur  procurer  pius  de  commo-* 
dites  a  son  corps;  ne  point  se  priver  de  ce  que  fait  plaisir;  don- 
ner  a  la  raison  la  nature  pour  guide.  La  loi  de  la  nature  dicte  de 
leur  [\.  e.  aux  loix  des  hommesj  livrer  plutot  la  verite  que 
nos  corps;  il  est  naturel  de  traiter  la  vertu  comme  de  la  verite.**' 
Such  is  the  morality  taught  by  some  of  our  pretended  masters 
of  reason  in  the  present  age,  who  are  too  wise  to  be  guided  by 
revelation,  and  express  a  contempt  for  those  as  weak  and  super-* 
stitious  persons,  who  are  for  governing  themselves  by  its  sacred 
rules.  It  can  hardly  be  thought  too  severe  a  censure  to  say,  that 
the  principal  reason  for  their  endeavouring  to  discard  the  Gospel 
is,  that  they  may  be  free  from  the  restraint  it  lays  Upon  their  sen- 
sual and  depraved  passions,  and  that  they  may  be  left  loose  in 
matters  of  morality,  to  follow  their  own  inclinations,  and  to  do 
whatsoever  their  appetites  would  prompt  them  to.  ^ 

*  Discours  sur  la  Vie  Heureuse,  a  Potsdam  1748.  p.  34.  See  L'Abbe 
Gauchet  Lettres  Critiques,  torn.  i.  lettre  iv. 

Vol.  il  M 


90  The  Morality  of  Epicurus  considered.     Part  II. 

highly  extolled  by  some  of  the  antients,  and  has  had  very 
learned  apologists  among  the  moderns,  some  of  whom  have 
not  scrupled  to  prefer  it  to  any  other  of  the  heathen  philoso- 
phers. It  is  necessary,  therefore,  in  considering  the  systems 
of  the  Pagan  moralists,  to  take  particular  notice  of  that 
of  Epicurus,  that  we  may  see  whether  it  deserves  the  enco- 
miums which  have  been  so  liberally  bestowed  upon  it.  And 
I  cannot  help  thinking,  that,  whatever  plausible  appearance 
it  may  put  on,  yet  if  we  take  the  whole  of  his  scheme  to- 
gether, and  impartially  consider  it  in  its  proper  connection 
and  natural  consequences,  we  shall  find  it  destructive  of 
true  virtue. 

It  is  evident  that  there  is  one  essential  defect  which  runs 
through  his  whole  system  of  morality,  and  that  is,  that  it 
had  no  regard  to  the  Deity,  or  to  a  Divine  Authority  or 
Law:  the  gods  he  owns  (for  he  does  not  speak  of  one  Su- 
preme God)  were  such  as  lived  at  ease,  and  without  care,  in 
the  extra-mundane  spaces,  and  exercised  no  inspection  over 
mankind,  nor  ever  concerned  themselves  about  their  actions 
and  affairs.  There  was  therefore  no  room  upon  his  scheme 
foi  thi:  exercise  of  piety  towards  God,  a  submission  lo  his 
aut'n.' rity,  and  resignation  to  his  will,  or  for  a  dependance 
upon  Providence,  and  a  religious  regard  to  the  Divine  fa- 
vour and  Jipprobation.  It  is  true,  that  Epicurus  writ  books 
about  piety  and  sanctity  (i),  for  which  he  is  deservedly 
ridiculed    by   Cotta    in    Cicero  (/).     And    Epictetus    ob- 


(A-)  Laert.  lib.  x.  segm.  27. 

(/)  De  nat.  Deor.  lib.  i.  cap.  41.  It  is  a  little  surprising,  that 
so  great  a  man  as  Gassendus,  among  the  many  fine  things  he 
says  of  Epicurus,  has  thought  fit  to  mention  his  disinterested 
piety,  and  fili?l  affection  towards  the  Divine  Nature.  What  he 
offers  on  this  hrad  is  extremely  weak,  and  is  a  remarkable  in- 
stance of  what  may  be  often  observed,  that  when  learned  men 


Chap.  IV.     The  Morality  of  Epicurus  considered.  91 

serves  concerning  the  Epicureans,  that  "  they  got  them- 
selves m  ide  priests  and  prophets  of  gods,  which  according 
to  them,  had  no  existence,  and  consulted  the  Pythian  priest- 
ess, only  to  hear  what  in  their  opinion  were  falsehoods, 
and  interpreted  those  oracles  to  others."  This  he  treats  as 
a  monstrous  impudent  imposture  (w). 

As  to  that  part  of  morality  which  relates  to  the  duties 
we  owe  to  mankind,  in  this  also  the  scheme  of  Epicurus, 
at  least  if  pursued  to  its  genuine  consequences,  was  greatly 
defective.  He  taught,  that  a  man  is  to  do  every  thing  for 
his  own  sake:  that  he  is  to  make  his  own  happiness  his 
chief  end,  and  to  do  all  in  his  power  to  secure  and  preserve 
it.  And  he  makes  happiness  to  consist  in  the  mind's  being 
freed  from  trouble,  and  the  body  from^  pain.  Accordingly, 
it  is  one  of  his  maxims,  that  **  business  and  cares  do  not 
consist  with  happiness.*'— 'Oy  0'vfA<Pa>vS(ri  Treaty f*xrt7ett  }^  (p^ovTihg 
(nxKcc^toTUTt  (n).  According  to  this  scheme  of  principle,  no 
man  ought  to  do  any  thing  that  would  expose  him  to 
trouble  and  pain,  or  give  him  disturbance:  and  therefore 
he  ought  not  to  run  any  hazard,  or  expose  himself  to  suf- 
ferings, for  the  public  good,  for  his  friend,  or  for  his  coun- 
try. I  know  that  he  sometimes  expresses  himself  in  a  differ- 
ent strain.  But  this  is  the  natural  consequence  of  his  avow- 
ed principles.  And  therefore  Epictetus  charges  him  with 
having  mutilated  all  the  offices  of  a  master  of  a  family,  of 
a  citizen,  and  of  a  friend.  He  observes,  that,  from  a  desire 
of  shunning  all  uneasiness,  Epicurus  dissuaded  a  wise  man 
from  marrying  and  breeding  up  children;  because   he  was 


have  undertaken  an  hypothesis,  they  seemed  resolved  at  any  rate 
to  defend  it.  See  Gassend.  de  Vita  et  Moribus  Egicuri,  lib.  iv. 
cap.  3. 

(w)  Epictet.  Dissert,  book  ii.  cap.  20.  sect.  2,  3,  4. 

(w)  Laert.  lib,  x.  ^gm.  77. 


^  The  Morality  of  Epicurus  considered.  Part  II. 

sensible,  that  if  once  a  child  is  born,  it  is  no  longer  in  a  pa^ 
rent's  power  not  to  be  solicitous  about  it.  For  the  same 
reason  he  says,  that  a  wise  man  will  not  enga^^e  himself  in 
public  business,  or  meddle  with  the  affairs  of  the  common- 
wealth (o).  His  own  practice  was  suitable  to  it,  for  he  loved 
an  easy  and  retired  life.  But,  as  Epictetus  there  observes, 
many  of  the  Epicureans,  though  they  talked  at  this  rate, 
both  married  and  engaged  in  public  affairs, 

Let  us  now  come  to  that  part  of  Epicurus's  morals,  which 
has  the  fairest  appearance,  and  which  has  prejudiced  many 
persons  in  his  favour.  He  has  given  excellent  lessons  of 
moderation,  temperance,  patience,  meekness,  and  forgive- 
ness of  injuries,  and  even  continence  with  regard  to  venereal 
pleasures.  He  represents  the  inconveniences  of  indulging 
them  in  strong  terms.  He  declares,  "that  when  he  makes 
pleasure  the  chief  end,  he  does  not  mean  the  pleasures  of 
the  luxurious,  as  ignorant  persons,  and  those  that  do  not 
rightly  understand  his  sentiments,  suppose:  but  principally 
the  freedom  of  the  body  from  pain,  and  of  the  mind 
from  anguish  and  perturbation.  For,  says  he,  it  is  not 
drinking  or  revelling,  nor  the  enjoyment  of  boys  and  wo- 
men, nor  the  feasting  upon  fish,  and  the  other  things  that  a 
sumptuous  table  furnisheth,  which  procure  a  pleasant  life, 
)but  sober  reason,  which  searcheth  into  the  causes  of  things, 
why  and  how  far  they  are  to  be  chosen  or  avoided,  and 
teacheth  us  to  cast  out  those  opinions  which  fill  the  soul 
with  perturbation  and  tumult."  He  adds,  that  "  the  princi- 
ple of' all  these  things  is  prudence  (/>)."  What  the  opinions 
are  that  he  thinks  inconsistent  with  happiness  or  tranquil- 


(o)  Dissert,  book  ii.  chap.  20.  sect.  3.  and  ibid,  book  i.  chap,  3. 
^nd  book  lii.  chap.  7.  See  also  Laert.  lib.  x.  segm.  119. 
(p)  Laert,  lib.  x.  segm.  132, 


Chap.  VI.      The  Morality  of  Epicurus  considered,  93 

lity,  will  be  seen  afterwards;  at  present  I  shall  only  observe, 
that  he  here  openly  declares,  that  the  pleasures  he  intends 
are  not  those  of  luxury  and  excess,  as  many  are  apt  to  sup- 
pose, but  such  as  are  under  the  conduct  of  reason  and  pru- 
dence. He  frequently  speaks  in  high  terms  of  virtue,  and 
the  happiness  which  attends  it.  It  was  one  of  his  maxims, 
or  Kv^ixi  }c^ociy  that  "  it  is  not  possible  for  any  man  to  live 
pleasantly,  unless  he  lives  prudently,  and  honestly,  and  just- 
ly: nor  can  he  live  prudently,  honestly,  and  justly,  without 
living  pleasantly  (5'):"  and  that  "  virtue  is  inseparable  from 
a  happy  life  (r)."  He  often  recommends  frugality  and 
temperance,  and  the  being  content  with  a  little:  and  says, 
that  a  simple  meal  is  equal  to  a  sumptuous  feast:  and  that 
coarse  bread  and  water  yields  the  greatest  pleasure  to  a 
man  that  takes  it  when  he  needeth  it.  And  it  is  said  by 
Cicero,  Seneca,  and  other  antient  authors,  that  Epicurus 
himself  lived  a  sober  and  temperate  life,  and  took  up  with 
slender  fare.  So  that  those  who  allow  themselves  in  un- 
bounded gratifications  of  their  appetites,  and  make  pleasure 
to  consist  in  licentiousness  and  excess,  carry  it  much  farther 
than  Epicurus  did,  and  cannot  justly  avail  themselves  of 
his  authority. 

But  notwithstanding  all  that  can  be  alleged  in  favour  of 
Epicurus,  his  scheme  of  morality  appears  to  be  wrong  at  the 
very  foundation.  The  virtue  he  prescribes  is  resolved  ulti- 
mately into  a  man's  own  private  convenience  and  advantage, 
without  regard  to  the  excellence  of  it  in  its  own  nature,  or 
to  its  being  commanded  or  required  of  us  by  God:  for,  as 
has  been  already  hinted  in  his  system  of  morals,  there  is  no 
respect  had  to  a  divine  law.   The  friendship  of  Epicurus, 


(q)  Laert.  lib.  x.  segm.   1 
(r)  Ibid.  segm.   131,  132 


32.  et  140. 


94  The  Morality  of  Epicurus  considered.      Part  II. 

and  his  followers,  has  been  highly  extolled,  and  proposed 
as  a  model;  and  yet,  according  to  him,  friendship,  as  well 
as  justice  and  fidelity,  is  to  be  observed  and  exercised, 
only  because  of  the  profit  or  pleasure  which  it  procures  us. 
So  it  is  that  Torquatus  the  Epicurean  argues,  in  Cicero's 
first  book  De  Finibus  Bonorum  et  Malorum.  He  says  the 
same  thing  of  temperance:  and  blames  luxury  and  effemi- 
nacy, because  they  who  indulge  it,  being  allured  by  present 
pleasures,  expose  themselves  to  greater  pains,  diseases,  &c. 
afterwards.  It  is  one  of  Epicurus's  maxims,  as  it  was  also 
of  the  Cyrenaics,  that  no  pleasure  is  in  itself  an  evil,  but 
the  things  that  are  the  causes  of  some  pleasure,  bring  on 
many  more  troubles  then  pleasures  (s);  where  he  seems  to 
blame  no  pleasures  as  evil,  except  on  account  of  the  great- 
er troubles  to  which  they  expose  the  man  that  indulges 
them.  Agreeably  to  this  maxim,  he  says,  "  a  wise  man  will 
not  have  carnal  commerce  with  any  woman  which  the  law 
forbids  him  to  touch  (^)."  So  that  he  makes  the  laws,  i.  e. 
the  laws  of  the  country  where  a  man  lives,  and  a  man's  own 
convenience,  the  only  measure  of  continence:  and  in  effect 
allows  a  man  to  indulge  himself  in  any  pleasures  or  grati- 
fications, which  are  not  prohibited  by  the  laws,  provided  he 
does  not  run  into  such  excesses  in  those  pleasures  as  may 
hurt  himself.  Epicurus,  therefore,  if  he  had  lived  in  Per- 
sia, would  have  had  no  objection  to  the  incestuous  mixtures 
there  allowed  by  the  laws.  At  Athens,  where  he  dwelt, 
adultery  was  forbidded  under  severe  penalties,  he  would 
not  therefore,  according  to  his  principles,  touch  married 
women.  But  Leontium,  a  philosophical  Athenian  courtezan, 
was  mistress  both  to  him  and  his  intimate  friend  and  com- 


(«)  Laert.  lib.  X.  segm.  141. 
(r)  Ibid.  lib.  x.  segm.  118. 


Chap.  VI.      The  Morality  of  Epicurus  considered.  95 

panion  Metrodorus  (w).  Other  mistresses  of  his  are  men- 
tioned (^).  Some  authors,  indeed,  contend,  that  these 
stories  were  forged  by  his  enemies,  and  extol  his  conti- 
nence and  chastity:  but  I  do  not  see  that  Epicurus,  upon  his 
principles,  could  have  any  scruple  about  those  practices  as 
vicious,  though  he  might  abstain  from  them  on  other  con- 
siderations. It  may  not  be  improper  here  to  take  notice  of 
a  remarkable  passage  in  his  book  Uegi  TeAa?,  de  fine,  in  which 
ht  says,  that  he  "  cannot  understand  what  good  there  is,  if 
we  take  away  the  pL^asures  which  are  perceived  bv  the 
taste,  those  which  arise  from  venereal  gratifications,  those 
that  come  in  b  the  ears,  ind  the  agreeable  emotions  which 
are  excited  by  the  sight  of  beautiful  forms."  This  passage 
is  mentioned  by  his  gr<  at  admirer  Laertius,  who  represents 
it  as  urged  against  Epicurus  by  those  that  endeavoured  to 
calumniate  him  (z/).  But  he  does  not  deny,  that  it  was  real- 
ly to  be  found  in  that  book,  which  was  accounted  one  of 
the  best  of  his  treatises.  It  is  also  produced  more  fully  by 
Athenaeus  (z),  and  by  Cicero,  ^vho  often  refers  to  it.  He 
gives  a  fine  translation  of  it  in  the  third  book  of  his  Tus- 
culan  Disputations,  cap.  18.  p.  224.  where  Dr.  Davis's 
note  upon  it  may  be  consulted.  And  he  elsewhere  gives 
the  sense  of  it  thus:  "  Nee  intelligere  quidem  se  posse  ubi 
sit,  et  quid  sit  uUum  bonum,  prseter  illud  quod  sensibus  cor- 
poreis,  cibis,  potioneque,  formarum  aspectu,  aurium  delec- 
tatione,  et  obscsena  voluptate  percipitur  («)."  The  same 
great  author  charges  Epicurus  with  maintaining,   that    all 


(m)  Laert.  lib.  x.  segm.  6.  et  23. 

{x)  See   Menagius's  Observations  on  Laertius,  p.  448.  Edit. 
West. 

(t/)  Laert.  lib.  x.  segm.  6. 

(2)  Deipnos.  lib.  vii.  p.   208.  et  lib.  xii.  p.  546. 

(a)  De  Finib.  lib.  ii.  cap.  3.   And  see  Davis's  note. 


96  The  Morality  of  Epicurus  considered.     Part  II* 

the  pleasures  and  dolours  of  the  mind,  belong  to  the  plea- 
sures and  pains  of  the  body;  and  that  there  is  no  joy  of 
the  mind,  but  what  originally  arises  from  the  body  (^). 
Though  at  the  same  time  he  said,  that  the  pleasures  and 
pains  of  the  mind  are  more  and  greater  than  those  of  the 
body;  in  which  he  differed  from  Aristippus  and  the 
Cyrenaics. 

To  let  us  farther  into  Epicurus's  scheme  of  morals,  it  may 
be  observed,  that  though  he  forbids  injustice  and  other  great 
crimes,  it  seems  to  be  not  upon  the  most  noble  and  generous 
principles,  but  for  fear  of  human  punishments.  Seneca,  who, 
though  a  Stoic,  often  speaks  favourably  of  Epicurus,  and 
mentions  many  of  his  moral  sentences  with  approbation^ 
represents  his  sense  thus:  "  Nihil  justum  esse  natura,  et 
crimina  vitanda  esse  quia  metus  vitari  non  possit  (c)." — ■ 
That  "nothing -is  just  by  nature,  and  that  crimes  are  to 
be  avoided,  because  fear  cannot  be  avoided:"  that  is,  if  a 
man  commits  crimes,  he  cannot  avoid  the  fear  of  detection 
or  punishment.  And  that  in  this  he  justly  represents  Epi- 
curus's  sentiments,  may  be  fairly  concluded  from  the  pas- 
sages cited  from  Epicurus  himself  by  Laertius,  who  had  a 
high  esteem  for  him.  In  the  account  he  gives  of  his  Kv^Ut 
^oloti  or  principal  maxims,  one  is.  That  "justice  would  be 
nothing  of  itself,  but  for  the  conventions  or  agreements 
men  have  entered  into  in  many  places,  not  to  hurt  others, 
or  be  hurt  by  them."  And  again,  that  "  injustice  is  not  an 
evil  in  itself,  «  «3<»/«  »  ««3-*  Itcvrm  xccKovy  but  because  of  the 
fear  which  attends  it,  arising  from  a  suspicion  that  it  can- 
not be  hid  from  those  who  are  constituted  the  punishers 
of  sUch  things."  He  adds,  "Let  not  that  man,  who  se- 
cretly does    any  thing    contrary  to    the    conventions  men 


(b)  De  Finib.  lib.  i.  cap.  It, 

(c)  Sen.  epist.  97. 


Chap.  VI.     The  Morality  of  Epicurus  consider  ed»  97 

have  established  among  themselves,  not  to  hurt  others,  or 
be  hurt  by  them,  believe  that  he  shall  be  able  to  keep  it 
secret,  though  he  has  escaped  detection  a  thousand  times, 
even  to  this  present:  for  even  to  the  end  of  his  life,  it  is 
still  uncertain  whether  he  shall  be  able  to  conceal  it  (d)y 
Here  it  is  plain,  that  the  reason  he  gives  why  a  man  should 
abstain  from  doing  an  unjust  thing,  is  not  because  it  is  in 
itself  evil,  but  because  of  the  punishment  it  may  expose 
him  to,  not  from  God  (for  all  fear  of  this  kind  he  rejects  as 
▼ain  and  superstitious)  but  from  men:  either  from  public 
justice,  or  private  resentment  and  revenge,  which  no  man 
can  be  sure  he  shall  always  escape.  Accordingly,  it  was  an 
advice  of  his,  as  Seneca  informs  us,  "  Do  every  thing  as  if 
some  person  saw  thee  do  it;"  i.  e.  as  if  some  man  saw 
thee.  For  he  denied  that  the  gods  observe  or  concern  them- 
selves with  men,  or  any  of  their  actions:  "Sic  fac,  inquit, 
tanquam  spectet  aliquis  (t?)."  Upon  these  principles  there 
is  no  villany  which  a  man  may  not  commit,  if  he  can  but 
persuade  himself  (which  bad  men  are  often  apt  to  do)  that 
he  shall  not  be  detected  or  punished  for  it  by  men:  or,  as 
Cicero  expresses  it,  "  ut  hominum  conscientia  remoia,  nihil 
tam  turpe  sit,  quod  voluptatis  causa  non  videatur  esse 
facturus  (y^)."  Epictetus  sets  these  principles  of  Epicurus, 
and  their  pernicious  consequences,  in  a  strong  light  (^). 

That  which  Epicurus  valued  himself  principally  upon, 
and  for  which  he  was  mightly  extolled  and  admired  by  his 
followers,  was,  that  he  proposed  to  instruct  men  in  the 
nature  of  true  happiness,  and  to  direct  them  to  the  only 
proper  means  of  attaining  to  it.  Happiness  he  made  to  ccm- 


{d)  Laert.  Jib.  x.  segm.  150,  151. 
(e)  Sen.  epist.  25. 

(/)  De  Finib.  lib.  ii.  cap.  9.  p.  108.  edit.  Davis. 
{g)  Dissert,  book  ii.  cap,  20.  and  book  iii.  cap.  7.  sect.  1. 
.Vol.  II.  N  ■        ' 


98  The  Morality  of  Epicurus  considered.     Part  II. 

sist,  as  hath  been  already  hinted,  not  merely  as  Aristippus 
and  the  Cyrenaics  did,  in  the  actual  motions  of  sensual 
pleasures  and  gratifications,  though  these  also  he  admitted, 
but  chiefly  in  indolence  of  body  and  tranquillity  of  mind; 
i.  e.  that  the  body  be  freed  from  pain,  and  the  mind  from 
trouble,  both  in  the  most  perfect  degree,  and  so  as  to  admit 
of  no  increase.  This  happiness  he  supposed  to  be  perfectly 
attainable  in  this  life;  and,  indeed,  this  he  must  suppose,  or 
that  it  is  not  attainable  at  all,  since  he  allowed  no  other 
life  but  this.  The  Cyrenaics,  in  this  matter,  talked  more 
reasonably  than  Epicurus;  for,  as  they  looked  upon  pleasure 
to  be  the  chiefest  good,  and  could  not  deny  that  men  are 
now  subject  to  many  pains  and  troubles,  some  of  them 
asserted  that  it  is  extremely  difficult,  and  others  that  it  is 
impossible  to  attain  to  a  life  of  perfect  happiness  (A).  Nor 
would  they  allow  with  Epicurus,  that  a  freedom  from  pain 
can  be  accounted  pleasure,  and  even  the  highest  pleasure  (i). 
And  in  this  also  they  talked  more  reasonably  than  he. 

As  to  the  means  for  attaining  to  what  Epicurus  accounted 
perfect  happiness,  some  of  those  he  prescribed  were  cer- 
tainly very  proper.  He  advised  to  exercise  sobriety,  mo- 
deration, and  temperance;  to  avoid  all  excess;  not  to  indulge 
pleasure  to  a  degree  that  might  bring  greater  evils;  not  to 
do  an  unjust  thing,  or  any  thing  that  might  expose  a  man 
to  punishment;  to  avoid  a  restless  ambition;  to  shun  envy 
and  revenge,  and  the  bitter  ill-natured  passions;  and  to  cul- 
tivate friendship  and  benevolence.  On  these  heads  Epicurus 


(A)  Laert,  lib.  ii.  segm.  90  et  94. 

(/)  Ibid.  segm.  89.  See  also  Cicero  de  Finib.  lib.  i.  cap.  11. 
where  Torquatus  the  Epicurean  says,  "  CJmni  dolore  carere, 
non  modo  voluDiatem  esse,  serl  ^unirn-^m  voliipiaiem."  Cicero 
ciposes  this  very  well,  de  Finib.  lib.  ii.  cap.  5.  p.  89.  et  cap.  7. 
p.  93.  edit.  Davis. 


Chap.  VI.     The  Morality  of  Epicurus  considered.  99 

said  excellent  things,  and  judged  very'  rightly  that  this  was 
the  best  way  a  man  could  take,  even  for  his  own  sake,  and 
to  secure  to  himself  an  easy  and  pleasant  life.  But  his  chief 
recipe  for  happiness  was  the  raising  men  above  all  fear  of 
evil,  and  thereby  placing  them  in  a  state  of  perfect  tran- 
quillity. And  there  are  two  things  which  he  especially 
looked  upon  to  be  inconsistent  with  happiness,  the  fear  of 
the  gods,  and  the  fear  of  death:  and  he  boasted  that  he 
would  deliver  men  from  both  these.  His  remedv  against 
the  first  was  to  deny  a  Providence,  or  that  the  gods  have 
any  concern  with  men,  or  take  any  notice  of  their  affairs. 
And  it  must  be  acknowledgi^d,  that  nothing  could  be  better 
contrived  to  free  bad  men  from  the  terrors  they  might  be 
under  from  an  apprehension  of  divine  punishments;  but,  at 
the  same  time,  it  took  away  the  strongest  restraints  to  vice 
and  wickedness,  and  the  most  solid  support  of  virtue,  and 
that  which  is  the  principal  source  of  a  good  man's  satisfac- 
tion and  confidence  under  the  greatest  adversities.  As  to 
death,  he  would  have  a  man  accustom  himself  to  this 
thought,  "  That  death  is  nothing  to  us."  He  says,  "  the 
knowledge  of  this  will  enable  him  to  enjoy  this  mortal 
life;  and  that  there  is  nothing  evil  or  grievous  in  life  to  a 
man,  who  rightly  apprehends  that  the  privation  of  life  has 
no  evil  in  it."  And  the  way  he  takes  to  prove  his  capital 
maxim,  which  he  so  frequently  repeats,  "That  death  is 
nothing  to  us,"  is,  because  "  that  w^hich  is  dissolved  is  void 
of  sense,  and  that  which  is  void  of  sense  is  nothing  to  us." 
And  again,  that  "  whilst  we  live,  death  is  not;  and  when 
death  is,  we  are  not  (/^)."  As  if  such  quibbles  and  subtilties 
as  these  furnished  a  sufficient  remedy  against  the  natural 
fear  of  death.  But  if,  as  he  says,  we  are  without  sense  at 


(k)  Lacrt.  lib.  x.  segm.  124,  125.  ct  139. 


100  The  Morality  of  Epicurus  considered.     Part  1 1. 

death,  this  does  not  prove  that  death  is  nothing  to  us.  For 
is  it  nothing  to  us  to  be  deprived  of  life,  which  he  himself 
represents  as  a  thing  to  be  desired  and  embraced  (/)?  Since 
this  life,  according  to  him,  is  the  only  season  in  which  we 
can  enjoy  happiness,  how  can  it  be  said,  that  death  is 
nothing  to  us,  which  puts  an  utter  end  to  all  happiness  and 
enjoyment?  Is  it  not  natural  for  a  man  that  is  happy  to  de- 
sire to  continue  to  be  so,  and  to  be  averse  to  every  thing 
that  would  deprive  him  of  it?  But  Epicurus  endeavours  to 
provide  against  this,  by  observing,  that  "  a  right  knowledge 
takes  away  the  desire  of  immortality  (mj.''  Accordingly, 
one  of  his  Kyg/«<  5o|«<  is  this,  "That  an  infinite  and  finite 
time  yield  an  equal  pleasure,  if  any  man  will  measure  the 
boundaries  of  pleasure  by  reason." — 'O  ^.xs<§««  %§<>vo5  iV>i»  'ly^ti 

yiTf^m  (w).  Cicero  expresses  it  thus;  "  Negat  Epicurus  diu- 
turnitatem  temporis  ad  beate  vivendum  aliquid  conferre: 
nee  minorem  voluptatem  percipi  in  brevitate  temporis, 
quam  si  ilia  sit  sempiterna  (<?)."  And  whether  this  be  con- 
sistent with  reason,  may  be  left  to  any  man  of  common 
sense  to  determine. 

There  is  nothing  more  remarkable  in  Epicurus,  than  the 
glorious  pretences  he  makes  to  fortitude,  and  a  contempt  of 
pain.  He  affirms,  that  though  a  wise  man  be  tortured,  he  is 
still  happy,  '£«»  f^sCAwS-IJ  o  o-o'i^oj  e<»«e<  avrh  Iv^xi^otoc.  (/j).  And 
that "  if  he  were  shut  up  and  burned  in  Phalaris's  bull,  he 
would  cry  out.  How  sweet  is  this!  How  little  do  I  care 
for  it!''  Cicero,    who  mentions    this,  justly  exposes  it   as 


(/)  Laert.  lib.  x.  segm.  125. 

(m)  Ibid.  segm.  124. 

(n)  Ibid.  segm.   145. 

(o)  De  Finib.  lib.  ii. 

(ft)  Laert.  lib.  x.  segm.  1 18. 


Chap.  VI.     The  Morality  of  Epicurus  considered,         loi 

very  absurd  and  ridiculous,  in  a  man  that  made  pleasure  the 
chiefest  good,  and  pain  the  greatest  or  only  evil.  He  ob- 
serves, that  even  the  Stoics  themselves,  who  would  not  al- 
low pain  to  be  evil,  yet  owned  it  to  be  "  asperum  et  odiosum, 
— an  harsh  and  odious  thing;"  and  did  not  pretend  to  sayi 
that  it  is  sweet  to  be  tortured  (^.)  But  this  was  Epicurus's 
manner.  He  affected  to  speak  gloriously  rather  than  con- 
sistently. Cicero  remarks  concerning^  him,  that "  he  said  ma- 
ny excellent  things,  but  was  not  solicitous  whether  he  was 
consistent  with  himself  or  not. — Multa  prseclare  saepe  di- 
cit,  quam  enim  sibi  constanter  convenienterque  dicat,  non 
laborat  (r)."  But  as  he  there  observes,  "we  are  not  to 
judge  of  a  philosopher  by  a  few  detached  independent  sen- 
tences, but  by  the  general  tenour  of  his  doctrine — Non  ex 
singulis  vocibus  philosophi  spectandi  sunt,  sed  ex  perpetu- 
itate  atque  constantia."  He  said  among  other  things,  that 
a  wbe  man  will  sometimes  die  for  his  friend  (^).  A  gene- 
rous sentence,  but  not  well  becoming  a  man  who  resolved 
friendship,  as  well  as  every  other  virtue,  merely  into  a  self- 
ish principle,  and  a  regard  to  a  man's  own  happiness.  There 
is  a  remarkable  passage  of  Epicurus,  produced  by  Marcus 
AntoninuS)  which  shews  his  magnificent  way  of  talking,  and 
his  high  pretences  to  virtue,  as  well  as  the  great  opinion  he 
had  of  his  own  wisdom  and  philosophy.  "  When  I  was  sick 
(says  he)  my  conversations  were  not  about  the  diseases  of 
this  poor  body,  nor  did  I  speak  of  any  such  thing  to  those 
that  came  to  me;  but  continued  to  discourse  of  those  prin- 
ciples of  natural  philosophy  I  had  before  established;  and  was 
chiefly  intent  on  this,  how  the  intellectual  part,  though   it 


{q)  Tuscul.  Disput.  lib.  ii.  cap.  7.  et  lib.  v.  cap.  10.  See  also 
Lactant.  Div.  Inst.  lib.  iii.  cap.  27. 

(r)  Tuscul.  Disput.  lib.  v.  cap.  9.  See  also  De  Finib.  lib.  ii. 
cap.  22.  et  ibid.  cap.  26. 

(s)  Laert,  lib.  x.  segm.  121. 


102  The  Morality  of  Epicurus  considered.     Part  II. 

partakes  of  such  violent  commotions  of  the  body,  might 
remain  undisturbed,  and  preserve  its  own  proper  good; 
nor  did  I  allow  the  physicians  to  make  a  noise  and  vaunt, 
as  if  doing  something  of  great  moment;  but  my  life  con- 
tinued pleasant  and  happy  (?)•"  What  could  the  most  ri- 
gid Stoic  have  said  more  nobly?  But  certainly,  if  Epicurus 
himself,  supported  by  his  vanity,  made  such  a  show  of  for- 
titude, the  principles  of  his  philosophy  had  no  tendency  to 
inspire  a  contempt  of  pain,  or  a  true  greatness  of  soul.  The 
Stoics  were  more  consistent  with  themselves.  They  main- 
tained, that  a  wise  man  is  happy  under  the  greatest  pains 
and  tortures;  but  then  they  supposed  happiness  to  consist 
wholly  in  virtue,  that  this  is  the  only  good,  and  that  pain  is 
no  evil  at  alL  Epicurus  also  held,  that  a  wise  man  may  be 
perfectly  happy  under  the  extremity  of  pain;  and  yet  he 
made  happiness  consist  in  pleasure,  and  that  the  being  freed 
from  pain  is  a  necessary  ingredient  in  true  happiness.  And 
can  any  thing  be  more  absurd  and  inconsistent  than  to  sup- 
pose that  a  man  enjoys  a  complete  felicity  at  that  very  in- 
stant when  he  is  labouring  under  what,  according  to  his 
scheme  of  principles,  is  the  greatest  evil  and  misery? 

I  do  not  think  there  ever  was  a  greater  instance  of  vain- 
glory, than  appears  in  Epicurus's  last  letter,  written  by  him 
when  he  was  dying  to  one  of  his  friends  and  disciples,  Ido- 
meneus;  in  which  he  tells  him,  "  that  he  was  then  passing 
the  last  and  happiest  day  of  his  life:  that  he  was  under 
such  tornjenting  pains  of  the  stone  or  strangury  (w),  that 
nothing  could  exceed  them;  but  that  this  was  fully  com- 
pensated by  the  pleasure  he  found  in  his  mind,  arising  from 
the  remembrance  of  his  own   philosophical  reasonings  and 


(0  Anton.  Medit.  book  9.  sect.  41.  Glasgow  translation. 

{u)  So  some  understand  it:  Cicero  has  it,  pains  in  his  bladder 
and  bowels.  "  T«nti  morbi  aderant  vesicae  ct  viscerum,  ut  nihil  ad 
earum  magnitudinem  possit  accedere."  De  Finib.  lib.  ii.  cap.  30. 


Chap.  VI.     The  Morality  of  Epicurus  considered,         103 

inventions."  And  what  were  those  doctrines  and  inventions 
of  his,  which  yielded  him  such  a  wonderful  joy,  as  rendered 
him  completely  happy  under  the  extremest  pains  and  dying 
agonies?  The  principal  of  them  seem  to  have  been  such  as 
these:  That  the  world  was  made  not  by  any  wise  designing 
cause,  .but  by  chance,  and  a  fortuitous  concourse  of  atoms: 
that  there  is  no  Providence  which  exercises  any  care  about 
mankind:  that  the  soul  dies  with  the  body,  and  that  there  is 
no  life  after  this:  that  pleasure  is  the  chief  good,  and  pain 
the  greatest  evil.  And  what  comfort  these  principles  could 
furnish  in  these  circumstances,  is   difficult  to  conceive. 

This  shows  how  far  he  carried  that  vanity  to  the  last,  for 
which  he  had  been  always  so  remarkable.  To  his  vanity  it 
was  owing,  that  he  was  desirous  to  have  it  thought  that 
he  was  himself  his  own  teacher,  and  learned  his  philosophy 
from  no  man;  though  it  is  generally  agreed  among  the  an- 
tients,  that  he  borrowed  the  principal  things  in  his  philoso- 
phy from  others,  especially  from  Democritus  (x).  He  affect- 
ed not  to  quote  any  authors  in  his  works,  and  exalted  him- 
self above  the  greatest  men  of  his  age,  as  if  none  of  them 
were  capable  of  directing  men  in  the  way  to  true  happiness 
but  himself  alone.  His  envy  at  the  reputation  of  other  phi- 
losophers, carried  him  to  treat  some  of  the  most  eminent  of 
them  in  a  contemptuous  and  abusive  manner,  of  which  Ci- 
cero mentions  several  instances  (if),  Plutarch  observes  the 
same  thing  in  his  treatise  against  Colotes,  a  noted  disciple 
and  follower  of  Epicurus.  The  same  vanity,  and  desire  of 
being  remembered  with  admiration  and  applause,  appears 
in  his  last  testament;  in  which  he  ordered,  that  the  anniver- 
sary of  his  birth-day  should  be  kept  every  year;  and  that, 
besides  this,  on  the  twentieth  day  of  every  month  his  disci- 


{x)  Cicero  de  Finib.  lib.  iv.  cap.  5. 
(y)  De  nat.  Deor.  lib.  i.  cap.  33. 


104  The  Morality  of  Epicurus  considered.     Part  IL 

pies  should  meet  and  feast  together,  to  celebrate  the  memo- 
ry of  him  and  his  great  intimate  and  favourite  Metrodorus. 
Cicero  justly  represents  the  making  such  provisions  as  these, 
as  a  very  extraordinary  thing  in  a  man  who  taught  that  death, 
and  what  follows  after  it,  is  nothing  to  us  (2).  But  it  is  plain, 
that  though  he  was  for  extinguishing  in  men  "  the  desire  of 
immortality,"  yet  he  coveted  for  himself  an  immortal  fame. 
And  those  of  his  sect  were  not  wanting  to  satisfy  that  desire 
of  his  as  far  as  was  in  their  power.  They  in  eifect  were  for 
making  a  god  of  Epicurus,  for  delivering  them  from  the 
fear  of  other  gods;  and  whilst  they  laughed  at  superstition 
and  enthusiasm,  they  themselves  talked  of  Epicurus  and  his 
philosophy  in  the  most  enthusiastic  strains:  "  Freeing  our- 
selves (says  Metrodorus)  from  this  low  terrestrial  life,  let 
us  rise  to  the  truly  divine  or  sacred  mysteries,  of  Epicu- 
rus."— T«  'Ew^xKg^  Sq  ixuB-ag  ^ti^xvtet,  e^ytet  (d).  The  Epicu- 
reans, as  we  learn  from  Cicero,  had  his  image  on  their  cups 
and  rings  (^).  And  Pliny  tells  us,  that  in  his  time,  which 
was  three  hundred  and  fifty  years  after  the  death  of  Epicu- 
rus, they  were  wont  to  have  his  image  or  picture  in  their 
bed-chambers,  and  carry  it  about  with  them;  and  that  they 
continued  to  celebrate  his  birth-day  with  sacrifices,  and  to 
solemnize  feasts  every  month  to  his  honour  (c).  Numenius 
observes,  that  they  never  departed  in  the  least  from  the 
principles  their  master  taught,  and  even  thought  it  an  impi- 
ous thing  to  do  so,  or  to  bring  in  any  new  tenet  (d), 

Laertius,  his  admirer,  tells  us,  that  he  was  honoured  by 
his  country  with  statues  of  brass;  that  his  friends  were  so 


(z)De  Finib.  lib.  ii.  cap.  31.  p.  176.  et  seq.  edit.  Davis. 
(a)  Plut.  advers.  Colot.  Oper.  torn.  II.  p.  1 1 17.  B.  edit.  Xyl. 
(^)De  Finib.  lib.  v.  cap.  1. 

(c)  Plin.  Hist.  Natur.  lib.  xxxv.  cap.  2. 

(d)  Apud  Euseb.  Prsepar.  Evangel,  lib.  xiv.  cap.  5. 


Chap.  VI.     The  Morality  of  Epicurus  considered,        105 

many,  that  whole  cities  could  not  contain  them;  that  none 
of  his  disciples,  except  one, whom  he  mentions,  ever  left 
him  to  go  to  another  sect;  that  the  succession  of  his  school 
continued  when  all  the  rest  failed,  and  had  so  many  masters 
that  they  could  not  be  numbered.  He  commends  him  for 
many  virtues,  and,  among  others,  for  his  piety  and  devo- 
tion towards  the  gods  (/),  And  if  his  other  virtues  were 
no  better  founded  than  this,  they  had  a  shew  and  appear- 
ance only  without  the  reality.  The  principles  of  Epicurus 
seem  to  have  spread  very  much  in  Rome  in  the  latter 
times  of  the  Roman  republic.  Many  of  their  great  men 
openly  avowed  them.  Cicero,  who  was  no  great  friend  to 
Epicurus's  philosophy,  frequently  represents  his  followers 
as  very  numerous  at  Rome,  and  his  philosophy  as  having 
made  a  great  progress  there,  and  very  popular  (y^).  This 
gives  one  no  advantageous  idea  of  the  religion  and  manners 
of  that  age.  His  principles  continued  to  prevail  under  the 
emperors;  and  his  followers  were  very  zealous  to  propa- 
gate their  opinions,  for  which  they  are  ridiculed  by  Epic- 
tetus;  because,  as  he  observes,  if  their  principles  were  ge- 
nerally believed,  it  would  endanger  their  own  peace  and 
safety  as  well  as  that  of  the  public.  Lucian  informs  us,  that 
in  his  time  the  emperor,  by  whom  he  probably  means  Mar- 
cus Antoninus,  allowed  large  salaries  to  the  masters  of  the 
Epicurean  school,  as  well  as  to  those  of  the  Stoics,  Pla- 
tonists,  and  Peripatetics  (^). 

It  appears,  however,  that  the  Epicureans  did  not  every- 
where, and  at  all  times,  meet  with  the  good  reception 
Laertius   mentions.    They   were    expelled   out   of    several 


(e)  Laert.  lib.  x.  segm.  9,  10. 

(/)  De  Finib.  lib.  i.  cap.  7.  lib.  ii.  cap.  25.  De  Offic.  lib.  iii.  cap- 
ult. 

{g)  Lucian.  in  Eunuch.  Oper.  tom.  I.  p.  841.  edit.  Amst. 

.  Vol.  II.  O 


106  The  Morality  of  Epicurus  considered.     Part  IL 

cities,  because  of  the  disorcUrs  thev  occasioned.  Plutarch 
speaks  of  the  •4'>)^iV,t6«T«  €A«<r^»^«  iroMm^  the  reproachful  de- 
crees made  by  divcrs  cities  against  them  (A).  We  learn 
from  iElian,  that  the  Romans  expelled  Alcseus  and  Phi- 
lippus,  who  were  Epicureans,  out  of  the  city,  because  they 
taught  the  young  men  to  indulge  strange  and  flagitious 
pleasures.  And  that  the  republic  of  Messenia  in  Arcadia 
passed  this  censure  upon  the  Epicureans,  that  they  were 
the  pest  of  the  youth,  and  that  they  stained  the  govern- 
ment by  their  effeminacy  and  atheism.  They  enjoined  them 
to  depart  their  borders  by  sunset;  and  when  they  were 
gone,  ordered  the  priests  to  purify  the  temples,  and  ma- 
gistrates, and  the  whole  city  (z).  The  republic  of  Lyctos, 
in  the  isle  of  Crete,  drove  them  out  of  the  city,  and  issued 
out  a  severe  decree  against  them,  in  which  they  called 
them  the  contrivers  of  the  feminine  and  ungenerous  philo- 
sophy, and  the  declared  enemies  of  the  gods;  and  that  if 
any  of  them  should  presume  to  return,  he  should  be  put 
to  death  in  a  manner  which  was  very  ignominious  as  well  as 
painful.  (Ji). 


(A)  In  his  treatise  Non  posse  suaviter  vivi,  &c.  Oper.  tom.  II. 
p.  1 100.  D.  edit  Xyl. 

(i)  iElian.  var.  Hist.  lib.  ix.  cap.  12. 
{k)  Suide  in  voce  E^uta^of. 


107 


CHAPTER  VII. 

The  sentiments  of  those  who  are  accounted  the  best  of  the  Pagan  moral  philoso- 
phers considered.  They  held  in  general,  that  the  law  is  right  reason.  8at 
reason  alone,  without  a  superior  authority,  does  not  lay  an  obliging  force  upoa 
men.  The  v.  i  est  Heatliens  taught,  that  the  original  of  law  was  irom  God,  and 
that  from  him  it  lerived  its  authority  As  to  the  tpiestion,  how  this  law  comes  to 
be  known  to  us,  they  sometimes  i-epresent  it  as  naturally  known  to  all  men.  But 
the  pHncipal  way  of  knowing  it  is  resolved  by  them  into  the  mind  and  reason 
of  wise  men,  or,  in  other  words,  into  the  doctrines  and  instructions  of  the  phi- 
losophers. The  uncertainty  of  this  rule  of  morals  shewn.  They  talked  highly 
of  virtue  ingeneial,  but  differed  aljout  matters  of  great  importance  relating  to 
the  law  of  nature:  some  instances  of  which  are  mentioned. 

Let  us  now  proceed  to  consider  the  sentiments  of  those 
who  are  generally  accounted  the  ablest  and  best  of  the  Pa- 
gan philosophers  and  moralists.  Such  were  Socrates,  Plato, 
and  those  of  the  old  academy,  Aristotle  and  the  Peripate- 
tics, and  above  all  the  Stoics,  who  professed  to  carry  the 
doctrine  of  morals  to  the  highest  perfection. 

It  was  a  general  maxim  among  the  philosophers,  and 
which  frequently  occurs  in  their  writings,  that  the  law  is 
right  reason.  So  Plato,  Cicero,  Seneca,  Plutarch,  and 
others.  But  properly  speaking,  right  reason  is  not  a  law. 
Reason  as  such  only  counsels,  advises,  and  demonstrates, 
but  does  not  command:  nor  doth  it  lay  persons  under  an 
obligation  or  restraint  of  law,  but  by  the  interposition  of 
a  superior  authority.  Mr.  Selden  has  argued  this  matter 
very  well,  in  his  first  book  De  Jure  Nat.  et  Gent,  in  the 
seventh  and  eighth  chapters.  He  shews,  that  antecedently 
to  men's  being  formed  into  society,  no  man  can  be  so 
obliged  by  the  reason  of  another  man,  \vh6  is  only  sup- 
posed to  be  naturally  his  equal,  nor  by  his  own  reason,  as 
not  to  have  it  in  his  power  to  change  or  alter  it.  For 
whence  can  a  disparity  of  obligation  arise,  ,where  all  me*n 


lOS  Right  Reason  alone  considered         Part  II. 

are  supposed  to  be  equal,  and  sui  juris,  or  their  own  mas- 
ters? Or,  if  we  suppose  them  to  be  united  into  bodies  po- 
litic, or  civil  societies,  and  that  in  consequence  of  this  the 
authority  of  princes  and  of  the  laws  has  been  established, 
yet  except  there  were  some  superior  right  and  authority, 
by  which  they  should  be  all  bound  to  stand  to  their  com- 
pacts, and  yield  obedience  to  their  princes,  what  natural 
obligation  could  arise  which  should  bind  them  so  strongly, 
that  they  could  not  recede  from  those  compacts  or  agree- 
ments when  they  should  think  it  for  their  advantage  to  do 
so?  They  that  were  naturally  equal  cannot  by  any  subse- 
quent agreement  or  compact  become  so  far  unequal,  as  ab- 
solutely to  divest  themselves  of  a  power  or  liberty  to  re- 
nounce those  compacts  and  agreements,  and  to  resume  their 
natural  rights,  if  there  were  no  power  or  authority,  su- 
perior both  to  the  individuals  of  the  society  and  to  the 
whole,  to  bind  the  observation  of  their  conventions  upon 
them,  and  to  oblige  them  to  keep  their  faith  once  given, 
and  punish  their  violation  of  it.  The  obligation  therefore 
of  law  must  properly  arise  from  the  command  and  authority 
of  the  Supreme  Being,  since  none  but  God  hath  a  proper 
authority  over  all  mankind.  Mr.  Selden  hath  produced 
many  testimonies  to  shew,  that  the  wisest  Heathens  were 
sensible  of  this,  and  that  they  derived  the  original  of  law, 
and  its  obliging  force,  from  God  or  the  gods  (  /).  Plato 
frequently  intimates,  that  no  mortal  has  a  proper  power  of 
making, laws,  and  that  to  Him  alone  it  originally  and  pro- 
perly belongs.  Cicero,  in  his  books  of  laws,  expresseth 
himself  fully  and  strongly  on  this  head:  he  represents  it  not 


(/)  Seld.  de  Jure  Nat.  et  Gent.  lib.  i.  cap.  8.  p.  94.  et  seq. 
edit.  Lips.  This  is  also  largely  shewn  by  the  learned  and  in- 
genious author  of  "  The  Knowledge  of  Divine  Things  by  Re- 
velation only,  not  by  Reason  or  Nature.'* 


Chap.  VII.  is  not  properly  a  Law,  109 

only  as  his  own  opinion,  but  that  of  the  wisest  men,  that 
law  is  not  originally  of  human  institution,  nor  enacted  by 
the  decree  and  authority  of  the  people,  but  is  an  eternal 
thing,  and  proceedeth  from  the  Sovereign  Wisdom  which 
governeth  the  universe,  commanding  or  forbidding  with 
the  highest  reason  {m).  And  in  the  famous  passage  quoted 
by  Lactantius  from  Cicero's  third  book  De  Republica, 
speaking  of  that  universal  law  obligatory  on  all  mankind, 
which  he  represents  as  the  same  in  all  nations,  and  which 
cannot  be  dispensed  with  or  abrogated  in  the  whole  or  in 
any  part  of  it,  nor  can  we  be  absolved  from  it  by  the  au- 
thority of  senate  or  people,  he  adds,  that  "  God,  the  com- 
mon master  and  Lord  of  ail,  is  the  inventor,  the  propoun- 
der,  and  the  enacter  of  this  law  (»)."  And  before  him,  So- 
crates, speaking  of  certain  unwritten  laws,  as  he  calls  them, 
which  are  observed  in  every  place  or  region  after  the  same 
manner,  says,  that  these  laws  were  not  made  by  men,  since 
they  could  not  all  meet  together  for  that  purpose,  nor  are 
all  of  one  language,  but  that  the  gods  appointed  those  laws 
to  men  (o). 

Other  testimonies  might  be  added  to  shew,  that  the  best 
and  greatest  philosophers  held  God  to  be  the  only  universal 


(m)  "  Hanc  igitur  video  sapieniissimorum  fuisse  sententiam, 
legem  neque  hominuni  in^eniis  excogitatam,  nee  scitum  aliquod 
esse  populorum,  sed  a^ternum  quiddam,  quod  universum  mun- 
dum  regeret  imperandi  prohibendique  sapientia:  ita  principem 
illam  legem  et  ultimam  mentem  esse  dicebant  omnia  ratione  aut 
cogentis  aut  vetantis  Dei.  Quamobrem  lex  vera  atqiie  princeps 
ad  jubendum,  et  vetandum,  ratio  est  recta  summi  Jovis.'*  De 
Leg.  lib.  ii,  cap.  4. 

(n)  "Namque  erit  communis  quasi  magistelr  et  imperator 
omnium  Deus:  ille  legis  hujus  inventor,  disceptator,  later." 

(o)'^Eyft>  ^g»  S-i^j  tl^xi  THi  vofAHi  rarai  to7<  «».^^a»T<)<$  B-iTvxi.  Xen, 
Memorab.  lib.  iv.  cap.  4.  sect.  19,  20. 


110   The  Antients  held  that  natural  Law  derives  Part  II. 

legislator,  to  whom  it  beiongt-th  to  give  laws  obligatory 
upon  all  mankind.  But  then  the  quescion  naturally  arose, 
how  these  divine  laws  came  to  be  known  to  men. 

Cicero,  in  the  remarkable  passage  before  referred  to, 
quoted  by  Lactantius,  represents  the  universal  law  he 
speaks  of,  and  of  which  he  supposes  God  to  be  the  Su- 
preme Author,  as  naturally  known  to  all  men:  that  we  are 
not  to  seek  any  other  interpreter  of  it  but  itself;  and  he  in- 
timates that  every  man  carries  the  interpretation  of  it  in 
his  own  breast  (/?).  This  scheme  has  been  already  con- 
sidered, and  I  shall  not  here  repeat  what  I  have  offered  to 
shew,  that  the  hypothesis  concerning  the  universal  clearness 
of  the  whole  law  of  nature,  as  if  it  were  so  obvious  to  all 
men  that  they  need  no  direction  or  instruction,  is  contrary 
to  the  most  evident  fact  and  experience.  To  what  has  been 
before  observed,  I  shall  now  add  a  remarkable  testimony 
from  Cicero  himself.  "  If  (says  he)  we  had  been  naturally 
so  formed  from  our  birth,  that  we  could  clearly  behold  na- 
ture herself,  and  under  her  excellent  guidance  accomplish 
the  course  of  life,  there  would  have  been  no  need  of  learn- 
ing and  instruction."  But  he  goes  on  to  shew,  that  "this  is 
not  the  case;  that  nature,  indeed,  hath  given  us  some  small 
sparks,  but  which,  being  depraved  by  corrupt  customs  and 
wrong  opinions,  we  soon  extinguish,  so  that  the  light  of 
nature  no  where   appears  ($')."  And  he  afterwards   repre- 


{fi  )  "  Est  quidem  vera  lex  recta  ratio,  naturae  congruens, 
diffusa  in  omnes,  constans,  sempiterna,  quae  vocat  ad  officium 
jubendoj  vetando  a  fraude  deterreat;  neque  est  quaerendus  ex- 
planator,  aut  interpres  ejus  alius."  Cic.  de  Republ.  lib.  iii.  Frag- 
ment, apud  Lactant. 

(§r)  "  Quod  si  tales  nos  natiira  genuisset,  ut  earn  ipsam  intueri 
et  perspicere,  eademque  optunia  duce  cursum  vitae  conficere 
posse m us,  baud  sane  erat  quod  quisquam  rationem  et  doctrinam 
requireret.  Nunc  parvulos  nobis  dedit  igniculos,  quos  celeriler 


Chap,  VII.  its  Authority  and  obliging  Force  from  God.  Ill 

sents  vice  as  having  the  consent  of  the  multitude  on  its 
side;  and  that  popular  fame  is  for  the  most  part  inconsi- 
derate and  rash,  and  an  applauder  of  sins  and  vices  (r). 
And  from  thence  he  argues  the  great  usefulness  and  excel- 
lency of  philosophy,  for  instructing  and  directing  mankind, 
and  healing  the  distempers  of  the  mind. 

It  is  an  observation  of  the  learned  and  ingenious  Dr. 
Middltrton,  that  Cicero  "  took  the  system  of  the  world,  or 
the  visible  works  of  God,  to  be  the  promulgation  of  God's 
law,  or  the  declaration  of  God's  will  to  mankind:  whence, 
as  we  might  collect  his  being,  nature,  and  attributes,  so  we 
could  trace  the  reasons  also  and  motives  of  his  acting,  till, 
by  observing  what  he  had  done,  we  might  learn  what  we 
ought  to  do,  and  by  the  operations  of  the  Divine  Reason 
be  instructed  how  to  perfect  our  own;  since  the  periVction 
of  man  consisteth  in  the  imitation  of  God  (a*)*"  "  ^  believe 
(says  Cicero,  in  the  person  of  Cato)  that  the  immortal  gods 
have  dispersed  souls  into  human  bodies,  that  there  might 
be  beings  who  should  behold  the  earth,  and  contemplate 
the  order  of  the  heavens,  and  be  thereby  engaged  to  imi- 
tate that  order  in  the  regularity  and  constancy  of  their 
lives  (0«"  To   the  same  purpose   he   elsewhere  observes, 


malis  moribus  opinionibusque  depravati,  sic  restinguimus,  ut 
nusquam  naturae  lumen  appareat."  Tuscul.  Disput.  lib.  iii. 
cap.  2. 

(r)  "  Quasi  raaximus  quidam  magister  populus,  atque  omnis 
undique  ad  vitia  consentiens  multitudo;  temeraria  atqae  incon- 
siderata,  et  plerumque  peccatorum  vitiorumque  laudatrix  fama 
popularis."  Ibid. 

(«)  Life  of  Cicero,  Vol.  II.  sect.  12.  p.  612.  Dublin  edit. 

(r)  "  Credo  decs  immortales  sparsisse  animos  in  corpora  hu- 
mana,  ut  essent  qui  terras  tuerentur,  quique  coelestium  ordinem 
contemplantes  imitarentur  eum  vitae  modo  et  constantia.**  Cato 
Major,  sive  De  Se'nectute,  cap.  21. 


112  The  Ways  in  which  the  Philosophers  supposed  Part  IL 

that  "man  was  originally  made  for  contemplating  the 
world,  and  imitating  it  (w)."  And  that  "  the  contemplation 
and  knowledge  of  the  heavens,  and  the  orderly  disposition 
of  things,  teaches  men  modesty,  greatness  of  mind,  and 
justice  (^)."  But  whatever  influence  this  might  have  upon 
some  philosophical  and  contemplative  minds,  how  few  are 
there  that  can  read  their  duty  in  the  heavens,  or  collect  it 
from  the  order  and  harmony  of  the  celestial  bodies?  To  re- 
fer the  bulk  of  mankind  to  this  for  direction  in  morals, 
would  be  of  small  advantage,  and  would  give  to  them,  or 
even  to  philosophers  themselves,  little  light  or  instruction 
with  respect  to  the  particulars  of  their  duty. 

Accordingly,  many  of  the  H  athens  were  sensible,  that 
they  needed  a  more  particular  and  explicit  declaration  of 
the  Divine  Will  and  Law.  The  most  eminent  legislators, 
as  was  before  observed,  pretended  to  have  received  the 
laws  they  delivered  to  the  people  by  communication  from 
the  gods,  in  order  to  give  them  the  greater  weight  and  au- 
thority: or,  which  amounted  to  the  same  thing,  had  them 
approved  by  oracles,  which  were  looked  upon  as  making 
authentic  declarations  of  the  Divine  Will.  To  those  ora- 
cles the  people  had  frequent  recourse  for  direction,  and  in 
this  they  were  encouraged  by  the  philosophers  themselves. 
Socrates,  as  Xenophon  informs  us,  was  wont  to  consult  the 
oracle,  to  know  the  will  of  the  gods,  and  especially  the 
Delphian  oracle  (z/).  Plato  ascribes  "  the  first,  the  greatest, 
and  most  excellent  laws  and  institutions,"  T<e «  [Aiyi^u  xx) 
xtixXi^eCKMt  Ts^^aroi  t£v  vof^oB^irnfieirm,  tO  Apollo  at  Delphi.  And 
h^  has  a  particular  reference  to  the  establishing  of  temples 


(u)  "  Ipse  homo  ortus  est  ad  mundum  contemplandum  ct 
imitandum."  De  Nat.  Deor.  lib.  ii.  cap.  14. 
(x)  De  Finib.  lib.  iv.  cap.  5. 
(y)  See  concerning  this  vol.  I.  chap.  xv. 


Chap.  VII.         that  Men  learn  Moral  Duty,  113 

and  sacrifices,  and  the  several  kinds  of  worship  rendered 
to  the  gods,  daemons,  and  heroes,  and  whatever  was  neces- 
sary for  rendering  them  propitious.  "  Of  these  things  (says 
he)  we  ourselves  know  nothing.  A.nd  in  ordering  the  city,  we 
shall,  if  we  be  wise,  believe  no  other,  nor  use  any  other 
guide  than  the  patron  god:"  by  which  he  means  Apollo,  of 
whom  he  had  spoken  just  before  (2).  To  this  it  may  be 
added,  that  the  philosophers  universally  represented  it  as 
the  will  of  the  gods,  and  which  was  prescribed  by  the  oracles, 
that  all  men  should  conform  to  the  laws  of  their  country, 
both  in  religious  and  civil  matters;  and  what  false  guides 
these  were  in  many  cases,  and  how  unfit  to  furnish  a  pro- 
per rule  of  duty,  has  been  sufficiently  shewn. 

Another  way  which  the  phiiosopliers  proposed  for  leading 
men  into  the  knowledge  of  the  Divine  Law  and  of  Moral 
Duty,  was  by  the  dictates  and  instructions  of  wise  men,  that 
is,  of  the  philosophers  themselves.  Thus  Cicero,  in  his  trea- 
tise of  laws,  after  having  said  that  the  supreme  original  law 
is  the  reason  and  authority  of  the  supreme  eternal  mind,  ob- 
serves, that  from  thence  is  derived  the  law  which  the  gods 
have  given  to  mankind,  which  law  he  explains  to  be  "  the 
mind  and  reason  of  a  wise  man,  fitly  disposed  for  command- 
ing that  which  is  good,  and  deterring  from  evil. — E-x  qua 
[i.  e.  ratione  Dei]  ilia  lex  quam  dii  humano  generi  dederunt, 
recte  est  lauda*^a:  est  enim  ratio  mensque  sapientis  ad  ju- 
bendum  et  deterrendum  idonea  («)."  And  again,  he  says, 
That"  as  the  divine  mind  is  the  supreme  law,  so  when  it  is 
in  man,  it  is  perfect  in  the  mind  of  a  wise  man. — Ut  ilia  di- 
vina  mens  summa  lex  est,  ita  cum  in  homine  est,  perfecta  est 
in  mente  sapientis  (A)."  And  he  there  argues,  that  right  rea- 


(2)  Plato  de  Republ.  lib.  v.  Oper.  p.  448.  edit.  Lugd. 
(a)  Cic.  de  Leg.  lib.  ii.  cap.  4.  p.  86.  edit.  Davis, 
(6)  Ibid.  p.  88.  edit.  Davis. 
Vol.  IL  P 


114     Socrates^ s  Account  of  the  unwritten  Laws     Part  II. 

son  is  the  same  in  God  and  man;  and  that  there  is  a  commu- 
nity of  right  and  law  between  them,  as  belonging  to  one  city. 
"  For  (saith  he)  this  whole  world  is  to  be  regarded  as  one 
common  city  of  gods  and  men."  In  this  he  followed  ^he 
Stoics,  whose  scheme  was  this;  That  the  original  of  law  and 
right  is  reason!  that  the  reason  of  God  is  the  highest  law: 
and  the  reason  of  God  and  of  the  wise  man  is  the  same.  So  that 
in  the  issue  law  is  resolved,  with  respect  to  our  knowledge 
of  it,  into  the  reason  of  a  wise  man.  Hence  the  high  eco- 
miums  bestowed  by  Cicero  and  others  upon  philosophy,  as 
the  best  and  greatest  gift  of  the  gods,  the  inventress  of  laws, 
the  guide  of  life,  and  the  knowledge  of  things  divine  and 
human. 

But  though  the  philosophers  said  such  glorious  things  of 
the  universal  law,  the  law  of  God  and  reason,  and  supposed 
it  to  be  perfect  in  the  mind  of  the  wise  man,  yet  when  they 
came  more  particularly  to  explain  what  the  law  of  right  rea- 
son requires,  they  differed  mightily  about  it.  They  talked 
in  an  excellent  manner  of  virtue  in  gtneral,  but  it  is  not  true 
what  some  modern  writers  have  affirmed,  that  they  all  agreed 
what  is  virtue,  and  what  is  vice  (c).  There  is  a  remarkable 
passage  in  Plato's  Phaedrus,  vv  hich  it  may  not  be  amiss 
to  mention  here.  Socrates  asks  Phaedrus, "  When  any  one 
names  silver  or  iron,  do  not  all  understand  the  same  thing  by 
it?"  Phsedrus  acknowledges  that  it  was  so.  ^*  But  (says  So- 
crates) when  a  man  speaks  of  that  which  is  just  or  good, 
is  not  ,one  man  carried  one  vvay,  and  another  another, 
and  we  differ  from  one  another,  and  even  from  our- 
selves:"—^^AAA«5  «AA»j  (Pi^erxt^  f^  ecf4.(pta-^»75j^et  «AA>)A«/5,  J^  tjfuv 
ivToU  {d),  Maximus  Tyrlus  seems  to  have  had  this  passage 
in  view,  when  he  saith.  That  "  the  same  thing  is  not  good 
or  evil  to  all,  nor  is  the   same   thing  base  or  honourable  to 


(c)  Bolingbroke's  Works,  Vol  V.  p.  204,  205.  edit.  4to. 

(d)  Plato  Opera,  p.  35 1.  F.  edit.  Lugd. 


Chap.  VII.  common  to  all  Mankind*  115 

all  men.'^  And  speaking  of  law,  and  right,  or  justice,  he  de- 
clares, that,  *'  neither  nation  agreeth  with  nation  in  these 
things,  nor  city  with  city,  nor  family  with  family,  nor  one 
man  with  another,  nor  the  same  man  with  himself  (^)."  And 
with  regard  to  the  philosophers  themselves,  some  of  the 
most  celebrated  of  them,  as  will  be  shewn  afterwards,  ap- 
proved things  as  permitted  by  the  law  of  nature,  which  others 
condemned  as  contrary  to  it. 

Socrates,  in  a  passage  before  referred  to,  speaks  of  un- 
written laws,  which  he  supposes  to  be  of  divine  original, 
and  to  be  observed  by  all  men  in  every  region  after  the 
same  manner  (f).  But  this  can  only  be  understood  of  a  few 
general  maxims  and  principles:  and  even  with  respect  to 
these,  when  they  came  to  be  explained,  there  was  far  from 
being  an  universal  agreement. 

The  first  article  of  that  unwritten  law  mentioned  by  Socrates, 
and  which  he  seems  to  make  the  chief  and  the  most  univer- 
sally acknowledged,  is,"  that  the  gods  should  be  worshipped." 
Hx^u,  vZtrtv  uvB-^aTToti  nr^^Tov  vo^i^ereci  tiig  B-iiSi  a-iZuv.    He  doth    not 

represent  the  law  thus,  that  we  are  to  worship  God,  but  that 
we  are  to  worship  the  gods:  as  if  polytheism,  or  the  worship  of 
many  gods,  was  the  first  law  of  nature  (^).  It  has  been  often 


(e)  Dissert,  i.  p.  5.  Oxen. 

(/)  Xen.    Memor.  Socr.  lib.  iv.  cap.  4.  sect.   19. 

(g)  Lord  Herbert  de  Relig.  Gentil.  makes  the  first  articles  of 
his  catholic  universal  religion,  acknowledged  by  all  mankind,  to 
be  these,  That  there  is  one  Supreme  God,  and  that  he  is  chiefly 
to  be  worshipped.  Lord  Bolingbroke  carries  it  farther,  and  says, 
That  "  the  religion  and  law  of  nature  shews  us  the  Supreme 
Being,  manifested  in  all  his  works,  to  be  the  true  and  only  object 
of  adoration."  And  if  this  be  the  law  of  nature,  that  God  only  is 
to  be  worshipped,  it  is  evident,  that  the  greatest  among  th# 
Pagan  philosophers  were  so  far  from  agreeing  universally  in  this, 
that  they  universally' neglected  and  counteracted  it,  by  worshipt 


116      Socrates*s  Account  of  the  unwritten  Laws     Part  II, 

said,  and  manv^  passages  of  the  antients  are  produced  to  that 
purpos-%  that  there  has  been  a  general  consent  or  agreement 
among  all  nations,  the  most  barbarous  not  excepted,  in  the  ac- 
knowledgmf.ntof  a  Deit)^  And  it  is  true  that  thet  have  gen- 
erally agreed  in  the  notion  of  a  superior,  invisible  Divine  Pow- 
er or  Powers;  but  not  so  generally  as  some  have  represented 
it,  in  the  belief  of  one  Supreme  God:  though  many  of  them 
had  some  notion  of  this,  and  there  was  an  antient  tradition 
concerning  it,  which  had  spread  far  and  wide,  and  never 
was  entirely  extinguished.  But  when  we  proceed  to  examine 
more  distinctly  into  the  ideas  they  had  of  the  Divinity,  or 
of  superior  invisible  powers,  and  the  worship  that  was  to  be 
rendered  to  them,  here  we  shall  find  a  great  difference.  Plu- 
tarch observes,  That  "  poets,  philosophers,  and  lawgivers, 
were  all  along  the  first  that  instructed  and  confirmed  us  in 
our  opinion  of  the  gods.  For  all  agree  that  there  are  gods: 
but  concerning  their  number,  their  order,  their  essence,  and 
power,  they  vastly  differ  from  one  another.  The  philosophers 
differ  from  the  poets  and  lawgivers,  and  these  from  them." 
See  hisAmator.  Oper.  torn.  IL  p.  763.  C,  D.  edit.  Xyl, 
Francof.  1620. 

Another  instance  produced  by  Socrates  of  an  universal 
unwritten  law  observed  in  every  region  after  the  same  man- 
ner, is  that  of  honouring  our  parents.  And  in  this  mankind 
have  generally  agreed:  and  yet  they  have  differed  in  their 
observation  of  this  law.  In  several  nations  in  antient  times, 
they  were  wont  to  expose  or  destroy  their  sick  and  aged  pa- 


ping  a  muUiplicity  of  deities,  and  encouraging  others  to  do  so. 
And  this,  as  was  before  observed,  is  a  plain  confutation  of  what 
his  Lordship  has  confidently  aflfirmed,  "  That  tfiere  is  not  one 
moral  precept  in  the  whole  Gospel,  which  was  not  taught  by  the 
philosophers."  See  Bolingbroke's  "Works,  Vol.  V.  p.  97,  98. 
compared  p.  205. 


Chap.  VII.  common  to  alt  Mankind,  117 

rents,  pretending  that  this  was  better  for  them  than  to  wait 
for  their  natural  deaths.  The  same  custom  is  still  observed 
among  some  nations,  particularly  those  that  inhabit  the 
countries  near  the  Cape  of  Good  Hope.  Socrates  also  sup- 
poses it  to  be  a  part  of  the  natural  universal  law,  that  parents 
should  not  have  carnal  commerce  with  their  children,  nor 
children  with  their  part  nts.  And  yet  it  is  well  knovv^n,  that 
there  were  some  nations,  particularly  the  Persians  (A),  who 
in  other  respects  had  many  good  laws,  among  whom  this 
was  done  without  scruple.  And  the  Persian  magi,  who  were 
esteemed  very  v/ise  men  and  great  philosophers,  allowed 
and  approved  these  and  other  incestuous  mixtures  (i).  So 
did  some  of  the  principal  Stoics,  as  Sextus  Empiricus  and 
Plutarch  inform  us  (/^). 

That  parents  should  love  and  nourish,  and  take  care  of 
their  children,  may  be  also  justly  regarded  as  a  law  of  na- 
ture; and  yet  the  practice  of  exposing  and  destroying  their 
children  was  common,  as  I  have  shewn,  even  among  the 
most  civilized  nations,  approved  and  even  required  by  some 
of  the  most  famous  legislators,  and  wisest  philosophers. 

Other  instances  might  be  mentioned  in  relation  to  things 


(/z)  St.  Jerom  attributes  the  custom  of  incestuous  marriages  to 
the  Medes,  Indians,  ^Ethiopians,  lib.  ii,  advers.  Jovinian.  Oper. 
torn.  II.  p.  75.  edit.  Basil.  See  Grot,  de  Jure  Belii  et  Pacis,  lib. 
ii.  cap.  5.  sect.  12.  who  observes,  that  Euripides,  in  his  Andro- 
mache, speaks  of  it  as  a  custom  general  among  the  barbarians. 
See  also  Selden  de  Jure  Nat.  et  Gent.  lib.  v.  cap.  11.  And  it 
appears  from  Levit.  chap,  xviii.  that  these  practices  were  com- 
mon among  the  Canaanites  and  other  neighbouring  nations,  which 
shews  the  great  propriety  of  prohibiting  these  things  by  an  ex- 
press divine  law,  enforced  by  the  authority  of  God  himself,  and 
by  powerful  sanctions. 

(i)  Laert.  Prooem.  segm.  7. 

(Jc)  Pyrrhon.  Hypotyp.  lib.  iii,  cap.  24.  Plutarch.  Stoic.  Re- 
pugn, torn.  II.  p.  1044,  1045. 


lia  Socrates^ s  Account^  £i7*c.  Part  II. 

which,  one  should  be  apt  to  think,  are  plain  from  the  law 
of  nature,  concerning  which  yet  some  of  the  most  eminent 
philosophers  have  passed  very  wrong  judgments.  This  shews, 
that  even  men  of  the  greatest  abilities,  if  left  merely  to  their 
own  unassisted  reason,  are  apt  to  mistake  in  matters  of  great 
consequence  in  morality,  and  that  their  dictates  and  instruc- 
tions could  not  furnish  a  complete  rule  of  duty  that  might 
be  safely  depended  upon.  This  will  farther  appear  from  the 
instances  which  shall  be  brought  in  the  following  chapter, 
of  great  errors  which  they  have  actually  fallen  into  with  re- 
gard to  morals. 


119 


CHAPTER  VIII. 

Epictetus's  observation  concerning  the  difficulty  of  applying  general  preconcep. 
tioas  to  particular  cases,  verified  in  the  antient  philosophers.  They  wero  gene- 
rally wrong  with  respect  to  the  duty  and  worship  proper  to  be  rendered  to 
God,  though  they  themselves  acknowledged  it  to  be  a  point  of  the  highest  im- 
portance. As  to  social  duties,  some  eminent  philosophers  pleaded  for  re\enge 
and  against  forgiveness  of  injuries.  But  especially  they  were  deficient  in  that 
part  of  moral  duty  which  relates  to  the  government  of  the  sensual  appetites 
and  passions.  Many  of  the  philosophers  countenanced  by  their  principles  and 
practice  the  most  unnatural  lusts  and  vices.  Those  of  them  that  did  not  carry 
it  so  far,  yet  encouraged  an  impurity  inconsistent  with  the  strictness  and  dig- 
nity of  virtue.  Plato  very  culpable  in  this  respect,  so  also  were  the  Cynics  and 
Stoics.  Simple  fornication  generally  allowed  amongst  them.  Our  modern  deists 
very  loose  in  their  principles  with  regard  to  sensual  impurities. 

It  is  an  observation  of  that  excellent  philosopher  Epic- 
tetus,  That  "  the  cause  of  all  human  evils  is  the  not  being 
able  to  adapt  general  preconceptions  to  particular  cases  (  /)." 
This  he  frequentlv  repeats.  By  preconceptions,  ^poXii-^as,  he 
understands  general  common  notions,  which  the  Stoics  sup- 
posed to  be  originally  and  naturally  implanted  in  the  human 
mind.  He  instances  in  these,  that  good  is  eligible,  and  to  be 
pursued;  that  justice  is  fair  and  becoming.  In  these  and 
the  like  principles  and  maxims  men  of  all  ages  and  nations 
agree.  But  in  applying  these  general  notions  there  is  great 
difference:  and  the  best  education  consists  in  learning  to  do 
this  properly.  See  the  22d  chapter  of  the  first  book  of  his 
Dissertations.  This  is  also  the  subject  of  the  11th  and  17th 
chapters  of  his  second  book,  where  having  observed  that 
we  have  natural  ideas  and  preconceptions  of  good  and  just, 
he  represents  it  as  the  proper  business  of  phitosophy,  to  in- 


(  4  )  Epict.  Dissert,  book  iv.  chap.  1.  sect.  », 


120  The  Philosophers  7mstaken  in  their  applications  Part  II. 

struct  men  how  to  apply  such  preconceptions  in  a  right 
manner:  and  that  it  is  not  possible  to  do  this  as  we  ought, 
without  having  minutely  distinguished  them,  and  examined 
what  is  the  proper  subject  to  each.  But  it  is  no  hard  mat- 
ter to  shew,  that  the  philosophers  themselves  frequently 
erred  in  their  application  of  general  notions  and  maxims  (w), 
aBd  were  wrong  themselves,  and  led  others  wrong  in  mat- 
ters of  great  consequence,  with  regard  to  the  particulars  of 
moral  duty:  which  shews  the  great  need  they  stood  in  of  a 
superior  auth'iitv  and  direction. 

Many  of  the  philosophers  were  sensible  in  general  of  the 
great  importance  of  the  duties  we  owe  to  the  Deity:  that, 
as  Hierocles  speaks,  piety  is  the  miother  of  all  virtues. 
Cicero  in  his  Offices,  in  representing  the  order  of  duties, 
places  those  relating  to  the  gods  in  the  first  place,  before 


(m)  Though  Lord  Bolingbroke  frequently  asserts  the  uni- 
versal clearness  of  the  law  of  nature,  and,  in  a  passage  men- 
tioned above,  intimates  that  all  men  have  an  intuitive  knowledge 
of  it,  from  the  first  principles  to  the  last  conclusions,  yet  he 
elsewhere  makes  this  acknowledgment,  that  "  when  we  make 
particular  applications  of  the  general  laws  of  nature,  we  are 
liable  to  mistake."  He  adds,  '*  That  there  are  things  fit  and 
unfit,  right  and  wrong,  just  and  unjust,  in  the  human  system, 
and  discernible  by  human  reason,  as  far  as  our  natural  imper- 
fections admit,  I  acknowledf^e  most  read'ly.  But  from  the  dif- 
ficulty we  have  to  judge,  and  from  the  uncertainty  of  our  judg- 
ments in  a  multitude  of  cases  which  lie  within  our  bounds,  I 
would  demonstrate  the  folly  of  those  who  affect  to  have  know- 
ledge beyond  them.  They  are  unable,  on  many  occasions,  to  de- 
duct from  the  constitution  of  their  own  system,  and  the  laws  of 
their  own  nature,  with  precision  and  certainty,  what  these  re- 
quire of  them,  and  what  is  right  or  wrong,  just  or  unjust, 
for  them  to  do."  Bolingbroke's  Works,  Vol.  V.  p.  444.  edit.  4to. 


Chap.  VIII.    of  genertil  Rules  to  particular  Cases.        i2i 

those  we  owe  to  our  country,  and  to  our  parents  (n).  Yet 
it  is  observable,  that  in  that  book,  which  is  one  of  the 
most  excellent  moral  treatises  that  was  written  by  any  of 
the  philosophers,  he  very  slightly  passes  over  the  duties 
relating  to  the  Divinity.  He  sometimes,  though  seldom, 
makes  mention  of  the  gods,  but  takes  no  notice  of  the  one 
Supreme  God.  No  where  does  he  in  that  treatise  draw  any 
arguments  or  motives  to  enforce  the  practice  of  duty  from 
the  authority  and  command  of  God,  but  merely  from  the 
beauty  and  excellency  of  the  Honestum,  and  the  evil  and 
turpitude  of  vice.  It  is  a  just  observation  of  Mr.  Locke, 
that  "  the  philosophers  who  spoke  from  reason,  make  not 
much  mention  of  the  Deity  in  their  ethics  (o)."  The  Stoics, 
indeed,  gave  precepts  of  piety,  which  would  have  been  ex- 
cellent, if  they  had  been  directed  not  to  the  gods,  but  to 
the  one  true  God.  But  of  these  I  shall  treat  distinctly  af-- 
terwards.  The  philosophers  generally  acknowledged,  that 
God,  or  the  gods,  as  they  usually  expressed  it,  were  to  be 
worshipped.  But  what  kind  of  worship  this  should  be^ 
they  were  greatly  at  a  loss  to  know.  Some  of  them,  under 
pretence  of  the  most  exalted  thoughts  of  the  Divinity^ 
were  only  for  worshipping  inwardly  in  the  mind,  and  were 
hot  for  rendering  any  outward  worship  to  the  Supreme 
Being,  or  Him  whom  they  called  the  Highest  God  of  alL 
Others,  in  accommodation  to  the  imaginations  of  the  peo- 
ple, were  for  worshipping  the  Divinity  by  images  and  gross 
corporeal  representations.  Many  were  for  rendering  reli^ 
gious  worship  to  the  things  of  nature  and  parts  of  the  uni- 


(n)  De  Offic.  lib.  i.  cap.  ult.  And  to  the  samC^purpose,  Ibid. 
lib.  ii.  cap.  3. 

(o)  Locke's  Reasonableness  of  Christianity,  in  his  Worksy 
Vol.  II.  p.  534.  edit.  3d. 

Vol.  XL  Q 


121^  The  Philosophers  generalkj  wrong      Part  IL 

verse,  under  pretence  of  worshipping  God  in  them,  as  being 
either  parts  and  members  of  the  Divinity,  or  animated  by 
his  powers  and  virtues.  They  all  in  general  encouraged  the 
worship  of  a  multiplicity  of  deities;  and  with  respect  to  the 
particular  rites  of  worship,  they  referred  the  people  to  the 
decision  of  oracles,  and  to  the  laws  of  their  respective 
countries;  though  some  of  those  rites  were  no  way  fit  to 
make  a  part  of  that  worship,  which  reasonable  creatures 
should  offer  to  a  pure  and  perfect  mind  (/?)• 


(Ji)  Plato,  in  his  Euthyphro,  says,  that  holiness  and  piety  is 
that  part  of  justice  which  is  conversant  about  the  service  and 
worship  of  the  gods:  the  other  part  of  justice  is  that  which  re- 
lates to  men*.  As  to  the  former,  he  does  not  in  that  dialogue 
give  any  directions  what  kind  of  worship  and  service  is  to  be 
rendered  to  the  gods.  But  in  other  parts  of  his  works,  he  is  for 
the  people's  worshipping  the  gods  appointed  by  the  laws  of  the 
state,  and  in  the  manner  there  prescribed.  It  is  true,  that  the 
Platonists  speak  in  hi.^h  strains  of  what  they  call  their  divine 
virtue,  as  distinguished  from  that  which  is  ethical  and  politi- 
cal: they  also  talk  frequently  of  assimilation  to  God.  Plato  in  his 
Thegetetus,  seems  to  have  placed  this  in  holiness  and  justice, 
together  with  prudencef.  But  the  most  eminent  of  his  fol- 
lowers, those  especially  that  lived  after  Christianity  had  made 
some  progress  in  the  world,  seem  not  lo  understand  this  of  a 
piety  or  virtue  which  the  people  were  supposed  capable  of  at- 
taining to:  nor  will  they  allow  this  to  have  been  Plato's  sense. 
They  sd  explain  their  divine  virtue,  as  to-make  it  of  little  use  to 
the  people.  It  belonged  properly  to  the  philosophers,  and  was 
chiefly  of  a  theoretical  nature,  consisting  in  abstracted  contem- 
plations of  the  Platonic  intelligible  gods,  the  eternal  ideas  and 
archetypal  forms  of  things,  and  the  t'  ayjeS-ov,  which  is  to 
be  discerned  by  a  "  boniform  light,"  as  Plotinus  calls  it,  and 
which  he  represents  as  above  intellectl:.  They  placed  the  height 

•  Plato  Opera,  p.  52.  F.  edit.  Lugd.  1590.  f  Ibid.  p.  128.  G. 

\  Plotin.  Enn.  VI.  lib.  viii.  cap.  15. 


Chap.  VIII.  with  respect  to  the  Duties  we  ozve  to  God,  123 

An  oath  has  been  always  accounted  a  sacred  thing,  and 
regarded  as  a  solemn  appeal  to  the  Divinity.  In  the  law 
of  Moses  it  is  required  as  a  part  of  the  religious  homage 
due  to  the  Supreme  Being,  to  swear  by  his  name,  when  it 
is  necessary  to  do  so;  and  the  swearing  by  other  gods  is 
forbidden  (^).  No  precept  of  this  kind  is  to  be  found  in 
the  writings  of  the  Pagan  philosophers  and  moralists;  nor 
do  they  any  where  forbid  swearing  by  the  creatures,  which 
is  condemned  by  our  Saviour  (r).  Dr.  Potter,  in  his  ex- 
cellent Greek  Antiquities,  observes  concerning  Socrates, 
that  he  told  his  disciples,  that  Rbadamanthus,  the  justest 
man  that  ever  lived,  had  disapproved  men's  swearing  by 
the  gods,  but  instead  of  this,  allowed  them  to  swear  by  a 
dog,  a  goose,  a  ram,  or  such  like  creatures.  And  accord- 
ingly that  philosopher  was  wont  to  swear,  either  by  ani- 


of  their  divine  virtue  or  deiform  life  in  a  perfect  apathy*  and 
an  absolute  abstractedness  from  all  material  objects,  as  if  all 
body  and  matter  were  in  itself  a  pollution,  and  of  a  contaminat- 
ing nature.  They  contrived  also  methods  of  purging  and  puri- 
fying the  soul,  and  raising  it  to  communion  with  the  gods,  by 
what  they  called  theurgy.  And  it  is  to  be  observed,  that  amidst 
all  their  sublimities,  and  though  some  of  them  rose  to  extrava- 
gant flights  of  mysticism  and  enthusiasm,  they  made  no  attempts 
to  reclaim  the  people  from  the  common  idolatry,  but  endeavoured 
so  to  model  their  philosophy  and  theology,  as  to  countenance  and 
uphold  the  Pagan  system  of  superstition  and  polytheism.  But  it 
is  the  great  advantage  of  the  Gospel  Revelation,  that  the  piety 
and  conformity  to  God  which  it  requires,  is  such  as  the  gene- 
rality of  good  men  are  capable  of,  whom  it  teaches  to  form  the 
most  just  and  worthy  notions  of  the  Deity,  and  to  worship  him 
in  spirit  and  in  truth.  ^ 

(<;)  Deut.  vi.  13.  Josh,  xxiii.  7. 

(r)  Matt.  V.  35,  36,  37.  James  v.  12. 

•  Enn.  I.  lib.  iv.  cap.  7.  15. 


t%4  The  Philosophers  geryerally  wrong     Part  II, 

mals,  as  by  a  goose,  by  a  goat,  by  a  dog,  or,  as  he  some- 
times expresses  it,  by  the  dog  which  the  Egyptians  wor- 
shipped: sometimes  he  swears  by  a  plant,  as  an  oak,  or  a 
plane-tree  (*).  Though,  if  Plato  represents  him  right,  he 
also  swears  by  the  gods,  by  Juno,  and  frequently  by  Jupiter; 
of  which  there  are  several  instances  in  one  of  his  most  re- 
markable dialogues,  which  is  entituled,  Euthyphron.  It  was 
a  saying  of  Plaio,  '^O^**?  Tsgi  9r«yT«5  a-xi^a.  "  Juramentum  prae 
omnibus  absit,"  as  Grotius  renders  it  (?);  where  he  seems 
to  advise  the  abstaining  from  all  oaths.  And  yet,  certain  it 
is,  that  oaths  every  where  abound  in  Plato's  works.  Ztno, 
the  father  of  the  Stoics,  was  wont  to  swear  >«  t^v  x««^5r«§<»5 
by  a  shrub  that  bears  capers.  It  is  an  advice  of  Epictetus, 
"Avoid  swearing  as  much  as  possible^  if  not,  as  far  as  vou 
are  able."  This  probably  is  to  be  understood  of  swearing 
before  a  magistrate,  which  some  of  the  philosophtrs,  and 
particularly  the  Pythagoreans,  disapproved.  Yet  he  himself 
swears  in  his  discourses,  particularly  by  heaven,  and  by 
J'ipiter,  and  by  all  the  gods  {ii).  Marcus  Antoninus  also 
swears  by  Jupiter,  and  by  the  gods  (at).  The  emperor 
Julian  frquently  swears  by  the  gods.  Pythagoras  rarely 
swore  by  the  gods,  or  allowed  his  disciples  to  do  so.  But 
they  used  to  swear  ^i  t«»  TfT^*e»Tyv,  by  the  tetractys,  or  the 
number  four.  But  whatever  was  the  meaning  of  the  te- 
tractys, in  the  explication  of  which  the  Pythagoreans  them- 
selves were  not  agreed,  the  swearing  by  the  .tetractys  was 


(s)  Potteri  Archaeolog.  Graec.  Vol.  I.  book  ii.  chap.  6.  p.  215. 
first  edit. 

(r)  Grotius  in  Matt.  v.  34. 

(m)  Epict.  Dissert,  book  ii.  chap.  19.  sect  3.  ct  ibid.  chap.  20. 
sect.  6.  and  in  other  passages. 

{x)  Antonin.  book  v.  sect.  5.  et  book  yii.  sect.  17.  and  e^se* 
where, 


Chap.  VIII.  xvith  respect  to  the  Duties  ive  owe  to  God,  125 

so  understood  by  them,  as  to  include  the  swearing  by  him 
that  taught  them  the  tetractys,  i.  e.  by  Pythagoras  him- 
self (?/).  Hierocks,  in  his  commentary  on  the  golden  verses 
of  Pythagoras,  in  explaining  that  precept,  (ri&a  o^kov,  "  reve- 
rence an  oath,"  gives  good  directions  about  oaths,  that  we 
ought  not  only  to  keep  our  oaths  when  we  make  them,  but 
to  abstain  from  swearing,  and  not  accustom  ourselves  to 
it  (z).  Yet  afterwards,  commenting  upon  that  part  of  those 
verses  which  relates  to  the  swearing  by  the  author  of 
their  institution,  who  taught  them  the  tetractys,  Hierocles 
thinks  it  reasonable,  that  so  much  honour  should  be  done 
to  the  master  who  taught  them  the  truth,  as  to  swear  by 
him,  whenever  it  was  netdful,  for  the  confirmation  of  his 
doctrine;  and  not  only  to  pronounce  that  he  taught  those 
doctrines,  but  to  swear  they  were  true.  For  that  though  he 
was  not  of  the  number  of  the  immortal  gods  or  heroes,  he 
was  adorned  with  the  similitude  of  the  gods,  and  retained 
among  his  disciples  the  image  of  the  Divine  Authority:  and 
that  therefore  they  swore  by  him  in  great  matters,  to  shew 
how  much  he  was  honoured  by  them,  and  what  dignity  he 
had  acquired  by  the  doctrines  he  had  delivered  (a). 

As  to  the  civil  and  social  duties,  which  men  owe  to  one 
another,  the  absolute  necessity  of  this  part  of  morals  to  the 
welfare,  and  in  some  respects  to  the  being  of  society,  helped, 
no  doubt,  to  preserve  the  sense  of  them  in  some  conside- 
rable degree  among  mankind.  The  philosophers  said  ex- 
cellent things,  and  gave  many  good  instructions  and  di- 
rections concerning  them.  And  the  measures  of  just  and 
unjust,  of  right  and  wrong,  were  for  the  mqst  part  settled 


(y)  Stanley's  Hist,  of  Philos.  p.  516.  edit.  2d.  Lend, 
(z)  Hierocles  in  Aur.  Carm.  p.  31  et  32.  edit.  Needham. 
Caniab. 

(a)  Ibid.  p.  169,  170. 


126   The  Philosophers  differed  in  their  Sentiments  Part  II. 

by  the  civil  laws,  as  far  as  was  necessary  for  the  preserva- 
tion of  public  order*. 

The  philosophers  frequently  speak  of  that  benevolence 
which  should  unite  men  to  one  another,  and  represent  all 
mankind  as  formed  and  designed  by  nature  for  mutual  as- 
sistance, and  an  intercourse  of  kind  offices.  Yet  in  this,  as 
well  as  other  instances,  they  were  not  always  consistent 
with  themselves,  and  fell  short  of  that  noble  universal  be- 
nevolence which  the  Gospel  requires.  In  Plato's  fifth  Re- 
public, Socrates  is  introduced  as  saying,  That  the  Greeks 
should  look  upon  one  another  as  brethren  of  the  same  fa- 
mily and  kindred;  but  upon  the  barbarians,  which  was  a 
name  they  bestowed  upon  all  nations  but  themselves,  as 
strangers  and  aliens:  that  the  Greeks  were  ^irti  ^iXetj  by 
nature  friends;  and  therefore  they  should  not  go  to  war 
with  one  another,  or  if  they  did,  they  should  do  it  as  if 
they  were  one  day  to  be  reconciled;  but  that  the  barbarians 
were  TFeXsf^cm  (pirii,  enemies  by  nature,  with  whom  they  were 
to  be  continually  at  war:  that  therefore  it  would  be  wrong 


*  The  lawyers  preferred  their  institutions,  as  more  proper  to 
form  men  to  a  virtuous  practice,  than  those  of  the  philosophers. 
See  to  this  purpose  what  Cicero  says  concerning  the  laws  of  the 
twelve  tables.  De  Orat.  lib.  i.  cap.  42,  43.  and  Cotta's  declara- 
tion in  the  3d  book  De  Nat.  Deor.  cap.  2.  To  which  may  be 
added  that  of  Tribonian  upon  the  Pandects.  "  Justitiam  colimus 
et  boni  et  sequi  notitiam  profitemur,  aequum  ab  iniquo  separantes, 
licitum  ab  ilRcito  discernentes,  bonos  non  solum  metu  paenarum, 
verum  etiam  praimiorum  exhortatione  efficere  cupientes,  veram, 
nisi  fallor,  philosophiam,  non  simulatam  affectantes.*'  But  though 
civil  laws  and  constitulions  are  undoubtedly  very  useful,  and  pro- 
bably had  a  greater  effect  upon  the  people  than  the  moral  lessons 
of  the  philosophers,  yet,  as  I  had  occasion  to  observe  before,  they 
are  not  adequate  measures  of  moral  duty,  nor  are  the  sanction  of 
civil  laws  fitted  to  inforce  virtue  in  its  just  extent.  See  here  above, 
chap.  ii. 


Chap.  VIII.  concerning  the  Forgiveness  of  Injuries.     127 

for  the  Grecians  to  destroy  Grecians,  to  reduce  them  to 
slavery,  or  to  waste  their  fields,  or  burn  their  houses;  but 
that  they  should  do  all  this  to  the  barbarians  (l)). 

The  forgiving  those  that  have  injured  us,  is  a  noble  part 
of  that  benevolence  which  men  should  exercise  towards  one 
another.  Some  of  the  most  eminent  philosophers  were  sen- 
sible of  this.  Plato  lays  it  down  as  a  maxim,  in  his  Crito, 
that  a  man  when  provoked  by  an  injury  ought  by  no  means 
to  retaliate  it.  And  Maximus  Tyrius  has  a  whole  disserta- 
tion in  defence  of  that  maxim.  Grotius  has  collected  other 
testimonies  to  the  same  purpose  (c).  But  above  all,  Epic- 
tetus  and  Marcus  Antoninus  have  given  excellent  lessons  on 
this  head.  But  there  were  other  philosophers  of  great  name, 
who  taught  a  different  doctrine.  Among  the  moral  maxims 
of  Democritus,  one  is  this,  which  Stobaeus  has  preserved, 
that  "  it  is  the  work  of  prudence  to  prevent  an  injury,  and 
of  indolence,  when  it  is  done,  not  to  revenge  it."  Aristotle 
speaks  of  meekness  Ss  seeming  to  err  by  defect;  "  because 
the  meek  man  is  not  apt  to  avenge  himself,  but  rather  to 
forgive."— 'Oy  yet^  Ti^a^viTDcog  o  argaej,  eiXXet  fAeiXXov  cvyyvaf^ovtxof 
(d).  Anger  was  usually  described  by  the  philosophers, 
«gg|v5  <evT<Ayw8<w?,  a  desire  of  revenge,  or  returning  the  evil. 
Cicero  translates  it,  '*•  ulciscendi  libido  (0-"  The  same  great 
philosopher  and  moralist  represents  it  as  the  first  thing  that 
justice  requires,  "  that  no  man  should  hurt  another,  unless 
he  be  provoked  by  an  injury. — Justitiae  primum  munus  est, 
ut   ne  cui    quis  noceat,  nisi  lacessitus  injuria  (y^)«"    And 


(6)  Plato  Opera,  p.  464.  G.  465.  A.  edit.  Lugd.  1590. 
(c)  Grot,  in  Matt.  v.  39. 

{d)  Ethic,  ad  Nicomach.  lib.  iv.  cap.  1 1.  Oper.  torn.  II.  p.  53. 
edit.  Paris. 

(e)  Tuscul  Disput.  lib.  iii.  cap.  5.  et  lib.  iv.  cap.  19. 
(/)  De  Offic.  lib.'i.  cap.  7, 


128   The  Philosophers  differed  in  their  Senti?nents  Part  II,- 

again,  he  gives  it  as  the  character  of  a  good  man,  that  "  he 
does  good  to  those  whom  it  is  in  his  power  to  serve,  and 
hurts  no  man  unless  he  be  provoked  by  an  injury.— Eum 
virum  bonum  esse,  qui  prosit  quibus  possit;  noceat  nemini 
nisi  lacessitus  injuria  (^)."  And  he  declares  to  his  friend 
Atticus  concerning  himself,  that  "  he  would  avenge  each 
of  the  evil  deeds  that  were  done  him,  according  to  the  pro- 
vocations he  received. — Sic  ulciscar  facinora  singula  quem- 
admodum  a  quibusque  sum  provocatus."  But  it  may  be 
proper  here  to  take  notice  of  a  passage  in  his  Offices,  where 
he  declares  for  setting  bounds  to  revenge.  "  There  are  cer- 
tain offices  (says  he)  to  be  observed  towards  those  from 
whom  we  have  received  an  injury;  for  there  is  a  measure 
to  be  kept  in  avenging  and  punishing:  and  for  aught  I  know,, 
it  may  be  sufficient,  if  he  that  did  the  injury  repents  of  it, 
so  that  both  he  himself  may  abstain  from  doing  the  like  for 
the  future,  and  that  others  may  be  discouraged  from  at- 
tempting to  injure  us  (A)."  He  seems  here  to  intimate,  that 
if  the  man  that  did  the  injury  repented  of  it,  this  might  per- 
haps be  a  sufficient  satisfaction;  but  he  tacks  two  things  to  it 
as  the  conditions  of  forgiveness;  one  is,  that  the  man  should 
never  do  the  like  again;  the  other  is,  that  others  might  be 
deterred  from  injuring  us;  and  this  might  open  a  large 
scope  for  retaliation  of  injuries.  Here  there  seems  to  be  no 
room  left  for  forgiving  or  passing  by  repeated  injuries.  On 
this  supposition,  a  man  might  forgive  one  that  had  injured 
him  once,  but  not  if  he  should  injure. him  a  second  time. 


(g)  De  Offic.  lib.  iii.  cap.  19. 

(/i)  "  Sunt  quaedam  officia  etiam  adversus  eos  servanda,  a  qCii- 
bus  injuriam  acceperis.  Est  enim  ulciscendi  et  puniendi  modus. 
Atque  baud  scio  an  satis  sit,  eum  qui  lacessiverit  injuriae  suae- 
potnitere,  ul  et  ipse  ne  quid  tale  posthac  committat,  et  cseteri- 
sint  ad  injuriam  turdiores."  De  Offic,  lib,  i.  cap.  U. 


Chap.  VIII.   concerning  the  Forgiveness  of  Injuries,     129 

And  how  difFerent  this  is  from  the  Gospel  doctrine  of  for*- 
giveness,  I  need  not  take  pains  to  shew* 

It  is  observable,  that  when  Plato  introduces  Socrates  in 
his  Crito,  saying  excellent  things  concerning  the  forgive- 
ness of  injuries,  and  against  the  returning  injury  for  injury, 
he  at  the  same  time  owns,  that  what  he  taught  was  con- 
trary to  the  sentiments  of  the  li  -xlxxot^  the  generality  of 
mankind.  And  what  authority  could  he  pretend  to,  which 
should  oblige  men  to  regard  his  opinion  as  a  law,  especially 
when  it  was  contradicted  by  other  philosophers?  And  so  it 
is  also  by  several  of  those  among  the  moderns,  who  have 
been  admired  as  great  masters  of  reason.  Mr.  Bayle  pre- 
tends, that  the  precept  prohibiting  revenge,  though  deli- 
vered in  the  Gospel,  is  contrary  to  the  law  of  nature.  The 
same  thing  is  asserted  by  many  of  our  deists,  who  profess 
to  be  governed  by  the  law  of  nature  and  reason.  Dr.  Tindal, 
particularly,  makes  the  doctrine  of  forgiving  injuries  an  ob- 
jection against  the  Gospel  morality.  I  have  elsewhere  ex- 
amined his  objections,  and  vindicated  the  doctrine  of  the 
Gospel  on  this  head,  against  the  censures  and  misrepresen- 
tations of  that  author  (i).  At  present  I  shall  only  observe, 
that  it  hence  appears  how  far  men  would  be  in  agreeing  in 
this  point,  if  left  merely  to  judge  of  it  by  their  own  reason. 
And  yet  it  is  of  no  small  importance  in  morals.  And  to 
leave  men  to  themselves,  to  act  in  this  matter  as  they  should 
think  fit,  would  be  to  open  a  wide  door  to  that  malice  and 
revenge,  and  reciprocation  of  injuries,  which  hath  produced 
such  infinite  mischiefs  in  the  world,  and  hath  often  dis- 
turbed, and  continueth  still  to  disturb,  the  peace  and  order 
of  societies.  It  was  therefore  a  worthy  object  of  a  Divine 
Revelation  to  restrain  private  revenge  by  a  Divine   Com- 


(0  See  Answer  ^to  Christianity  as  old  as  the  Creation,  Vol.  IL 
chap.  9.  p.  232.  et  seq.  2d.  edit. 

Vol.  II.  R  ' 


150  The  Philosophers  greatly  defc'tent  hi  that  part  Part  IL 

mand.  And  so  strong  is  the  disposition  towards  it,  that  all 
the  restraints  that  can  be  laid  upon  it  are  no  more  than  is 
necessary.  And  the  doctrine  of  our  Lord  in  respect  to  this, 
when  duly  considered,  appears  to  be  excellent,  and  becom- 
ing the  great  Saviour  and  Lover  of  mankind. 

But  there  was  no  part  of  morals,  in  which  the  philoso- 
phers were  more  generally  deficient,  than  in  that  which  re- 
lates to  the  regulating  the  sensual  passions,  and  maintaining 
a  virtuous  chastity  and  purity  of  manners.  Some  of  them, 
indeed,  talked  in  very  high  terms  of  the  necessity  of  govern- 
ing the  fleshly  appetites,  in  order  to  the  preserving  the  due 
order  and  dignity  of  the  rational  nature:  bat  notwithstand- 
ing this,  when  they  came  to  apply  these  general  rules  to 
particular  cases,  they  were  often  shamefully  wrong  and  de- 
fective, and  countenanced  impurities  which  dishonoured 
human  nature.  It  is  an  observation  of  Sir  John  Marsham, 
and  which  may  be  supported  by  good  authorities,  that  "  all 
manner  of  incest,  adultery,  and  even  masculine  mixtures, 
were  reckoned  by  some  of  the  antients,  who  were  famous 
for  wisdom,  among  indifferent  things — Incestus  omnigenus, 
adulterium,  et  etiam  «e§ff£K>^i|<«,  veterum  nonnullis,  sapientise 
nomine  claris,  inter  u^ioi<pt^ct  habebantur  (i)." 

That  abominable  and  unnatural  vice,  which,  I  have 
shewn,  was  very  common  in  Greece,  and  which,  Xenophon 
tells  us,  was  in  some  cities  established  by  the  laws,  was 
what  many  of  the  philosophers  countenanced,  both  by  their 
maxima  and  by  their  practice.  Plato  himself  is  accused  of 
it  by  several  authors  (/);  but  though  his  manner  of  express- 
ing himself  in  some  of  his  works  can  scarce  be  excused, 
and  he  might   possibly  have  fallen  into   some   excesses   of 


(Jc)  Canon.  Chronic,  secul.  ix.  p.  172. 

(0  See  Dr.   Davis's  note  on  Tuscul.  Disput.  lib.  iv.  cap.  34. 
p,  339. 


CiiAP.  XIII.  of  Morals  relating,  to  Chastity  and  Purity,  131 

this  kind  in  his  younger  years,  it  is  certain  that  he  has 
stronglv  declared  against  it,  in  his  eighth  book  of  laws,  as 
being  contrarv  to  nature,  and  which  ought  by  no  means  to 
be  pvirmiited.  Plutarch,  though  he  represents  it  as  common- 
ly practised  and  pleaded  for,  speaks  of  it  with  detestation, 
in  the  person  of  one  of  his  dialogists,  in  his  Amatorius.  Yet 
there  were  others  of  the  pbilosophc^rs,  great  pretenders  to 
reason  and  virtue,  who  judged  very  differently  concerning 
it.  Sextus  Empirlcus  tells  us,  that  the  Cynics,  and  the  chiefs 
of  the  Stoic  sect,  looked  upon  it  to  be  an  indiff.  rent  thing  (m). 
How  much  the  philosophers  were  suspected  and  blamed  on 
this  account,  appears  from  Plutarch's  treatise  De  liberis 
educandis,  where  it  is  intimated,  that  many  parents,  who 
were  concerned  for  the  reputation  of  their  sons,  would  not 
suffer  them  to  keep  company  with  the  philosophers,  who 
professed  love  to  them  {n).  He  seems,  indeed,  to  think,  that 


(m)  Pyrrhon.  Hypotyp.  lib.  iii.  cap.  24. 

(w)  I  shall  here  subjoin  part  of  a  marejinal  note  of  the  learned 
Dr.  Ford,  in  his  English  translation  of  that  treatise  of  Plutarch. 
After  having  declared  his  willingness  to  believe  that  the  Philoso- 
phers whom  Plutarch  mentions,  and  who  were  the  strictest  ob- 
servers of  morality  among  the  Heathens,  "  had  good  intentions 
in  the  love  they  made  to  boys;  yet  (he  thinks)  Plutarch  was  too 
severe  in  his  censure  of  the  parents,  who  were  in  this  point  cau- 
tious of  their  sons'  reputation,  considering  how  infamous  this 
conversation  was,  even  among  the  Grecians:  and  how  ill  Alci- 
biades  was  reputed  of  for  his  love  to  Socrates,  and  even  Socrates 
himself  for  his  sake.  And  the  choice  of  the  most  beautiful  chil- 
dren by  the  philosophers  for  their  courtship,  and  the  rivalries 
they  encountered,  together  with  the  expressions  of  dalliance 
which  they  used  to  them,  nothing  different  from  those  which 
ordinarily  are  bestowed  by  woers  on  the  other  sex,  gave  too 
much  occasion  for  the  wits  of  ihose  times  to  expose  them,  as 
justly  suspected  of  the  foulest  vices:  who,  under  whatever  pre- 
tence of  love  to  their  souls,  and  design  to  ingratiate  their  philo« 


132  The  Philosophers  greatly  dejicient  in  that  part  Part  II. 

those  parents  were  too  austere  and  scrupulous;  and  pro- 
duces the  examples  of  Socrates,  Plato,  Xenophon,  JEschines, 
Cebes,  and  others,  who  professed  love  to  young  gentlemen, 
with  a  view  to  train  them  up  to  virtue,  and  make  them  use* 
ful  to  their  country:  yet  he  declares  himself  to  be  in  doubt, 
and  at  a  loss  what  to  determine  in  this  matter,  and  at  last 
concludes  with  saying,  that  it  is  proper  for  parents  not  to 
suffer  those  to  come  near  their  sons,  who  make  bodily 
beauty  the  object  of  their  desire,  but  to  admit  and  approve 
those  who  are  lovers  of  the  soul  (o).  So  infamous  were 
many  of  those  who  called  themselves  philosophers  for  this 
vice,  that  "  Socratici  Cinsedi"  became  a  proverb.  Lucian, 
in  his  Eyeing,  in  the  person  of  one  of  his  dialogists,  rallies 
the  philosophers  for  pretending  to  be  in  love  with  the  souls, 
when  it  was  really  the  bodily  beauty  they  were  fond  of. 
And  when  he  himself  passes  a  judgment  upon  the  dispute, 
he  says,  that  "  marriage  belongs  to  all,  but  paederasty  should 
be  left  to  the  philosophers."— ntft<?f^«{f^g7»  ci(^u(r^a  ft-ovoig  (piXoTo- 
<poi?,  Lucian.  Oper.  tom.  I.  p.  890,  891.  909.  edit.  Amst. 
Origen,  after  having  observed  that  we  may  find  purity, 
gravity,  and  simplicity  of  manners  among  illiterate  Chris - 


sophical  counsels  the  better  to  them  thereby,  thus  kept  them 
company:  and  that  it  was  certainly,  were  they  otherwise  never  so 
innocent,  a  great  scandal  on  their  parts  given  to  others  that  made 
an  ill  u$e  of  their  examples."  This  is  a  judicious  and  moderate 
censure.  Some  very  amorous  and  passionate  expressions  of 
Socrates  himself  are  mentioned  by  Maximus  Tyrius,  in  the 
apology  he  makes  for  him,  which  cannot  be  excused  from  great 
indecency. 

(o)  Cicero  ridicules  the  Stoics*  pretence  of  loving  a  beautiful 
boy  from  a  principle  of  friendship;  and  asks,  "  What  is  that  love 
of  friendship?  How  comes  it,  that  none  them  is  in  love,  either 
with  an  ugly  young  man,  or  a  handsome  old  one?"  Tuscul.  Dis- 
put.  lib.  iv.  cap,  33,  34. 


Chap.  VIII.  of  Morals  relating  to  Chastity  andPurity,  133 

tians,  of  which  those  are  not  partakers  who  call  themselves 
wise  men  and  philosophers,  represents  these  latter  in  strong 
terms,  as  indulging  the  most  unnatural  filthiness,  and  ap- 
plies to  them  the  words  of  St.  Paul,  Rom.  i.  27  (/>). 

But  not  to  insist  longer  upon  vices  shocking  to  human  na- 
ture, which  yet  passed  among  many  of  the  philosophers  for 
matters  of  indifFerency,  there  were  other  instances  of  impu- 
rity countenanced  by  them,  which,  though  not  so  unnatural, 
yet  are  not  consistent  with  the  strictness  and  dignity  of  vir- 
tue. 

None  of  the  philosophers  was  more  admired  than  the  di- 
vine Plato,  as  he  was  usually  called,  and  who,  Cicero  says, 
was  a  kind  of  god  among  the  philosophers:  and  yet  his 
doctrine  in  the  fifth  book  of  his  Republic,  where  he  propo- 
ses to  give  a  perfect  model  of  a  well-ordered  commonwealth, 
is  such  as  can  scarce  be  reconciled  to  the  rules  of  common 
modesty  and  decency.  He  would  have  the  women  appear 
naked,  as  well  as  the  men,  at  the  public  exercises,  and  apo- 
logizes for  it,  under  pretence  that  they  will  be  clothed  with 
virtue  instead  of  garments  (^).  In  the  same  book  he  ap- 
points the  commuility  of  women  in  his  commonwealth  (r): 


(Ji)  Origen  cont.  Cels.  lib.  vii.  p.  365. 

{q)  Plato  de  Republ.  lib.  v.  Oper.  p.  459.  edit.  Lugd.  1590. 

(r)  There  have  been  several  nations,  among  whom  a  commu- 
nity of  wives  was  allowed.  This  is  said  to  have  been  the  custom 
of  the  Troglodytes,  Agathyrsi,  the  Massagetae,  and  Scythians,  of 
whom  Strabo  saith  they  had  their  wives  in  common,  agreeable 
to  the  laws  of  Plato.  Geograph.  lib.  vii.  p.  461.  A.  edit.  Amst. 

Puffendorf  has  give  a  long  list  of  other  nations,  which  have 
the  same  custom  among  them,  such  as  the  antient  inhabitants 
of  Britain,  the  Sabeans,  those  of  the  kingdom  ot  Calecut,  the 
antient  Lithuanians,  &c.  See  Puffend.  de  Jure  Nat.  et  G^nt.  lib. 
vi.  cap.  L  sect.  15.  where  he  proves  very  well  that  this  is  con- 
trary to  the  law  of  nature.  And  it  is  a  remarkable  instance  to  shew> 


134  The  Philosophers  greatly  deficient  in  that  part  F art  II. 

that  the  wives  of  those  whom  he  calls  <pyA«>ce5)  the  guardians 
of  the  city  and  commonwealth,  should  be  common  to  them 
all,  and  that  the  children  should  be  so  too;  so  that  the  father 
should  not  know  his  son,  nor  the  son  his  father;  but  all 
should  be  the  children  of  the  commonwealth.  He  farther 
proposes,  that  those  young  men  who  had  distinguished  them- 
selves in  war,  or  were  eminent  in  other  respects,  should  be 
rewarded,  by  allowing  them  a  larger  liberty  of  accompany- 
ing with  the  women;  that  more  children  might  be  had  from 
them  for  the  commonwealth  than  from  others  (s).  And 
again,  he  would  have  the  man  that  was  remarkable  for  his 
bravery,  to  be  allowed,  upon  a  military  expedition,  to  kiss 
whomsoever  he  pleased,  and  that  it  should  not  be  permitted 
to  any  one  to  refuse  him;  that  if  he  happened  to  be  in  love 
with  any  person,  whether  male  or  female,  it  should  make  him 
more  eager  by  his  courageous  exploits,  to  obtain  the  rewards 
of  his  valour  (t).  There  is  another  passage  in  the  same  book, 
which  I  had  occasion  to  hint  at  before,  and  which  admits  of 
no  excuse,  that  when  men  and  women  have  passed  the  age 
which  he  assigns  to  them  as  fit  for  the  begetting  and  conceiv- 
ing strong  and  healthy  children  for  the  commonwealth, 
which,  according  to  him,  is  the  age  of  forty  for  the  women, 
and  fifty-five  for  the  men,  they  should  be  at  liberty  both 
and  women)  to  accompany  with  whom  they  pleased,  only 
excepting  their  parents  and  children,  or  those  in  a  direct  line 
above  or  below  either  of  these.  And  if  it  should  happen  that 
any  chi^d  should  be  begotten,  care  should  be  taken,  either 
to  prevent  its  coming  to  the  birth,  or  to  expose  it  afterwards 


that  men  are  apt  to  pass  wrong;  judgments  even  in  things  which 
are  really  founded  in  nature  and  reason. 

(s)  Plato  Republ.  lib.  v.  Oper.  p.  460.  edit.  Lugd. 

(t)  Ibid.  p.  464.  edit.  Lugd. 


Chap.  VIII.  of  Morals  relating  to  Chastity  a7id  Purity.  135 

without  nourishment  (w).  I  am  sorry  that  I  am  obliged  to 
mention  these  and  other  things  of  the  like  kind,  which  may- 
shock  the  delicacy  of  the  reader;  but  the  subject  I  am  up- 
on makes  it  necessary  to  take  notice  of  them,  as  they  fur- 
nish striking  instances,  that  men  of  the  greatest  abilities  and 
genius,  when  left  to  themselves,  may  fall  into  the  most  gross 
mistakes  in  matters  of  great  importance  in  morals.  For  who 
might  seem  more  to  be  depended  on  than  Plato,  whose  wri- 
tings have  been  admired  in  all  ages  by  the  best  judges,  as 
containing  some  of  the  noblest  efforts  of  human  genius,  and 
who  is  particularly  celebrated  for  his  moral  sentiments^ 
which,  in  many  respects,  were  undoubtedly  very  just  as  well 
as  sublime.  This  great  man  has  observed  in  this  fifth  book 
of  his  Republic,  from  whence  I  have  extracted  the  passages 
here  referred  to,  that  *'  except  philosophers  were  to  have  the 
rule  over  cities  and  kingdoms,  or  kings  and  rulers  were  to 
be  well  instructed  in  philosophy,  and  both  united  in  one,  and 
not  separated  as  now,  neither  cities  nor  human  kind  would 
have  any  rest  from  evil  (^)."  But  I  believe  it  will  be  allow- 
ed, that  Plato  has  given  a  specimen  in  this  book,  that  if  phi- 
losophers were  to  have  the  making  of  laws  and  the  govern* 
ment  of  cities  and  kingdoms  committed  to  them,  they  might 
make  very  wrong  regulations  with  regard  to  the  morals  of 
their  subjects. 

The  Cynics  were  a  sect  of  philosophers,  who  professed  to 
make  morals  their  entire  study,  and  to  govern  themselves 
by  the  pure  simple  dictates  of  nature  and  right  reason,  with- 
out any  regard  to  popular  opinions  and  customs,  and  accord- 
ingly they  are  highly  praised  by  Epictetus  and  others.  But 
though  they  gave  excellent  precepts,  and  examples  too,  of 
equanimity,  patience,  contentment,  and  a  contempt  of  world- 


(M)Plato  RepubV  lib.  v.  Oper.  p.  461.  B,  C. 
{x)  Ibid.  p.  466!  B.  edit.  Lugd. 


136  The  Philosophers  greatly  deficient  in  that  part  V  ART  11^ 

ly  riches  and  honours,  the  usual  objects  of  ambition  and  ava- 
rice, they  allowed  themselves  great  liberties  in  the  gratifica- 
tion of  their  sensual  passions.  Diogenes  was  one  of  the  most 
celebrated  among  them;  for  whom  Epictetus  frequently  pro- 
fesses the  greatest  esteem,  proposing  him,  as  well  as  Socra- 
tes, as  a  model  and  pattern  of  virtue,  and  especially  of  a 
great  mind,  superior  to  the  honours,  riches,  and  pleasures 
of  the  world  (z/).  He  employs  a  whole  large  chapter  in  des- 
cribing the  true  Cynic,  of  whom  he  speaks  with  the  highest 
admiration;  and  particularly  he  there  celebrates  Diogenes, 
as  sent  by  Jupiter  to  men  to  instruct  them  concerning  good 
and  evil  (2).  And  he  elsewhere  calls  him  the  minister  of 
Jove,  and  the  divine  Diogenes  (a).  This  shews,  that  some 
of  the  best  of  the  Heathens,  for  such  undoubtedly  Epictetus 
was,  laid  no  great  stress  on  chastity  and  purity,  as  a  neces- 
sary ingredient  in  the  character  of  a  man  of  virtue,  Dio- 
genes never  married,  for  which  he  seems  to  be  commended 
by  Epictetus;  but  he  found  other  ways  of  gratifying  his 
concupiscence,  which  he  did  without  any  regard  to  modesty 
or  shame.  Some  of  his  base  acts  of  filthiness,  committed 
in  public,  were  approved  by  the  famous  Stoic  Chrysippus, 
as  Plutarch  informs  us  (^).  And  Laertius  says,  that  Dio- 
genes held,  "  that  women  ought  to  be  common,  looking  upon 
marriage  to  be  nothing,  and  that  every  man  and  woman 
might  keep  company  with  those  they  liked  best,  and  that 
therefore  the  children  ought  to  be  in  common  (c)." 

The  custom  of  lending  their  wiveis,  which  was  common 


(t/)  Epict.  Dissert,  book  i.  chap.  24.  sect.  1.  and  book  ii.  chap, 
16.  sect.  3. 
(z)  Ibid,  book  iii.  chap.  22. 

(a)  Ibid.  chap.  24.  sect.  3,  4.  and  Enchirid.chap.  15. 

(b)  De  Stoic.  Repugn.  Oper.  torn.  II.  p.  1044.  B. 

(c)  Laert.  lib.  vi.  segm.  72. 


Chap.  VIII.     Morals  relating  to  Chastity  and  Purity,      137 

at  Sparta,  and  authorized  by  the  laws  of  Lycurgus,  is  not 
condemned,  but  seems  rather  .to  be  approved  by  that  emi- 
nent philosopher  Plutarch,  in  his  life  of  Lycurgus  {d).  And 
he  gives  a  remarkable  instance  of  it  among  the  Romans,  in 
his  life  of  Cato  of  Utica.  That  rigid  Stoic,  who  was  ac- 
counted a  perfect  model  of  virtue,  lent  his  wife  to  the  ora- 
tor Hortensius.  This  was  agreeable  to  the  doctrine  of  the 
Stoics,  who  held,  according  to  Laertius,  that  women  ought 
to  be  common  among  the  wise;  for  which  he  cites  Zeno 
and  Chrysippus. 

As  to  fornication,  it  was  generally  allowed  among  the 
Heathens.  And  I  do  not  find  that  any  of  the  philosophers 
absolutely  condemned  it,  provided  it  was  done  in  a  legal 
way.  Plato,  in  his  eighth  book  of  laws,  orders  that  no  man 
should  presume  to  touch  noble  or  free  women,  except  his 
own  wife;  but  he  does  not  forbid  them  to  accompany  with 
other  women,  provided  they  were  such  as  they  had  bought, 
or  acquired  in  any  other  lawful  way  (e).  Solon  made  a  se- 
vere law  against  adultery;  but  allowed  prostitutes  to  go 
openly  to  those  that  hired  them  {/)»  And  Demosthenes 
speaks  of  it  openly,  and  without  scruple,  as  what  was  daily 


{d)  This  is  not  disapproved  by  some  of  our  modem  sceptics, 
Mr.  Bayle,  in  his  Nouvelles  Lettres  contre  Maimbourg,  lettre 
17,  maintains,  that  if  we  only  consult  reason  as  separated  from 
grace,  and  the  light  of  divine  faith,  a  man  would  make  no  more 
difficulty  of  lending  his  wife,  than  of  lending  a  book;  and  that 
were  it  not  for  the  ridiculous  fear  of  cuckoldom,  reason  would 
rather  advise  the  community  than  the  propriety  of  wives.  This 
is  well  answered  and  exposed  by  Mr.  Barbeyrac,  in  his  notes  on 
Puffendorf's  Le  Droit  de  la  Nature  et  des  Gens,  Hvre  vi.  chap* 
1.  sect.  15. 

(e)  Plato  Opera,  p.  646,  647. 

(/)  See  Plutarch,  in  his  Life  of  Solon. 

Vol.  II.  S 


138    The  Philosophers  very  deficient  in  that  part  of  PartII. 

practised,  and  universally  allowed  among  the  Greeks  (^). 
The  philosophers  took  as  great  liberties  this  way  as  any 
others,  without  being  at  all  ashamed  of  it,  or  thinking  they 
had  done  a  wrong  thing.  Epictetus  praises  Socrates  and 
Diogenes,  in  opposition  to  those  who  corrupt  and  intice 
women.  But  if  they  did  not  corrupt  other  men's  wives, 
which,  it  is  said,  Socrates  never  did,  yet  it  is  well  known, 
that  Diogenes  did  not  scruple  the  making  use  of  common 
women.  The  same  thing  is  affirmed  of  Socrates  by  Porphy- 
ry, in  his  third  book  of  the  Lives  of  the  Philosophers,  who 
produces  the  testimony  of  Aristoxenus,  a  celebrated  antient 
author;  which  testimony  is  also  referred  to  by  Cyril  Alex- 
andrinus  (A)  and  Theodoret  (J).  Socrates  the  ecclesiastical 
historian  censured  Porphyry  on  this  account;  but  Holstenius 
has  vindicated  Porphyry  against  that  censure,  in  his  book 
De  Vita  et  Scriptis  Porphyrii,  p.  41.  43.  at  the  end  of  the 
Cambridge  edition  of  Porphyr.  de  Abstinentia,  1655. 

It  is  true,  that  some  of  the  Heathens  were  sensible  that 
there  was  a  turpitude  in  women's  prostituting  themselves; 
or,  as  Ulpian  expresses  it,  "  Meretrices  turpiter  facere 
quod  meretrices  essent." — That  harlots  acted  basely  in 
being  "  harlots."  And  that  there  was  a  probrum  or  infamy 
in  such  a  conduct. — "  Probrum  intelligitur  etiam  in  his 
mulieribus  esse,  quae  turpiter  viverent,  vulgoque  qusestum 
facerent,  etiamsi  non  palam."  And  in  some  nations  they 
had  public  notes  of  disgrace  put  upon  them,  and  were  not 
suffered  to  enter  into  their  temples.  Tacitus,  speaking  of 
Vestilia,  a  Roman  lady  of  a  noble  family,  who  before  the 
sediles  published  herself  a  prostitute,  observes,  that  the  an- 
tient Romans  thought  that  these   women  were   sufficiently 


{g)  Orat.  cont.  Neaeram,  ap.  Athen.    Deipnos.  p.  573. 

(Ji)  Cyril  Alex.  cont.  Julian,  lib.  vi. 

(0  Theodoret  Therap.  serm.  1.  as  also  serm.  4  et  12. 


Chap.  VIII.     Morals  relating  to  Chastity  and  Purity.     13^ 

punished  by  their  very  avowing  their  own  infamy.  "  Satis 
pcenarum  adversus  impudicas  in  ipsa  professione  flagitii  cre- 
debatur  (^)."  One  should  have  thought,  therefore,  that  they 
must  have  acknowledged  that  the  indulging  meretricious 
loves  is  contrary  to  that  purity  and  decency  which  becomes 
the  rational  nature,  as  distinguished  from  the  brutal  kind: 
and  that  if  there  is  a  turpitude  iii  women's  prostituting 
themselves,  there  must  be  also  in  men's  making  use  of  pro- 
stitutes, and  thereby  encouraging  such  prostitutions.  And 
yet  it  does  not  appear  that  this  was  regarded  among  the 
men  as  a  crime.  It  has  been  observed,  how  universal  this 
was  among  the  Greeks.  And  as  to  the  Romans,  the  say- 
ing of  Cato  to  a  young  gentlemen,  whom  he  saw  coming 
out  of  a  brothel,  is  well  known,  in  which  he  encouraged 
young  men  to  that  practice,  provided  they  took  care  not  to 
abuse  other  men's  wives  (/).  And  the  famous  passage  of 
Cicero,  in  his  oration  for  M.  Caelius,  is  still  more  remark- 
able, in  which  he  openly  declares  before  a  public  assembly 
of  the  Roman  people,  "  That  to  find  fault  with  meretri- 
cious amours  was  an  extraordinary  severity,  abhorrent  not 
only  from  the  licentiousness  of  that  age,  but  from  the  cus- 
toms and  constitutions  of  their  ancestors."  And  he  asks, 
''  When  was  this  not  done?  When  was  it  found  fault  with? 
When  was  it  not  allowed?  Can  the  time  be  named  when  this 
practice,  which  is  now  lawful,  was  not  accounted  so?  Quan- 
do  enim  hoc  factum  non  est?  Quando  reprehensum?  Quan- 
do  non  permissum?  Quando  denique  fuit,  ut  quod  licet,  non 
liceret  (w)."  Indeed,  after  Christianity  had  made  some 
progress,  some  of  the  Pagans  declared  positively  against  it. 
Grotius  has  produced  some  remarkable  testimonies  to  this 


{k)  Tacit.  Annal.  lib.  ii.  cap.  85. 

(0  Horat.  Sat..lib.  i.  sat.  2.  ver.  31.  et  seq. 

(m)  Orat.  pro  M.  C^lio,  cap.  20. 


140  ThePhihsophers  very  deficient  in  that  part  of  Va'R.t  IL 

purpose,  particularly  from  Dion  Chrysostomus,  Musonius, 
and  Porphyry  (rz).  But  the  generality  of  the  philosophers 
seem  not  to  have  regarded  it  as  a  sin.  Origen  hath  the 
philosophers  of  his  time  particularly  in  view,  when  he 
speaks  of  those,  who,  like  the  vulgar,  wallowed  in  the  lusts 
of  uncleanness  and  lasciviousness,  and  went  promiscuously 
to  brothels,  teaching  that  in  this  there  was  nothing  contrary 
to  decency  and  good  morals.  A<3«5-3c«»t£?  fiit  Tetnuq  Ttet^ei  to  x«- 
SS;*«»  tSto  -/s»«5-3-fle;  (5),  The  Stoics,  who  were  the  most  famous 
teachers  of  morals  in  the  Pagan  world,  yet  carried  it  so 
far  as  to  maintain,  that  it  is  not  absurd  or  unreasonable  to 
cohabit  with  a  harlot,  rn  aros/^*  o*y»o<x«r>,  or  to  get  a  livelihood 
by  such  practices,  as  Sc^xtus  Empiricus  informs  us  (/7).The 
Evangelical  Precept,  therefore,  which  forbids  fornication 
as  a  sin,  and  contrary  to  the  Divine  Law,  is  not  without 
reason  produced  by  some  judicious  authors  as  an  instance 
of  amoral  precept  not  to  be  found  in  the  writings  of  the  an- 
tient  Pagan  philosophers.  The  learned  Dr.  Sykes,  indeed, 
will  not  allow  this.  But  all  that  he  offers  to  the  contrary 
only  shews,  that  it  was  looked  upon  as  having  a  turpitude 
in  it  for  women  to  prostitute  themselves  (y):  but  he  has 
produced  no  testimony  to  prove  that  it  was  accounted  a 
sin  in  the  men  to  make  use  of  such  prostitutes;  or  that  the 
philosophers,  before  the  coming  of  our  Saviour,  prohibited 
or  condemned  it  as  a  vicious  practice,  and  contrary  to  good 
morals,  except  w^hen  it  was  carried  to  an  excess.  It  is 
not,  therefore,  so  much  to  be   wondered   at,  that  all  man- 


(n)  Grot,  in  Matt.  v.  27. 

(0)  Orig.  cpnt.  Cels.  lib.  iv.  p.  177.  edit.  Spenser. 
Qi)  Pyrrhon.  Hypotyp.  lib   iii    cap   24. 

(7)  Dr.  Sykes's  Principles  and  Connection  of  Natural  and  Re- 
vealed Religion,  p.  412. 


Chap.VIII.     Morals  relating  to  Chastity  and  Purity,     141 

ner  of  impurity  abounded  so  much  in  the  Pagan  world, 
since  even  their  wisest  men  were  so  loose  in  their  notions 
as  well  as  in  their  practice.  To  convince  men  of  the  evil  of 
that  impurity  which  so  greatly  prevailed,  was  one  noble  de- 
sign of  the  Gospel,  as  St.  Paul  signifies  to  the  Christian 
converts,  in  that  excellent  passage,  1  Thess.  iv.  3,4,  5. 
"  This  is  the  will  of  God,  even  your  sanctification,  that 
ye  should  abstain  from  fornication:  that  every  one  of  you 
should  possess  his  vessel  in  sanctification  and  honour,  not 
in  the  lust  of  concupiscence,  even  as  the  Gentiles  which 
know  not  God." 

Several  learned  writers  on  the  law  of  nature,  and  among 
others  Puffendorf,  have  produced  good  arguments  to  prove, 
that  the  conjunction  of  men  and  women  out  of  marriage, 
and  a  vague  and  licentious  commerce  between  the  sexes, 
is  contrary  to  the  law  of  nature  and  reason.  There  is  also 
a  remarkable  passage  to  the  same  purpose,  from  M.  de 
Montesquieu,  which  the  reader  may  find  above,  p.  47  (r)» 
To  which  may  be  added  another  passage  from  the  same 
celebrated  author,  where  he  observes,  1  hat  "  there  are  so 
many  evils  attending  the  loss  of  virtue  in  a  woman,  the 
whole  soul  is  so  degraded  by  it,  and  so  many  other  faults 
follow  upon  it,  that  in  a  popular  state  public  incontinence 
may  be  regarded  as  the  greatest  of  misfortunes,  and  a  sure 
prognostic  of  a  change  in  the  constitution  (5)."  And  yet  if 
this  matter  had  been  left  merely  to  the  judgment  of  phi- 
losophers, there  was  no  likelihood  of  their  determining  the 
point:  and  there  was  great  need  of  an  express  Divine  Law 
and  Authority,  to  ascertain  our  duty  in  this  respect,  and 
enforce  it  upon  us  by  the  most  powerful  sanctions. 


(r)  See  L'Esprit  des  Loix,  Vol.  I.  livre  xvi.  chap.  12. 

(«)  Ibid,  livre  yii.  chap.  8.  See  also  Vol.  II.  livre  xxiii.  cbap.  ^* 


142  Modern  Deists  allow  great  Liberties    Part  IL 

From  the  instances  which  have  been  produced  it  suffi- 
ciently appears,  that  as  to  that  part  of  moral  duty  which 
relates  to  the  government  of  the  sensual  appetites  and 
passions,  the  philosophers,  even  those  of  them  that  said  the 
noblest  things  concerning  virtue  in  general,  and  the  neces- 
sity of  keeping  the  fleshly  appetite  in  a  due  subjection  to 
reason,  were  greatly  deficient,  and  not  to  be  depended  upon 
as  proper  guides  to  mankind.  The  same  may  be  observed 
concerning  those  among  the  moderns,  who  shew  the  greatest 
zeal  for  the  absolute  clearness  and  sufficiency  of  the  law^  of 
nature,  independent  of  all  Divine  Revelation. 

It  IS  to  be  feared,  that  if  left  merely  to  themselves,  and 
to  what  they  would  call  the  dictates  of  nature  and  reason, 
they  would  prove  very  loose  interpreters  of  that  law,  in 
that  part  of  it  which  relates  to  the  restraining  and  govern- 
ing the  carnal  appetites.  Some  of  them,  in  the  accounts 
they  give  of  natural  religion  and  law,  make  it  to  consist  in 
worshipping  God,  and  being  just  to  men,  and  loving  one's 
countrv;  but  scarce  take  any  notice  at  all  of  temperance 
and  purity  (t);  or  at  least  they  allow  much  greater  indul- 
gence in  this  respect,  than  is  consistent  with  that  purity  of 
heart  and  life  which  Christianity  requires.  Dr.  Tindal 
seems  to  lay  no  other  restraint  on  the  fleshly  concupi- 
scence, than  that  it  be  gratified  in  such  a  manner,  that  the 
species  may  be  propagated,   and  the  happiness  of  the  per- 


(?)  This  seems  to  be  the  scheme  of  the  famous  M.  De  Vol- 
taire, in  his  poem  on  Natural  Religion.  See  Abbe  Gauchet's 
Lettres  Critiques,  tome  IV.  lettre  37.  And,  indeed,  if  we  may 
judge  from  many  passages  in  the  works  of  that  very  ingenious 
author,  chastity  and  purity,  and  the  exercising  a  due  govern* 
ment  over  the  sensual  passions,  does  not  seem  to  make  a  neces- 
sary part  of  his  scheme  of  religion  and  morals. 


Chap.  VIII.     with  regard  to  the  sensual  Passio7is,       143  ^ 

sons  promoted:  and  of  this,  according  to  his  scheme,  f  \  ery 
man  must  be  a  judge  for  himself,  according  to  the  circum- 
stances he  is  in  (u).  Lord  Bolingbroke  has  no  great  notion  of 
the  virtue  or  obligation  of  chastity,  which  he  resolves  in^o  a 
vanity  inherent  in  our  nature  of  appearing  to  be  superior  to 
other  animals.  He  says,  That  "  the  shame  of  modesty  is 
artificial,  and  has  been  inspired  by  human  laws,  by  preju- 
dice, and  the  like  causes:  and  thinks  the  law  of  nature 
does  not  forbid  incest,  except  it  be  perhaps,  that  of  the 
highest  kind."  He  concludes,  that  "  Increase  and  multiply 
is  the  law  of  nature.  The  manner  in  which  this  practice 
shall  be  executed  with  the  greatest  advantage  to  society,  is 
the  law  of  man  (^)."  Here  this  matter  is  left  wholly  to  po- 
litical considerations  and  human  laws,  without  any  Divine 
law  to  restrain  or  regulate  it.  And  what  scandalous  liberties 
this  way  have  been  countenanced  and  encouraged  by  the 
laws  of  many  nations,  I  have  before  had  occasion  to  shew. 
The  author  of  the  famous  book  De  I'Esprit  has  given  a 
large  account  of  them,  and  seems  himself  to  be  for  allow- 
ing an  almost  boundless  indulgence  to  the  fleshly  concu- 
piscence. And  it  may  be  observed  concerning  many  of  the 
foreign  writers,  who  profess  to  be  admirers  of  Natural 
Religion,  and  are  thought  to  be  no  friends  to  Revelation, 
that  they  have  written  in  a  very  loose  manner:  they  abound 
in  lascivious  anecdotes,  and  stories  of  gallantry;  and  paint 
impure  scenes  and  pleasures  in  a  very  alluring  s|;yle,  at  the 
same  time  intermixing  strokes  against  Religion.  But  surely 
authors  who  are  so  loose  in  their  writings,  are  not  very 
proper  to  be  guides  in  matters  of  religion  and  morality.  It 


{u)  See  Answer  to  Christianity  as  old  as  the  Creation,  Vol.  I. 
p.  203.  2d  edit. 

{x)  Bolingbroke's  Works,  Vol.  V.  p.  172.  et  seq.  edit.  4to. 


144       Modern  Deists  allow  great  Liberties^  £s?c.  Part  II. 

looks  a  little  odd,  that  men  who  set  up  for  delivering  man- 
kind from  superstition,  and  leading  them  into  the  paths  of 
reason  and  virtue,  should,nnstead  of  endeavouring  to  correct 
and  restrain  the  prevailing  licentiousness  of  manners,  open 
a  wide  door  to  libertinism  and  impurity. 


145 


CHAPTER  IX. 

The  Stoics  the  most  eminent  teachers  of  morals  in  the  Pagan  world.  Mightily 
admired  and  extolled  both  by  the  antients  and  moderns.  Observations  on  the 
Stoical  maxims  and  precepts  with  regard  to  piety  towards  God.  Their  scheme 
tended  to  take  away,  or  very  much  weaken,  the  fear  of  God  as  a  punisher  of 
sin.  It  tended  also  to  raise  men  to  a  state  of  self-sufficiency  and  independency^ 
inconsistent  with  a  due  veneration  for  the  Supreme  Being.  Extravagant  strains 
of  pride  and  arrogance  in  some  of  the  principal  Stoics.  Confession  of  sin  ia 
their  addresses  to  the  Deity  made  no  part  of  their  religion. 

IF  the  people  had  been  to  depend  upon  any  one  sect  of 
philosophers,  for  leading  them  into  right  notions  of  moral 
duty,  the  Stoics  seem  to  have  bid  the  fairest  for  it,  as  they 
made  the  highest  pretences  to  a  pure  and  sublime  morality^ 
Many  admirable  precepts  and  moral  instructions  are  to  be 
found  in  their  writings,  and  the  main  principle  which  lay  at 
the  foundation  of  their  whole  system  was  this,  that  virtue 
is  the  chief,  the  only  good. 

A  celebrated  author,  M.  dc  Montesquieu,  expresses 
his  admiration  of  the  Stoics  in  very  high  terms.  He  says^ 
that  "  of  all  the  sects  of  philosophers  among  the  antients,- 
there  was  none  whose  principles  were  more  worthy  of 
man,  or  better  fitted  to  make  men  good,  than  that  of  the 
Stoics:  and  that  if  he  could  abstract  a  moment  from  the 
consideration  of  his  being  a  Christian,  he  could  not  help 
regarding  the  extinction  of  the  sect  of  Zeno  as  a  misfor- 
tune to  the  human  race:  that  if  it  were  chargeable  with  car- 
rying things  too  far,  it  was  only  with  respect  to  those 
things  which  had  a  certain  grandeur  in  them,  the  contempt 
of  pleasures  and  of  pain:  that  whilst  they  regarded  riches 
and  honour,  pains  and  pleasures,  as  vain  things,  they  were 
wholly  employed  in  labouring  for  the  happiness  of  man- 
kind, and  in  exercising  the  duties  of  society,  for  the  gooci* 

Vol.  IL  T 


14G  Stoics  the  most  eminent  of  Part  II. 

of  which  they  looked  upon  themselves  to  be  born  and 
destined:  and  this  without  looking  for  any  other  rewards 
than  what  were  within  themselves;  as  if  being  happy  in 
their  philosophy  alone,  nothing  but  the  happiness  of  others 
was  capable  of  augmenting  their  own."  I  would  observe  by 
the  way,  that  this  ingenious  writer  seems  here  not  to  be 
quite  exact.  For,  according  to  the  Stoic  principles,  the  hap- 
piness of  a  wise  man  is  complete  in  himself,  absolutely  in- 
dependent on  that  of  others,  and  incapable  of  receiving  any 
addition  from  it.  This  excellent  author  adds,  that  "  it 
looked  as  if  the  Stoics  regarded  that  sacred  spirit,  which 
they  believed  to  be  in  them,  as  a  kind  of  favourable  provi- 
dence, which  watched  over  the  human  race."  And  that  this 
sect  alone ''  knew  how  to  make  good  citizens,  great  men,  and 
good  erpperors  (j/)." 

There  is  also  a  fine  encomium  on  the  principles  of  the 
Stoic  philosophy,  in  the  learned  Gataker's  Prseloquium  or 
Preliminary  Discourse  prefixed  to  his  excellent  translation 
and  commentary  on  Antoninus's  Meditations.  He  there 
gives  a  summary  of  the  Stoical  maxims  and  principles, 
both  with  respect  to  the  duties  of  piety  towards  God,  and 
those  we  owe  to  man,  or  the  social  duties  and  affections  (2). 
The  passages  he  produces  to  this  purpose  are  almost  all 
taken  from  Epictetus  and  Antoninus:  both  of  whom  lived 
after  Christianity  had  made  some  progress,  and  had  spread 
among  many  of  the  people  the  knowledge  of  God,  and  of 
a  pure  morality.  These  two  excellent  philosophers  seem  to 


(z/)  L'Esprit  des  Loix,  Vol.  II.  liv.  xxiv.  chap.  10.  p.  157, 
158.  edit.  Edinb. 

(z)  The  reader  may  see  this  part  of  Gataker*s  Preliminary 
Discourse  translated,  with  the  references  to  the  several  passages, 
and  some  additional  notes,  at  the  end  of  the  Glasgow  translation 
of  Antoninus's  Meditations. 


Chap.  IX.  the  Pagan  Moralists,  I47 

have  carried  the  doctrine  of  morals  to  a  greater  degree  of 
perfection  than  any  of  the  more  antient  Stoics.  And  any  one 
that  would  form  a  judgment  of  the  Stoical  system,  merely 
from  the  summary  which  that  learned  man  gives  out  of 
their  writings,  must  needs  have  a  very  advantageous  notion 
of  it,  as  having  a  near  affinity  to  the  rules  laid  down  in  the 
Gospel.  I  am  far  from  denying  to  the  Stoics  their  just  praises. 
But,  in  order  to  our  forming  a  right  and  impartial  judgment, 
it  is  proper  to  take  their  whole  system  together,  and  not 
the  fair  side  of  it  only.  Several  instances  may  be  men- 
tioned, some  of  them  of  considerable  importance,  in  which 
they  were  defective,  others  in  which  they  carried  things  to 
an  extreme.  From  whence  it  will  appear,  that  the  Stoical 
doctrines  and  precepts  were  not  sufficient  guides  to  man- 
kind, nor  exhibited  a  complete  rule  of  moral  duty,  and  con- 
sequently, furnish  no  just  objection  against  the  usefulness 
and  necessity  of  the  Christian  Revelation. 

I  shall  begin  with  some  observations  on  the  Stoical  doc- 
trines and  precepts  with  regard  to  the  duties  of  piety  to- 
wards God.  This  is,  by  their  own  acknowledgment,  the 
noblest  and  most  important  part  of  our  duty.  That  great 
philosopher  and  emperor  Marcus  Antoninus  advises,  "to 
do  every  thing,  even  the  most  minute,  as  mindful  of  the 
connection  there  is  between  divine  and  human  things.  For 
(says  he)  you  will  neither  rightly  discharge  any  duty  to 
man  without  a  due  regard  to  divine  things,  nor,  on  the 
other  hand,  any  duty  to  God  without  a  regard  to  human 
things  («)."  And  again  he  declares.  That,  "the  soul  is 
formed  for  holiness  and  piety  towards  God,  no  less  than 
for  justice  towards  men."  And  he  adds,   that  "these  are 


(a)  Anton.  Medit.  book  iii.  sect.  13. 


148      The  Stoical  Precepts  deficient  -with  regard  Part  II, 
rather  more  venerable  than  acts  of  human  justice."  Mecxx$y 

One  great  defect  which  runs  through  their  noblest  pre- 
cepts of  piety,  is,  that  the  duties  they  prescribe  of  devo- 
tion, submission,  absolute  resignation,  trust  and  dependence, 
prayer,  praise  and  thanksgiving,  are  promiscuously  ren- 
dered to  God  and  to  the  gods.  There  are  many  passages  in 
the  writings  of  the  Stoics,  which  would  deserve  the  highest 
praise,  if  understood  of  the  duty  we  owe  to  the  one  true 
God;  but  there  are  numerous  other  passages  in  which  they 
prescribe  the  same  duties  to  a  multiplicity  of  deities.  Zeno 
defines  piety  to  be  "  the  knowledge  of  the  worship  of  the 
gods."  He  taught,  that  "  wise  men  are  pious  and  religious, 
and  understand  the  rites  relating  to  the  gods;  that  they  sa- 
crifice to  the  gods,  and  are  acceptable  to  them,  and  that 
they  alone  are  priests  (c)."  Thus  their  precepts  of  piety 
are  so  managed  as  to  uphold  the  people  in  their  polytheism. 
This  holds  true,  even  of  Epictetus  and  Antoninus;  for  a 
distinct  proof  of  which  I  refer  the  reader  to  the  former 
volume  of  this  work,  in  the  latter  part  of  the  fourteenth 
chapter;  and  it  must  be  observed,  that  those  which  are 
eminent  acts  of  piety,  when  rendered  to  the  one  true  God, 
are  very  culpable  acts  of  idolatry,  when  directed  to  false 
and  fictitious  deities. 

An  essential  part  of  religion,  and  upon  which  a  great 
stress  is  laid  in  the  Holy  Scriptures,  is  the  fear  of  God. 
This  ,is  a  disposition  becoming  reasonable  creatures  to- 
wards the  Supreme  Being,  and  which  his  infinite  perfec- 
tions, his  justice  and  purity,  and  sovereign  dominion,  justly 
demand  from  us.  But  with  regard  to  this,  the  Stoics  seem 
to  have  been  greatly  deficient.  I  do  not  deny,  that  they  pre- 


(Jb)  Anton.  Medit.  book  xi.  sect.  20. 
(c)  Diog.  Laert.  lib.  vii.  segm.  1 19. 


Chap.  IX.     to  the  Duties  of  Piety  towards  God,  149 

scribed  a  fear  of  reverence  or  veneration.  'A«5«  S-esj,  "  reve- 
rence the  gods,"  was  one  of  their  precepts,  and  is  urged 
urged  by  Antoninus.  But  there  is  a  fear  of  God  as  the  just 
punisher  of  vice  and  wickedness,  which  is  also  of  great 
importance  in  religion  in  the  present  state  of  mankind,  and 
this  had  properly  no  place  in  the  Stoical  system.  Zeno 
makes  it  one  of  the  requisites  to  happiness,  not  to  fear  the 
gods.  And  perfect  liberty  and  tranquillity  of  mind,  accord- 
ing to  Seneca,  consists  in  neither  fearing  the  gods  nor  men, 
and  in  a  man's  having  an  absolute  power  over  himself. 
"  Quseris  quae  sit  ista?  [tranquillitas  animi  et  absoluta 
libertas.]"  He  answers,  '"  Non  homines  timere  non  deos: 
in  seipsum  habere  maximam  potestatem;  inestimabile  bo- 
num  est  suum  fieri  (^)."  And  indeed,  according  to  their 
scheme  of  principles,  and  the  idea  they  give  of  a  wise  man, 
it  is  not  in  the  power  of  God  to  hurt  him,  or  to  hinder  his 
being  completely  happy.  For  as  to  what  are  accounted  ex- 
ternal evils  and  bodily  pains,  they  are  really  no  evils  at  all, 
and  the  wise  man  can  enjoy  himself,  and  be  perfectly  happy 
in  the  severest  torments:  and  as  to  his  mind,  he  can  wrap 
himself  up  in  his  own  virtue,  which  is  self-sufficient  and 
independent:  so  that  it  may  be  said,  not  only  that  God 
will  not,  but  that  he  cannot  do  any  thing  to  render  him 
unhappy  (^), 


{d)  See  at  the  end  of  his  75th  epistle. 

{e)  The  Stoics,  through  an  affectation  of  greatness  of  mind, 
destroyed,  as  far  as  in  them  lay,  the  influence  of  fear  in  mortals, 
by  taking  away  the  fear  of  the  gods,  of  pain,  sickness,  disgrace, 
and  death,  which  tends  to  subvert  one  of  the  main  principles  of 
government,  both  human  and  divine.  Any  one  tjiat  has  made 
due  reflections  on  the  state  of  the  world,  and  on  human  nature, 
must  be  sensible  that  the  passion  of  fear  is  implanted  in  liie 
heart  of  man  for  very  wise  ends,  and,  if  properly  made  use  of, 
may  answer  very  important  purposes.  It  seems  evident,  that  this- 


150      The  Stoical  Precepts  dejicient  zvith  regard  Part  II. 

To  which  it  may  be  added,  that  the  Stoics  advanced  such 
a  notion  of  the  Divine  Goodness,  as  tended  to  free  men  in 
a  great  measure  from  the  fear  of  God,  and  was  scarce  con- 
sistent with  punitive  justice.  Antoninus  declares,  speak- 
ijig  of  the  Intelligence  which  governs  the  universe,  that  no 
man  is  hurt  by  it  (/).  I  do  not  remember  that  he  ever 
speaks  of  God's  being  angry  with  bad  men  for  their  wicked- 
ness; nor  indeed  can  I  well  see  what  room  there  is  for  it 
upon  his  scheme.  Some  of  the  reasons  which  are  urged  by 
him  and  Epictetus,  and  which  I  shall  particularly  consider 
afterwards,  to  shew  that  good  men  should  not  be  angry  at 
the  wickedness  of  others,  would  equally  prove,  if  they  were 
just  and  well  founded,  that  God  should  not  be  so.  And  ac- 
cordingly, never  do  Epictetus  or  Antoninus,  as  far  as  I  re- 
member, give  any  intimation  of  God's  calling  men  to  an 
account,  and  punishing  them  for  their  sins.  Antoninus 
says.  That  "  the  gods  in  a  long  eternity  must  always  bear 
with  a  numerous  wicked  world  (^)."  The  Stoics,  indeed, 
acknowledged  an  imperial  head  of  the  universe,  and  main- 
tained that  the  world  was  governed  by  laws:  but  they  al- 
lowed no  proper  sanctions  of  rewards  and  punishments  to 
enforce  obedience  to  those  laws,  but  such  as  necessarily 
flow  from  the  nature  of  the  actions  themselves.  I'hey  af- 
firmed, that  their  own  virtues  were  the  only  rewards  of  the 
good  and  virtuous,  and  their  own  vices  the  only  punish- 
ments of  the  wicked.  There  are  many  passages  of  Epictetus 


is  one  way  by  which  the  Author  of  Nature  designed  mankind 
should  be  g:overned;  and  that  it  is  this  which  gives  force  to  the 
sanctions  of  law,  and  without  which  they  would  have  small 
effect. 

(/)  Anton.  Medit.  book  vi.  sect.  1. 

(g")  Ibid,  book  vii.  sect.  70. 


Chap.  IX.     to  the  Duties  of  Piety  towards  God,  151 

to  this  purpose  (Ji).  So  Seneca  says,  that  the  greatest 
punishment  of  an  injury  that  .is  done,  is  the  having  done 
it.  "  Maxima  est  injurise  tactse  pcena,  fecisse:  nee  quisquam 
gravius  afficitur,  quam  qui  ad  supplicium  poenitentiae  tra- 
ditur  (i)."  This  seems  to  be  a  noble  way  of  talking,  and  to 
argue  high  notions  of  the  intrinsic  excellency  of  virtue,  and 
the  evil  and  deformity  of  vice  and  sin.  But  if  this  were  all 
the  punishment  wicked  men  were  to  expect,  to  be  left  to 
their  own  reflections,  and  to  the  natural  consequences  of 
their  own  actions,  without  any  farther  punishment  to  be 
inflicted  upon  them  by  a  governing  authority,  it  would  be 
of  the  most  pernicious  consequence  to  the  peace  and  order 
of  the  moral  world.  No  human  government  could  subsist 
upon  this  foot;  and  if  no  other  punishment  were  to  be  ex- 
pected from  God,  it  would  go  a  great  way  to  banish  the 
fear  of  God  from  among  men.  Plutarch  observes,  that  the 
famous  Stoic  Chrysippus,  in  bis  books  against  Plato,  con- 
cerning justice,  says,  that  "  Cephalus  did  not  rightly  deter 
men  from  injustice  by  the  fear  of  the  gods;  and  that  many 
things  may  be  probably  off'ered  to  the  contrary;  impugning 
the  discourse  concerning  divine  punishments,  as  nothing 
different  from  the  tales  of  Akko  and  Alphito,  which  women 
are  wont  to  frighten  children  withal."  Yet  Plutarch  adds, 
as  an  instance  of  the  Stoical  contradictions,  that  Chrysippus 
elsewhere  speaks  of  the  gods  as  sending  punishments,  that, 
admonished  by  these  examples,  men  may  not  dare  to  at- 
tempt the  doing  wicked  things  (J-)* 


{h)  The  reader  may  consult  his  Dissertations,  book  i.  chap.  12. 
sect.  2.  book  iii.  chap.  7.  at  the  end.  And  ibid.  chap.  24.  sect.  2. 
and  book  iv.  chap.  9.  sect.  2. 

(i)  Sen.  de  Ira,  lib.  iii.  cap.  26. 

ik)  De  Stoic.  JRepugna.  Oper.  torn.  II.  p.  1040.  edit.  Xyl. 


152     The  Stoical  Precepts  deficient  with  regard    Part  II* 

It  is  a  noted  saying  of  Seneca,  that  "  no  man  in  his  sound 
reason  fears  the  gods:  for  it  is  a  madness  to  be   afraid  of 

the  things  which    are    salutary." ''  Deos    nemo  sanus 

timet;  furor  est  enim  metuere  sakitare  (/)."  And  again,  he 
represents  the  gods  as  of  a  mild  and  gentle  nature,  ''  hav- 
ing it  neither  in  their  inclination,  nor  in  their  power,  to 
hurt  any  one;  and  that  they  have  no  power  but  what  is  be- 
nificent  and  salutary"— "Quaedam  sunt  quae  nocere  non 
possunt,  nuUamque  vim  nisi  beneficam  et  salutarera  habent: 
ut  dii  immortales,  qui  nee  volunt  obesse,  nee  possunt.  Na- 
tura  enim  illis  mitis  et  placida  est,  tam  longe  remota  ab 
aliena  injuria  quam  a  sua  (m)."  He  expresses  himself  to  the 
same  purpose  in  another  place.  "  Errat,  siquis  putat  illos 
nocere  velle;  non  possunt:  nee  accipere  injuriam  queunt, 
nee  facere;"  i.  e.  "  He  errs,  who  thinks  the  gods  are  wil- 
ing to  hurt  any  man;  they  cannot  do  it:  they  can  neither 
do  nor  suffer  any  hurt  or  injury."  And  yet  he  there  talks 
of  their  sending  chastisements,  to  correct  and  restrain  some 
persons,  and  putting  on  a  shew  of  punishing  them  {n), 

I  think  upon  the  whole,  it  may  be  justly  said,  that  the 
doctrine  of  the  Stoics  tended  to  take  away,  or  at  least 
very  much  to  weaken  and  diminish,  the  fear  of  God  as 
a  punisher  of  sin.  Such  a  fear  was  frequently  represented 
by  them  as  base  and  superstitious.  And  yet  some  fear  of  this 
kind  seems  to  be  a  necessary  and  most  useful  part  of  the 
religion  of  sinful  creatures,  and  is  one  of  the  most  power- 
ful preservatives  against  sin  and  wickedness.  Accordingly, 
it  is  what  our  Saviour  most  expressly  prescribes,  at  the 
§ame  time  that  he  directs  his  disciples  not  to  be  afraid  of 


(/)  Sen.  de  Benefic.  lib.  iv.  cap.  19. 
(m)  Sen.  de  Ira,  lib.  ii.  cap.  27. 
(n)  Sen.  Epist.  95, 


Chap,  IX.       to  the  Duties  of  Piety  towards  God,  153 

the  power  or  displeasure  of  the  greatest  man  upon  earth, 
Luke  xii.  4,  5. 

There  is  another  part  of  the  Stoical  system,  which  is  not 
very  consistent  with  that  profound  veneration  for  the  Su- 
preme Being,  and  that  humble  sense  of  our  entire  .depen- 
dence upon  him,  which  is  a  necessary  branch  of  true  piety. 
They  proposed  to  raise  men  to  a  state  of  absolute  indepen- 
dency, and  they  thereby  put  them  upon  affecting  a  kind  of 
equality  with  God  himself.  The  notion  they  had  of  making 
the  souls  of  men  effluxes  and  portions  of  the  Divinity  had 
a  manifest  tendency  to  cherish  this  presumption.  That  this 
was  the  notion  even  of  the  best  of  the  Stoics,  such  as  Epic- 
tetus  and  Antoninus,  appears  from  express  passages  quoted 
from  both  these  excellent  philosophers  in  the  former  part 
of  this  wprk,  chap.  xii.  To  what  was  there  observed,  I 
shall  here  add  one  passage  more  from  Epictetus.  "  As  to 
the  body  (saith  he),  thou  art  a  small  part  of  the  universe; 
but  in  respect  of  the  mind  or  reason,  neither  worse  nor  less 
than  the  gods.  Will  you  not  place  your  good  there,  where 
you  are  equal  to  the  gods  (0)." 

I  cannot  think  it  becoming  the  veneration  we  owe  to  the 
Supreme  Being,  to  assert,  as  Epictetus  does,  that  the  will 
of  man  is  unconquerable  by  God  himself.  In  opposition  to 
the  threatning,  "  I  will  fetter  thee,"  he  answers,  "  What 
sayest  thou,  man?  Fetter  me!  Thou  wilt  fetter  my  feet: 
but  Jupiter  himself  cannot  overcome  my  choice;"  i.  e.  my 
deliberate  election  or  determination.  T«v  zyfoxi^e^n  kV  0  Zev^ 
UK^(rtci  ^vvecTeti  (fi).  He  seems  elsewhere  to  say,  that  it  is  God 
that  hath  appointed  it  to  be  so.  *'  God  (saith  he)  hath  given 
us  faculties,  by  which  we  may  bear  every  event  without 
being  depressed  or  broken  by  it;  but  like  a  good  prince,  and 


(0)  Epict.  Dissert,  booki.  chap.  12.  sect.  3. 
{fi)  Ibid.  chap.  1.  sect.  6. 
Vol.  II.  U 


154     The  Stoical  Precepts  deficient  with  regard    Part  II. 

a  true  father,  hath  rendered  them  incapable  of  restraint, 
compulsion,  or  hindrance,  and  entirely  dependent  on  our 
own  pleasure;  nor  hath  he  reserved  a  power  even  to  him- 
self, of  hindering  or  restraining  them  (^)."  This  he  after- 
wards explains  in  this  manner.  *'  If  God  hath  constituted 
that  portion,  which  he  hath  separated  from  his  own  essence, 
and  given  to  us,  capable  of  being  restrained  or  compelled, 
either  by  himself  or  by  any  other,  he  would  not  have  been 
God,  nor  have  taken  care  of  us  in  a  due  manner  (r)."  This 
appears  to  me  to  be  a  very  rash  and  presumptuous  way  of 
talking.  I  do  not  well  understand  the  strain  of  his  reason- 
ing. But  it  seems  to  be  this:  that  God  hath  made  us,  with 
respect  to  the  freedom  of  our  will,  independent  of  himself, 
yea,  and  to  have  necessarily  made  us  so;  because  we  are 
parts  of  God,  which  he  hath  separated  from  his  own  essence; 
and  therefore  are  no  more  to  be  constrained  and  compelled 
than  he  is;  and  that  if  he  had  made  us  capable  of  being  com- 
pelled, either  by  himself  or  by  any  other,  he  would  not  have 
been  God:  for  it  would  follow  that  he  himself  might  be 
compelled,  if  we,  who  are  portions  of  his  essence,  might  be 
so:  and  consequently  he  would  not  be  God.  For  it  is  neces- 
sarily included  in  the  idea  of  God,  that  he  is  independent, 
and  not  liable  to  compulsion. 

Seneca,  Epictetus,  and  Antoninus,  often  talk  of  our  hav- 
ing a  God  within  us,  by  which  they  understand  the  rational 
human  soul.  And  many  of  the  Stoics  carried  to  it  such  a 
height  of  arrogance,  that  they  in  effect  equalled  their  wise 
man  with  God,  in  virtue,  perfection,  and  happiness.  "  It  is 
a  common  conception  concerning  the  gods  (saith  Plutarch) 
that  in  nothing  do  they  so  much  excel  men  as  in  happiness 


(5^)  Epict.  Dissert,  book  i.  chap.  6.  sect,  6, 
(r)  Ibid.  chap.  17.  sect.  2. 


Chap.  IX.     to  the  Duties  of  Piety  towards  God.  155 

and  virtue:  but  Chrysippus  does  not  allow  them  this  prero- 
gative." Accordingly,  he  produces  a  passage  from  that  fa- 
mous Stoic,  in  which  he  saith,  that  "Jupiter  has  no  pre- 
eminence above  Dion  in  virtue:  but  that  Jupiter  and  Dion, 
being  both  wise,  are  in  like  manner  helpful  or  profitable  to 
one  another."  'A^ijtIJ  te  ny,  vare^z^eiv  rov  Alec  rQ  Aiavoi,  a^piXeh^ut 
re  ofAciaq  vzs-o  uXXiiXav  rov  A/at  >^  ror  Aicova  <ro(^iii  'ovrctq,  Plularch 
adds,  that  che  Stoics  say,  that  "the  man  who  does  not 
come  short  of  the  gods  in  virtue,  does  not  come  short  of 
them  in  happiness,  but  is  equally  happy  with  Jupiter  the 
saviour,  even  then  when  being  unfortunate  because  of  dis- 
eases, and  bodily  torments,  he  puts  an  end  to  his  own  life, 
provided  he  be  a  wise  man  (^)."  The  same  author  produ- 
ces another  arrogant  saying  of  Chrysippus,  in  his  third 
book  of  Nature,  that  "  as  it  is  proper  and  becoming  for  Ju- 
piter to  glory  in  himself,  and  in  his  own  life,  and  to  think 
and  speak  magnificently  of  himself,  as  living  in  a  manner 
that  deserves  to  be  highly  spoken  of;  so  these  things  are 
becoming  all  good  men,  as  being  in  nothing  exceeded  by 
Jupiter  (O'"  To  this  may  be  added  another  passage  of 
Chrysippus,quoted'by  Stobseus,  that  "  the  happiness  of  good 
men  differeth  in  nothing  from  the  divine  happiness;  and 
that  the  happiness  of  Jupiter  is  in  nothing  more  eligible, 
more    beautiful,   more    venerable,   than  that  of  wise  men 

Seneca  has  many  passages  in  the  same  strain.  He  says. 
That "  a  wise  man  lives  upon  a  parity  or  equality  with  the 
gods    (.^)."    That  "  a  good   man  differs   only  in  time  from 


(5)  Plut.  de  Commun.   Notit.   adver.  Stoic.    Oper.  torn.  II.  p. 
1076.  A,  B. 
{t)  De  Stoic.  Repugn.  Oper.  torn.  II.  p.  1038.  C.  edit.  Xyl. 
(u)  Stob.  Eclog.  Ethic,  lib.  ii.  p.  178.  edit.  Plantin. 
{3?)  "  Sapiens' cum  diis  ex  pari  vivit."  Sen.  epist.  59. 


156     The  Stoical  Precepts  deficient  with  regard  Part  IL 

God  (t/)'"  And  this  in  the  Stoical  scheme  is  no  great  mat- 
ter, since  they  held  that  the  length  of  duration  makes  no 
difference  as  to  happiness.  And  accordingly  he  directly 
asserts,  that  "  God  does  not  exceed  the  wise  man  in  happi- 
ness, though  he  does  in  age  (z)^"  To  the  same  purpose 
Cicero  gives  it  as  the  sentiment  of  the  Stoics,  that  "  from 
virtue  arises  a  happy  life,  like  and  equal  to  the  gods,  giving 
place  to  them  in  nothing  but  immortality,  which  does  not 
in  the  least  conduce  to  the  living  happily  (a)."  Seneca 
seems  to  mention  it  to  the  advantage  of  the  wise  man,  that 
"  he  has  the  art  of  crowding  the  whole  of  happiness  into  a 
narrow  compass."  And  he  carries  it  so  far  as  to  say,  that 
"  there  is  one  thing  in  which  the  wise  man  excels  God,  that 
God  is  wise  by  thie  benefit  of  nature,  and  not  by  his  own 
choice  (^)."  He  mentions  with  approbation,  some  arrogant 
sayings  of  Sextius.  As,  that  *'  Jupiter  can  do  no  more  than 
a  good  man.  Jupiter  indeed  has  more  things  to  bestow  upon 
men:  but  of  two  good  persons,  he  is  not  the  better  who  is 
richer. — That  a  wise  man  sees  and  contemns  all  worldly 
goods  which  others  are  possessed  of,  with  an  equal  mind,  as 
well  as  Jupiter;  and  for  this  he  values  and  admires  himself 
the  more,  that  Jupiter  cannot  make  use  of  them,  the  wise 
man  will  not  (c)." 


(?/)  *'  Bonus  vir  tempore  tantum  a  Deo  differt."  Idem,  de 
Providently,  cap.  1. 

(z)  **  Deus  non  vincit  sapientem  in  felicitate,  etiamsi  vincat 
.aetate."  Idem,  epist.  73. 

(a)  "  E  virtutibus  vita  beata  existit,  par  et  similis  deorum,  nulla 
re  nisi  imraortalitate,  quae  nihil  ad  beate  vivendum  pertinet, 
cedens,  coelestibus."  Cic.  de  Nat.  Deor.  lib.  ii. 

(6)  "  Mehercule  magni  artificis  est  clausisse  totum  in  exiguo. 
— Est  aliquid  quo  sapiens  antecedat  Deum.  Ille  naturae  beneficio, 
non  suo  sapiens  est."  Sen.  epist.  53. 

(c)  Solebat  dicere  Sextius,  «  Jovem  plus  non  posse  qua'^ 


Chap.  IX.     to  the  Duties  of  Piety  towards  God,  157  " 

These  are  extravagant  strains,  which  cannot  be  excused 
from  impiety,  and  yet  are  the^  genuine  consequences  of  the 
Stoical  principles.  To  which  may  be  added,  their  high 
pretensions  to  self-sufficiency.  "  The  condition  and  charac- 
ter of  a  philosopher  (says  Epictetus)  is,  that  he  expects  all 
that  might  profit  or  hurt  him  only  from  himself  (<af )."  This 
naturally  led  to  self-confidence  and  self-dependence.  Seneca 
makes  the  confiding  in  a  man's  self  the  only  cause  and  sup- 
port of  a  happy  life.  "  Unum  bonum  est,  quod  beatse  vitse 
causa  et  fundamentum  est,  sibi  fidere  (e)."  This  might  be 
so  explained  as  to  admit  of  a  good  sense;  but  if  we  compare 
it  with  the  other  parts  of  the  Stoical  system,  it  breathes 
that  arrogance  and  self-sufficiency  for  which  they  were  so 
remarkable,  and  which  naturally  flowed  from  their  avowned 
principles.  And  accordingly  Seneca  himself,  in  the  same 
epistle,  represents  it  as  needless  to  apply  to  the  gods  by 
prayer,  since  it  is  in  a  man's  own  power  to  make  himself 
happy.  "Turpe  est  etiamnum  deos  fatigare.  Quid  votis 
opus  est?  Fac  te  ipse  felicem  (y)."  And,  speaking  of  vir- 
tue and  an  uniform  course  of  life  consistent  with  itself,  he 
saith,  "  This  is  the  chief  good,  which  if  thou  possessest, 
thou  wilt  begin  to  be  a  companion  of  the  gods,  not  a  sup- 
plicant to  them." — "  Hoc  est  summum  bonum,  quod  si  oc- 
cupas,  incipis  deorum  esse  socius,  non  supplex."  And  again, 
speaking  of  persevering  in  a  good  mind,   he  says,  "  How 


bonum  virum  PJura  habet  Jupiter  quae  pracstet  hominibus:  sed 
inter  duos  bonos,  non  est  melior  qui  locuplctior, — Sapiens  tam 
aequo  animo  omnia  apud  alios  videt  contemnitque,  quam  Jupiter; 
et  hoc  se  suspicit  quod  Jupiter  ud  illis  non  potest,  sapiens  rion 
vult."  Sen.epist.  73.  at  the  latter  end. 

(d)  Epict.  Enchirid.  chap.  33.  Miss  Carter's  translation^ 

(e)  Sen.  epist.  3 1 . 
(/)  Id.  Ibid. 


158     The  Stoical  Precepts  deficient  -with  regard    Part  II. 

foolish  is  it  to  wish  or  pray  for  it,  when  thou  canst  give  it 
to  thyself?  There  is  no  need  to  lift  up  thy  hands  to  hea- 
ven."— ''  Quam  stultum  est  optare  cum  possis  a  te  impe- 
trare?  JNon  sunt  ad  ccelum  elevandse  manus  (^),"  &c.  This 
was  talking  consistently  with  their  scheme,  which  went 
upon  this  principle,  that  virtue  is  properly  and  absolutely 
in  our  own  power,  and  that  God  himself  cannot  overcome 
our  choice.  But  in  this  matter,  as  in  several  others,  the 
Stoics  were  not  always  consistent  with  themselves.  Seneca 
himself  elsewhere  gives  it  as  his  advice  to  his  friend,  in  his 
tenth  epistle,  that  he  should  pray  for  a  good  mind  and 
a  sound  state,  first  of  the  soul,  then  of  the  body.  "  Roga 
bonam  mentem,  bonam  valetudinem  animi  deinde  corporis." 
There  are  several  passages  both  in  Epictetus  and  Antoninus, 
which  recommend  the  praying  for  divine  assistances  in  the 
performance  of  our  duty.  The  former,  speaking  of  the  com- 
bat against  the  passions,  and  appearances  of  things,  saith, 
"  Remember  God,  invoke  him  for  your  aid  and  protector, 
as  sailors  do  Castor  and  Pollux  in  a  storm  (/z)*"  And  An- 


(^)  S^n.  epist.  41.  It  is  to  be  observed,  that  it  was  a  general 
practice  among  the  Heathens  to  pray  to  their  gods;  but  then  the 
things  they  ordinarily  prayed  for,  were  only  outward  advantages, 
or  what  are  usually  called  the  goods  of  fortune:  as  to  wisdom 
and  virtue,  they  thought  every  man  was  to  depend  only  upon 
himself  for  obtaining  it.  There  is  a  passage  of  Cotta  in  Cicero's 
third  book  de  Nat  Deor.  which  is  very  full  to  this  purpose,  and 
which  I  have  produced  and  considered  at  large,  Vol.  I.  chap, 
xvii.  With  this  may  be  compared  that  passage  of  Horace: 

*'  Hoc  satis  est  orare  Jovem,  qui  donat  et  aufert, 
Det  vitam,  det  opes,  aequum  mi  animum  ipse  parabo." 

Horat.  Epist.  lib.  i.  ep.  18. 

(A)  Epictetus  here  mentions  God  in  the  singular  number,  and 
so  he  does  in  some  other  passages.  And  when  Christian  writers 


Chap.  IX.     to  the  Duties  of  Piety  towards  God.  159 

toninus  intimates,  that  we  ought  to  pray  to  the  gods  to  give 
us  their  assistance,  even  in  things  which  they  have  put  in 
our  own  power:  and  particularly,  that  we  ought  to  pray  to 
the  gods  that  they  would  enable  us  to  govern  our  desires  and 
fears  with  regard  to  external  things.  See  his  Meditations, 
book  ix.  sect.  40.  And  both  the  one  and  the  other  of  these 
philosophers  gives  thanks  to  God  for  moral  improvements. 
Even  Seneca  himself  seems  to  suppose,  that  a  wise  man 
ought  to  do  this:  though  he  mentions  the  giving  thanks  in 
a  way  that  has  a  great  mixture  of  vain-glory  in  it.  "  lUe 


meet  with  such  passages,  they  immediately  are  for  interpreting 
them  of  the  one  true  God,  the  Supreme  Lord  of  the  universe, 
and  of  him  only.  But  in  this  they  are  frequently  mistaken.  Plato, 
in  a  passage  I  have  taken  notice  of  before,  Vol.  I.  chap.  xvii. 
represents  it  as  the  practice  of  every  prudent  man  to  apply  to 
God  by  prayer  in  every  undertaking:  but  it  is  evident  that  this 
is  there  to  be  understood  either  of  the  patron  god,  whom  he 
elsewhere  supposes  to  be  Apollo,  or  some  other  of  the  popular 
deities.  Antoninus,  in  the  passages  I  have  here  referred  to,  sup- 
poses the  gods  to, be  authors  and  givers  of  all  good  things,  and 
that  to  them  we  are  to  offer  up  our  prayers  for  divine  assistances, 
and  our  thanksgivings  for  the  blessings  we  enjoy.  And  Epictetus 
himself,  in  his  Enchiridion,  supposes  the  administration  of  things 
in  the  universe  to  be  in  the  hands  of  the  gods,  and  that  they  order 
all  things  with  the  most  perfect  understanding,  justice  and  good- 
ness. It  was  a  maxim  with  the  Stoics,  that  wisdom  cometh 
from  the  gods  to  men.  And  if  the  gods,  or  any  one  of  them, 
were  applied  to  for  assistance,  it  would,  according  to  the  Pagan 
notions,  have  answered  the  intendon  of  Epictetus*s  advice.  It 
must  be  considered,  that  in  the  Stoical  scheme  the  whole  anima- 
ted system  of  the  universe  was  God,  and  the  several  parts  of  the 
universe  were  so  many  parts,  members  or  powers  of  the  Divinity, 
to  which  they  gave  several  appellations  of  particular  gods  or 
goddesses.  But  for  a  more  distinct  account  of  this,  I  must  refer 
the  reader  to  what  is  said  in  the  former  volume,  chax).  xiii.  xir^ 


leo     The  Stoical  Precepts  deficient  with  regard   Part  IL 

vero  glorietur  audacter,  et  diis  agat  gratias." — "  Let  him 
i)oldh'  glory  (says  he)  and  give  thanks  to  the  gods." 

There  is  another  part  of  religion  recommended  in  Scrip- 
ture, and  which  ought  to  accompany  our  prayers  and  acts 
of  devotion  in  this  present  sinful  state;  and  that  is,  the  con* 
fessing  our  sins  to  God,  the  humbling  ourselves  deeply  be- 
fore him  on  the  accounc  of  them,  and  imploring  the  pardon 
of  them.  But  this  seems  not  to  be  a  part  of  religion  which 
the  Stoics  prescribe.  Antoninus,  indeed,  speaks  of  repen- 
tance, ^  ^gr«vo<fls,  as  a  reprehension  of  a  man's  self  for  having 
neglected  something  useful.  See  his  Meditations,  book  viii. 
sect.  10.  And  he  talks  of  a  man's  condemning  himself  for 
the  wrong  he  hath  done,  which  he  compares  to  the  tearing 
his  own  flesh.  Ibid,  book  xii.  sect.  16.  But  this  seems  to 
have  been  regarded  rather  as  a  punishment  inflicted,  than  as 
a  duty  required.  According  to  that  of  Seneca;  "  Nee  quis- 
quam  gravius  afficitur,  quam  qui  ad  supplicium  poeni- 
tentia  traditus."  Where  he  speaks  of  repentance  as  the 
greatest  punishment  a  man  can  suff'er.  But  1  do  not  find  that 
they  prescribe  and  urge  it  upon  men  as  a  duty  of  religion 
to  acknowledge  their  guilt  to  God,  with  an  ingenuous  godly 
sorrow  and  deep  humiliation,  for  having  sinned  against  him. 
Nor  indeed,  could  they  consistently  do  it,  considering  the 
apologies  they  frequently  make  for  sin,  to  shew  that  men 
are  not  to  be  blamed  or  condemned  on  the  account  of  it, 
which  I  shall  have  occasion  to  take  notice  of. 

Under  the  greatest  outward  evils  and  calamities,  they 
did  not  direct  men  to  humble  themselves  under  the  hand 
of  God,  and  to  reflect  upon  their  sins  as  the  causes  of 
those  evils.  Instead  of  this,  they  talked  in  a  high  magni- 
ficent strain,  that  these  things  were  no  evils  at  all,  and  that 
let  what  would  befal  them,  they  had  strength  sufficient  to 
bear  it.  "  Dare  to  look  up  to  God  (saith  Epictetus)  and  say, 
make  use  of  me  for  the  future  as  thou  wilt:  I  am  of  the 
same  mind  with  thee:  I  am  equal  to  any  thing  which  thou 


Chap.  IX.     to  the  Duties  of  Piety  towards  God,  iei 

shalt  lay  upon  me."  This  seems  to  me  to  be  the  meaning 
of  the  phrase  here  used  in  the  original,  iVes  iif^t.  He  adds, 
*'  I  refuse  nothing  which  seems  good  to  thee:  lead  me 
where  thou  wilt  (i),"  &c.  Here  and  in  what  follows,  as 
well  as  in  other  parts  of  his  writings,  there  are  admirable 
strains  of  resignation,  and  compliance  with  the  will  oi  God: 
though  I  am  sorry  to  observe,  that  there  is  too  frequently 
along  with  it  a  mixture  of  self-sufficiency,  and  confidence 
in  his  own  strength,  without  that  humble  sense  of  his  own 
weakness  and  unworthiness,  which  becomes  such  creatures 
as  we  are  in  this  present  state   of  imperfection  and  sin  (i). 


(?)  Epictet.  Dissert,  book  ii.  chap.  16.  sect.  4. 

{k)  Tlifit  resit^nation  lo  God  which  makes  so  great  an  ap- 
pearance in  the  vvriiii)gs  of  the  Stoics,  and  which  has  been  ofteii 
produced  as  an  instance  of  their  devout  temper  of  mind,  seems, 
if  duly  examined,  to  be  in  several  respects  different  from  that 
meek  and  humble  subtnission  to  the  will  of  God  which  Christi- 
anity requires.  Stoicism  prescribes  an  unfeeling  temper  under 
afflictions.  It  is  a  stiffness  of  soul  that  scorns  to  bend  under  ad- 
versity, and  proceeds  upon  the  supposition  that  no  external  ca- 
lamities are  evils,  or  can  really  hurt  us  in  the  least:  that  they 
are  things  of  an  indifferent  nature,  and  in  which  we  have  no 
concern:  and  that  abstracting  from  all  foreign  helps,  or  hope  of 
future  happiness,  the  mind  has  strength  enough  in  itself,  to 
despise  and  overcome  the  very  wor^t  events  which  can  pos^bly 
befal  us.  The  Stoical  resignation,  strictly  considered,  leaves  no 
room  for  deprecating  calamities,  or  for  humble  applications  to 
God  for  removing  or  allaying  ihem.  This  indeed,  has  a  shew  of 
an  invincible  greatness  of  mind,  which  is  apt  to  dazzle  us;  but 
does  not  seem  to  be  suitable  to  our  condition  and  ciicumstances 
in  this  present  state,  or  to  comport  with  the  designs  of  Provi- 
dence If  God  sendeth  afflictions  and  adversities  upon  us,  it 
must  be  supposed  to  be  his  will  that  we  should  have  an  affecting 
sense  of  them,  so  as  not  to  despise  or  make  light  of  his  correc- 
tions and  trials,  as  if  they  were  things  that  do  not  concern  us': 

Vol.  ii.  X 


162     The  Stoical  Precepts  dejicient  xu'ith  regard    Part  II. 

One  should  think,  that  at  the  time  of  death,  in  reflecting 
on  the  errors  of  a  past  life,  some  acknowledgments  of  our 
faults,  and  petitions  for  pardoning  mercy,  would  be  neces- 
sary: yet  when  Epictetus  introduces  a  dying  man  making 
his  address  to  God,  nothing  of  this  appears:  it  is  all  in  a 
strain  of  self-confidence,  asserting  his  own  perfect  con- 
formity and  obedience  to  the  w\\\  of  God,  without  the  least 
acknowledgment  of  any  failure  or  neglect  of  duty  he  had 
been  ever  guilty  of  (/).  I  shall  here  subjoin  Miss  Carter's 


and  therefore  to  stand  out  against  them  with  an  unfeeling 
apathy,  cannot  be  esteemed  a  proper  resignation  or  conformity 
to  the  Divine  will.  How  much  more  agreeable  to  reason  and  hu- 
manity is  the  resignation  prescribed  in  the  Holy  Scriptures,  and 
of  which  our  Lord  Jesus  Christ  hath  given  us  the  most  perfect 
example?  It  is  a  bearing  affliction  with  a  patient,  but  with  a  ten- 
der and  submissive  frame  of  spirit.  It  alloweth  us  the  emotions 
of  sorrow  under  them,  and  thai  we  may  pray  to  have  them  re- 
moved or  alleviated,  but  in  an  entire  submission  of  our  own 
wills  to  the  will  of  God,  and  without  murmuring  or  repining  at 
any  of  his  dispensations.  It  instructs  us  to  regard  them,  in  many 
cases,  not  only  as  trials  to  exercise  our  faith  and  patience,  and 
other  virtues,  but  as  tokens  of  the  Divine  displeasure  against 
us  for  our  sins,  which  are  desii>ned  to  humble  us,  and  to  put  us 
upon  proper  methods  of  correcting  our  miscarriages,  and  con- 
ciliatmg  the  Divine  favour.  The  Stoical  wise  pian  could  not  con- 
sistently consider  them  in  this  view.  His  resignation  is  rather  an 
assent  to  the  will  of  God  than  a  submission  to  it,  according  to 
that  of  S^eneca:  "  Nihil  cogor,  nihil  patior  invitus,  nee  servio 
Deo  sed  assentio*."  Taken  in  connection  with  the  rest  of  their 
principles,  the  resignation  prescribed  by  the  Stoics  seems  to  be 
a  part  of  the  scheme  they  had  formed  for  securing  that  liberty 
and  self-sufficiency,  to  raise  men  to  which  is  the  great  aim  of 
their  philosophy. 

( / )  Epict.  Dissert,  book  iv.  chap.  10.  sect.  2. 

♦  Sen.  de  Provid.  cap.  v. 


Chap.  IX.     to  the  Duties  of  Piety  towards  God.  163 

note  upon  it,  in  her  excellent  translation  of  Epictetus.  "  I 
wish  (says  she)  it  were  possible  to  palliate  the  ostentation 
of  this  passage,  by  applying  it  to  the  ideal  perfect  charac- 
ter." [i.  e.  to  the  character  of  the  Stoical  wise  man,  which 
some  look  upon  to  be  only  an  ideal  one.]  ''  But  it  is  in  a 
a  general  way,  that  Epictetus  hath  proposed  such  a  dying 
speech,  as  cannot  without  shocking  arrogance  be  uttered  by 
any  one  born  to  die.  Unmixed  as  it  is  with  any  acknowledg- 
ments of  faults  or  imperfections  at  present,  or  with  any 
sense  of  guilt  on  account  of  the  past,  it  must  give  every 
sober  reader  a  very  disadvantageous  opinion  of  some  prin- 
ciples of  the  philosophy  on  which  it  is  founded,  as  contra- 
dictory to  the  voice  of  conscience,  and  formed  on  an  abso- 
lute ignorance  or  neglect  of  the  condition  and  circumstances 
of  such  a  creature  as  man." 

And  yet  sometimes  they  cannot  help  making  acknow- 
ledgments, which  should  have  led  them  to  an  humbler  way 
of  thinking.  "  If  we  would  be  equal  judges  of  all  things 
(saith  Seneca)  let  lis  in  the  first  place  persuade  ourselves, 
that  none  of  us  is  without  fault." — ''  Hoc  primum  nobis 
suadeamus,  neminem  nostrum  esse  sine  culpa."  He  after- 
wards adds,  "  Who  is  he  that  professes  himself  with  re- 
spect to  all  laws  to  be  innocent?" — Quis  est  iste  qui  se 
profitetur  omnibus  legibus  innocentem?  (m)  Epictetus  seems 
to  say,  that  *'  to  be  absolutely  faultless  is  impracticable  (?z)." 
And  that  "  the  beginning  of  philosophy,  at  least  to  such  as 
enter  upon  it  in  a  proper  manner,  is  a  consciousness  of  our 
own  weakness,  and  inability  in  necessary  things  (o)."  M. 
Antoninus  having  mentioned  gravity,  sincerity,  a  contempt 
of  pleasure,  an  heart  never  repining  against   Providence, 


(w)  Sen.  de  Ira,  lib.  ii.  cap.  27. 

(w)  fcLpict.  Dissert,  book  iv.  chap.  12.  sect.  4, 

(o)  Ibid^.  book  ii.  chap.  1 1.  sect.  1.^ 


164    The  Stoical  Precepts  defcient  with  regard  Part  II, 

with  other  virtues,  charges  the  person  he  is  speaking  to,  by 
which  he  probably  there  intends  himself,  as  having  volun- 
tarily come  short  of  them.  And  having  mentioned  the  con^ 
trary  faults,  swears  by  the  gods,  ^\vou  might  have  escaped 
these  vices  long  ago  (/?  )."  And  is  not  here  matter  of  in- 
genuous confession  and  humiliation  before  God?  Though 
it  must  be  owned,  that  he  elsewhere  represents  all  sins  and 
faults  as  involuntary. 

We  see,  by  tht;  instances  I  have  mentioned,  that  the 
Stoics  were  sometimes  obliged  to  come  down  from  their 
heights,  and  express  themselves  in  a  lower  strain.  But  the 
general  tendency  of  their  principles  led  them  to  an  undue 
self-f  xaltation;  and  this  entered  into  the  character  of  their 
wise  and  virtuous  man.  An  instance  of  this  we  have  in  He- 
raclitus,  a  philosopher  much  admired  by  the  Stoics,  who  in 
many  things  adhtred  to  the  tenets  of  his  philosophy.  No- 
thing can  be  more  boastful  and  assuming,  or  discover  a 
higher  degree  of  pride  and  self-sufficiencv,  than  the  man- 
ner in  which  he  speaks  ot  himself  in  his  epistle  to  Hermo^ 
dorus.  "  I  am  excellent  in  wisdom  (saith  he):  I  have  per- 
formed many  difficult  l.;bours:  I  have  vanquished  pleasures; 
I  have  vanquished  riches;  I  have  vanquished  ambition:  I 
have  wrestled  against  and  subdued  cowardice  and  flattery. 
Fear  and  intemperance  have  nothing  to  say  against  me; 
sorrow  is  afraid  of  me;  anger  is  afraid  of  me.  For  these 
thiagb  am  I  crowned,  not  by  Eurystheus  [as  Hercules  was] 
but  by  myself,  as  being  my  own  master,  and  under  my 
own  c6i)imand."  *Efietvrt»  hnrecrlav.  See  .also  his  epistle  to 
Amphidamas,  in  which,  among  other  high  things,  he  saith 
of  himself,  "•  I  shall  not  build  altars  to  others,  but  others 
to  me  (^).'* 


(/?)  Anton.  Medit.  book  v.  sect.  5. 

(q)  Stanley's  Hist,  of  Philos.  p.  739.  741.  edit.  2d.  Lend.  1687. 


Chap.  IX.     to  the  Duties  of  Piety  towards  God,  165 

The  great  philosopher  Plotinus,  so  highly  extolled  by 
Mr.  Bavle,  for  his  eminent  virtues,  frequently  speaks  in 
the  same  vain-glorious  strain  with  the  Stoics:  That  the 
wise  and  virtuous  man  is  not  impressed  by  any  thing  with- 
out him:  that  he  accounteth  the  death  of  mortals,  the  over- 
turning of  his  citv,  or  any  public  calamities,  no  great  mat- 
ter: nor  can  the  captivit)  of  himself,  or  his  nearest  friends 
and  relations,  in  the  least  diminish  his  felicity  (r).  That  he 
is  void  of  all  fear,  misting  in  himscUV  ^^s-iyo-ets  I«ut«,  that 
no  evil  shall  ever  touch  him  (v).  It  may  help  to  let  us  into 
the  pride  of  his  character,  that  vvhen  Amelius  invited  him 
to  assist  at  a  sacrifice,  which  he  intended  to  offer  to  the 
gods  at  a  solemn  festival,  he  answered,  "  It  is  for  them  to 
come  to  me,  not  for  me  to  go  to  them  (0»" 

Some  learned  persons  have  denied  that  humility,  either 
as  to  name  or  thing,  is  to  be  found  in  the  writings  of  the 
Pagans;  and  it  must  be  owned,  that  humility  is  of  a  bad 
sound  among  the  philosophers,  and  among  the  Stoics  it  is 
always  taken  for  a  vice:  but  the  word  ''  humble"  some- 
times occurs  in  the  Pagan  writers  in  a  good  sense,  nor 
were  they  altogether  strangers  to  the  virtue  intended  by  it. 
But  if  we  take  humility  as  it  implies,  a  deep  sense  of  our 
own  unworthiness  and  insufficiency  in  ourselves,  and  of  the 
manifold  defects  of  our  obedience  and  righteousness,  ac- 
companied with  a  true  contrition  of  heart  for  our  sins,  and 
which  carrieth  us  to  acknowledge,  that  if  God  should  enter 
into   strict  judgment  with  us  we  could  not  be  justified  in 


(r)  Plotin.  Ennead.  I.  lib.  iv.  cap.  7. 

(s)  Ibid.  cap.  14,  15. 

{t)  Porphyry's  Life  of  Plotinus,  prefixed  to  his  works,  p.  8. 
B.  The  same  vain-glorious  spirit  animated  the  Indian  brrich- 
mans.  When  Apollonius  asked  them  what  they  were?  larchas, 
the  chief  of  them,  answered,  that  they  thought  themselves  gods. 


166  The  Stoical  Precepts  deficient,  £5fc.      Part  II. 

his  sight;  this  humility,  which  is  opposed  to  self-confidence 
and  self-dependence,  and  which  causeth  us  to  place  our 
whole  trust  in  the  infinite  grace  and  mercy  of  God  for  sal- 
vation, seems  not  to  enter  into  the  Pagan  systems  of  piety 
and  morality,  especially  that  of  the  Stoics  (w).  There  is  a 
spiritual  pride  and  self-sufficiency  running  through  their 
whole  scheme,  scarce  reconcilable  to  that  humble  frame  of 
spirit  which  our  Lord  insists  upon  as  a  necessary  ingredient 
in  the  piety  and  virtue  of  such  imperfect  creatures  as  we 
are  in  the  present  state.  Here  then  is  a  remarkable  instance 
of  an  evangelical  precept  relating  to  a  temper  of  mind, 
which  is  represented  as  of  great  importance  to  our  accep- 
tance with  God,  and  which  yet  is  not  to  be  found  in  the 
Pagan  moralists. 


{y)  It  is  true,  that  the  Stoics  seemed  to  require,  that  a  man, 
as  a  preparative  for  philosophy,  should  have  a  consciousness 
of  his  own  weakness  and  inability:  See  a  passage  to  this  purpose 
in  Epictetus,  cited  above,  p.  163.  But  the  design  of  their  philo- 
sophy, when  once  a  man  was  engaged  in  it,  was  to  inspire  him 
with  a  confidence  in  his  own  strength,  and  the  absolute  suffi- 
ciency of  his  own  virtue. 


167 


CHAPTER  X. 

The  Stoits  gave  excellent  precepts  with  regard  to  the  duties  men  owe  to  one 
another.  Yet  they  carried  their  docti'ine  of  apathy  so  far,  as  to  be  in  some  in- 
stances not  properly  consistent  with  a  humane  disposition  and  a  charitable  sym- 
pathy. They  said  fine  things  concerning  forgiving  injuries  and  beai^ng  with  other 
men's  faults.  But  in  several  respects  they  carried  this  to  an  extreme,  and 
placed  it  on  wrong  foundations,  or  enforced  it  by  improper  motives.  This  is 
particularly  shewn  with  regard  to  those  two  emintnt  xjhilosophers  Epictetus 
and  Mfircus  Antoninus  The  most  ancient  Stoics  did  not  allow  pardoning 
mercy  to  be  an  ingredient  in  a  perfect  character. 

J  HE  Stoics  were  particularly  remarkable  for  the  precepts 
and  directions  they  gave  with  regard  to  the  duties  men  owe 
to  one  another.  They  taught  that  men  were  born  to  be  help- 
ful to  each  other  in  all  the  offices  of  mutual  assistance  and 
benevolence,  and  that  they  are  united  by  the  strongest  ties, 
as  all  belonging  to  one  common  city  of  gods  and  men  (;c). 
Many  of  their  precepts  tended  to  set  the  obligations  we  are 
under  to  love  and,  do  good  to  one  another,  and  to  all  mankind, 
in  a  strong  and  affecting  light.  Yet  it  must  be  acknowledged, 
that  some  parts  of  their  scheme  were  little  consistent  with 
that  humanity  and  mutual  benevolence,  which  it  was  the  de- 
sign of  many  of  their  precepts  to  recommend. 

To  support  their  vain-glorious  scheme  of  self-sufficiency 
and  independency,  they  prescribed  an  unnatural  apathy. 
Their  wise  man  was  to  be  devoid  of  passions,  of  fear  and 
grief,  of  sorrow  and  joy.  He  must  not  be  grieved  for  the 
loss  of  wife,  children,  or  friends,  or  for  any  calamity  which 
can  befal  himself  or  them,  or  even  for  the  public  distresses 


Qc)  Cicero  de  Finib.  lib.  iii,  cap.  19.  p.  258. 


168   The  Stoical  Doctrines  of  Apathy  not  consistent  Part  II* 

and  calamities  of  his  country.  There  is  a  fragment  of  a  trea- 
tise in  Plutarch  to  shew,  that  the  Stoics  speak  greater  nn- 
probabilities  than  the  poets:  and  he  produces  as  an  instance  of 
it,  their  asserting,  that  their  wise  man  continue  s  fearless  and 
invincible  in  the  subversion  of  the  walls  of  his  city,  and  in 
other  great  calamities  of  a  public  nature  (i/).  Seneca  says, 
in  his  74th  epistle,  that  "^  a  wise  man  is  not  afflicted  at  the 
loss  of  his  friends  or  children."— •*  Non  affligitur  sapiens 
liberorum  amissione  aut  amicorum."  And  in  the  same  epis- 
tle, among  the  things  which  should  not  grieve  nor  disturb 
him,  he  reckons  "  the  besieging  of  his  country,  the  death  of 
his  children,  and  the  slavery  of  his  parents." — **  Obsidio 
patriae,  liberorum  mors,  parentum  servitus  (2)."  Nor  is  this 
merely  an  extravagant  rant  of  Seneca,  who  often  gave  into 
an  hvperbolical  way  of  expression.  Epictetus,  one  of  the 
gravest  and  most  judicious  authors  among  ihe  Stoics,  and 
who  adhered  very  closely  to  the  principles  of  their  philoso- 
phy, expresseth  himself  to  the  same  purpose.  It  is  true  that 
he  says,  "  I  am  not  to  be  undisturbed  by  passion  in  the  same 
sense  that  a  statue  is,  but  as  one  who  preserves  the  natural  and 
acquired  relations,  as  a  private  person,  as  a  son,  as  a  bro- 
ther, as  a  father,  as  a  citizen  («)."  And  he  allows  a  man  ''  to 
preserve  an  affectionate  temper,  as  becomes  a  noble-spirited 
and  happy  person  (^)."  It  is  usual  with  the  Stoics  to  throw 
in  every  now  and  then  some  hints,  which  seem  to  correct 
and  soften  their  extravagant  maxims,  and  reduce  them  with- 
in the  bounds  of  nature  and  humanity.   But  that  great  phi- 


(y)  Plutarch.  Opera,  torn.  ii.  p.  1057,  1058.  edit.  Xyl.  Fran- 
cof.    1620. 

(z)  Sen  epist.  74.  Plotinus  expresses  himself  to  the  same  pur- 
pose. See  above,  p.  165. 

(a)  Epict.  Dissert,  book  iii.  chap.  2.  sect.   3. 

(6)  Ibid.  chap.  24.  sect.  4. 


Chap.  X.  with  Humanity  and  a  charitable  Sympathy,    169 

losopher  himself  has  several  passages  which  it  is  very  diffi- 
cult for  the  most  candid  censurer  to  interpret  in  a  favourable 
sense.  Having  mentigned  those  which  he  says  are  called 
"  great  events,"  viz.  wars  and  seditions,  the  destruction  of 
numbers  of  men,  and  the  overthrow  of  cities,  he  asks,  "  What 
great  matter  is  there  in  all  this?  Nothing.  What  great 
matter  is  there  in  the  death  of  numerous  oxen,  numb,  rs 
of  sheep,  or  in  the  burning  or  pulling  down  numbers  of 
nests  of  storks  or  swallows?"  He  affirms,  that  ''these  cases 
are  perfectly  alike:  the  bodies  of  men  are  destroyed,  and 
the  bodies  of  sheep  and  oxen:  the  houses  of  men  are  burnt, 
and  the  houses  or  nests  of  storks.  What  is  there  great  and 
dreadful  in  all  this?"  He  owns  afterwards,  that  there  is  a 
difference  between  a  man  and  a  stork;  but  not  in  body  (c). 
To  talk  with  such  indifference  of  great  public  calamities,  is 
more  a  proof  of  the  want  of  humanity  than  of  a  real  great- 
ness of  mind,  and  is  not  well  consistent  with  a  true  benevo- 
lence towards  mankind,  or  with  a  g  nerous  patriotism  or 
love  to  our  country,  which  yet  the  Stoics  made  great  pro- 
fession of.  To  the  same  purpose  he  expresses  himself  in 
another  remarkable  passage,  the  design  of  which  is  to  sig- 
nify, that  the  slaughter  of  armies  is  an  indifferent  matter; 
and  that  it  ought  not  to  have  given  Agamemnon  concern  if 
the  Greeks  were  routed  and  slain  by  the  Trojans  (</).  The 
note  of  the  ingenious  translator  before-mentioned  upon 
this  passage  appears  to  me  to  be  a  just  one.  "  As  the  Stoi- 
cal doctrine  all  along  forbids  pity  and  compassion,  it  will 
have  even  a  king  look  upon  the  welfare  of  his  people,  and  a 
general  upon  the  preservation  of  his  soldiers,  as  a  matter 
quite  foreign  and  indifferent  to  him  (^)." 


(c)  Epict.  Dissert,  book  i.  chap.  28.  sect.  3. 

(d)  Ibid,  book  iii.  chap.  22.  sect.  4. 

(e)  Ibid.  marg.  note. 

Vol.  II.  Y 


170  The  Stoical  Doctrine  of  Apathy  not  consistent  Part  II» 

With  respect  to  crosses  and  adverse  events  of  a  private 
nature,  Epictetus  every  where  treats  them  as  if  they  were 
nothing  to  us  all.  I  shall  mention  one  passage  of  this  kind 
among  many  others  that  might  be  produced,  "  A  son  is  dead 
(saith  he).  What  hath  happened?  A  son  is  dead.  Nothing 
more?  Nothing. — A  ship  is  lost.  What  hath  happened? — A 
hip  is  lost. — He  is  carried  to  prison.  What  hath  happened? 
He  is  carried  to  prison. — That  he  is  uiihappy,  is  an  addition 
that  every  one  makes  of  his  own."  Epictetus  adds,  that 
*'  Jupiter  hath  made  these  things  to  be  no  evils:  and  that  he 
has  opened  you  the  door  whenever  they  do  not  suit  you:  Go 
out,  man,  and  do  not  complain  (7^)."  The  reader  cannot  but 
observe,  that  though  he  speaks  with  such  indifference  of 
these  things,  as  if  they  were  nothing  at  all,  and  should  not  give 
us  the  least  disturbance,  yet  he  most  inconsistently  supposes, 
that  they  may  be  so  grievous  as  to  render  life  insupportable; 
and  in  that  case  advises  a  man  to  put  an  end  to  his  life,  that 
he  may  get  rid  of  them. 

There  is  little  room  in  the  Stoical  scheme  for  that  affec- 
tionate sympathy  with  others  in  distress,  which  Christianity 
requires,  and  which  is  so  amiable  a  part  of  an  humane  dis- 
position. And  they  seem  not  willing  to  allow  the  workings 
of  the  natural  tender  affections.  Epictetus  blames  Homer  for 
representing  Ulysses  as  sitting  and  crying  upon  a  rock, 
when  he  longed  to  see  his  wife.  "  If  Ulysses  (says  he)  did 
indeed  cry  and  bewail  himself,  he  was  not  a  good  man  (^)." 
And  he  elsewhere  declares,  that  "  no  good  man  laments,  nor 
sighs,  nor  groans  (/i)."  Yet  in  his  Enchiridion  he  says, 
"  If  you  see  any  one  weeping  for  grief,  either  that  his  son  is 


(/)  Epict.  Dissert,  book  iii.  chap.  8.  sect.  2. 
(^)  Ibid,  book  iii.  chap.  24.  sect.  1. 
(A)  Ibid,  book  ii.  chap.  13.  sect.  2. 


Cha^p.  X,     zvith  Humanity  and  a  charitable  Sympathy,     171 

gone  abroad  or  dead,  or  that  he  hath  suffered  in  his  affairs, 
take  heed  that  the  appearance  may  not  hurry  you  away  with 
it.  As  far  as  words  go,  however,  do  not  disdain  to  condescend 
to  him,  and  even,  if  it  should  so  happen,  to  groan  with  him. 
Take  heed,  however,  not  to  groan  inwardly  too  (?)•"  What 
strange  philosophy  was  this!  They  might  put  on  an  out- 
ward appearance  of  sympathizing  with  their  friends,  but 
they  were  to  take  great  care  that  there  should  be  no- 
thing in  the  temper  of  their  minds  answering  to  that  appear- 
ance. 

Thus  the  Stoics,  whilst  they  aimed  at  greatness  of  mind, 
in  effect  strove  to  stifle  the  kind  and  humane  affections. 
Epictetus  compares  the  death  of  a  friend  to  the  breaking 
of  an  old  pipkin,  in  which  one  uses  to  cook  his  meat:  and 
asks,  "  Must  you  die  with  hunger,  because  you  do  not  use 
your  old  pipkin?  Do  you  not  send  and  buy  a  new  one  (/^)?" 
Who  can  without  some  indignation  read  this  mean  represen- 
tation of  the  death  of  a  beloved  and  esteemed  friend?  But 
Marcus  Antoninus's  good-nature  got  the  better  of  his  Sto- 
ical principles.  He  shed  tears  at  the  death  of  his  old  tutor: 
and  when  some  about  the  court  put  him  in  mind  of  his  usual 
firmness  and  steadiness,  Antoninus  Pius  replied  in  his  de- 
fence: "  You  must  give  him  leave  to  be  a  man:  neither  phi- 
losophy nor  imperial  dignity  can  extinguish  our  natural  af- 
fections (/)."  Cato  of  Utica,  rigid  Stoic  as  he  was,  carried 
his  sorrow  for  the  death  of  his  brother  Csepio  to  an  extra- 
ordinary degree.  Plutarch,  in  his  account  of  Cato's  life,  ob- 
serves, that  upon  this  occasion  he  showed  himself  more  a 
fond  brother  than  a   philosopher,  not  only  in  the  excess  of 


(?)  Epict.  Enchirid.  chap.  16.  Miss  Carter's  translation. 
{k)  Epict.  Dissert,  book  iv.  chap.  10.  sect  5. 
(/)  See  the  Life  of  Marcus  Antoninus,  prefixed  to  the  Glas- 
gow translation  of  his  Meditations,  p.  13. 


172  The  Stoical  Doctrine  of  Part  II. 

grief  bewailing  and  embracing  the  dead  body,  but  also  in 
the  extravagant  expences  of  the  funeral:  and  that  this  was 
blamed  by  some,  as  not  suiting  with  Cato's  usual  moderation 
in  other  things.  But  how  justly  blameable  was  that  philoso- 
phy which  was  of  such  a  kind,  that  a  man  could  not  act  up 
to  it,  without  endeavouring  to  extinguish  the  tenderest  sen- 
timents of  the  human  nature!  Our  Saviour's  weeping  over 
his  beloved  friend  Lazarus,  and  the  sorrow  he  expressed 
upon  a  foresight  of  the  approaching  miseries  of  the  Jews, 
and  destruction  of  Jerusalem,  are  striking  instances  of  the 
most  humane  tenderness  and  friendly  affections,  mixed  with 
the  truest  greatness  of  soul.  And  how  much  more  just  as 
well  as  amiable  is  the  model  of  a  perfect  character,  as  actu- 
tually  exemplified  in  the  life  of  our  blessed  Lord,  than  the 
Stoics,  the  most  eminent  of  the  Pagan  moralists,  were  able 
to  form,  even  in  idea,  in  the  feigned  description  they  give 
us  of  their  perfect  wise  man  (w2)f 


(?«)  The  Gospel,  in  this  as  well  as  other  instances,  guards 
against  extremes.  It  allows  the  tender  movements  of  humanity 
and  compassion  on  proper  occasions,  but  prescribes  a  due  mo- 
deration to  be  observed:  that  we  be  not  swallowed  up  of  overmuch 
sorrow,  nor  mourn  as  those  that  have  no  hope.  The  Stoics 
thought  it  unbecoming  iheir  wise  man  to  give  way  to  the 
movements  of  sorrow  in  any  case,  and  particularly  on  funeral 
occasions.  On  the  other  hand,  the  Chinese  laws  and  customs,  and 
Confucius  himself,  their  great  moralist,  seem  to  have  encourag- 
ed a  sorrow  beyond  all  reasonable  bounds.  We  are  told  concerning 
that  philosopher,  that  he  constantly  shewed  great  grief  on  the 
death  of  his  friends  and  relatives,  and  on  occasion  of  the  death  of 
many  others,  and  even  carried  it  to  an  excess.  It  was  an  old 
custom  in  China,  that  the  time  of  mourning  for  a  parent  should 
be  three  years;  this  he  would  have  observed  with  the  utmost 
strictness,  and  reproved  one  of  his  disciples,  who  thought  some 
abatement  might  be  allowed.  He  approved  the  conduct  of  an  em- 
peror, who  hid  himself  three  years  in  the  royal  garden  or  grove 


Chap.  X.        forgiving  Injuries  considered*  I73 

With  regard  to  the  forgiving  injuries,  the  bearing  with 
the  weaknesses  and  faults  of  others,  and  shewing  a  good- 
will even  to  those  that  offend  us,  which  is  a  noble  part  of 
our  duty,  there  are  many  admirable  passages,  both  in  Epic- 
tetus  and  Antoninus,  in  which  this  excellent  temper  and 
conduct  is  urged  and  enforced  by  a  variety  of  considerations. 
Many  of  the  motives  to  eni^age  us  to  it  are  the  same  which 
are  proposed  in  the  Holy  Scriptures  (n).  But  they  some- 
times carry  it  too  far,  and  place  this  noble  duty  on  a  wrong 
foundation,  or  push  it  to  an  extreme  which  may  prove  pre- 
judicial. The  design  of  the  eighteenth  chapter  of  the  first 
book  of  Epictetus's  Dissertations,  as  given  by  Arrian,  is  to 
shew  that  we  are  not  to  be  angry  with  the  errors  of  others. 
A  good  precept,  but  which  he  there  builds  on  a  foundation 
that  will  not  bear  it,  viz.  "  That  all  men  act  according  to 
their  persuasion:  that  even  thieves  and  adulterers  act  from 
a  wrong  persuasion  or  error  in  their  judgment,  that  it  is  for 


where  his  father  was  buried,  and  abandoned  himself  lo  his  grief, 
so  as  not  to  take  any  care  of  the  affairs  of  government,  or  con- 
verse with  any  body.  He  says,  that  the  antient  kings  whom  he 
highly  esteemed,  acted  after  this  manner;  and  that  in  the  book 
of  offices  it  is  taught,  that  when  a  king  was  dead,  his  son  and  suc- 
cessor gave  himself  up  to  grief  for  three  years,  and  committed  af- 
fairs during  that  time  wholly  to  an  adniinistrator,  who  governed 
in  his  stead.  Scient.  Sin.  lib.  iii.  P.  vii.  p.  109  et  130.  I  think  the 
most  partial  admirer  of  Confucius  and  the  Chinese  constitutions 
must  acknowledge,  that  this  Is  carrying  things  to  an  extreme 
which  is  both  unreasonable  in  itself,  and  prejudical  to  society. 

(w)  Among  the  many  motives  to  forgiveness  urged  by  Epicte- 
tus  and  Antoninus,  I  do  not  remember  that  they  ever  take  notice 
of  that  which  is  particularly  insisted  on  by  our  Saviour,  and  is  of 
the  highest  consequence:  "  If  you  forgive  men  <heir  trespasses, 
your  heavenly  Father  will  also  forgive  you:  but  if  ye  lorgive 
not  men  their  trespasses,  neither  will  your  Father  forgive  your 
trespasses."  Matt.  yi.  14,  15. 


174  The  Stoical  Doctrine  of  Part  II. 

their  advantage  to  steal,  or  debauch  their  neighbour's  wife. 
And  while  they  have  this  persuasion,  they  cannot  act  other- 
wise. That  therefore  we  ought  not  to  be  angry  at  them, 
nor  endeavour  to  destroy  them,  but  to  pity  them  for  their 
mistakes,  and  shew  them  their  errors,  and  they  will  amend 
their  faults."  This  is  the  substance  of  what  Epictetus  says 
in  the  first  section  of  that  chapter.  The  Gospel  prescribes 
all  that  reason  and  humanity  requires  in  such  a  case,  but 
upon  far  juster  principles.  Miss  Carter's  note  upon  it,  in 
her  excellent  translation  of  Epictetus,  deserves  notice.  "The 
most  ignorant  persons  oiten  practise  what  they  know  to  be 
evil:  and  they  who  voluntarily  suffer,  as  many  do,  their  in- 
clination to  blind  their  judgments,  are  not  justified  by  fol- 
lowing it.  The  doctrine  therefore  of  Epictetus  here  and 
elsewhere  on  this  head,  contradicts  the  voice  of  reason  and 
conscience:  it  destroys  all  guilt  and  merit,  all  punishment 
and  reward,  all  blame  of  ourselves  or  others,  all  sense  of 
misbehaviour  towards  our  fellow-creatures  or  our  Creator. 
No  wonder  that  such  philosophers  did  not  teach  repentance 
towards  God."  Epictetus  frequently  represents  ignorance 
as  the  cause  of  all  our  faults  {o).  And  Antoninus  often 
talks  after  the  same  manner.  "It  is  cruel  (says  he)  to  hinder 
men  from  desiring  or  pursuing  what  appears  to  them  as 
their  proper  good:  and  yet  you  seem  in  a  certain  manner 
to  be  chargeable  with  this  conduct,  when  you  are  angry  at 
the  mistakes  and  wrong  actions  of  men;  for  all  are  carried 
to  what  appears  to  them  to  be  their  proper  good.  But,  say 
you,  it  is  not  their  proper  good.  Well:. instruct  them  then, 
and  teach  them  better:  and  do  not  be  angry  at  them  (/?)." 
But  it  frequently  happens,   that  it  would  be  a  vain  attempt 


(o)  See  his  Dissertations,  book  i.  chap.  26.  sect.  1.    And  ibid, 
chap.  28.  sect.  2. 

{Ji)  Anton.  Medit.  book  vi.  sect.  27. 


Chap.  X.  forgiving  Injuries  considered,  175 

to  instruct  them;  though  undoubtedly  it  would  be  well 
done  to  endeavour,  as  far  as  we  can,  to  make  them  sensible 
of  their  guilt,  and  reclaim  them  from  their  evil  courses. 
But  in  many  instances  it  is  not  for  want  of  knowing  what  is 
right  that  men  do  wrong,  but  because  they  are  carried  away 
by  inordinate  appetite;  and  there  is  often  no  other  way  of 
dealing  with  them,  but  punishing  and  restraining  them  by 
terror.  And  so  no  doubt  Antoninus  himself  was  obliged  to 
act,  or  he  could  not  well  have  fulfilled  his  duty  as  an  em- 
peror in  the  administration  of  the  government.  Epictetus 
has  another  passage  of  the  same  kind,  propei'  to  be  here  ta- 
ken notice  of,  in  which  he  evidently  carries  a  noble  precept 
too  far:  "  When  any  person  doth  ill  by  you,  or  speaks  ill 
of  you,  remember  that  he  acts  or  speaks  from  a  supposition 
of  its  being  his  duty.  Now,  it  is  not  possible  that  he  should 
follow  .v/hat  appears  right  to  you,  but  what  appears  so  to 
himself.  Therefore,  if  he  judges  from  a  wrong  appearance, 
he  is  the  person  hurt,  since  he  is  the  person  deceived  (^)." 
To  deliver  this,  as  lEpictetus  seems  here  to  do,  as  a  general 
rule  with  respect  to  all  persons  that  do  ill  to  others,  or 
speak  ill  of  them,  is  setting  an  excellent  duty  concerning 
bearing  injuries  and  calumnies  on  a  wrong  foundation.  For 
many  cases  may  happen,  in  which  the  most  extensive  cha- 
rity will  not  be  able  to  suppose,  that  the  injurious  person  or 
calumniator  thinks  he  does  right,  and  is  honestly  deceived 
in  what  he  looks  upon  to  be  his  duty.  It  frequently  hap- 
pens, that  persons  spread  calumnies  against  others,  knowing 
them  to  be  false  and  injurious,  from  an  envious  and  ma- 
licious principle. 

It  was  a  maxim  of  Socrates  and  Plato,  that  "  as  all  error 
is  involuntary,  so  no  man  is  willingly  wicked  or  unjust  in 


{q)  See  his  Enchirid.  chap.  42.  Miss  Carter's  translation. 


176  The  Stoical  Doctrine  of  Part  IL 

his  actions,  since  all  desire  truth  and  goodness."  To  this 
Marcus  Antoninus  refers  book  vii.  sect.  63,  and  he  him- 
self talks  to  the  same  purpose:  "  Men  are  not  to  be  blamed 
(says  he)  for  they  never  do  wrong  willingly."  And  again: 
"  If  any  do  wrong,  surely  it  is  unwillingly  and  ignorantly. 
It  is  unwillingly  that  any  soul  is  deprived  of  truth  by  err- 
ing, or  of  justice  by  a  conduct  unsuitable  to  the  object  (r)." 
But  this  way  of  talking  is  more  good-natured  than  just. 
For  certain  it  is  that  there  are  many  persons,  who  knowing- 
ly and  wilfully  commit  actions,  which  they  are  sensible  are 
unjust,  impelled  by  pride,  envy,  avarice,  ambition,  and  sen- 
sual appetite.  All  errors  are  not  involuniary:  they  may 
often  be  said  to  be  voluntary,  since  they  are  owing  to  a  wil- 
ful neglect  of  examining  and  using  proper  means  for  infor- 
mation. And  to  exclude  the  will  from  any  part  of  wicked 
actions,  and  to  represent  them  all  as  owing  to  involuntary 
errors  of  judgment,  is  to  excuse  the  worst  of  crimes,  and 
take  away  the  evil  of  them.  Antoninus  sometimes  plainly 
supposes  the  contrary.  In  a  passage  quoted  before,  having 
mentioned  several  virtues,  he  charges  himself,  or  the  per- 
son he  is  there  speaking  to,  as  having  voluntarily,  ix-avy 
come  short  of  them  (*).  And  elsewhere  he  saith,  that  '^  he 
that  willingly  lies,  ixuv  -^evTiofAivei^  is  guilty  of  impiety;  for 
the  nature  of  the  whole  is  truth,  and  the  cause  of  all 
truth  (0»"  Where  he  supposes,  contrary  to  what  he  himself 
and  Plato  had  said,  that  a  man  may  willingly  depart  from 
truth. 

Another  reason  which  Antoninus  frequently  gives  for  not 
being  angry  at  the  faults  of  others,  is  drawn  from  their 
being  necessary  and  unavoidable.  Thus,   to   induce  us  not 


(r)  Anton,  book  xii.  sect.  12.  and  book  xi.  sect.  18. 
(«)  Ibid,  book  v.  sect.  5. 
(/)  Ibid,  book  ix.  sect.  1. 


Chap.  X.        forgiving  Injuries  considered,  iY'/ 

to  be  angry  at  any  man's  faults,  he  would  have  us  consider 
that  he  is  forced  to  it:  and  asks,  "  What  else  could  he 
do  (w)?"  This  is  a  thought  which  he  frequently  repeats  ill 
various  forms.  Speaking  of  those  that  have  wrong  maxims 
of  good  and  evil,  pleasure  and  pain,  glory  and  ignominy,  he 
says,  "  If  they  act  wrong,  we  ought  to  recollect  that  they 
are  under  a  necessity  of  acting  thus  (at)."  He  compares  one 
that  does  wrong  to  a  man  whose  armpits  or  breath  are  dis- 
agreeable: "  How  can  the  man  help  it  (says  he)  that  has 
such  a  mouth,  and  such  armpits  (i/)?"  And  again,  "One 
who  expects  a  vicious  man  should  not  do  wrong,  is  as  ab- 
surd as  one  expecting  a  fig-tree  should  not  produce  the 
natural  juice  of  the  figs,  or  that  an  infant  should  not  cry,  or 
a  horse  should  not  neigh,  or  such  other  necessary  things. 
What  can  the  man  do,  that  has  such  dispositions?"  I  do  not 
deny,  but  that  to  express  the  power  of  evil  habits,  which 
induce  a  moral  impotency,  comparisons  may  be  sometimes 
aptly  drawn  from  the  things  that  are  physically  necessary; 
but  great  care  should  be  tajcen  not  to  carry  it  too  far,  as  if 
bad  men  were  not  to  be  blamed  for  the  evil  actions  they 
commit,  and  as  if  those  actions  were  what  they  could  not 
possibly  avoid  doing.  And  I  think  it  mast  be  acknowledged 
that  Antoninus  has  pushed  it  to  an  extreme.  I  shall  only 
mention  one  passage  more  to  the  same  purpose.  "  It  is  the 
part  of  a  madman  (says  he)  to  expect  impossibilities:  now 
it  is  impossible  that  vicious  men  should  act  another  part 
than  we  see  they  act  (z)."  This  is  not  true,  if  applied  to 


(m)  Anton,  book  x.  sect.  30. 

(a:)  Ibid,  book  viii.  sect.  14. 

(t/)  Ibid,  book  v.  sect.  28.  / 

(2)  Anton.  Medit.  book  v.  sect.  17.  The  author  of  the  book 
De  'LEsprit  observes,  that  the  famous  Mr.  Fonienelle  contem^ 
plated   the  wickedness  of  men  without  sharpness  or  bitterness^ 

Vol.  II.  Z 


178  The  Stoical  Doctrine  of  Part  IL 

particular  actions.  There  is  not  one  bad  action  which  a 
wicked  man  commits,  but  it  was  possible  for  him  in  that 
very  instance  to  have  acted  otherwise. 

Another  consideration  which  is  insisted  upon  both  by 
Epictctus  and  Antoninus,  to  engage  us  to  btar  with  those 
that  offend  us  and  not  be  angry  at  them  for  any  thing  they 
do  to  us,  is,  that  in  reality  they  do  us  no  injury.  Epictetus 
lays  it  down  as  a  maxim,  that  "one  cannot  be  in  fault,  and 
another  the  sufferer  («)."  Upon  which  the  ingenious  tran- 
slator very  properly  remarks,  "  This  is  a  Stoic  extravagance; 
the  very  thing  which  constitutes  the  fault  of  the  one  in  this 
case,  is  that  he  makes  the  other  suffer."  Epictetus  has 
many  good  things  about  patience  under  injuries.  But  the 
truth  is,  that,  according  to  him,  no  injury  can  be  done  to  a 
good  man.  "  No  one,  (says  he)  either  hurts  or  benefits  ano- 


considering  it  as  the  necessary  effect  "  de  Tenchainement  uni- 
versel," — *'  of  the  universal  concatenation  of  things. '*  Sec  De 
I'Esprit,  disc.  4.  chap.  14.  But  if  this  was  a  just  reason  for  not 
censuring  or  being  angry  at  any  man  for  his  wicked  deeds,  he 
ought,  upon  the  same  principle,  not  lo  have  acknowledged  a  good 
man's  merit,  or  to  have  allowed  him  any  praise  or  reward  for  his 
virtuous  actions.  Another  French  author,  who  maintains  the 
same  prii^ciple  of  universal  necessity,  does  not  draw  so  goodna- 
tured  a  conclusion  from  it  as  Mr  Fonienelle:  for  though,  he  thinks* 
the  criminal  person  should  not  feel  any  remorse  for  the  evil  he 
has  done,  because  he  could  not  help  it,  yet  he  supposes  it  may  be 
necessary  for  the  public  good  to  destroy  hun,  as  we  do  mad  dogs 
or  serpents.  See  Le  Discours  sur  la  Vie  Heureuse,  at  the  end  of 
Les  Pensees  Philosophiques.  And,  indeed,  if  one  man  is  neces- 
sitated by  the  fatal  chain  to  commit  bad  actions,  why  may  not 
another  man  be  equally  supposed  to  be  necessitated  to  hate,  to 
censure,  and  punish  him?  So  that  at  the  bottom  this  doctrine  will 
bring  no  great  confort  even  to  evil  doers,  nor  be  a  good  reason 
for  exercising  forbearance  towards  them,  or  forgiving  them, 
(a)  Epict.  Dissert,  book  ii.  chap.  13.  sect.  2. 


Chap.  X.         forgiving  Injuries  considered,  179 

ther:  but  the  principles  which  we  hold  concerning  every- 
thing, it  is  this  that  hurts  us,  this  that  overturns  us  (^)." 
He  gives  it  as  a  nvaxim,  that  "one  man  doth  not  hurt 
another,  but  that  every  man  is  hurt  and  profited  by  his  own 
actions  (<:•)•"  ^^  ^^^^  manner  Maximus  Tyrius  has  an  ex- 
press dissertation  to  prove,  that  an  injury  is  not  to  be  re- 
taliated. And  he  goes  upon  this  principle,  that  a  good  man 
cannot  be  injured  by  a  wicked  man;  because  he  has  no  good 
thing  which  it  is  in  the  power  of  a  bad  man  to  spoil  or  de- 
prive him  of,  and  that  a  good  man  can  neither  do  nor  suffer 
an  injury.  Seneca  often  talks  in  the  same  strain,  especially  ia 
his  tract,  Quod  in  sapientem  non  cadit  injuria  (d).  So  also 
Antoninus  says,  "  I  cannot  be  hurt  by  any  of  them,  since 
none  of  them  can  involve  me  in  any  thing  dishonourable 
or  deformed  (^)."  And  he  often  argues,  that  we  ought  not 
to  be  angry  at  any  injustice  men  do  to  us,  because  they 
cannot  hurt  us.  But  though  this  consideration  may  be  so 
managed,  as  greatly  to  moderate  our  resentments,  yet  if  it 
be  understood  in  its  rigour,  according  to  the  Stoical  princi- 
ples, it  leaves  nothing  properly  praise-worthy  in  forgiveness, 
or  rather  leaves  no  room  for  forgiveness  at  all.  For  if  no  in- 
jury be  done  me,  where  is  the  exercise  of  a  forgiving  dispo- 
sition? How  much  juster  and  nobler  is  it  to  be  able  to  say, 
he  hath  hurt  and  injured  me,  yet  1  forgive  him:  I  bear  him 
no  malice  or  ill-will,  but  am  ready,  if  a  proper  opportunity 
offers,  to  render  him  good  for  his  evil?  which  is  the  temper 
Christianity  requires. 

There  is  another  consideration  urged  by  that  worthy  em- 
peror and  philosopher  Marcus  Antoninus,  which  deserves 


(b)  Epict.  Dissert,  book  iv.  chap.  5.  sect  4. 

(c)  Ibid.  chap.  13.  sect.  2. 

(rf)  See  particularly  cap.   15.  et    16. 
(e)  Anton.  Medit.  book  ii.  sect.  I. 


X80  The  Doctrine  of  forgiving  Injuries         Part  11. 

to  be  examined.  It  is  to  this  purpose:  that  the  injury  done 
us  is  not  hurtful  to  the  whole,  and  what  is  not  hurtful  to 
the  whole,  cannot  be  really  hurtful  to  any  particular  part. 
*'  What  is  not  hurtful  to  the  city  (says  he)  cannot  hurt  the 
citizen.  Make  use  of  this  rule  upon  every  conception  of  any 
thing  as  hurting  you.  If  the  city  (by  which  he  there  means 
the  universe)  be  not  hurt  by  it,  I  cannot  be  hurt(y)."  And 
again;  "  If  this  event  be  not  hurtful  to  the  whole,  why  am 
I  disturbed  by  it?  Nay,  who  can  hurt  the  whole  (^)."  To 
this  may  be  added  what  he  elsewhere  observes,  '^  there  is 
no  universal  wickedness  to  hurt  the  universe.  Particular 
wickedness  of  any  individual  hurts  not  another,  it  hurts 
himself  only;  who  yet  has  this  gracious  privilege,  that  as 
soon  as  he  heartily  desires  it,  he  may  be  free  from  it  alto- 
gether (A)."  I  do  not  well  see  how  it  can  be  said  upon  these 
principles,  that  there  is  any  hurt  in  sin  at  all.  It  cannot  hurt 
tht  universe,  it  cannot  hurt  any  other  ram  but  him  that 
commits  it,  nor,  according  to  this  way  of  reasoning,  can  it 
hurt  the  man  himself.  For  nothing  can  hurt  any  part  that 
does  not  hurt  the  whole:  and  sin  is  so  far  from  hurting  the 
whole,  that  according  to  the  Stoic  principles  it  contributes  to 
the  harmony  of  the  universe,  and  as  such  may  be  said  to 
be  agreeable  to  the  nature  of  the  whole  (i).  And  he  express- 
ly asserts,  that  "  nothing  advantageous  to  the  whole  is  hurt- 
ful to  the  part(>^)." 


■  (/)  Anton.  Medit.  book  v.  sect.  22. 

(,§•)  Ibid,  book  v.  s^ct,  35. 

(A).  Ibid,  book  viii.  sect.  5S. 

\i)  Aci  ording  to  the  account  Plutarch  gives  from  Chrysippus, 
sin  tends  to  the  good  of  the  whole.  He  says,  that  virtue  and  vice, 
like  the  difference  and  variety  of  the  seasons,  tend  to  the  har- 
mony of  the  universe.  De  Stoic.  Repug.  Opera)  p.  1050,  1051. 
torn.  2   edit.  Xyl  See  also  ibid.  p.  1066. 

{k)  Anton,  Medit.  book  x.  sect.  6. 


Chap.  X.  placed  by  the  Stoics  on  a  -wrong  Foundation,  181 

I  shall  mention  &ome  other  passages   which  tend  to  illus- 
trace  this.  "  When  you  are   disgusted,   says   he,   with    the 
impudence  of  any  one,  immediately  ask  yourself.  Can  the 
universe  then  be  without  the  shameless?   It  cannot.   Do  not 
demand  then  what  is  impossible.   For  this   is  one  of  those 
shameless    men  who  mast  needs  be  in  the  universe.   Have 
the  same  question  also  at  hand,  when  shocked  at  the  crafty, 
the  faithless,  or  the  faulty  in  any  respect."   See  Ant.  Medit. 
b.  ix.  sect.  42.    Here  and  in  some  other  passages  he  speaks 
as  if  those  persons  and  actions,  which  seem  to  us  bad  and 
vicious,  were  so  connected  with  the  whole,  as  to  be  neces- 
sary to  the  order  of  it,  and  without  which  the  whole  would 
run    into    confusion.     And    accordingly  he  supposes,   that 
every  event  which   comes  to  pass  tends  to  the  prosperity 
and  felicity  of  Jupiter  himself  in   his    administration,  who 
never  ^yould  have  permitted  this  event  if  it   had    not   con- 
duced to   good.    But  if  this  be  applied  to  particular    bad 
men  and  particular  wicked  actions,  as  if  these  very  men  and 
these  evil  actions  were  necessary  to  the  good  order  of  the 
universe,  and  that  the   whole    would   be  less   perfect,   and 
God  less  happy,  if  those  particular  persons  had  not  existed, 
and  those  actions  had  not  been  done,  this  appears  to  me  to 
be  a   false  supposition,  and  dishonourable  to  the  Deity.   It 
is  indeed  for  the  good  of  the  universe,  and  the  glory  of  the 
divine  administration,  that  God  hath  made  reasonable  crea- 
tures, endued  with  liberty   and  free  agency;   and    that    he 
dealeth  with  them  as  such,  and  consequently  permits  them 
to  use  their  liberty  even  in  doing  evil  actions.  But  it  does 
not  follow,  that  every  particular  action  of  theirs  conduceth 
to  good,  and  that  God  permitteth   it  for  that  reason.  He 
may  indeed  in  his  infinite  wisdom  over-rule  it  to  good,  and 
bring  good  out  of  it;  but  in  its  own  nature  vice  and  sin  is 
evil,  and  of  a  pernicious  tendency:  and  therefore  a  righteous 
and  holy  God  hath  a  just  displeasure  against  it,  and  against 
the  persons  that  commit  it;  and  may,  in  an  entire  consist- 


182  The  Stoical  Doctrine  of  Part  II. 

ency  with  his  governing  wisdom,  righteousness,  and  good- 
ness, punish  them  for  it.  And  in  like  manner  a  good  and  vir- 
tuous man  may  and  ought  to  conceive  a  just  abhorrence  of 
such  evil  actions,  and  may,  without  any  imputation  upon 
his  goodness,  be  displeased  with  those  that  are  guilty  of 
them. 

I  acknowledge  that  there  are  many  considerations,  seve- 
ral of  which  are  very  properly  urged  both  by  Epictetus  and 
Antoninus,  ^vhich  should  dispose  us  not  to  be  too  rigorous 
in  our  censures  upon  the  actions  of  others,  and  to  put  the 
most  favourable  construction  upon  them,  which  the  cir- 
cumstances of  the  case  can  possibly  admit.  But  it  is  cer- 
tainly wrong,  under  prttence  of  engaging  men  not  to  be 
angry  at  the  faults  of  others,  to  endeavour  to  palliate  the 
evil  and  deformity  of  vice  and  sin,  and,  to  make  such  a  re- 
presentation of  it  as  if  it  were  true,  and  pursued  to  its 
genuine  consequences,  would  shew  that  neither  God  nor 
man  should  be  angry  at  it,  and  punish  it.  This  seems  to  be 
the  plain  tendency  of  some  of  the  passages  which  have  been 
produced  from  Marcus  Antoninus;  though  I  am  far  from 
charging  that  excellent  emperor  and  philosopher  with  in- 
tending those  consequences,  and  indeed  he  has  other  pas- 
sages of  a  different  strain.  For  though  he  expressly  asserts, 
as  has  been  shewn,  that  "  the  particular  wickedness  of  any 
individual  hurts  not  another,  it  hurts  himself  only;  and  that 
no  injury  or  evil  action  can  be  hurtful  to  the  whole;"  yet  he 
elsewhere  says,  that  "  he  who  is  guilty  of  an  injury  is  guilty 
of  an  impiety:  for  since  the  nature  of  the  whole  has  formed 
rational  animals  for  being  useful  to  one  another,  he  who 
trangresses  this  her  will,  is  thus  guilty  of  impiety  against 
the  most  antient  and  venerable  of  the  gods."  By  which  he 
means  what  he  so  often  calls  the  whole,  and  the  nature  of 
the  whole.  Here  he  seems  plainly  to  suppose,  contrary  to 
what  he  elsewhere  teaches,  both  that  a  man  may  hurt  and 
do  an  injury  to  another  of  the  same  species  with  himself, 


Chap.  X.  forgiving  Injuries  considered,  183 

and  that  in  so  doing  he  is  guilty  of  an  impiety  against  the 
whole.  And  he  there  adds,  that  "  he  who  willingly  lies  is 
guilty  of  impiety,  in  as  far  as  by  deceiving  he  does  an  in- 
jury; and  he  who  lies  unwillingly,  in  as  far  as  his  voice 
dissents  from  the  nature  of  the  whole;  which  as  he  had  ob- 
served just  before  is  truth,  and  the  first  cause  of  all 
truth." — He  there  also  says,  "  that  he  who  pursues  plea- 
sure as  good,  and  shuns  pain  as  evil,  or  who  is  not  indiffer- 
ently disposed  to  pain  and  pleasure,  life  and  death,  glory 
and  ignominy,  all  which  the  nature  of  the  whole  regards  as 
indifferent,  is  plainly  guilty  of  impiety  (  /)." 

I  have  insisted  the  more  largely  on  the  Stoical  doctrine 
of  forgiving  injuries,  and  doing  good  to  those  that  have 
used  us  ill,  because  it  is  that  part  of  their  doctrine  in  which 
they  had  been  thought  to  come  up  to  some  of  the  sublimest 
precepts  of  morality  as  taught  by  our  Saviour.  I  readily 
acknowledge  that  an  excellent  spirit  breathes  in  several  of 
their  precepts  on  this  head.  But  it  appears  from  the  ob- 
servations which  have  been  made,  that  by  placing  that  duty 
in  some  respects  on  a  wrong  foundation,  and  enforcing  it 
by  motives  which  will  not  bear  a  strict  scrutiny,  and  carry- 
ing it  in  some  instances  to  an  extreme,  they  weaken  what 
they  endeavour  to  establish.  All  that  is  just  in  this  doctrine 
is  taught  in  the  Gospel,  without  running  into  extremes. 
The  best  and  properest  of  the  motives  proposed  by  these 
philosophers  are  also  there  urged  to  engage  us  to  bear  with 
one  another's  faults  and  infirmities,  and  to  forgive  and  da 
good  to  those  that  injure  and  offend  us:  besides  which 
there  are  additional  motives  proposed,  which  are  of  the 
greatest  weight.  This  duty  is  bound  upon  us  by  the  ex- 
press command  and  authority  of  God  himself,'  who  hath 
also  made  our  forgiving  other  men  their  offences  commit- 


(0  Anton.  Medit.  bookix.  sect,  1. 


184  The  Stoical  Doctrine  of  Part  IL 

ted  against  us,  a  necessary  condition  of  our  obtaining  the 
forgiveness  of  our  own  offences  from  God.  We  are  assured, 
that  the  unmt-rciful  and  unforgiving  shall  have  no  mercy 
«he\vn  them  at  the  day  of  Judgment  (m).  But  especially 
the  motives  drawn  from  the  wonderful  love  of  God  in 
sending  his  Son  to  suffer  and  die  for  us  whilst  we  were  yet 
enemies  and  ungodh ,  and  the  exceeding  riches  of  his 
grace  towards  penitent  sinners,  together  with  the  perfect 
example  of  a  forgiving  disposition  in  our  most  amiable  and 
benevolent  Saviour,  must  needs,  where  they  are  heartily 
believed,  have  a  mighty  force  upon  an  ingenuous  mind. 
And  yet  at  the  same  time  great  care  is  taken  to  keep  up 
a  deep  sense  of  the  evil  of  sin,  and  an  abhorrence  of  it 
in  the  minds  of  men,  which  is  of  the  utmost  consequence 
to  the  cause  of  virtue,  and  the  good  order  of  the  moral 
world. 

I  shall  conclude  this  part  of  the  subject  with  observing, 
that  the  benevolent  doctrine  which  hath  been  mentioned^ 
seems  not  to  have  been  carried  by  any  of  the  Stoic  philoso- 
phers so  far  as  by  Epictetus  and  Marcus  Antoninus;  both 
of  whom  lived  after  this  doctrine  had  received  its  utmost 
improvement  in  the  Gospel  of  Jesus,  and  was  exemplified 
in  many  of  the  primitive  Christians,  who  prayed  for  their 
enemies  and  persecutors  with  their  dying  breath.  The 
more  antient  Stoics  seem  to  have  wrought  up  their  scheme 
with  greater  rigour,  and  to  have  advanced  maxims  not  very 
consistent  with  that  humane  and  forgiving  disposition  so 
strongly  recommended  by  Marcus  Antoninus.  Mr.  Stanley 
in  his  excellent  History  of  Philosophy  gives  it  as  part  of  the 
Stoical  description  of  their  wise  man,  or  man  of  perfect 
virtue,  that  "  he  is  not  merciful  or  prone  to  pardon,  remit- 


(rn)  James  ii.  13. 


CtiAP.  X.  forgiving  Injuries  considered,  185 

ting  nothing  of  the  punishments  inflicted  by  law,  as  know- 
ing them  to  be  proportioned  to,  not  exceeding,  the  offi  ncej 
and  that  whosoever  sinneth,  sinneth  out  of  his  own  wicked- 
ness. A  wise  man  therefore  is  not  benign,  for  he  who  is 
benign  mitigates  the  rigour  of  justice,  and  conceives  the 
punishments  inflicted  by  law  to  be  greater  than  they  ought; 
but  a  wise  man  knoweth  the  law  to  be  good,  or  a  right  rea- 
son, commanding  what  is  to  be  done,  and  what  not  (w)." 
Stanley  refers  for  the  proof  of  this  to  Laertius  and  Stobaeas, 
but  does  not  point  out  to  the  particular  passages  of  those 
authors,  which  therefore  I  shall  here  mention.  The  reader 
may  consult  Laert.  lib.  vii.  segm.  123.  and  Stobaeus  Eclog. 
Ethic,  p.  178.  edit.  Plant.  To  which  may  be  added  what 
Seneca  says  concerning  it,  de  Clem.  lib.  2.  cap.  6  et  7. 
where  he  endeavours  to  explain  and  apologize  for  the  Stoi- 
cal doctrine  on  this  head  (o).  *'  Mercy,  (says  he,)  is  the  vice 
or  fault  of  souls  that  are  too  favourable  to  misery,  which 
if  any  one  requireth  of  a  wise  man,  he  may  also  require  of 
him  lamentations  and  groans." — To  shew  that  a  wise  man 
ought  not  to  pardon  he  observes,  that   "  pardon  is  a  remis- 


{n)  Stanley's  Hist.  Philosoph.  p.  468.  second  edit.  Lond. 

(o)  Misericordia  vitium  est  animorum  nimis  miseriae  faven- 
tium:  quam  siquis  a  sapiente  exigii,  prope  est  utlameutatmnem 
exigat,  et  in  alienis  funeribus  gemiius.  At  quare  non  i^^noscat 
dicam:  constiluamus  nuoc  quoque,  quid  sit  venia,  ut  sciamus 
dari  illam  a  sapiente  non  debere.  Venia  est  poenae  meriiae  re- 
missio — ei  ignoscitur  qui  puniri  debuit  bupiens  autem  nihil 
fach,  quod  non  debet,  nihil  praetermirtit  quod  deb^t.  Itaque 
paenam  quam  exigere  debet,  non  donat.  Sed  iliud  quod  eX 
venia  consequi  vis,  honestiori  tibi  via  tiibuil. — Parcii  enim 
sapiens,  consulit  et  corrii^it.  Idem  facit  quod  si  i^nosceret,  nee 
ignoscit:  quoniam  qui  ignoscit,  fatetur  aliquid  se  quod  fieri  de- 
buit omisisse — ignoscere  autem  est,  qu<x;judicas  punienda  non 
punire. 

Vol*  IL  2  A  -  ' 


186  The  Stoical  Doctrincy  £s?c.  Part  II. 

sion  of  the  penalty  which  is  justly  due;  and  that  a  man  is 
said  to  be  pardoned,  who  ought  to  be  punished:  but  a  wise 
man  does  nothing  which  he  ought  not  to  do,  and  omits  no- 
thing which  he  ought  to  do:  and  therefore  he  does  not  remit 
the  punishment  which  he  ought  to  exact.  Yet  he  grants  that 
which  is  the  effect  of  pardon,  but  does  it  in  a  more  honour- 
able way.  He  spares,  counsels,  and  corrects;  he  does  the 
same  thing  as  if  he  did  pardon,  but  does  not  pardon:  be- 
cause he  that  pardons  acknowledges  that  he  hath  omitted 
something  which  he  ought  to  have  done. — To  pardon  is  not 
to  punish  those  things  which  you  judge  ought  to  be  pu- 
nished." 

We  have  a  remarkable  instance  of  the  rigorous  Stoical 
disposition  in  the  famous  Cato  of  Utica,  who  is  cried  up 
as  a  perfect  model  of  Stoical  virtue,  and  whose  character 
is  so  exquisitely  drawn  by  the  masterly  pen  of  Sallust:  and 
one  of  the  principal  strokes  in  his  character  is  this,  that 
whereas  Caesar  was  admired  for  clemency  and  mercy,  and 
his  readiness  to  pardon,  Cato  was  revered  for  his  strict  and 
inflexible  severity:  "  Severitas  dignitatem  addiderat."  In 
Csesar  was  found  a  sure  refuge  to  the  wretched;  in  Cato  a 
certain  vengeance  to  the  guilty,  "  malis  pernicies."  Sal.  de 
Bel.  Catalin.  cap.  Iv, 


187 


CHAPTER  XI. 

The  Stoical  precepts  with  regard  to  self-gOTernment  considered.  They  talk  in 
high  strains  of  regulating  and  subduing  the  appetites  and  passions;  and  yet 
gave  too  great  indulgence  to  the  fleshly  concupiscence,  and  had  not  a  due  re- 
gard to  purity  and  chastity.  Their  doctrine  of  suicide  considered.  Some  of  the 
roost  eminent  wise  men  among  the  Heathens,  and  many  of  our  modern  ad- 
mirers of  natural  religion,  faulty  in  this  respect.  The  falsehood  and  pernicious 
consequences  of  this  doctrine  shewn. 

Let  us  next  proceed  to  consider  that  part  of  the  Stoical 
morals,  which  relates  more  immediately  to  ourselves,  and 
the  government  of  our  appetites  and  passions.  And  with 
regard  to  this,  nothing  can  make  a  more  glorious  appear- 
ance than  the  general  principles  of  the  Stoics,  which  every 
where  breathe  a  contempt  both  of  pleasure  and  pain.  They 
prescribe  the  subduing  and  even  the  extinguishing  the  appe- 
tites and  passions,  and  keeping  them  under  the  most  per- 
fect subjection  to  the  laws  of  reason  and  virtue,  and  seem 
to  aim  at  a  greatness  and  dignity  above  the  attainments  of 
human  nature.  Yet  if  we  closely  examine  their  scheme  in 
this  respect,  it  will  appear  that  it  was  in  several  instances 
defective,  at  the  same  time  that  in  other  instances  it  was 
carried  to  a  degree  of  extravagance. 

What  has  been  already  observed  concerning  the  other 
philosophers,  is  equally  true  of  the  Stoics:  that  whatever 
they  might  say  in  general  concerning  temperance  and  con- 
tinence, and  against  a  love  of  sensual  pleasures,  yet  in  par- 
ticular instances  they  gave  greater  allowances  ^to  fleshly 
lusts  and  the  sensual  appetite,  than  were  consistent  with  the 
dignity  of  virtue  and  the  rules  of  modesty  and  purity. 
Some  hints  of  this  were  given  before.  That  unnatural  and 
detestable  vice,    which,  as  I  have  shewn,  was  commonly 


188  The  Stoical  Precepts  with  regard         Part  II. 

charged  upon  the  philosophers,  was  looked  upon  by  the 
principal  of  the  antient  Stoics,  Zeno,  Chrysippus,  and 
Cleanthes,  to  be  an  indifferent  thing,  as  Sextus  Empiricus 
informs  us  (/?).  And  some  of  the  chief  leaders  of  that  sect 
acted  as  if  they  really  thought  so.  Zeno,  the  founder  of  the 
Stoics,  allowed  himself  in  that  practice,  and  seems  not  to 
have  had  any  scruple  about  it.  Laertius  indeed  says,  that 
he  did  it  seldom  and  sparingly,  -xui^ti^Uii  l^^^ro  o-a-«vw5  (^). 
But  Antigonus  Carystius,  as  cited  by  Athenseus,  represents 
it  as  a  common  practice  with  him.  Yet  he  was  cried  up  as 
a  man  of  exemplary  virtue,  and  was  remarkable  for  his 
gravity,  austerity,  patience,  and  temperance.  The  Athenians 
made  a  memorable  decree  in  his  favour,  which  may  be  seen 
in  Laertius  (r),  in  which  they  bear  him  testimony,  that  he 
had  for  many  \  ears  taught  philosophy  in  their  city,  and  had 
formed  the  youth  to  virtue  and  sobriety,  and  had  in  his 
own  life  given  an  example  to  all  of  the  most  excellent  things: 
his  practice  was  r?greeable  to  his  doctrine,  and  therefore 
they  decreed  him  a  golden  crown  on  the  account  of  his  vir- 
tue and  temperanc,  and  that  a  sepulchre  should  be  built 
for  him  in  the  Ceramicus,  at  the  public  charge,  and  that  the 
decree  should  be  engraven  upon  two  pillars.  One  may  see 
by  this,  that  the  Heathens  laid  no  great  stress  on  chastity 
and  continence,  and  that  a  man  might  pass  for  a  very  good 
man  amo -g  them,  who  was  guilty  of  great  vices  and  im- 
purities (6).   From  the  instance  now   mentioned,  it  is  a  na- 


(/?)  Pyrrhon.  Hypotyp.  lib.  iii.  cap.  24. 

(y)  Laert.  lib.  vii.  segm.  13.  See  Menag.  Observat.  in  Laert. 
p   273.  i  dit.  Weisten. 

(>)   Laert.  ubi  supra,  segm.  10,  11. 

(a)  Cicero,  in  one  of  the  best  of  his  works,  joins  Aristippus 
ivilh  S»c rates,  and  represents  them  both  as  excellent  and  extra- 
ordinary persons  of  divine  endowments,  De  Offic.  lib.  i.  cap.  41, 


Chap.  XI.         to  Self -Government  considered.  .      189 

tliral  inference,  that  if  those  rigid  teachers  of  morals  passed 
so  wrong  a  judgment  in  a  case  like  this,  in  which  the  law 
of  namre  seems  to  be  very  clear,  this  ^^ffords  a  plain  proof 
that  they  were  not  to  be  depended  upon  for  sound  instruc- 
tions in  morality:  and  that  if  men  were  left  merely  to  in- 
terpret the  law  of  nature  as  they  themselves  thought  agree- 
able to  reason,  without  any  other  or  higher  guide,  they 
might  be  apt  to  judge  wrong  in  matters  of  great  conse- 
quence. That  famous  Stoic  Chrysippus,  as  we  are  told  by 
Sextus  Empiricus  (^),  held,  that  carnal  commerce  of  father 
and  daughter,  of  mother  and  son,  of  brother  and  sister,  has 
nothing  in  it  contrary  to  reason:  for  which  he  quotes  Chry- 
sippus's  book  De  Republica.  Laertius  gives  the  same  ac- 
count, and  quotes  that  book  of  Chrysippus  for  it,  and  says, 
that  he  asserts  it  in  others  of  his  treatises  (m).  The  same 
thing  is  affirmed  by  Plutarch,  who  produces  a  passage  from 
a  work  of  Chrysippus,  which  is  full  to  this  purpose;  where 
he  argues  from  its  being  practised  by  the  brutes,  that  there 
is  nothing  in  it  absurd  or  contrary  to  nature  (x),  Laertius 
farther  acquaints  us,  that  Chrysippus  was  censured  for  hav- 
ing in  his  commentary  on  the  antient  physiology,  written 
obscene  things  conctrning  Jupiter  and  Juno,  such  as  be- 
came pi  ostitutes  rather  than  gods  (z/j.  It  appears  also  from 


Whatever  may  be  said  of  Socrates,  Aristippus  is  known  to  have 
allowed  himself  great  liberties  in  all  kinds  of  pleasures.  In  like 
manner  Epictetus,  as  has  been  observed  before,  gives  the  high- 
est encon.iums  to  Diogenes,  and  sets  him  up  as  a  perfect  model 
of  virtue. 

{t)  Pyrrhon.  Hypotyp.  ubi  supra. 

{u)  Laert.  lib.  vii.  segm.  188.  Concerning  the  obscenity  of 
Zeno  and  the  Stoics,  see  Menag.  ubi  supra,  p.  2^7,  278. 

(r)  Plutarch,  de  Stoic.  Repugn.  Oper.  torn.  ii.  p.  1044.  F. 
1045.  A.  Edit.  Xyl.  Francof.  1620. 

(y)  Laert.  ubi  supra. 


190    Xhe  Stoics  notwithstanding  their  Pretences^VAKT  II. 

Laertius,  that  Zeno,  in  his  book  of  the  Commonwealth,  a 
book  much  applauded,  and  Chrysippus,  in  a  book  of  the 
same  title,  held  the  community  of  women,  and  in  this  they 
followed  Plato  and  Diogenes  (2).  It  is  not  therefore  to  be 
wondered  at,  that,  as  Sextus  Empiricus  informs  us  in  a  pas- 
sage before  cited,  the  Stoics  thought  it  not  absurd  or  un- 
reasonable to  cohabit  with  a  harlot,  nor  to  get  a  living  by 
such  practices.  But  it  is  but  justice  to  Epictetus  and  An- 
toninus to  observe,  that  none  of  these  maxims  appear  in 
their  writings.  Epictetus  compares  adulterers  to  wasps, 
whom  all  men  shun,  and  endeavour  to  beat  down:  and  he 
advises  to  abstain,  as  far  as  possible,  from  familiarity  with 
women  before  marriage;  but  he  speaks  of  it  in  very  soft 
terms,  and  does  not  expressly  censure  it  as  a  fault,  provid- 
ed a  man  does  it  lawfully,  i.  e.  by  making  use  of  prostitutes 
allowed  by  the  laws  (a). 

This  may  suffice  to  shew,  that  the  Stoics,  notwithstand- 
ing their  glorious  pretences,  were  very  loose  both  in  their 
notions  and  practices,  with  regard  to  that  purity  which  is 
of  so  great  importance  to  the  good  order  and  dignity  of 
the  rational  nature;  and  in  several  instances  laid  aside  that 
modesty  which  seems  to  be  implanted  in  mankind  as  a 
fence  against  those  exorbitant  fleshly  lusts,  which  dishonour 
and  defile  the  soul. 

Another  instance,  in  which  the  Stoics  seem  to  have  al- 
lowed too  great  indulgence  to  the  sensual  appetites,  relates 
to  the  drinking  to  excess.  Zeno  himself  is  said  to  have 
been  a  great  drinker  (3):  and  Chrysippjiis  died  of  a  surfeit 


(z)  Laert.  lib.  vii.  segm.   131. 

(a)  Epict.  Dissert,  book  ii.  chap.  4.  et  Enchirid.  chap.  33. 
Miss  Carter's  translation. 

(6)  La«rt.  lib.  vii.  segm.  26.  See  also  Menagius's  Observa- 
tions on  Laertius,  p.  276.  edit.  Wetstcn. 


Chap.  "^1.  gave  great  Indulgence  to  the  sensual  Passions,  191 

of  drinking  sweet  wine  too  freely  at  a  sacrifice,  to  which  he 
was  invited  by  his  scholars  (c).  Cato  of  Utica,  who  was 
thought  to  have  arrived  to  the  perfection  of  virtue,  appears 
to  have  been  > addicted  to  it.  Plutarch  says,  ,he  often  spent 
whole  nights  in  drinking  (^).  Seneca,  in  his  tract  De  Tran- 
quillitate  Animi,  cap.  ult.  recommends  not  only  "  liberalior 
potio,"  a  drinking  more  freely  than  ordinary  on  some  oc- 
casions, but  that  "nonnunquam  ad  ebrietatcm  veniendum,"^^ 
we  must  sometimes  carry  it  even  to  drunkenness:  and  he 
proceeds  to  make  an  apology  for  it.  He  observes,  that  So- 
lon and  Arcesilas  indulged  themselves  in  it.  And  he  had 
said  before,  that  Cato  relaxed  himself  with  wine,  when  he 
was  fatigued  with  the  cares  of  the  public;  and  he  after- 
wards owns,  that  he  was  charged  with  drunkenness.  "  Ca- 
toni  ebrietas  objecta  est."  But  that  it  would  be  easier  to 
prove  that  drunkenness  is.  a  virtue,  t]^an  that  Cato  was 
guilty  of  a  base  or  vicious  thing.  "  At  facilius  efficiet, 
quisquis  objecerit,  hoc  crimen  honestum,  quam  turpem  Ca- 
tonem."  The  Stoics  held  that  the  wise  man  might  be  ine- 
briated, but  not  overcome:  his  body  might  be  disordered 
with  win«,  but  it  could  not  hurt  his  mind.  They  maintained, 
as  Mr.  Upton,  cited  by  Miss  Carter,  observes,  that  their 
wise  man  was  a  perfect  master  of  himself,  when  he  was  in 
a  fever  or  in  drink.  And  indeed  Epictetus  seems  to  repre- 
sent it  as  the  prerogative  of  a  man  arrived  at  the  perfection 
of  wisdom,  that  he  is  unshaken  by  error  and  delusion,  not 
only  when  awake,  but  when  asleep,  when  warmed  with 
wine,  when  diseased  with  the  spleen  (e). 

Another  instance   of   great   importance,  relating  to  the 
duty  incumbent  upon  us  with  regard  to  ourselves,  and  in 


(c)  Laert.  lib.  vii.  segm.  184. 

{d)  See  Plutarch,  in  the  life  of  Cato  Minor. 

(e)  Dissert,  book  ii.  chap.  17.  sect.  2, 


192  The  Stoical  Doctrine  Part  IL 

which  the  Stoics  fell  into  a  dangerous  error,  was  their  doc- 
trine of  suicide  or  self-murder.  Others  of  the  philosophers 
were  faulty  in  this  respect,  but  it  was  in  a  particular  manner 
the  avowed  doctrine  of  the  Stoics.  They  asserted,  that  in 
some  cases  it  was  not  only  lawful,  but  a  duty,  for  a  wise 
man  to  dispatch  himself.  This  they  call  8yA«y«»  ilxyayiiv^  an 
exit  agreeable  to  reason;  when  a  man  has  a  just  cause  of  de- 
parting out  of  life.  And  Zeno  the  founder  of  the  Stoic 
school  declares,  that  it  is  reasonable  for  a  man  to  put  an 
end  to  his  own  life,  not  only  for  the  sake  of  his  friend,  or 
of  his  country,  but  "  if  he  be  under  any  severe  pain  or  tor- 
I  ment,  or  is  maimed  in  his  limbs,  or  labours  under  any  in- 
I  curable  disease.  Kciv  h  (rKXn^an^x  ymviTxi  «6Ay>j3o'w,  n  uvi^aria-tv  5 
virctf  «»<«eT«<?  (y  )."  Cato,  who  was  a  rigid  Stoic,  declares  in 
Cicero's  third  book  de  Finib.  that  it  was  the  duty  of  the 
man,  whose  conveniencies  in  life  exceeded  the  incon- 
veniencies,  to  continue  in  life:  but  where  the  inconvcniencies 
he  was  under  were  greater  than  the  conveniencies,  or  he 
foresaw  that  it  would  be  so,  it  was  his  duty  to  depart  out 
of  life.  "  In  quo  plura  sunt  quse  secundum  naturam  sunt, 
hujus  officium  est  in  vita  manere:  in  quo  autem  sunt  plura 
contraria,  aut  fore  videntur,  hujus  officium  est  e  vita  exce- 
dcre."  And  he  expressly  affirms,  that  "  it  is  often  the  duty 
I  of  a  wise  man  to  depart  out  of  this  life,  though  he  be  most 
I  happy,  when  it  can  be  done  opportunely:  for  this  is  to  live 
agreeably  to  nature."  "  Ssepe  officium  est  sapientis  descis- 
cere  a  vita,  cum  sit  beatissimus;  et  id  opportune  facere 
pbssit:  quod  est  convenienter  naturae  vivere  (^)»"  It  is  ob- 
servable that  Cato,'  who  teaches  this  doctrine,  lays  the 
foundation  of  his  moral  system  in  this,  that  every  animal 
has  from  its  birth  a  natural  desire  of  preserving  itself  in  its 


(/)  Laert.  lib.  vii.  segm.  130. 

(g)  Cicero  de  Finib.  lib.  iii.  cap.  18. 


Chap.  XL  of  Suicide  considered,  193 

natural  state,  and  an  aversion  to  its  destruction,  and  every 
thing  that  tends  to  it  (A).  In  this  he  followed  the  principles 
of  the  chief  masters  of  the  Stoic  sect.  And  since  they 
made  the  perfection  of  virtue  to  consist  in  living  agreeably 
to  nature,  how  could  it  be  consistent  with  it  for  a  man  to 
destroy  himself,  which  they  themselves  own  to  be  contrary 
to  nature,  is  hard  to  see.  Seneca  in  this,  as  well  as  other 
instances,  is  not  always  consistent  with  himself,  but  he 
gives  large  allowances  to  suicide.  Speaking  of  the  wise  man, 
he  saith,  that  "  if  he  meets  with  many  things  that  are 
troublesome  to  him,  and  disturb  his  tranquillity^  he  dis- 
misses himself  out  of  life;  and  this  he  docs,  not  merely  in 
the  last  necessity,  but  as  soon  as  ever  fortune  bepjins  to  be 
suspected  by  him."  Si  multa  occurrunt  molesta,  et  tran*  f 
quillitatem  turbantia,  emitit  se:  nee  hoc  tantiim  in  neces-  | 
sitate  ultima  facit,  sed  cum  primum  illi  coeperit  suspecta 
esse  fortuna  (e)."  And  in  his  little  tract.  Cur  bonis  Viris 
mala  fiant,  the  design  of  which  is  to  vindicate  providence 
with  respect  to  the  evils  which  befal  good  men,  he  bestows 
the  highest  encomiums  upon  Cato's  killing  himself,  and  ex- 
tols it  as  a  most  glorious  action.  And  in  the  conclusion  of 
that  tract,  he  introduces  God  as  declaring  to  men,  that  he 
had  opened  a  way  for  them  to  escape  from  their  calamities^ 
and  had  made  nothing  easier  for  them  than  to  die,  which 
was  a  short  and  ready  way  to  liberty.  This  seems  to  have 
been  a  fashionable  doctrine,  that  spread  much  among  the 
Romans,  especially  those  of  learning  and  quality.  The 
elder  Pliny  represents  a  timely  or  seasonable  death  as  one 
of  the  greatest  benefits  which  nature  hath  conferred  upon 
mankind,  and  that  the  best  of  it  is,  that  it  is  what  every  man 


{K)  Cicero  de  Finib.  lib.  iii.  cap.  5. 

(i)  Sen.  Epist.  70.  and  he  argues  the  same  thing  more  largely 
in  his  58th  Epistle. 

Vol.  IL  2  B  ,  * 


I 


194  The  Stoical  Doctriiie  Part  IL 

may  procure  for  himself  (k).  And  Pliny  the  younger  men- 
tions it  as  a  sign  of  a  great  soul  to  judge  by  reason,  and  to 
deliberate  upon  it,  when  it  is  proper  to  stay  in  life,  and 
when  to  go  out  of  it  (  /  ). 

But  what  I  would  principally  observe  is,  that  Epictetus 
and  Antoninus,  who  seem  to  have  carried  the  doctrine  of 
morals  to  a  greater  height  than  any  of  the  other  Stoics, 
plainly  admit  this  doctrine.  It  is  true  that  the  former  of 
these  excellent  philosophers  has  some  passages,  which,  at 
first  view,  have  a  different  aspect.  "  My  friends,  (saith  he,) 
wait  for  God,  till  he  shall  give  the  signal,  and  dismiss  you 
from  this  service;  then  return  to  him.  For  the  present  be 
content  to  remain  in  this  post  where  he  has  placed  you— 
Stay.  Depart  not  inconsiderately  (w)."  And  again  in  an- 
other place,  where  he  has  some  noble  strains  of  resignation 
to  God,  he  saiih;  "  Is  it  thy  pleasure  I  should  any  longer 
continue  in  being?  I  will  continue  free,  of  a  generous  spi- 
rit, y<vyfl6?oj,  agreeably  to  thy  pleasure. — But  hast  thou  no 
farther  use  for  me?  Fare  thou  well!  I  have  staid  thus  long 
for  thy  sake  alone,  and  no  other;  and  now  I  depart  in  obe- 
dience to  thee. — Whatever  post  or  rank  thou  shalt  assign 
me,  like  Socrates,  I  will  die  a  thousand  times  rather  than 
desert  it.  If  thou  shalt  send  me,  where  men  cannot  live 
conformably  to  nature,  I  do  not  depart  from  thence  in  dis- 
obedience to  thy  will;  but  as  receiving  my  signal  of  retreat 
from  thee.  I  do  not  dese-rt  thee:  heaven  forbid!  but  I  per- 
ceive thou  hast  no  use  for  me  («)." 

But  if  we  compare  these  with  other  passages  of  that  au- 
thor, we  shall  find,'  that  after  all  this  shew  of  an  entire  re- 


(A-)  Hist.  Natural,  lib.  xxviii.  cap.  1.  in  fine. 
(/)  Plin-  Epist.  lib.  i.  ep.  22. 
(m)  Epict.  Dissert,  book  i.  chap.  9.  sect.  4. 
(w)  Ibid,  book  iii.  chap.  24.  sect.  5. 


Chap,  XI.  of  Suicide  considered.  195- 

signation  to  the  divine  will,  the  signal  he  professes  to  wait 
for  from  God  for  his  departure,  may  be  anv  great  calamity 
V'hich  befals  him:  and  of  this  he  himself  is  to  be  the  judge. 
So  that  in  effect  he  allows  a  man  to  go  out  of  life  when  he 
thinks  fit,  in  order  to  free  himself  from  the  pressure  of 
some  grievous  trouble.  "Is  the  house  in  a  smoke?"  saith  he: 
*'  if  it  be  a  moderate  one  I  will  stay;  if  a  very  grievous  one, 
I  will  go  out.  For  you  must  always  remember  that  the 
door  is  open."  ji  ^v^»  ^vc/xleit  (o).  Again,  "  if  suffering  be  not 
worth  your  while,  the  door  is  open;  if  it  be,  bear  it  (Z^)." 
And  he  gives  it  as  a  general  rule,  "  Remember  the  princi- 
pal thing,  that  the  door  is  open.  Do  not  be  more  fearful 
than  children;  but  as  they,  when  the  play  does  not  please 
them,  say,  *  /  will  play  no  longer;'*  so  do  you,  in  the  same 
case,  say,  '  will  play  no  longer;"*  and  go:  but  if  you  stay, 
do  not  complain  (y)."  To  the  same  purpose,  speaking  of 
the  calamities  of  life,  such  as  the  death  of  children,  loss  of 
worldly  substance,  imprisonment,  and  the  like,  he  saith, 
"Jupiter  hath  made  these  things  to  be  no  evils;  and  he  hath 
opened  you  the  door,  whenever  they  do  not  suit  you.  Go 
out  man,  and  do  not  complain  (r)."  I  shall  only  add  one 
passage  more  from  Epictetus;  "  Hanging  is  not  unsup- 
portable:  for,  as  soon  as  a  man  has  learned  that  it  is  rea- 
sonable, ««A6yo»,  he  goes  and  hangs  himself  (i)." 

The  emperor  Marcus  Antoninus  was  in  this,  as  well  as 
most  other  points,  of  the  same  sentiments  with  Epictetus. 
Speaking  of  the  things  which  a   man  ought  to  consider, 


(o)  Epict.  Dissert,  book  i.  chap.  25.  sect.  3. 
(Ji)  Ibid,  book  ii.  chap.  1.  sect.  3. 
(y)  Ibid,  book  i.  chap.  24.  sect.  4.  ^ 

(r)  Ibid,  book  iii.  chap.  8.  sect.  2.  See  also  book  iv.  chap.  1 
sect.  12. 
(«)  Ibid,  book  i,  chap.  2.  sect.  1. 


196  The  Stoical  Doctrine  Part  II. 

one  is,  that  "he  should  judge  well  of  this  very  point,  whe- 
ther he  should  depart  out  of  life,  or  not  (^)."  Where  he 
supposes,  that  it  dependeth  upon  a  man's  own  determina- 
tion to  depart  out  of  life,  when  he  himself  judges  it  rea- 
sonable to  do  so.  And  he  elsewhere  allows  a  man,  if  he  be 
hindered  from  living  in  that  way  that  he  should  chuse,  "  to 
go  out  of  life,"  rcTiKxi  rQ^^vi^i6t.  And  he  adds,  "If  my 
house  be  smoky,  I  go  out  of  it;  and  why  is  this  looked 
upon  as  a  great  matter  (z^)."  He  elsewhere  puts  the  suppo- 
sition of  a  man's  being  grieved,  because  he  is  hindered  by 
a  superior  force  from  accomplishing  some  good  design, 
without  which  life  is  not  worth  retaining:  and  he  advises 
him  in  that  case  to  quit  life  with  the  same  serenity  as  if  he 
had  accomplished  it;  ii^idt  vt  Ix  iS  ^«v  ivfAivuv,  "  go  therefore 
out  of  life  well  pleased  (^)."  And  in  another  passage  to  the 
same  purpose,  he  seems  to  allow  men,  if  they  cannot  attain 
to  that  constancy  and  magnanimity  which  they  aspire  after, 
**  to  dt'part  out  of  life  altogether,  yet  not  angry,  but  with 
simplicity,  liberty,  and  modesty,  having  at  least  performed 
this  one  thing  well  in  life,  that  they  have  in  this  manner 
departed  out  of  it  (z/)."  And  again  he  says,  "who  hinders 
you  to  be  good  and  single  hearted?  Only  do  you  determine 
to  live  no  longer,  if  you  are  not  to  be  such  a  man.  For  rea- 
son in  that  case  requires  you  should  (2)."  Gataker  in  his 
annotations  on  the  Meditations  of  Antoninus,  of  whom  he 
was  a  great  admirer,  passes  a  just  censure  on  this  doctrine 
of  the  Stoics,  as  little  agreeable  to  piety.  "  Dogma  pietati 
parum  consentaneum."  And  I  wish  some  notice  had  been 


{t)  Anton.  Medit.  book  iii.  sect.  1, 
(u)  Ibid   book  v.  sect.  29. 
(jc)  Ibid,  book  viii.  sect.  47. 
(t/)  loid.  book  X.  sect.  8. 
(2)  Ibid.  beet.  32c 


Chap.  XI.  of  Suicide  considered,  197 

taken  of  it  in  the  ingenious  and  learned  notes  on  the  Glas- 
gow translation  of  Antoninus,  and  which  seem  to  have 
been  designed  to  set  the  sentiments  of  that  great  emperor 
and  philosopher  in  a  proper  light. 

Agreeable  to  this  doctrine  of  the  Stoics  was  the  practice 
of  some  of  the  chief  leaders,  and  greatest  men  of  that  sect. 
Zcno,  as  Diogenes  Laertius  informs  us,  when  he  was  very 
old,  fell  as  he  was  going  out  of  his  school,  and  broke  his 
finger,  which  being  very  painful  to  him,  he  strangled  him- 
self {a).  Or,  as  Lucian  has  it,  voluntarily  put  an  end  to  his 
life  by  abstaining  from  all  food  (J>),  Cleanthes  did  the  same 
on  account  of  a  painful  disorder  in  his  gums  (c).  What 
Cato  did  is  well  known:  and  Plutarch  says,  that  the  laws 
enacted  by  the  Stoa,  had  induced  many  wise  men  to  kill 
themselves,  that  they  may  be  more  happy  (^). 

Here,  is  a  remarkable  instance  of  the  deficiency  of  the 
Stoic  morality  in  a  capital  point  of  great  importance.  What 
rendered  this  doctrine  peculiarly  wrong  and  absurd  in  the 
Stoics  was,  that  they  held  virtue  to  be  perfectly  sufficient  to 
its  own  happiness:  that  the  wise  man  is  happy  in  the  highest 
degree  under  the  greatest  outward  calamities  and  suflFer- 
ings:  and  that  bodily  pains  and  diseases,  poverty,  reproach, 
&c.  which  the  world  calls  evils,  are  really  no  evils  at  all: 
and  yet  they  taught,  that  a  wise  man  may,  and  sometimes 
ought  to  put  an  end  to  his  own  life,  to  deliver  himself  from 
them:  i.  e.  to  put  an  end  to  a  life  which  is  perfectly  happy, 
in  order  to  free  himself  from  things,  which,  according  to 
them,  are  no  evils,  and  cannot  in  the  least  disturb  or  di- 


(a)  Laert.  lib.  vii.  segm.  28. 

{b)  Lucian.  in  Macob.  Oper.  torn.  II.  p.  473.  »  < 

(c)  Laert  lib.  vii.  et  Lucian  ubi  supra. 

{d)  Plut.  de  commun.  notit.  advers.  Stoic.  Oper.  torn.  II.  p. 
i063.C. 


198  The  Stoical  Doctrme  Part  II. 

minish  his  happiness.  Plutarch  exposes  them  on  this  head 
with  a  great  deal  of  justice  and  smartness.  Epicurus,  who 
had  his  wise  man  as  well  as  the  Stoics,  agrted  with  them 
in  opinion,  that  it  was  proper  for  a  man  to  put  an  end  to 
his  own  life  when  he  judged  it  reasonable  to  do  so,  or 
when  the  pains  and  miseries  of  life  became  insupporta- 
ble (^).  And  in  this  he  was  more  consistent  with  himself 
than  the  Stoics;  since  he  looked  upon  pain  to  be  the  greatest 
evil,  and  therefore  might  have  recourse  to  death  to  get  rid 
of  it:  though,  as  he  most  unarcoantably  pretended  to  the 
secret  of  being  completely  happy  under  the  severest  pains 
and  torments,  he  ought  not,  one  should  think,  to  have  ad- 
vised any  man  by  putting  an  end  to  this  present  life,  to  put 
an  end  to  his  happiness,  since  he  had  no  other  life  in  view. 
The  Indian  Gymnosophists  acted  in  this  matter  upon 
nobler  principles,  though  they  were  much  mistaken  in  the 
application  of  them.  Remarkable  is  the  account  Porphyry- 
gives  of  them  in  his  fourth  book  de  Abstinentia.  After 
having  honoured  them  with  the  highest  encomiums,  that 
they  were  famous  and  just  persons,  and  ^to(r6(p»i^  divinely 
wise,  he  tells  us,  that  "  they  endure  the  term  of  life  with 
reluctance,  as  a  necessary  ministry  to  nature,  and  hasten  to 
get  their  souls  at  liberty  from  their  bodies;  and  when  they 
appear  to  be  in  health,  and  have  no  evil  upon  them  to  urge 
them  to  it,  they  freely  depart  out  of  this  life,  telling  others 
before-hand  of  their  intention,  who  far  from  hindering  them 
account  them  happy,  and  give  them  commissions  to  their 
d-eceased  friends.  After  which  they  give  up  their  bodies  to 
the  fire,  that  the  so\il  may  be  separated  as  pure  as  possible 
from  the  body,  and  thus  singing  hymns  they  expire   (y^)*" 


(e)  Cic.  de  Finib.  lib.  i.  cap.  15. 
(/)  Porphyr.  de  Abstin.  lib.  iv. 


Chap.  XI.  of  Suicide  considered.  199 

This  is  certainly  a  great  abuse  of  a  noble  principle,  the  be- 
lief of  an  immortal  happiness  in  a  future  state:  and  it  shews 
how  apt  the  best  and  wisest  among  the  Heathens  were  to 
fall  into  mistakes  in  very  important  points  of  morality; 
since  they  who  were  looked  upon  as  having  arrived  at  an 
extraordinary  degree  of  wisdom,  purity,  and  virtue,  really  f 
committed  self-murdtr,  under  the  notion  of  an  eminent 
and  heroic  act  of  piety  (^).  flow  greatly  therefore  should 
it  recommend  the  scheme  of  religion  laid  down  in  the  holy 
Scriptures,  which  at  the  same  time  that  it  raiseth  good  men 
to  the  most  lively  hopes  of  a  blessed  immortality,  and  ani- 


(^)  Many  authors  have  taken  notice  of  the  famous  Indian  phi- 
losopher Calanus,  who  voluntarily  burned  himself  before  Alex- 
ander the  Great.  And  ihe  same  customs  continue  among  many 
of  the  Pai^an  Indians  to  this  day.  We  are  told  concerning  the 
disciples  of  Fo  in  China,  that  many  of  them  having  a  disrelish 
for  the  present  state  of  existence,  seek  the  means  of  procuring 
a  better  as  soon  as  possible,  by  putting. an  end  to  their  own 
lives*.  The  Bramins  esteem  those  to  be  heroic  and  purified 
souls  who  contemn  life  and  die  generously,  either  by  casting 
themselves  from  a  precipice,  or  leaping  into  a  kindled  pile, 
or  throwing  themselves  under  the  holy  chariot-wheels,  to  be 
crushed  to  death,  when  the  Papjods  are  carried  about  in  proces- 
sion through  the  townf.  And  it  is  related  of  the  ancient  inhabi- 
tants of  the  Canary  Islands,  who  worshipped  the  sun  and  stars, 
that  on  solemn  festivals  kept  in  honour  of  the  deity  they  adored, 
in  a  temple  seated  on  the  brink  of  a  mountain,  they  threw  them- 
selves down  into  a  vast  depth,  out  of  a  religious  principle,  danc- 
ing and  singing,  their  priests  assuring  them  that  they  should 
enjoy  all  sorts  of  pleasures  after  such  a  noble  deathl:. 

*  See  a  tract  of  a  Chinese  philosopher  in  Du  Halde's  History  of  Chiiia, 
vol.  III.  p.  272.  English  translation.  * 

t  Xavier's  Life,  by  F.  Bouhours,  cited  by  Millar  in  his  History  of  the 
Propagation  of  Christianity,  vol.  II.  p.  138. 

t  Millar,  ibid.  p.  132 


200  The  Stoical  Doctrine  Part  II* 

mates  them  to  a  patient  and  chearful  enduring  the  greatest 
sufferings  and  torments,  and  even  death  itself,  when  called 
to  it  in  a  just  cause,  and  for  the  defence  of  truth  and 
righteousness,  forbids  us  to  put  a  voluntary  end  to  our 
own  lives!  In  this  as  well  as  other  instances  it  furnisheth 
us  with  the  most  exalted  idea  of  true  piety  and  virtue, 
without  running  into  any  unwarrantable  extremes. 

It  is  true,  that  there  were  some  great  philosophers  among 
the  Pagans  who  did  not  appro\e  suicide.  Seneca,  even 
where  he  argues  in  favour  of  it,  acknowledges  that  there 
were  some  among  those  that  professed  wisdom,  who  denied 
that  any  violence  was  to  be  offered  by  men  to  their  own 
lives;  and  affirmed  that  it  was  a  wicked  thing  for  any  man 
to  be  the  murderer  of  himself.  "  Invenies  etiam  professos 
sapientiam,  qui  vim  offerendam  vitse  suae  negant,  et  nefas 
judicant  ipsum  interemptorem  sui  fieri  (A)."  Pythagoras 
taught  that  a  man  was  placed  in  a  certain  watch  or  post, 
which  it  was  his  duty  not  to  desert  without  the  orders  of 
the  great  commander,  that  is  God.  "Vetat  Pythagoras," 
says  Cicero,  "injussu  intemperatoris,  id  est  Dei,  de  prse- 
sidio  et  statione  vitx  decedere  (0*'*  This  was  also  the  doc- 
trine of  Socrates  and  Plato,  as  appears  from  his  Phsedo. 
Socrates  there  observes,  that  the  gods  take  care  of  us,  and 
that  we  may  be  regarded  as  their  possession  and  property^ 
and  that  as  any  man  would  take  it  ill,  if  any  of  his  slaves 
should  dispatch  himself  that  he  might  escape  his  service,  it 
is  reasonable  to  suppose  in  like  manner,  that  no  man  ought 
to  depart  out  of  life,  till  God  has  laid  a  necessity  upon  him 
to  do  so;  as  he  did  then  upon  Socrates.  And  he  there  also 
represents  it,  as  what  was  taught  in  the  izro^pviTx,  or  mys- 


(A)  Sen.  epist.  70. 

(/)  Cic.  Cato  Major,  cap.  2Q. 


Chap.  XI.  of  Suicide  considered.  201 

teries,  that  we  are  here  in  a  kind  of  prison  or  custody;  and 
that  no  man  ought  to  break  out  of  it,  or  run  away  without 
a  lawful  discharge  (^).  And  indeed  it  is  not  to  be  wondered 
at  that  this  doctrine  was  taught  in  the  mysteries,  consider- 
ing that  they  were  under  the  direction  of  the  civil  magis- 
trates, and  that  suicide  is  pernicious  to  society.  And  ac- 
cordingly Virgil,  in  his  sixth  ^neid,  which,  as  a  celebrated 
writer  has  shewn,  was  probably  formed  upon  the  plan  of 
the  mysteries,  represents  those  that  offered  violence  to  their 
own  lives,  as  in  an  unhappy  condition  in  the  subterraneous 
regions. 

"Proxima  deinde  tenent  moesti  loca,  qui  sibi  lethum 
Insontes  peperere  manu,  vitamque  perosi 
Projecere  animas  Qudm  vellent  aethere  in  alto 
Nunc  et  pauperiem,  el  duros  perferre  laboresl" 

jEneid.  VI.  ver.  434,  &c. 

The  Attic  laws  appointed,  that  the  hand  of  the  self-murderer 
should  be  cut  off,  and  that  it  should  be  buried  apart  (/). 
Among  the  Thebans,  those  who  had  killed  themselves  were 
burned  with  infamy  (m).  The  Roman  civil  laws  ordered, 
that  those  "  qui  mala  conscienta  sibi  manus  intulerant," 
should  not  be  lamented  by  their  relations,  and  that  their 
wills  should  not  be  valid.  And  yet  they  gave  too  much  al- 
lowance to  suicide;  for,  as  Ulpian  has  it,  "  Quod  si  quis 
tsedio  vitae,  vel  valetudinis  adversae  impatientia  et  jactatione, 
ut  quidam  philosophi,  mortem  sibi  consciverunt,  in  ea  causa 
sunt,  ut  eorum  testamenta  valeant  (w)."  So  that  if  they  kill- 


er) Plato  Opera,  p.  2>77.  D.  edit.  Lugd.  1590. 
(/)  Sam.  Petit,  in    Leg.  Attic,  lib.  vii.  tit.  1.  p.  522. 
(w)  Zenobius  ex  Aristot.  apud  S.  Petit,  ibid. 
(n)  Ulpian   in  Leg.  VL  De  injusto,  rupto,  irrito  facto  Testa- 
mento,  et  Paulus  Jurisconsultus  in  Lege  45.  De  Jure  Fisci. 

Vol.  IL  2  C  -  ' 


202  The  Stoical  Doctrine  Part  IL 

ed  themselves  through  weariness  of  life,  or  from  impatience 
under  sickness,  or  from  a  principle  of  vain-glory,  as  some 
philosophers  did,  they  were  to  be  excused  from  the  penalty. 
To  which  the   famous  lawyer  Paulus  adds  as  a  reason  for 
suicide,  the  shame  of  being  in  debt,  "  pudorem  seris  alieni." 
That  great  magistrate  and  philosopher  Cicero  seems  to  be 
not  quite  consistent  with  himself  in  what  he  delivereth  upon 
this  subject.  In  the  passage  cited  above  from  his  Cato  Ma- 
jor, he  approves  the  opinion  of  Pythagoras.    But  still  more 
clearly  in  his  dream  of  Scipio,  v/here  he  makes  Paulus  tell 
Scipio,  "  Except  God  shall  free  thee  from  the  bonds  of  this 
body,  there  can  be  no  entrance  for  thee  into  this  place,"  i.  e. 
into  heaven.  And  he  adds,  "■  That  therefore  it  was  his  duty, 
and  that  of  all  pious  persons,  to  endeavour  to  keep  the  soul 
in  the  body  as  in  custody,  and  not  to  depart  out  of  this  life 
without  his  orders  who  gave  us  our  souls,  lest  we  should 
seem  to  have  quitted  the  work  and  office  which   God  hath 
assigned  us  (o)."  To  the  same  purpose,  in  the  first  book  of 
his  Tusculan  Disputations,  Cicero  says,  that  God  forbids 
us  to  depart  hence,  and  to  desert  our  station,  except  he 
commands  us  to  do  so:  but  then  he  adds,  that  "  when  God 
himself  gives  a  just  cause   of  departure,  then  a  wise  man 
may  go  joyfully  out  of  his  prison,  as  if  dismissed  by  law 
and  the  orders  of  the  magistrate."  And  this  he  supposes  to 
be  there  the  case  of  Cato.  This  is  to  give  a  licence  to  sui- 
cide in  several  cases,  and  leaves  it  to  men  themselves  to  in- 


(o)  "  Nisi  Deus  istis  te  corporis  vinculis  liberaverit  hue  tibi 
aditus  patere  non  potest. — Quare  et  tibi  et  piis  omnibus  retinen- 
dus  est  animus  in  custodia  corporis:  nee  iiijussu  ejus,  a  quo  ille 
est  nobis  datus,  ex  hominum  vita  migrandum  est,  ne  munus 
humanum  assignatum  a  Deodefugisse  videamur."  In  Som.  Scip, 
cap.  3.  Cicer.  Oper.  Gronov.  p.  1408.  Lugd.  Bat. 


Chap.  XI.  of  Suicide  considered*  203 

terpret  the  circumstances  they  are  in  as  an  express  order 
from  God  to  destroy  themselves;  which  may  be  of  perni- 
cious consequence  (/>).  In  his  Offices,  speaking  of  men's 
acting  suitably  to  their  different  characters,  their  stations, 
and  geniuses,  he  says,  that  in  consequence  of  this,  one  man 
may  be  obliged  to  make  away  with  himself,  whilst  another, 
though  like  him  in  other  circumstances,  may  be  obliged  to 
the  contrary.  And  he  vindicates  Cato's  killing  himself,  as 
what  was  suited  to  his  character,  and  that  it  became  him. 
rather  to  die,  than  to  see  the  face  of  the  tyrant  (jq).  And 
in  the  fifth  book  of  his  Tusculan  Disputations,  having 
spoken  of  death  as  a  safe  harbour  and  refuge  from  all  cala- 
mities, he  declares,  that  in  his  opinion  "  that  law  ought  to 
be  observed  in  life,  which  obtained  among  the  Greeks  in 
their  banquets,  either  let  a  man  drink,  or  go  off  and  quit  the 
company. — So  (says  he)  when  you  cannot  bear  the  injuries 
of  fortune,  you  may  by  fleeing  from  them  leave  them  be- 
hind you." — "  Mihi  quidem  in  vita  servanda  videtur  ilia 
lex  quse  in  Grsecorum  conviviis  obtinet,  aut  bibat,  aut 
abeat. — Sic  injurias  fortunse,  quas  ferre  nequeas,  defugien- 
do  relinquas  (r)."  I  shall  only  add  one  passage  more.  It  is 
in  one  of  his  epistles,  where,  writing  to  his  friend  Papirius 
Psetus,  he  seems  to  plead  for  it,  as  in  some  cases  not  only 
lawful  but  commendable,  and  praises  Cato's  killing  himself 
as  a  glorious  action.  "  Ceteri  quidem,  Pompeius,  Lentulus 
tuos,  Scipio,  Afranius,  foede  perierunt:  at  Cato  prseclare. 
Jam  istuc  quidem  si  volumus  licebit  («)."  This  is  a  remark- 
able instance  of  the  uncertainty  the  ablest  of  the  Heathen 


{ii)  Tuscul.  Disput.  lib.  i.  cap.  30. 
(glDe  Offic.  lib.  i.  cap.  31. 
(r)  Tuscul.  Disput  lib.  v.  cap,  40,  41. 
C«)  Epist.  lib.  ix.  epist.  18. 


204  The  Stoical  Doctrine  Part  11. 

philosophers  were  under  in  matters  of  very  great  conse- 
quence: and  that  even  where  they  had  a  notion  of  what 
was  agreeable  to  right,  they  were  ever  varying  for  want 
of  more  certain  guidance  on  which  they  might  entirely  de- 
pend (t). 

The  same  uncertainty  appears  in  several  of  the  moderns, 
who  profess  to  be  goverened  by  the  law  of  reason  and  natu- 
ral religion.  Some  of  them  have  pleaded  for  the  lawfulness 
of  suicide.  The  noted  author  of  the  Oracles  of  Reason,  Mr. 
Blount,  practised  it  on  himself:  and  this  practice  was  jus- 
tified in  the  preface  of  that  book:  though  the  writer  of  that 
preface,  Mr.  Gildon,  afterwards  saw  his  error,  and  retracted 
it  in  a  book  he  published  against  the  deists,  intituled.  The 
Deist's  Manual.  Some  foreign  writers  have  gone  the  same 
way.  Among  the  Lettres  Persanes,  there  is  one  which  is 
particularly  desigm^d  to  apologize  for  suicide.  This  is  also 
the  intention  of  a  tract  published  in  France  not  long  ago, 
intituled,  Question  Royale.  And  in  a  periodical  paper 
lately  published  at  Paris,  Le  Conservateur,  an  attempt  is 
made  to  shew  that  suicide  is  not  contrary  to  reason,  though 
it  is  acknowledged  to  be  contrary  to  religion.  The  argu- 
ments in  these  and  some  other  treatises  of  the  like  kind  are 
judiciously  answered,  and  the  case  of  suicide  largely  consi- 
dered, in  the  second  tome  of  La   Religion  Vengee,  ou  Re- 


•  (?)  The  Platonists  themselves  were  not  quite  agreed  with 
relation  to  the  doctrine  of  suicide.  There  are  some  passages  of 
Plotinus,  which  seem  to  allow  a  good  man  in  some  cases  to  put 
an  end  to  his  own  life.  And  even  Plato  sometimes  expresses 
himself  in  a  manner  that  looks  that  way.  Ficinus,  who  was  well 
acquainted  with  the  writings  of  both  those  philosophers,  and 
was  strongly  prejudiced  in  their  favour,  leaves  it  undetermined, 
what  were  their  sentiments  in  this  matter.  Ficin.  in  Plotin. 
p.  84. 


Chap.  XI.  of  Suicide  considered,  205 

futation  des  Auteurs  impies,  from  lettre    10,  to  lettre  18,  a 
Pans  1757. 

I  cannot  quit  this  subject,  which  appears  to  me  to  be  of 
great  importance,  without  observing,  that  for  a  man  volun- 
tarily to  put  an  end  to  his  own  life,  is  an  act  of  impiety 
against  God,  tne  Author  of  life,and  who  alone  hath  an  ab- 
solute dominion  over  us.  It  is  not  unfitly  compared,  as  was 
before  hinted,  by  some  celebrated  antients,  to  a  soldier's 
deserting  his  post  and  station,  without  the  leave  of  his  com- 
mander or  general.  Nor  can  it  be  pretended,  that  when  we 
meet  with  great  adversities  in  life,  it  is  a  call  from  God  to 
quit  it;  on  the  contrary,  it  is  a  call  to  the  exercise  of  patience, 
resignation,  and  fortitude.  The  author  of  our  beings  has  so 
constituted  our  bodies,  that  as  it  is  not  in  our  power  to  con- 
tinue in  life  as  long  as  we  please,  so  neither  does  it  depend 
upon  ourselves  to  put  an  end  to  it,  except  by  an  act  of  vio- 
lence to  our  nature,  which  it  is  not  lawful  for  us  to  commit. 
If  that  law  of  God  which  commands  us  not  to  kill,  obliges 
us  not  to  take  away  the  life  of  another  man  by  our  own  pri- 
vate will,  without  lawful  authority,  much  more  does  it  oblige 
us  not  to  murder  ourselves  whtn  we  think  fit:  since  the  duty 
of  preserving  our  own  lives  is  more  directly  and  immedi- 
ately incumbent  upon  us  than  the  preserving  the  lives  of 
others.  And  hence  the  right  a  man  hath  to  kill  another,  when 
it  is  necessary  to  his  own  defence.  Suicide  is  also  contrary 
to  the  duties  a  man  owes  to  the  society.  It  is  mistake  to 
imagine  that  any  man  is  absolutely  "  sui  juris"  at  his  own 
disposal.  He  is  not  only  under  the  dominion  of  God  the  Su- 
preme Lord,  to  whom  he  is  accountable,  but  as  a  member 
of  society  bears  a  relation  to  his  king,  his  country,  his  fami- 
ly, and  is  not  at  liberty  to  dispose  of  his  life  as  he  himself 
pleases.  If  this  were  the  natural  right  of  one  man,  it  would 
be  so  of  another:  and  so  every  man  would  have  a  right  to 
put  an  end  to  his  own  life,  whenever  he  thinks  proper,  and 


206  The  Stoical  Doctrine  Part  II. 

of  this,  he  himself  is  to  be  the  judge.  And  if  he  has  a  right 
to  kill  himself  when  any  great  evil  befals  him,  or  when  he  is 
under  the  apprehension  of  it,  why  might  he  not  have  an  equal 
right  to  kill  another  who  he  apprehends  has  brought  evil 
upon  him,  or  who  he  fears  will  do  it?  And  what  confusion 
this  would  produce  in  society,  I  need  not  take  pains  to  shew. 
To  all  which  it  may  be  added,  ihat  for  a  man  to  kill  him- 
self, because  he  is  under  the  apprehension  or  pressure  of 
some  grie\  ous  calamit}'^,  is,  whatsoever  may  be  pretended 
to  the  contrary,  inconsistent  with  true  fortitude.  It  is  an  ar- 
gument of  a  pusillanimous  soul,  that  takes  unwarrantable 
methods  to  flee  from  a  calamity;  whereas  he  ought  nobly 
and  patiently  to  bear  it,  which  is  true  magnanimity  and 
fortitude.  The  poet  says  well:  "  It  is  an  easy  thing  to 
contemn  life  in  adversity:  he  acts  a  courageous  part,  who 
can  bear  to  be  miserable." 

"Rebus  in  adversis  facile  est  contemnere  vitam: 
Fortiterille  facit,  qui  miser  esse  potest." 

Upon  the  whole,  the  practice  we  have  been  considering,  and 
which  was  justified,  and  in  several  places  even  prescribed, 
by  many  of  the  philosophers,  especially  by  the  Stoics,  the 
most  eminent  teachers  of  morality  among  the  antients,  is  a 
practice  deservedly  rendered  infamous  by  our  laws,  as 
being  a  murder  committed  by  a  man  upon  his  own  person, 
in  opposition  to  the  most  sacred  obligations  of  religion, 
and  to  the  rights  of  the  community  to  .which  he  belongs, 
and  to  the  strongest  i^nstincts  of  the  human  nature,  wisely 
implanted  in  us  by  the  Author  of  our  beings,  as  a  bar  to 
such  inhuman  practices. 

The  observations  which  have  been  made  are  sufficient  to 
shew  that  the  Stoics  are  not  to  be  absolutely  depended  upon 
in  matters  of  morality.  This  will  further  appear  from  a  dis- 


Chap.  XI.  of  Suicide  considered. 


207 


tinct  examination  of  the  main  principles  on  which  their  mo- 
ral system  is  founded,  and  on  the  account  of  which  they 
have  been  thought  to  be  the  most  strenuous  advocates  for 
the  cause  of  virtue,  and  to  have  carried  their  notion  of  it  to 
the  noblest  height. 


208  Stoical  Scheme  of  the  absolute         Part  II. 


CHAPTER  XII. 

The  Stoics  professed  to  lead  men  to  perfect  happiness  in  this  present  life,  abstract- 
ing from  aU  consideration  of  a  future  state.  Their  scheme  of  the  absolute  sufficien- 
cy of  virtue  to  happiness,  and  the  itidifFerency  of  all  external  things  considered. 
They  were  sometimes  obliged  to  make  concessions  which  were  not  very  con- 
sistent with  their  system,  Thfir  philosophy  in  its  rigour  not  reducible  to  prac- 
tice, and  had  little  influence  either  on  the  people  or  on  themselves.  They  did 
not  give  a  clear  idea  of  the  nature  of  that  virtue  which  they  so  highly  extolled. 
The  loose  doctrine  of  many  of  the  Stoics,  as  well  as  other  philosophers,  with 
regard  to  truth  and  lying. 

1  HE  professed  design  of  the  whole  Stoical  scheme  of  mo- 
rality was  to  raise  men  to  a  state  of  complete  felicity.  This, 
indeed,  was  what  all  the  philosophers  pretended  to;  and  Ci- 
cero represents  this  as  the  principal  thing  which  induced 
men  to  spend  so  much  time  and  pains  in  the  study  of  it.  (w). 
But  none  of  them  made  such  glorious  pretences  this  way  as 
the  Stoics,  nor  spoke  of  virtue  in  such  high  terms  as  they 
did.  They  maintained,  that  virtue  alone,  without  any  out- 
ward advantages,  is  sufficient  to  a  life  of  perfect  happiness 
in  this  present  state.  And  to  support  this  scheme,  they  as- 
serted that  all  outward  things  are  indifferent,  and  nothing  at 
all  to  us:  y^h  lar^oe,  ^uoii.  Indiffi^rent  things,  ret  a^iei^o^ety  as  La- 
ertius  represents  the  sense  of  the  Stoics  (:v),  neither  profit 
nor  hurt  us;  of  this  kind  are  life,  health,  pleasure,  beauty, 
strength,  riches,  honour,  nobility;  and  their  contraries,  such 
as  death,  sickness,  pain,  deformity,  poverty,  dishonour,  &c. 


(77)  Cic.   de  Finib.  lib.  iii.  cap.  3.   Et  Tuscul.  Disput.  lib.   v. 
cap.   1. 

{x)  Laert.  lib.  v'.i.  segm.  105,  106. 


Chap.  XII.     sufficiency  of  Virtue  to  Happiness.  209 

And  again,  that  those  things  are  indifterent,  which  are  nei- 
ther good  nor  evil,  neither  to  be  desired  nor  shunned,  con- 
ducing neither  to  happiness  nor  unhappiness.  In  this  sense, 
all  things  are  ilidifFc^rent,  which  are  between  virtue  and  vice* 
No  philosopher  ever  carried  the  Stoic  notion  in  this  matter 
farther  than  Epictetus.  It  it  a  principle  which  runs  through 
his  whole  system,  and  most  of  his  magnificent  precepts  are 
built  upon  it,  that  nothing  is  good  or  evil,  but  what  is  in  the 
power  of  our  own  wills:  that  none  of  the  things  without  us 
are  either  profitable  or  hurtful:  that  neither  life  nor  death, 
health  nor  sickness,  bodily  pain  nor  pleasure,  neither  afflu- 
ence nor  poverty,  honour  or  ignominy,  neither  the  having 
wife,  children,  friends,  possessions,  nor  the  want  or  loss  of 
them,  are  to  be  the  objects  of  our  desires  or  aversions,  they 
are  nothing  to  us,  nor  of  the  least  moment  to  our  happiness. 
Agreeable  to  this  is  the  idea  the  Stoics  give  of  him  whom 
they  call  a  wise  man:  that  he  has  all  his  goods  within  him- 
self, wants  nothing,  never  fails  of  obtaining  what  he  desires, 
is  never  subj  ct  to  any  disappointment;  because  he  never 
has  a  desire  or  aversion  to  any  thing  but  what  is  in  his  own 
power;  nor  can  any  outward  calamity  touch  him,  whether  of 
a  public  or  private  nature.  And  what  is  especially  to  be  ob- 
served, they  assert,  that  he  is  pt- rfectly  happy  even  in  the 
extremity  of  torments  and  sufferings.  This  is  the  principle 
upon  which  they  chiefly  valued  themselves,  and  were  admir- 
ed by  others.  Ctcero  represents  their  opinion  thus,  concern- 
ing the  wise  or  virtuous  man:  ''That  suppose  him  to  be 
blind,  infirm,  labouring  under  the  most  grievous  distemper, 
banished  from  his  country,  bereaved  of  his  children  or 
friends,  in  indig- ice,  tortured  upon  the  rack,  he  is  in  that 
instant,  and  in  those  circumstances,  not  onlv  happy,  but  hap- 
py in  the  highest  degree  (z/)."  And  this  happiness^they  suppos- 


(y)  "  Sit  idem  [sapiens"]  csccus,  debilis,  morbo  gravissimo  ad- 
Vol.  II.  2D 


210  Stoical  Scheme  of  the  absolute  Part  II# 

cd  to  be  wholly  in  a  man  s  own  power,  and  entirely  owing 
to  virtue  itself;  that  it  is  sufficient  merely  by  its  own  intrinsic 
force  and  excellence  to  produce  and  secure  an  independent 
felicity,  without  any  foreign  support,  and  abstracting  from 
all  consideration  of  a  future  state  or  recompence.  This  was 
in  reality  making  an  idol  of  their  own  virtue,  and  erecting 
it  into  a  kind  of  divinity.  And  accordingly  their  scheme,  as 
was  before  observed,  sometimes  betrayed  them  into  a  way  of 
talkinp;  which  bordered  upon  profaneness;  as  if  theirwise  man 
was  equal  in  virtue  and  happiness  with  God  himself.  The 
Peripatetics  agreed  with  the  Stoics  in  affirming,  that  virtue 
is  the  greatest  good,  and  that  a  wise  and  good  man  is  happy 
under  the  severest  bodily  torments.  But  they  would  not  al- 
low, that  in  that  case  he  was  most  happy,  or  happy  in  the 
highest  degree.  Thus  it  is  that  Cicero  represents  their  sense, 
in  the  fifth  book  of  his  Tusculan  Disputations,  where  he  ar- 
gues pretty  largely  against  those  who  supposed  that  a  wise 
and  good  man  is  "  happy"  in  such  circumstances,  but  not 
"most  happy:"  ^'beatum  esse,  at  non  beatissimum  (z)."  He 
thinks,  that  he  who  wants  any  thing  that  is  requisite  to  an 
happy  life,  cannot  with  any  propriety  be  said  to  be  happy  at 
all:  "  Si  est  quod  desit,  ne  beatus  quidem  est:"  that  happi- 
ness includes  the  full  possession  and  enjoyment  of  all  good 
things,  without  any  evil  joined  to  it  or  mixed  with  it:  and 
that  if  any  thing  relating  to  the  body  or  outward  circumstan- 
ces were  good,  a  wise  man  could  never  be  sure  of  being  hap- 
py, because  these  out»vard  things  are  not  in  his  own  pow- 
er {a).  In  this  the  Stoics  seem  to   have  had  the  advantage 


fectus,  exsul,  orbus,  egens,  torqueatur  eculeo:  quem  hunc  ad- 
pellat  Zeno?  Beatum,  inquit,  etiam  beatissimum."  De  Finib.  lib. 
V.  cap.  28.  p.  427.  edit.  Davis. 

(z)  See  particularly  Tuscul.  Disput.  lib.  v.  cap.  8.  et  cap.  14. 
et  seq. 

(a)  Ibid.  cap.  10.  p.  365.  edit.  Davis. 


Ghap.  XII.     sufficiency  of  Virtue  to  Happiness*  211 

of  the  Peripatetics.  They  both  agreed  that  wise  and  good 
men  are  happy  in  this  present  state:  for  in  their  disquisitions 
on  this  subject,  a  future  state  of  happiness  was  never  brought 
into  the  accou-nt.  They  also  agreed,  that  this  happiness  was 
in  every  wise  and  good  man's  own  power.  But  the  Stoics 
plainly  saw,  that  it  was  not  in  any  man's  power  to  obtain 
external  advantages  when  he  pleased,  or  to  attain  to  a  per- 
fect freedom  from  all  outward  pains  and  troubles.  And  there- 
fore they  would  not  allow  that  external  things  are  either 
good  or  evil,  or  have  the  least  concernment  with  the  happi- 
ness of  human  life.  This,  though  contrary  to  nature  and 
experience,  yet  was  a  consistent  scheme,  which  that  of  the 
Peripatetics  was  not.  Cato,  in  arguing  against  the  Peripa- 
tetics, urges,  that  if  they  allowed  pain  to  be  an  evil,  it  would 
follow  that  a  wise  man  could  not  be  happy  when  tortured  up- 
on the  rack:  whereas,  according  to  those  who  denied  pain  to 
be  an  evil,  a  wise  man  kept  the  happiness  of  his  life  unvio- 
lated  in  the  severest  torments  (Ji).  He  there  takes  it  for 
granted  on  all  sides,  that  a  wise  man  is  happy  on  the  rack, 
and  treats  it  as  an  absurdity  to  suppose  the  contrary.  And 
indeed,  this  seems  to  have  been  a  principle  common  to  all 
the  philosophers,  and  it  was  looked  upon  as  shameful  to  de- 
ny it.  Hence  it  was,  that  Epicurus  himself,  that  he  might 
not  come  behind  them  in  a  glorious  way  of  talking,  though 
in  his  system  pain  was  the  greatest  evil,  asserted  that  a  wise 
man  would  be  perfectly  happy  in  Phalaris's  bull.  Theophras- 
tus,  indeed,  one  of  the  most  eminent  of  the  Peripatetic  phi- 
losophers, was  sensible  of  the  absurdity  of  this.  He  thought, 


(b)  "  An  vero  certius  quicquam  potest  esse  quam  illorum  ra- 
tione  qui  dolorem  in  malis  ponunt,  non  posse  sapientem  beatum 
esse  cum  eculeo  torqucdtur?  Eorum  autem,  qui  dblorem  in  ma- 
ils non  habent,  ratio  certe  cogit,  uti  in  omnibui  tormends  con- 
servetur  vita  beata  sapientis."  Apud  Cic.  de  Finib.  lib.  iii.  cap. 
13.p.  239.  edit.  Davis. 


212  Virtue  alone  not  absolutely  sufficient  to    Part  II. 

as  Cicero  informs  us,  that  "  great  external  calamities,  pains 
and  torments,  were  absolutely  incompatible  with  a  happy- 
life:  and  that  it  was  a  contradiction  to  suppose,  that  the 
same  man  could  be  happy,  and  oppressed  with  many  evils." 
Yet,  as  Cicero  intimates,  he  durst  not  speak  his  mind  clear- 
ly, and  was  blamed  by  all  the  other  philosophers,  for  seem- 
ing to  suppose,  though  he  did  not  directly  affirm,  that  a  wise 
man  could  not  be  happy  on  the  rack,  or  under  the  severest 
torments  (c).  What  led  the  philosophers  in  general  into  this 
way  of  ta  king,  was  with  a  view  to  extol  the  high  advan- 
tages of  their  philosophy  as  the  only  infallible  way  to  make 
men  completely  happy,  and  raise  them  a'oove  all  outward 
evils.  This  is  the  account  Cicero  gives  of  what  philosophy- 
makes  profession  of,  that  "  every  man  who  obeys  its  dictates 
shall  be  alwavs  armed  against  the  attacks  of  fortune,  and 
shall  have  in  himself  all  the  helps  necessary  to  a  good  and 
happy  life:  and  finally,  that  he  shall  be  always  happy  (<3?)." 
Such  were  the  glorious  pretences  of  the  Pagan  philosophy. 
Their  whole  scheme  was  founded  on  the  supposition  of  at- 
taining to  the  perfection  of  virtue  and  happiness  in  this  pre- 
sent state:  and  this  involved  them  in  inextricable  difficulties, 
how  to  reconcile  those  high  pretences  with  experience,  and 
the  presnt  appearances  of  things. 

It  is  manifest,  that  the  virtue  of  the  best  men  is  at  pre- 
sent mix^r^d  with  weaknesses  and  dc  fects.  Or,  if  it  were 
never  so  perfect  in  itself,  it  meets  with  many  obstacles  in  a 


(c)  De  Finib.  lib.  v.  cap.  26.  p.  261.  Et  Tuscul.  Disput.  lib.  v. 
cap.  9.  p.  361.  edit  Davis. 

(c/)  "  Nam  quid  profitetur  [philosophia]?  O  dii  bonil  perfec- 
turam  se,  qui  legibus  suis  paruisset.  ut  esset  contra  fortunam 
semper  armatus.  ct  omnia  praesidia  haheret  in  se  be  ne  beateque 
Vivendi,  ut  esset  semper  denique  beatus."  Tuscul.  Disput.  lib.  v. 
cap.  7.  p.  357. 


Chap.  XII.  complete  Happiness  in  this  present  State.   218 

world  full  of  vice  and  disorder,  and  cannot  exert  itself  as 
it  would,  nor  produce   the  effects    it  is  naturally  fitted  to 
produce,  and  which  it  would  actually  produce  in  a  better 
state  of  things.    Many  are  the  temptations  and  snares  to 
which  our  virtue  is  here  exposed,  and  which  it  requires  a 
constant  care  and  vigilance  to  guard  against,  as  well  as  to 
keep  all  our  appetites   and  passions  under  a  perfect  subjec- 
tion  to  the   law  of  religion   and    reason.    And    as  we   are 
united  to  others  by  many  social  ties,  their  calamities  often 
by  a  tender  sympathy  become  our  own;   and  in  such  cases 
and  circumstances,  even  our  virtue  and  benevolence  itself, 
except  we  cast  off  all  human  affections,  will  be  apt  to  pro- 
duce   uneasy  feelings.    To  which  may  be  added,  the  many 
hindrances  arising  from  the  body,   its  pains,   weaknesses, 
diseases,   and  languors;  which  by  the   present   constitution 
of  our  nature,  cannot   but   greatly  affect  our    minds,    and 
often  have  such  an  influence,  as  to  fill  the  whole   soul  with 
black  and   dismal  ideas.  And  this  has  frequently  happened 
to  virtuous  and  excellent  persons  under  the  power  of  an 
habitual  prevailing  melancholy.   Or,  if  we  put  the  case  of 
a  good  man's  being  exposed  to  a  series  of    the  most  bitter 
persecutions  and  sufferings  for  the  cause  of  truth  and  righte- 
ousness, to  pretend   that  in  these  circumstances  he  is  per- 
fectly  happy  by  the  mere  force  and  sufficiency  of  his  own 
virtue,  without  any  foreign  assistances  or  any  future  hopes, 
is  a  visionary  scheme,  contrary  to  reason   and   nature.  So 
far  is  it  from  being  true,   that    human   virtue  is  of  itself 
alone  sufficient  to  render  a  man  completely  happy  in  such 
circumstances,  that  it  would  not  hold  true,  if  such   a  sup- 
position could  possibly  be  admitted,  even  with   resp.  ct  to 
the  divine  nature.  That  God  is  perfectly  happy  Is  a  prin- 
ciple acknowledged   by  all  that   believe  a  Deity.   But  who 
would  account  him  perfectly  happy,  though  never  so  per- 
fect in  moral  excellence,  if  he  were  subject  to  pain  or  ex- 
ternal violence,  or  to  those  inconveniencies  and  sufferings 


214  Virtue  alone  not  absolutely  siifficient  to    Part  II. 

to  which  good  men  are  liable  in  this  present  state,  and 
which  often  by  the  allowance  of  the  Stoics  themselves, 
make  it  reasonable  for  them  to  put  an  end  to  their  own 
lives?  And  indeed  there  cannot  be  a  more  manifest  proof 
of  the  vanity  of  their  pretences  than  this,  that  they  who 
professed  so  absolute  a  contempt  of  all  external  things,  and 
declared  in  their  solemn  addresses  to  God  that  they  were 
able  to  bear  whatsoever  he  should  see  fit  to  lay  upon  them, 
frequently  recommend  self-murder  as  a  remedy  to  free 
them  from  external  calamities.  "  It  is  remarkable,"  says 
Miss  Carter,  "  that  no  sect  of  philosophers  ever  so  dogma- 
tically prescribed,  or  so  frequently  practised  suicide,  as 
those  very  Stoics,  who  taught  that  the  pains  and  sufferings 
which  they  sought  to  avoid  by  this  act  of  rebellion  against 
the  decrees  of  Providence,  were  no  evils.  How  absolutely 
this  horrid  practice  contradicted  all  their  noblest  principles 
of  resignation  and  submission  to  the  Divine  Will,  is  too 
evident  to  need  any  enlargement  (^)."  Indeed  this  seems 
to  shew  that  their  affected  contempt  of  all  outward  things, 
was,  for  the  most  part,  little  more  than  a  pompous  osten- 
tation of  high-sounding  words.  Epicurus  himself,  as  hath 
been  already  observed,  spoke  as  magnificently  of  a  wise 
man's  being  happy  in  the  severest  torments,  as  the  Stoics 
did.  It  is  no  hard  matter  to  put  on  an  air  of  grandeur  in 
the  expressions.  But  where  there  is  no  prospect  of  a  future 
recompence  or  happiness,  this  magnanimity  has  not  a  solid 
foundation  to  support  it,  or  can  only  have  an  effect  on  a 
very  few  minds  of  a  particular  constitution. 

The  Stoics  after  all  their  high  talk  of  the  absolute  in- 
differency  of  all  external  things,  found  themselves  obliged 
to  make  some  concessions  which  were  not  very  consistent 


(e)  See  Miss  Carter's  introduction  to  her  translation  of  Epic- 
tetus,  sect.  26. 


Chap.  XII,  complete  Happiness  in  this  present  State.    215 

with  the  rigor  of  their  principles;  and  which  involved  them 
in  seeming  contradictions.  Plutarch  takes  great  advantage 
of  this  for  exposing  them  in  his  two  treatises  of  the  Con- 
tradictions of  the  Stoics,  and  of  Common  Conception 
against  the  Stoics.  Cato  in  Cicero's  third  book  de  Finib. 
after  having  laid  it  down  as  a  principle,  that  that  only  is 
good  which  is  honest,  and  that  only  is  evil  which  is  base; 
"  Solum  esse  bonum  quod  honestum  est,  et  id  malum  so- 
lum quod  turpe;"  sets  himself  largely  to  shew,  that  with 
regard  to  other  things,  which  the  Stoics  would  not  allow 
to  be  cither  good  or  evil,  or  to  contribute  in  the  least  to 
render  life  happy  or  wretched,  there  is,  notwithstanding,  a 
real  difference  between  them:  so  that  some  of  them  were 
aestimabilia,  as  he  calls  them,  that  is,  fit  to  have  some  value 
put  upon  them,  others  the  contrary;  and  he  positively 
affirms,  as  what  cannot  be  doubted,  that  of  those  which 
they  called  middle  or  indifferent  things,  i.  e.  neither  good 
nor  evil,  some  are  to  be  chosen  or  taken,  others  to  be 
rejected  (y):  and  that  some  of  these  things  are  se- 
cundum naturam,  according  to  nature,  others  are  con- 
trary to  nature.  The  same  account  of  the  Stoical  doc- 
trine is  given  by  Laertius  (^).  Cicero  observes  in  his 
first  book  of  laws,  that  what  the  Peripatetics,  and  those 
of  the  Old  Academy,  called  bona,  good  things,  were 
called  by  the  Stoics,  commoda,  commodious  or  convenient 
things;  what  the  former  called  mala,  evil  things,  the  latter 
called  incommoda,  incommodious  or  disagreeable:  from 
which  he  concludes,  that  they  changed  the  names  of 
things,  when  the  things  themselves  continued  the  same  (Ji), 


(/)  "  Non  dubium  est,  quin  ex  his  quae  media'  dicimus,  sit 
aliud  sumendum,  aliud  rejiciendum."  Apud  Cic.  de  Finib.  lib. 
iii.  cap.  18.  p.  254.  "» 

{g)  Laert.  lib.  vii.  segm.  102. 

{h)  Cic.  de  Leg,  lib.  i.  cap,  13.  et  cap.  21. 


216  The  Stoics  obliged  to  make  Concessions     Part  I L 

And  in  his  fourth  book  de  Finib.  h-  undertakes  to  prove 
at  large,  that  the  Stoics  and  Peripatetics,  if  narrowly  ex- 
amined, differed  more  in  the  manner  of  expression  than  in 
the  thing  itself,  (z)  But  the  same  great  author  seems  to 
assert  in  his  Offices,  that  there  was  a  real  difference  between 
them,  and  gives  the  Stoical  system  the  preference  to  that 
of  the  Peripatetics  (Ji), 

If  there  was  a  real  difference  between  the  Stoics  and 
Peripatetics,  it  seems  to  have  consisted  principally  in  this, 
that  though  the  Peripatetics  allowed,  that  virtue  is  the 
highest  good,  yet  they  held  that  the  commodities  of  life, 
which  they  called  good  things,  contributed  in  some  degree 
to  human  happiness.  But  the  Stoics  would  not  allow  that 
these  things  were  of  the  least  moment  to  happiness,  and 
asserted  that  with  respect  to  the  happiness  of  life,  all  out- 
ward things  were  nothing,  and  of  no  concernment  to  us  at 
all.  This  indeed  was  necessary  to  support  their  system  con- 
cerning the  absolute  felicity  and  independency  of  their  wise 
and  virtuous  man.  But  it  is  contrary  to  nature  and  expe- 
rience (  /  ).  Nor  can  I  well  conceive  how  the  Stoics  could 
allow,  as  they  did,  external  things  to  be  commodious  for 
us,  or  the  contrary,   if  they   had  no  influence  at  all  to  pro- 


(i)  See  particularly  de  Finib.  lib.  iv.  cap.  6.  et  cap.  8.  et  9. 

{k)  De  Offic.  lib  i.  cap.  24   et  lib.  iii.  cap.  4. 

(/)  Aristotle's  opinion,  which  was  generally  followed  by  the 
Peripatetics,  was,  that  though  virtue  is  the  greatest  good,  yet 
outward  good  things  are  necessary  to  happiness:  for  that  nature 
is  npt  self-sufficient,  the  body  must  be  in  health,  and  men  must 
have  the  necessaries  and  conveniencies  of  life.  See  his  Ethic' 
ad  Nicom.  lib.  10.  cap.  9.  oper.  torn  II.  p.  140,  C.  edit.  Paris 
1629.  et  Magn.  Moral,  lib.  2.  cap.  8.  ibi  i.  p.  184.  D  In  this 
matter  Posidonius  and  Panaetius,  two  eminent  Stoics,  quitted  the 
docU'ines  of  their  sect.  They  denied  that  virtue  alone  is  sufficient 
for  beatitude,  and  affirmed  that  it  requires  the  assistance  of 
health,  strength,  and  necessaries.  Laeit.  lib.  vii.  segm.  128. 


Chap.  XII.  not  very  consistent  with  their  Principles.    217 

mote  or  to  obstruct  human  happiness.  These  philosophers 
themselves  did  not  pretend  to  deny,  that  man  is  an  animal 
compounded  of  body  and  soul:    and  from  thence  it  follows 
that  that  which  is   good  or  evil  for  the  compound,  may  be 
properly  said  to  be  good  or  evil  to  man  in  his  present  state. 
Marcus  Antoninus  says,  that  "  pain  is  either  an  evil  to  the 
body,  and  then  let  the  body  pronounce   it  to  be  an  evil,  or 
to  the  soul:   but   the   soul   can   maintain   her  own    serenity 
and  calm;  and   not   conceive   pain   to  be  an  evil  (w)."  But 
if  the  body  pronounces    pain  to   be   an   evil,  the   soul   as 
united   to  the  body  feels  and  pronounces   it  to  be  so.  Cato 
in  explaining   the  doctrine  of  the  Stoics,   says,   "  Ic  is  ma- 
nifest that  we  have    a  natural  abhorrence  of  pain:"  ''  Per- 
spicuum  est   natura  nos  a  dolore  abhorrere  (z?)"  And  how 
the  Stoics  could  consistently  acknowledge  this,  and  \  et  not 
own  it  to  be   an  evil,  or  assert  that  men  may  be  perfectly 
happy  under  it,   is  hard  to  see.   Cicero   observes   that  the 
Stoics  said,  that  "  pain  is  sharp,  troublesome,  odious,  hard 
to  be  borne,  contrary  to  nature,"  but  would  not  call  it  evil: 
and  he  adds,   speaking   to  Cato,  "  you  deny  that  any  man 
can  have  true  fortitude,  who  looks  upon  pain  to  be  an  evil: 
but  why  should  not  that  man  have  as  much  fortitude,  as  he 
that  owns  it  to  be  grievous,  and  scarce  to  be  endured,  as  you 
yourself  grant  it  is?  For  timidity  arises  not  from  names, 
but  from  things  (<?)." 


(w)  Anton,  lib.  viii.  sect.  28. 

(n)  Cicero  de  Finib.  lib.  iii.  cap.  19.  p.  257.  edit.  Davis. 

(o)  "  Dicunt  illi  [Stoici]  asperum  esse  dolere,  molestum, 
odiosum,  contra  naturam,  difficile  toleratu.  Tu  autem  negas 
fortem  esse  quenquam  posse,  qui  dolorem  malum  putat.  Cur 
fortior  sit,  si  illud,  quod  tute  concedis,  asperum  et  vix  feren- 
dum  putabit?  Ex  rebus  enim  timiditas,  non  ex  vocabulis  se- 
quitur."  Cicero  de  Finib.  lib.  iv.  cap.  19.  p.  331,  322, 

Vol.  IL  2  E 


218   The  Stoical  Scheme  of  the  absolute  Indifference  Part  IL 

The  Stoical  maxims  must  be  acknowledged  to  have  an 
air  of  greatness;  but  they  would  have  done  more  service  to 
the  cause  of  morals,  if  instead  of  denying  that  their  wise 
or  virtuous  man  ever  suffers  any  evil,  or  is  liable  to  any 
disappointment,  they  had  represented  it  as  one  of  the  no- 
blest exercises  of  virtue  to  bear  evils  and  disappointments 
with  a  becoming  temper  of  mind.  Antoninus  indeed  ar- 
gues, that  "  that  which  may  equally  befal  a  good  man  or 
a  bad  man,  can  be  neither  good  nor  evil  (Z^)."  According 
to  this  way  of  representing  it,  no  evil  can  befal  a  good 
man.  And  this,  if  true,  would  at  once  remove  the  objection 
against  Providence,  drav/n  from  the  evils  to  which  good 
men  are  obnoxious  in  this  present  state.  But  except  man- 
kind could  be  persuaded  out  of  their  natural  feelings,  such 
a  way  of  arguing  will  be  of  little  force.  It  is  still  unde- 
niably true,  that  gviod  men  are  often  exposed  to  great  suf- 
ferings and  calamities  which  are  very  grievous  to  nature, 
nor  does  the  refusing  to  call  them  evil  at  all  alter  their  na- 
ture, or  render  them  less  grievous  and  troublesome.  The 
true  remedy  is  not  by  denying  them  to  be  so,  but  by  of- 
ferring  such  considerations  as  are  proper  to  support  the 
mind  under  them,  the  most  powerful  of  which  are  drawn 
from  the  hope  of  eternal  happiness  in  a  future  state.  But 
this  did  not  enter  into  the  Stoical  system,. 

The  same  pjreat  emperor  and  philosopher  says,  "  when- 
ever you  imagine  that  any  of  those  things,  which  are  not 
in  your  own  power,  are  good  or  evil  to  you,  if  you  fall 
into  such  imagined  evils,  or  are  disappointed  of  such  good, 
you  must  necessarily  accuse  the  gods,  and  hate  those  men 
who,  you  deem,  were  the  causes,  or  suspect  will  be  the 
causes  of  such  misfortunes   (^)."   He  frequently  expresses 


(/?)  Anton.  Medit.  book  iv.  sect.  39. 

{q)  Ibid,  book  vi.  sect.  41.  Glasgow  translation. 


Chap.  XII.  of  all  external  Things  farther  considered,  219 

himself  to  this  purpose,  and  so  does  Epictetus.  But  it  by- 
no  means  follows,  that  if  we  look  upon  any  of  the  things 
which  befal  us  to  be  evils,  i.  e.  to  be  severely  troublesome, 
painful  and  grievous  (for  this  is  all  that  is  really  meant  by 
calling  them  evils,  since  no  man  pretends  that  they  are  evil 
in  the  moral  sense)  that  therefore  we  must  necessarily  curse 
or  accuse  God  and  Providence:  for  we  may  upon  solid 
grounds  be  persuaded,  that  God  sends  those  evils  upon  us, 
or  permits  them  to  befal  us,  for  wise  ends,  and  will  in  the 
issue  over-rule  them  to  our  greater  benefit.  And  indeed,  if 
we  do  not  look  upon  them  to  be  evils,  there  is  no  proper 
exercise  for  patience  and  resignation,  which  consisteth  in 
bearing  evils  with  equanimity  and  fortitude.  Nor  does  it 
follow,  that  if  we  regard  these  things  as  evils,  we  must 
necessarily  hate  those  men,  whom  we  suppose  to  be  the 
authors  or  causes  of  them.  We  may,  and  in  many  cases 
cannot  help  looking  upon  the  injurieg  we  suffer  from  others 
to  be  indeed  evils  and  injuries  when  we  feel  them  to  be  so, 
and  yet  we  may  in  obedience  to  the  will  of  God,  and  from 
a  prevailing  goodness  of  heart,  forgive  the  authors  of  those 
injuries,  and  even  render  good  for  evil.  This  is  one  of  the 
most  eminent  acts  of  virtue  which  is  powerfully  recom- 
mended and  enforced  in  the  Holy  Scriptures.  Whereas 
upon  their  scheme  there  is  properly  no  such  thing  as  for- 
giving injuries,  or  doing  good  for  evil,  since  a  good  man 
cannot  be  hurt  or  injured,  nor  suffer  any  evil:  or,  if  it  were 
a  real  evil  or  injury  that  he  suffered,  he  must  necessarily, 
according  to  their  way  of  arguing,  curse  the  man  that  did 
it,  and  accuse  Providence  for  permitting  it. 

Some  of  the  Stoical  principles  were  so  much  out  of  the 
way  of  common  sense  and  conception,  that  w^hen  they  came 
into  the  world,  and  engaged  in  public  offices  and  affairs, 
they  could  not  put  in  practice  their  own  rtiaxims:  but,  as 
Plutarch  observes,  they  then  spoke  and  acted  as  if  they 
looked  upon  external  things  to  be  good  or  evil,  and  to  be 


220  The  Stoical  Scheme  of  the  absolute  Indlff'erence  Part  II. 

things  which  are  of  concernment  to  the  happiness  or  un- 
happiness  of  human  life:  he  produces  a  passage  from  Chry- 
sippus,  in  which  he  says,  that  a  wise  man  will  so  speak  in 
public,  and  so  order  the  commonwealth,  as  it  riches,  and 
glory,  and  health  were  good  things.  And  Plutarch  very 
justly  takes  this  to  be  in  effect  a  confessing  that  his  doc- 
trine about  the  absolute  indifferency  of  all  external  things 
"was  contrary  to  true  policy,  and  could  not  be  reduced  into 
practice  {r).  There  are  several  passages  of  Epictetus,  by 
•which  it  appears,  that  those  maxims  of  the  Stoics,  which 
make  so  glorious  an  appearance  in  their  books,  had  little 
influence  upon  the  people,  or  even  upon  those  philosophers 
themselves.  ''  Shew  me,"  says  he  (5),  "  that  I  may  see  what 
I  have  long  sought,  one  who  is  truly  noble  and  ingenuous, 
shew  me  either  a  young  or  old  man?"  The  nineteenth 
chapter  of  his  second  book  is  concerning  those  who  em- 
braced philosophy  only  in  word.  He  there  says;  "shew  me 
a  Stoic,  if  you  have  one. — You  can  indeed  shew  a  thousand 
that  can  repeat  the  Stoic  reasonings.  Shew  me  some  person, 
formed  according  to  ihe  principles  which  he  professes.  Shew 
me  one  who  is  sick  and  happy,  in  danger  and  happy,  dying 
and  happy,  exiled  and  happy,  disgraced  and  happy.  Shew 
him  me;  for,  by  heaven,  i  long  to  see  a  Stoic.  Shew  me 
one  who  is  approaching  towards  this  character:  do  me  the 
favour:  do  not  refuse  an  old  m;m  a  sight  which  he  hath 
never  yet  seen."  Here  he  complains,  that  he  never  yet  saw 
a  true  Stoic,  one  that  acted  up  to  their  principles.  But  what 
he  represents  as  impracticable,  and  no  where  to  be  found, 
the  seeing  a  man  happy  in  sickness,  danger,  exile,  disgrace 
and  death,  was  actually  verified  in  many  of  the  primitive 


(r)  Plutarch.  Oper.  torn.  II.  p.  1034.  Epictet.  Dissert,  book  ii. 
chap.  »6.  sect.  2 
(«)  ibid.  chap.  19.  sect.  3. 


Chap.  XII.  of  all  external  Things  farther  considered,   221 

Christians.  Not  that  they  looked  upon  these  things,  in  the 
Stoical  language,  to  be  perfectly  indifferent,  and  no  evils  at 
all;  but  because  they  were  persuaded  that  the  sufferings  of 
this  present  time  are  not  worthy  to  he  compared  with  the 
glory  which  shall  be  revealed:  and  that  this  light  affliction 
which  is  but  for  a  moment  worketh  for  us  a  far  more  ex- 
ceeding  and  eternal  weight  of  glory.  Rom.  viii.  18.  2  Cor. 
iv.  17.  Supported  and  animated  by  these  glorious  hopes, 
and  by  the  gracious  assistance  of  God's  Holy  Spirit,  they 
gloried  even  in  tribulation:  They  were,  as  St.  Paul  ex- 
presseih  it,  as  sorro'vful^  yet  always  rejoicing;  troubled  on 
every  side^  yet  not  distressed;  perplexed^  but  not  in  despair; 
as  having  nothings  but  possessing  all  things;  and  performed 
things  which  would  otherwise  have  seemed  impracticable. 
The  reader  may  consult  the  passages  referred  to  at  the  bot- 
tom of  the  page,  which  are  admirable  to  this  purpose  (t). 

There  is  one  farther  observation  which  I  would  offer 
concerning  the  Stoical  doctrine  of  morals,  and  that  is,  that 
afier  all  the  high  encomiums  which  they  and  others  of  the 
antient  philosophers  bestowed  upon  virtue,  and  the  glorious 
things  they  ascribed  to  it,  they  did  not  give  a  clear  idea  of 
the  nature  of  that  virtue  they  so  highly  extolled.  They  laid 
it  down  as  the  foundation  of  their  moral  system,  that  every 
animal  has  a  desire  to  preserve  itself  in  its  natural  state: 
and  that  the  chief  good  of  man,  and  the  proper  office  of 
virtue,  is  to  live  agreeably  and  conformably  to  nature; 
"  congruenter  naturae  convenienterque  vivere,"  as  Cato  ex- 
presses it  in  the  account  he  gives  of  the  doctrine  of  the 
Stoics  (w).  Laertius  gives  the  same  account  of  their  doc- 


{t)  See  Matt.  v.  11,  12.  Acts  v.  40,  41.  xvi.  25.  Rom.  v  3,  4, 
5.  viii.  \7,  ZS^  36,  37,  38,  39.  2  Cor.  iv.  7.  17  ^  Tim.  iv.  6,  7,  8. 
Heb.  X.  34. 

(w)  Apud  Cic.  de  Finib.  lib.  iii.  cap.  5,  6,  et  7. 


222    The  Stoics  did  not  give  a  clear  Idea  of  the     Part  II. 

trine,  that  the  end  of  man  is  to  live  agreeably  to  nature, 
ey^oXoynfiive/g  ty)  ^vth  ^?»,  This  principle  that  virtue  and  hap- 
piness consists  in  living  according  to  nature  was  common 
to  most  of  the  philosophers.  But  as  they  differed  in  their 
accounts  of  nature,  and  what  was  agreeable  to  it,  so  they 
differed  in  the  idea  they  formed  of  virtue.  The  Epicureans, 
as  well  as  the  Stoics,  placed  virtue  and  happiness  in  living 
conformably  to  nature.  But  as  they  supposed  the  desire  of 
pleasure  to  be  the  first  principle  of  nature  in  men  and  all 
animals,  they  made  every  thing  else  subordinate  to  it;  and 
this  was  the  central  point  of  their  moral  system.  So  it  was 
also  of  the  Cyreniacs:  but  they  understood  pleasure  in  a 
yet  grosser  sense  than  the  Epicureans  did.  Many  of  the 
philosophers,  in  judging  of  what  is  according  to  nature, 
took  in  the  brute  animals  into  the  account.  The  Stoics 
themselves  sometimes  did  so,  and  upon  this  principle  some 
of  them  undertook  to  justify  incestuous  copulations.  But 
for  the  most  part  the  Stoics  took  nature  in  a  higher  sense, 
and  the  idea  they  formed  of  living  according  to  nature  was 
like  the  idea  of  their  wise  man,  little  conformable  to  fact 
and  experience.  If  we  judge  of  the  human  nature  by  what 
it  appears  to  be  in  its  present  state  in  the  generality  of 
mankind,  when  they  come  to  the  use  and  exercise  of  their 
reason,  we  shall  not  have  a  very  advantageous  notion  of  it. 
The  nature  of  man,  as  it  now  is,  cannot  justly  be  set  up  as 
a  proper  rule  or  standard  of  virtue,  but  must  itself  be  re- 
gulated by  a  higher  law,  by  which  we  are  to  judge  of  its 
rectitude,  and  of  its  corruptions  and  defects.  And  there- 
fore the  ablest  of  the  Stoics  in  judging  of  what  is  according 
to  nature,  were  for  considering  the  nature  of  man  as  in  a 
conformity  to  the  law  of  reason,  and  the  nature  of  the 
whole.  Diogenes  Laertius  has  mentioned  the  several  expli- 
cations given  by  the  principal  Stoics,  of  what  it  is  to  live 


Chap.  XII.  Nature  of  that  Virtue  they  so  highly  extolled,  223 

according  to  nature  (^x).  And  they  seem  generally  to  have 
agreed  with  Chrysippus,  that  as  our  natures  are  parts  of  the 
whole,  so  to  live  according  to  nature,  or  to  live  virtuously, 
is  for  a  man  to  live  according  to  his  own  and  the  universal 
nature.  I  think  this  way  of  talking  is  not  well  fitted  to 
furnish  us  with  clear  notions.  And  I  believe  it  will  be  ac- 
knowledged, that  it  would  be  of  no  great  advantage  to  the 
bulk  of  mankind  to  send  them  for  direction  in  their  duty 
to  the  knowledge  of  their  own  nature,  and  that  of  the  uni- 
verse. And  it  is  what  the  wisest  of  the  human  race,  if  left 
to  themselves,  could  scarce  attain  to,  if  taken  in  the  extent 
in  which  Cato,  after  the  Stoics,  explains  it.  He  affirms, 
"that  no  man  can  judge  truly  of  things  good  and  evil, 
without  knowing  the  whole  reason  of  nature,  and  even  of 
the  life  of  the  gods,  and  whether  the  nature  of  man  har- 
monizes or  not  with  the  universal  nature  (t/)."  What 
an  extensive  knowledge  is  here  required  in  order  to  a 
man's  having  a  just  discernment  of  his  duty,  and  passing  a 
right  judgment  oh  things  good  and  evil!  How  much  more 
easily  and  certainly  might  we  come  to  the  knowledge  of 
our  duty,  if  it  were  directly  and  expressly  determined  by 
a  revelation  from  God  himself! 

Another  notion,  which  the  Stoics,  as  well  as  other  phi- 
losophers, advanced  of  virtue,  and  which  may  probably 
be  thought  to  give  a  clearer  idea  of  it,  is,  that  they  made 
it  equivalent  to  what  the  Greeks  called  to  Kxhovj  the  Latins 
"  honestum."  And  this  seems  to  be  the  notion  of  it  which 
Cicero  principally  insists  upon,  in  his  celebrated  books  De 


(x)  Lae.rt.  lib.  vii.  segm.  86,  87,  88. 

(y)  "  Nee  vero  potest  quisquara  de  bonis  et  mails  vere  judi- 
care,  nisi  omni  cognit^  ratione  naturae,  et  vitse^etiam  deorum,  et 
utrum  conveniat  necne,  natura  hominis  cum  universa?"  Apud 
Cicero  de  Finib.  lib.  iii.  cap.  22.  p.  267.  edit.  Davis. 


224     The  Stoics  did  not  g-ive  a  clear  Idea  of  the    Part  IL 

Officiis.  And  he  describes  the  honestum  to  be,  "  that  which 
is  justly  to  be  praised  for  its  own  sake,  abstracting  from  all 
view  to  profit  and  reward:  vvhich  is  not  so  much  to  be 
known  by  this  definition,  as  by  the  common  judgment  of 
all  men,  and  the  studies  and  practices  of  the  best  men,  who 
do  many  things  for  this  only  reason^  that  it  is  decent,  right, 
and  honest,  though  they  do  not  see  any  advantage  that  will 
follow  upon  it  (z)."  He  here  supposes  the  honestum  to  be 
that  which  is  approved  by  the  judgment  of  all  men,  and 
especially  by  the  wisest  and  best  of  men  as  decent  and 
laudable.  And  I  readily  acknowledge,  that  there  is  a  beauty 
and  decency  in  some  actions  and  aflftctions,  which,  in  the 
common  judgment  of  mankind,  are  excellent  and  praise- 
worthy; and  that  if  the  human  nature  was  in  a  sound  and 
uncorrupt  state,  this  might  extend  very  far,  and  have  a 
great  effect:  and  even  taking  mankind  as  they  are,  it  is  un- 
doubtedly in  many  instances  of  signal  use.  But  it  is  mani- 
fest from  experience,  and  the  observation  of  all  ages,  that 
the  moral  sense  and  taste  is  greatly  weakened  and  depraved 
by  erroneous  opinions,  vicious  affections,  false  prejudices, 
and  worldly  selfish  interests,  so  that  it  is  by  no  means  to 
be  depended  upon  as  a  safe  and  universal  rule  in  morals. 
This  has  been  sufficiently  shewn  in  the  first  chapter  of  this 
treatise.  It  cannot  be  denied,  that  whole  nations  differ  with 
regard  to  their  notions  of  what  is  virtuous,  decent,  and 
praise-worthy.  And  whereas    Cicero  seems  here  to  refer 


(z)  "  Honestum  id  i'ntelli^imus,  quod  tale  est,  ut  detracts 
omni  utilitate,  sine  ullis  praemiis  fructibusque,  per  se  ipsum 
possit  jure  laudari,  quod  quaje  sit,  non  tarn  definidone  qua  sum 
usus,  intelligi  poiest  (quanquam  aliquantum  polest)  quam  com- 
muni  omnium  judicio,  et  oplumi  cujusque  studiis  atque  factis: 
qui  per  multa  ob  earn  uiam  causam  faciunt,  quia  decet,  quia 
rectum,  quia  honestum  est,  etsi  nullum  consecuturum  emolu- 
mentum  vident."  De  Finib.  lib.  ii.  cap.  14.  p.  122.  Davis. 


Chap.  XII.  Nature  of  that  Virtue  they  so  highly  extolled,  22S. 

particularly  to  the  judgment  of  the  wise  and  good,  for  the 
knowledge  of  the  to  xflsAoc,  or  honestum;  what  shall  we  think 
of  Zeno,  Chrysippus,  and  others  of  the  principal  Stoics, 
who  saw  no  indecency,  nothing  contrary  to  the  to  xetxov^  or 
beauty  of  virtue,  in  the  most  abominable  and  unnatural  im- 
purities, or  the  most  incestuous  mixtures  («),  or  in  the 
community  of  women  approved  by  them,  by  the  Cynics, 
and  the  famous  Plato;  or  in  the  exposing  and  destroying 
weak  and  sickly  children,  which  this  last  mentioned  emi- 
nent philosopher,  as  well  as  Aristotle  and  others,  advised 
and  prescribed;  and  which  was  in  use  in  many  of  the  best 
policied  states?  To  this  may  be  added,  that  practice  of 
suicide,  which  the  Stoics  and  others  not  only  allowed,  but 
in  several  instances  recommended  and  extolled  as  laudable 
and  glorious. 

From  the  account  that  has  been  given  of  the  Stoical  sys- 
tem of  morals,  and  which  is  accounted  the  most  complete 
that  Pagan  philosophy  could  furnish,  it  appears  that  it 
could  not  be  depended  upon  as  a  sufficient  guide  in  mo- 
ral duty.  Besides  the  instances  already  mentioned,  I  shall 
mention  one  more,  which  deserves  to  be  taken  notice  of; 
and  that  is,  that  many  of  the  philosophers,  and  the  Stoics 
among  the  rest,  were  very  loose  in  their  doctrine  with  re- 
gard to  truth  and  lying.  They  thought  lying  lawful,  when 
it  was  profitable,  and  approved  that  saying  of  Menander, 
that  a  lie  is  better  than  a  hurrfuj  truth. 

Plato  says,  he  may  lie  who  knows  how  to  do  it,  Iv  dmrl 
xef/fo),  in  a  fitting  or  needful  season  (^b).  In  his  fifth  Repub- 
lic, he  lays  it  down  as  a  maxim,  that  it  is  necessary  for 
rulers  to  make  use  of  frequent  lying   and  deceit,  for  the 


(a)  The  same  may  be  said  concerning  the  Persian  magi,  who 
were  famous  amoni?  the  antients  for  their  wisdom, 

(b)  Apud  Stob.  serm.  12. 

2  F 


226     The  loose  Doctrine  of  the  Stoics  and  other    Part  II. 

benefit  of  their  subjects,  tri^^ti,  rZ  ^iv^it  Kat  Kir^m  x^^<T^ott  (c). 
And  in  his  third  and  fourth  books  de  Republ.  he  advises 
governors  to  make  use  of  lies  both  towards  enemies  and 
citizens,  when  it  is  convenient.  In  his  second  Republic,  he 
allows  Iving  in  words  on  some  occasions,  but  not  lying  in 
the  soul,  so  as  to  believe  a  falsehood.  And  in  this  he  was 
followed  by  the  Stoics,  who  held  that  a  wise  man  might  make 
use  of  a  lie  many  ways,  omv  trvyKurxB-iasai^  without  giving 
assent  to  it,  as  in  war,  in  prospect  of  some  advantage, 
and  for  many  other  conveniences  and  managements  of  life, 
xxr  uxxeci  otxovafitetg  rS  €/»  TroAAat^  fflf).  Maximus  Tyrius  saith, 
there  is  nothing  venerable,  4^h  n^vlv^  in  truth,  if  it  be  not 
profitable  to  him  that  hears  it.  He  adds,  that  "  a  lie  is  often 
profitable  or  advantageous  to  men,  and  truth  hurtful  (eV" 
This  is  one  instance  among  many  that  might  be  mentioned, 
several  of  which  have  been  already  produced,  to  shew  how 
apt  they  were  to  mistake  in  judging  of  what  is  truly  ve- 
nerable, decorous,  and  laudable,  which  yet  they  made  one  of 
the  principal  characters  of  the  to  x^Aav,  or  honestum.  Plato 
mentions  it  as  an  old  saying,  and  which  he  approves,  that 
that  which  is  profitable  is  x«Aey,  honourable,  and  that  which 
is  hurtful  is  base,  %ri  to  (Av  &)(piXif^.h  KocXt'><,  to  ^l/SXct^t^ov  utr^^h  (y ). 
Since,  therefore,  both  he  and  others  of  the  philosophers 
held  that  a  lie  in  many  cases  is  profitable,  they  must  hold 
that   a    lie    is    often    xaAov,    honestum.  But  that  excellent 


(c)  Platon.  Opera,  p.  460.  D.  edit.  Lugd.  1590. 

(d)  Stob.  Eclog   Ethic,  lib.  ii.  p.  183.  edit.  Plantin. 

(e)  Max.  Tyr.  dissert.  3.  p.  35.  edit.  Oxon.  1678. 

(/)  Plato  Repubi.  v.  Oper.  p.  459.  D.  E.  edit.  Lugd.  It  is  to 
be  observed,  that  Plato  there  makes  use  of  this  maxim,  to  vindi-. 
cate  the  women's  appearing  naked  at  the  public  exercises, 
which  he  looked  upon  to  be  decent,  because  in  his  opinion  it 
was  profitable  for  the  connnonweahh. 


Chap.  XII.   Philosophers  respecting  Truth  and  Lying,  227 

emperor  and  philosopher  Marcus  Antoninus,  from  the  ge- 
nerosity of  his  nature,  judged  better  in  this,  as  well  as  se- 
veral other  instances,  than  most  of  the  other  philosophers. 
He  says,  that  a  wise  and  good  man  should  say  and  do  no- 
thing falsely  and  insincerely,  hi^'^vTf^Utiti  xu}  f^i^'  vTreK^/rwi, 
that  the  mind  should  be  just,  and  the  speech  so  as  never  to 
tell  a  lie;  Aoy«5  «<«?  fA^Trore  ^lec-^ivrcttrB-ar,  and  that  he  who  lies 
willingly  is  guilty  of  impiety  (^).  Some  of  our  modern 
admirers  of  the  law  of  nature  fall  short  of  thia  great  philo- 
sopher in  this  respect,  and  seem  to  allow  nothing  comely 
or  venerable  in  truth,  in  itself  considered,  but  to  judge  of 
it  merely  by  profit  or  convenience  (/?). 

I  have  now  finished  the  enquiry  I  proposed  into  the 
state  of  the  antient  Heathen  world,  with  regard  to  a  rule 
of  moral  duty.  1  have  considered  the  doctrine  of  morals  as 
taught  by  their  most  eminent  legislators  and  philosophers 
in  those  nations  which  were  most  renowned  for  learning 
and  knowledge.  It  might  have  been  expected,  that  as  all 
the  main  doctrines  of  morals  are  built  upon  the  most  solid 
grounds,  and  when  duly  considered,  are  agreeable  to  right 
reason,  some  of  those  great  men  would  have  furnished  the 
world  with  a  complete  rule  of  moral  duty,  which  might  be 
safely  depended  upon.  But  it  appears  that  in  fact  it  was 
otherwise,  and  that  the  most  celebrated  of  them  mistook  or 
perverted  the  law  of  nature  in  matters  of  great  impor- 
tance (f).  I  think,  therefore,  it  must  be  acknowledged  that 


(g)  Anton.  Medit.  book  ii.  sect.  17.  and  book  iv.  sect.  33.  and 
49.  and  book  ix.  sect.  1. 

(h)  See  particularly  what  Dr.  Tindal  says  upon  it',  whose  doc- 
trine on  this  head  is  fully  considered.  Answer  to  Christianity  as 
old  as  the  Creation,  Vol.  I.  chap.  vii.  ^ 

(z)  No  particular  notice  has  been  here  taken  of  the  philosophers 
of  the  Alexandrian  school,  or  of  the  sacred  succession,  as  they 


228      The  loose  Doctrine  of  the  Stoics  a?id  other    Part  II. 

Mr.  Locke  was  not  in  the  wrong  in  asserting,  that  "  what- 
ever was  the  cause,  it  is  evident  in  fact,  that  human  reason, 
unabsisted,  failed  in  its  great  and  proper  business  of  mo- 
rality. It  never  from  unquestionable  principles,  by  clear 
deductions,  made  out  an  entire  body  of  the  law  of  na- 
ture (/^)."  The  same  excellent  author,  who  was  himself  a 
great  master  of  reason,  and  far  from  denying  it  any  of  its 
just  prerogatives,  observes,  that  "it should  seem  by  the 
little  that  has  been  hitherto  done  in  it,  that  it  is  too  hard  a 
task  for  unassisted  reason,  to  establish  morality  in  all  its 
parts,  with  a  clear  and  convincing  light  (/)."  But  whatever 
he  supposed  concerning  this,  what  he  afterwards  observes 
cannot  be  reasonably  denied,  that  "  be  the  cause  what  it 
will,  our  Saviour  found  mankind  under  a  corruption  of 
manners  and  principles,  which  age  after  age  had  prevailed, 
and  must  be  confessed  was  not  in  a  way  or  tendency  to  be 
mended — The  rules  of  morality  were  in  different  countries 


v/ere  called,  who  flourished  a  considerable  time  after  Christianity 
had  made  its  appearance.  Some  of  them  had  noble  notions  of 
morality.  But  'hey  cannot  be  properly  brought  as/proofs  of  what 
unassisted  reason  can  do  in  morals:  since  it  is  £;enerally  agreed 
among  the  learned,  that  they  were  acquainted  with  the  Holy 
Scriptures,  and  with  the  doctrines  and  morals  of  Christianity,  of 
which  they  made  their  own  advantage,  though  they  would  not 
acknowlcdee  the  obligation.  But  as  to  this,  I  would  refer  the 
reader  to  what  has  been  obset  ved  in  the  first  volume  of  this  work, 
at  the  latter  part  of  the  2 1st  chapter. 

(k)  See   Mr.  Locke's    Reasonableness  of  Christianity,  in  his 
Works.  Vol.  11.  p.  532   3d  edit. 

'  (I)  Mr.  Locke,  Ibid.  There  is  a  remarkable  passage  to  the 
same  purpose  in  an  author  who  has  shown  himself  far  from 
being  prejudiced  in  favour  of  Religion.  Mor.  Philos.  Vol.  I.  p. 
143,  144.  I  have  already  cited  this  passage  in  the  Preliminary 
Discourse,  p.  7,  8. 


Chap.  XII.  Philosophers  respecting  Truth  and  Lying.  229 

and  sects  different,  and  natural  reason  no  where  had  nor 
was  like  to  cure  the  defects  and  errors  in  them  (m)."  This 
could  only  he  effectually  done  by  a  Divine  Revelation,  and 
ho»v  admirably  Christianity  was  fitted  to  answer  this  excel- 
lent end,  I  shall  now  proceed  to  shew. 


(m)  Locke,  ubi  supra,  p.  534. 


230  Deplorable  State  of  the  Heathens  zvith  regard  Part  1 1. 


CHAPTER  XIII. 

The  nations  were  sunk  into  a  deplorable  state  of  corruption,  with  regard  to 
morals,  at  the  time  of  our  Saviour's  appearing.  To  recover  them  from  their 
wretched  and  guilty  state  to  holiness  and  happiness,  one  principal  end  for  which 
God  sent  his  Son  into  the  world.  The  Gospel  Dispensation  opened  with  a 
free  offer  of  pardon  and  salvation  to  perishing  sinners,  upon  their  returning 
to  God  by  faith  and  repentance,  and  new  obedience:  at  the  same  time  the 
best  directions  and  assistances  were  given  to  engage  them  to  a  holy  and  vir- 
tuous practice.  The  Gospel  scheme  of  morality  exceeds  whatsoever  had  beert 
published  to  the  world  before.  A  summary  representation  of  the  excellency 
of  the  Gospel  precepts  with  regard  to  the  duties  we  owe  to  God,  our  neigh- 
bours, and  ourselves.  Thpse  precepts  enforced  by  the  most  powerful  and  im- 
portant motives.  The  tendency  of  the  Gospel  to  promote  the  practice  of  holi- 
ness and  virtue,  an  argument  to  prove  the  Divinity  of  the  Christian  Reve- 
lation. 

t  ROM  the  account  which  hath  been  given  it  appears,  that 
the  Pagan  nations,  even  those  of  them  which  were  most 
learned  and  civilized,  were-  sunk  about  the  time  of  our  Sa- 
viour's coming  into  the  most  deplorable  corruption  in  re- 
gard to  morals.  God  had  in  his  wise  and  good  providence 
done  a  great  deal  to  preserve  among  men  a  sense  and 
knowledge  of  their  duty,  but  they  had  neglected  and  abused 
their  advantages.  By  the  influence  of  vicious  appetites,  cor- 
rupt habits  and  customs,  and  wrong  opinions,  their  moral 
sense  and  taste  was  become  greatly  depraved.  The  divine 
laws  which  had  been  originally  given  to  mankind,  and  the 
traditions  relating  to  them,  were  very  much  obscured  and 
defaced.  What  passed  among  them  for  religion,  and  which 
ought  to  have  been  the  greatest  preservative  to  their  morals, 
was  amazingly  corrupted.  Their  manifold  idolatries,  the 
rites  of  their  worship,  and  the  examples  of  their  deities, 
contributed  not  a  little  to  the  general  depravity.  The  laws 
of  their  respective  countries  were  by  no  means  fitted  to  be 


Chap.  XIII.    to  Morals  at  our  Saviour^s  Coming'.  231 

an  adequate  rule  of  morals,  and  in  many  instances  allow- 
ed and  even  prescribed  things  not  consistent  with  the  purity 
of  religion  and  virtue.  The  same  may  be  said  of  their  phi- 
losophers and  moralists:  many  of  them  did  hurt  by  their 
maxims  and  examples.  The  best  of  them  were  deficient  in 
material  points  of  duty;  and  they  generally  countenanced 
the  people  in  their  idolatries,  and  gave  a  great  loose  to  sen- 
sual impurities.  And  even  where  they  were  right,  and  gave 
good  instructions,  their  finest  sentiments  had  little  weight, 
and  passed  only  for  beautiful  speculations  of  this  or  that 
philosopher,  but  were  not  looked  upon  as  laws  obligatory 
upon  mankind.  They  had  no  divine  authority  to  plead,  or, 
if  they  had  pretended  it,  were  not  able  to  produce  any 
proofs  or  credentials  to  shew  that  God  had  sent  them  to  de- 
clare his  will. 

In  this  condition  the  state  of  things  grew  worse  and 
worse:  and  at  the  time  when  the  Gospel  was  published,  all 
kinds  of  wickedness  and  dissoluteness  of  manners  had  ar- 
rived to  a  most  amazing  height.  This  is  represented  in  a 
very  striking  manner  in  the  first  chapter  of  St.  Paul's  Epis- 
tle to  the  Romans.  And  the  account  he  gives  is  attested 
and  confirmed,  even  with  regard  to  the  most  shocking  part 
of  the  description,  the  monstrous  and  unnatural  vices  and 
impurities  which  prevailed  among  them,  by  undeniable  tes- 
timonies of  the  most  celebrated  Pagan  writers,  philosophers, 
poetb,  and  historians.  The  extreme  corruption  of  manners  • 
in  the  Heathen  world  is  represented  in  several  other  parts 
of  the  New  Testament.  Hence  they  are  said  to  be  "  dead 
in  trespasses  and  sins."  And  St.  John  gives  this  emphatical 
description  of  their  state,  "  The  whole  world  lieth  in  wick- 
edness (n)." 


(n)  1  John  V.  19.  See  also  Eph.  ii.  1,  2,  3.  iv.  18,  19.  y.  6,  7. 


232  Deplorable  State  of  the  Heathens  with  regard  Part  IL 

Justly  might.  God  have  left  the  nations  to  perish  in  their 
sins,  but  in  his  great  mercy  he  had  compassion  up^^n  therai 
in  this  their  wretched  and  lost  estate.  At  the  time  which 
had  been  marked  out  by  a  series  of  illustrious  prophecies, 
and  which  was  in  itself  the  fittest,  and  when  the  great  need 
men  stood  in  of  an  extraordinary  interposition  in  the  cause 
of  religion  and  virtue  was  most  apparent,  it  pleased  God, 
in  his  infinite  wisdom  and  goodness,  to  send  his  own  Son 
into  the  world  to  save  and  redeem  mankind,  and  to  recover 
them  from  their  guilty  and  corrupt  state  to  holiness  and 
happiness.  God  had  for  a  long  time  suffered  the  nations  to 
walk  in  their  own  ways,  without  making  any  new  and  ex- 
traordinary discoveries  of  his  will  to  them.  But  now  he 
commanded  all  men  every  where  to  repent.  The  wrath  of 
God  was  revealed  from  heaven  in  the  Gospel  against  all 
ungodliness  and  unrighteousness  of  men.  The  clearest  dis- 
coveries were  made  of  the  great  evil  of  those  idolatries,  that 
wickedness  and  corruption  of  all  kinds  in  which  mankind 
were  then  generally  involved.  The  consequence  of  this  must 
have  been,  that  when  they  were  thoroughly  convinced  of  the 
evil  of  their  ways,  a  sense  of  their  guilt  would  be  apt  to  fill 
them  with  awful  thoughts  of  the  divine  vengeance  justly 
due  to  them  for  their  manifold  offences.  It  pleased  God, 
therefore,  in  his  sovereign  grace  and  wisdom,  so  to  order  it, 
that  the  Gospel  Dispensation  opened  with  a  free  and  uni- 
versal offer  of  pardoning  mercy.  They  were  assured,  that 
upon  their  returning  to  God  through  Jesus  Christ,  the  great 
Saviour  whom  he  had  provided,  by -an  humble  faith  and 
sincere  repentance,  their  past  iniquities  should  be  forgiven 
them,  they  should  be  received  into  the  divine   favour,  and 


11,  12.  1  Pet.  iv.  3,  4,  1  Thess.  iv.  5.  and  other  places  to  the  same 
purpose. 


Chap.  XIII.     to  Morals  at  our  Saviour'^s  Coming,  233 

admitted  to  the  most  glorious  hopes  and  privileges.  At  the 
same  time,  the  most  holy  and  excellent  laws  and  precepts 
were  given  them  for  instructing  and  directing  them  in  their 
duty.  And  God  condescended  to  deal  with  them  in  the  way 
of  a  gracious  covenant,  which  contained  the  most  clear  and 
express  promises  of  eternal  life  and  happiness  as  the  reward 
of  their  sincere  persevering  obedience.  What  happy  tidings 
were  these  to  a  guilty  apostate  world,  to  creatures  ready  to 
perish  in  their  sins!  And  what  a  glorious  display  was  made 
of  the  divine  goodness  and  love  to  mankind! 

What  the  subject  I  am  now  upon  leads  me  particularly 
to  consider,  is  the  excellency  of  the  Gospel  morality,  as  de- 
livered to  us  in  the  Sacred  writings.  The  Scriptures  of  the 
Old  Testament  are  full  of  admirable  precepts  and  instruc- 
tions relating  to  the  duties  which  God  requireth  of  man. 
These  had  been  published  long  before,  and  as  the  Jews  and 
their  Scriptures  were  generally  dispersed,  it  is  reasonable 
to  conclude  that  they  were  of  use  to  many  of  the  Gentiles 
who  had  access  to  them.  But  the  Jews  were  for  the  most 
part  very  unpopular,  and  kept  separate  by  distinct  rites  and 
usages,  and  their  doctors  had  by  wrong  interpretations 
wrested  and  perverted  the  true  sense  of  the  law  and  pro- 
phets. And  even  with  regard  to  several  of  the  moral  pre- 
cepts, they  had,  as  our  Saviour  charges  them,  made  the  law 
void  by  their  traditions,  teaching  for  doctrines  the  com- 
mandments of  men.  One  valuable  end  therefore  of  his  com- 
ing with  such  illustrious  proofs  of  his  divine  authority  and 
mission,  was  to  clear  the  true  sense  of  the  law  and  the  pro- 
phets, to  confirm  and  establish  the  moral  precepts,  and  to 
carry  them  to  a  still  higher  degree  of  excellence,  and  give 
them  additional  light  and  force.  As  he  came,  to  instruct 
men  in  the  right  knowledge  of  God,  and  the  nature  of  true 
religion,  so  also  to  set  before  them  a  complete  rule  of  moral 
duty  in  its  just  extent,  enforced  by  all  the  sanctions  of  a 
divine  authority,  and  by  the  most  powerful  and  engaging 

Vol.  IL  2  G 


234  One  great  design  of  Christian  Revelation  xvas  Part  II. 

motives,  and  beautifully  exemplified  in  his  own  sacred  life 
and  practice.  1  o  consider  the  evangelical  scheme  of  morality 
at  large,  as  it  justly  deserves,  would  furnish  mati'-r  for  a 
distinct  volume,  and  could  not  well  be  brought  wiihm  the 
compass  of  this  work.  But  it  may  be  of  use  to  set  before 
the  reader  a  summary  of  it  under  three  principal  heads,  as 
relating  to  the  duties  required  of  us  with  respect  to  God, 
our  neighbours,  and  ourselves,  which  St,  Paul  expresses  by 
our  living  soberly,  righteously,  and  godly  in  this  present 
world. 

The  most  eminent  part  of  our  duty,  which  is  the  first  in 
order  and  dignity,  and  gives  a  binding  force  to  all  the  rest, 
is  the  duty  we  more  immediately  owe  to  God.  And  as  a 
right  idea  of  the  Supreme  Bcmg  lies  at  the  foundation  of 
the  duties  we  o^ve  him,  so  it  is  not  possible  to  form  more 
just,  more  noble,  and  sublime  ideas  of  the  Deity  than  are 
held  forth  to  us  in  the  sacred  writings,  both  of  the  Old  Tes- 
tament and  of  the  New.  All  the  admirable  descriptions  of 
the  divine  nature  and  attributes,  which  are  to  be  found  in 
the  law  and  the  prophets,  do  also  belong  to  the  religion  of 
Jesus,  who  hath  farther  confirmed  and  improved  them.  We 
are  taught  that  there  is  one  only  living  and  true  God,  who 
existeth  of  himself  from  everlasting  to  everlasting:  that  he 
is  a  spirit,  invisible  to  a  mortal  eye,  and  who  is  not  to  be 
represented  by  any  corporeal  form:  that  he  is  possessed  of 
all  possible  perfection,  and  in  him  is  no  variableness,  neither 
shadow  of  turning  (o).  That  his  greatness  is  unsearchable, 
hrs  understanding  is  infinite,  his  power,  almighty  and  irre- 


(o)  The  passages  of  Scripture  rehiting  to  the  Divine  Nature 
and  Attributes  are  too  many  to  be  here  enumerated.  I  can  only 
point  to  a  very  few  Exod.  iii  14.  Deut,  vi.  4.  Psal.  xc.  2.  cii, 
26.  John  iv.  24.  I  Tim.  vi.   16.  Jam.  i.  If. 


Chap.  XIII.    to  give  us  a  perfect  rule  of  Moral  Duty,     235 

sistible  (/?).  That  at  the  time  which  seemed  most  fit  to  his 
own  wisdom  and  gooJnrss  he  made  heaven  and  earth,  and 
all  things  that  are  therein;  he  only  commanded  and  they 
were  created:^  that  he  continually  uphold-th  all  things  by 
the  word  of  his  power:  and  in  him  all  things  consist  (^), 
That  he  exerciseth  an  universal  government  and  Provi- 
dence over  all  the  orders  of  bt ings  which  he  hath  created. 
An  i  particular  care  is  taken  to  inform  us,  that  though  he 
be  infinitely  exalted  above  our  highest  conceptions,  and 
though  it  be  a  condescension  in  him  to  regard  the  most  ex^ 
alted  of  created  beings,  yet  his  care  extendeth  to  the 
meanest  of  his  creatures.  But  we  are  in  an  especial  manner 
assured,  of  what  it  most  nearly  concerneth  us  to  know,  that 
his  providential  care  extendeth  to  the  individuals  of  the  hu- 
man race;  that  he  is  the  author  of  all  the  good  things  we 
enjoy,  and  that  all  the  events  which  befal  us  are  under  his 
direction  and  superintendency  (r).  That  he  fiUeth  heaven 
and  earth  with  his  presence,  and  is  not  far  from  any  of  us, 
seeing  it  is  in  him  that  we  live,  move,  and  have  our  being: 
that  all  things  are  naked  and  opened  unto  him,  and  there 
is  not  any  creature  that  is  not  manifest  in  his  sight  (^).  * 

But  above  all  we  are  there  instructed  to  form  right  no- 
tions of  God's  illustrious  moral  perfections:  that  he  is  infi- 
nitely wise,  and  directeth  all  things  in  the  best  and  fittest 
manner  {t)\  and  though  sometimes  clouds  and  darkness  are 


(Ji)  Psal.  cxlv.  3.  cxlvii.  5.  Job  xi.  7.  xii.  13. 

{jj)  Gen.  i.  1.3,  &c.  Psal.  xxxiii.  6,  7,  8,  9.  cxlviii.  5.  Nehem. 
ix.  5,  6.  Acts  xiv.  15.  Col.  i.  16.  Revel,  iv.  1 1. 

(r)  Psal.  ciii  19.  Job  iv  18  Psal.  cxiii.  5,  6,  7.  Psal.  cxlv.  15, 
16.  Matlh.  vi.  26.  30.  x.  29,  30.  1   Sam.  ii.  6,  7,  8. 

(«)  Psal.  cxxxix.  7 — 12.  Jerem.  xxiii.  24.  Acts  xvii.  27,  2  8. 
Heb  iv.  13. 

(0  Deut.  xxxii.  4.  1  Tim.  i.  17. 


236  A  Summary  of  the  Gospel  Morality         Part  II. 

about  him,  and  we  cannot  penetrate  into  the  reasons  of 
his  dispensations,  yet  he  is  righteous  in  all  his  ways,  and 
holy  in  all  his  works:  that  he  is  of  invariable  faithfulness 
and  truth,  and  that  it  is  impossible  for  God  to  lie  (u).  That 
he  is  good  to  all,  and  his  tender  mercies  are  over  all  his 
works:  and  he  is  continually  doing  good  even  to  the  sinful 
human  race  (at).  That  he  is  the  God,  not  of  the  Jews  only> 
but  also  of  the  Gentiles:  and  that  with  him  there  is  no  re- 
spect of  persons,  but  in  every  nation  he  that  feareth  God, 
and  worketh  righteousness,  is  accepted  of  him  (z/).  The 
mercy  of  God  towards  penitent  returning  sinners  is  fre- 
quently declared  both  in  the  Old  Testament  and  in  the  New, 
But  it  is  especially  in  the  Gospel  that  all  the  riches  of  di- 
vine grace  are  represented  in  the  most  engaging  manner, 
and  the  wonderful  love  of  God  towards  mankind  is  most 
affect ingly  displayed  in  the  methods  of  our  redemption  and 
salvation  through  Jesus  Christ.  And  therefore  that  most 
amiable  description  is  there  given  of  him,  that  "  God  is 
love  (2)."  Yet  at  the  same  time,  that  the  riches  of  the  di- 
vine grace  and  mercy  may  not  be  abused  as  an  encourage- 
ment to  licentiousness,  he  is  every  where  represented  in 
Scripture  as  infinitely  just  and  holy:  his  goodness,  as  there 
described  to  us,  is  not  such  a  soft  indulgence  as  might  encou- 
rage sinners  to  transgress  his  laws  with  impunity,  but  is 
always  in  conjunction  with  the  most  perfect  wisdom  and 
righteousness.  His  just  displeasure  against  sin,  and  the  pu- 
nishments he  will  inflict  on  obstinate  impenitent  sinners,  are 
represented  in  a  striking  manner.   And  we  are  assured  that 


(w)  Psal.  xcvii.  2.  cxlv.  IT.cxvii.  2.    Tit.  i.  2.  Heb.  vi.  18. 
(x)  Psal.  cxlv,  9.  Matth.  v.  45.   Acts  xiv.  17. 
(t/)  Exod.  xxxiv.  6,  7.  Psal.  Ixxxvi.  9.  15.  Is.  Iv.  7.  Rom.  iii. 
29.    Acts   X.  34,  35.  2  Pet.  iii.  9. 
(z)  1  John  iv.    8,   9,  10.  16. 


Chap.  XIII.        as  delivered  in  the  Scriptures,  237 

he  will  judge  the  world  in  righteousness,  and  render  to  all 
men  according  to  their  deeds,  not  merely  their  outward  ac- 
tions, but  the  secret  dispositions  of  their  hearts  («). 

Such  is  the  idea  which  is  there  given  us  of  God  and  his 
glorious  perfections  and  attributes:  the  noblest  that  can  be 
conceived,  and  the  best  fitted  to  produce  worthy  affections 
and  dispositions  towards  him.*  And  accordingly  as  in  the 
Gospel  we  are  instructed  to  form  the  most  becoming  no- 
tions of  the  Deity,  so  we  have  the  most  excellent  directions 
given  us  as  to  the  duties  we  should  render  to  him. 

We  are  commanded  to  love  the  Lord  our  God  with  all 
our  heart,  and  soul,  and  mind,  and  strength:  this  our  Sa- 
viour represents  as  the  first  and  great  commandment  {b). 
And  what  an  amiable  idea  does  this  give  us  of  religion,  as 
flowing  from  and  comprehended  in  this  divine  principle! 
It  includes  our  having  the  highest  esteem  and  admiration 
of  his  incomparable  perfections,  and  especially  of  his  mar- 
vellous grace  and  goodness:  that  we  must  rejoice  and  de- 
light ourselves  in  him,  and  seek  for  our  highest  happiness 
in  him  alone  (c).  That  we  must  be  animated  with  a  pure 
zeal  for  his  glory,  and  must  prefer  the  pleasing  and  honour- 
ing him  before  the  gratifying  our  fleshly  inclinations,  or 
promoting  our  worldly  interests,  all  which  we  must  be  rea- 
dy to  abandon  when  called  to  do  so  for  his  sake,  or  which 
is  the  same  thing,  for  the  cause  of  truth,  real  religion,  and 
righteousness  (jd).  Divine  love  is  the  source  of  a  holy,  in- 
genuous, delightful  obedience.  Hence  it  is  declared,  that 


(a)  Eccles.  xii.  14.  Acts  xvii.  31.  Rom.  ii.  9,  10.  16. 

(b)  Deut.  vi.  5.  Matth.  xxii.  37,  38. 

(c)  Psal.  xxxvii.  4.  Ixxiii.  25.  Phil.  iv.  4. 

(rf)  Matth.  V.   10.  X.  37.  ^ 


238  A  Sumary  of  the  Gospel  Morality  Part  II. 

"  this    is    the   love   of  God,    that  we  keep  his  command- 
ments (0*" 

But  then  we  are  also  taught,  that  this  love  to  God,  in 
order  to  its  being  of  the  right  kind,  must  be  accompanied 
with  a  holy  fear  of  his  Divine  Majt^sty:  a  temper  highly 
becoming  reasonable  creatures,  towards  the  Supreme  and 
absolutely  perfect  Being,  our  Almighty  Maker,  our  Sove- 
reign Lord,  and  most  righteous  Governor  and  Judge. 
This  is  of  such  importance,  that  the  fear  of  God  and  real 
piety  are  often  made  use  of  as  terms  of  the  same  significa- 
tion. To  serve  God  with  reverence  and  godly  fear  is  re- 
presented as  essential  to  a  true  and  acceptable  worship 
(y).  And  where  this  prevails,  it  will  be  the  most  effectual 
pre:>ervative  against  sin  and  wickedness,  it  will  produce  in 
us  the  profoundest  siibmission  to  his  divine  authority,  it  will 
make  us  afraid,  above  all  things,  of  offending  him,  and 
will  raise  us  above  the  base   and  inordinate   fear   of  men 

is)- 

It  is  also  required  of  us,  that  we  exercise  a  firm  trust 
and  confidence  in  him,  and  an  entire  unreserved  resignation 
to  his  will,  from  a  steady  persuasion  of  his  just  dominion 
over  us,  his  power,  wisdom,  goodness,  and  all-sufficiency(A). 
On  him  we  are  encouraged  to  cast  all  our  burdens  and 
cares,  to  commit  ourselves  wholly  to  his  disposal,  and  to 
acquiesce  in  all  his  providential  dispensations,  being  satisfied 
that  he  ordereth  all  things  really  for  the  best,  and  will  cause 
all  events  to  work  together  for  good  to  them  that  love 
him  (z). 


(t)  I  Jahn  V.  3. 

(/)  Deut.  X.  20.  Heb.  xii.  28. 

{g)  Prov.  xvi,  6.  Eccles.  xii.  13.  Luke  xii.  4,  5.    1  Pet.  iii.  14, 
15. 
{h)  Psal.  Ixii  8.  Is.  xxvi.  4.  1  Tim.  vii.  17. 
Q)  Psal.  xxxvii.  4,  5.  Psal.  Iv.  22.  1  Pet.  v.  7.  Rom.  viii.  28. 


Chap.  XIII.         as  delivered  in  the  Scriptures.  239 

We  are  every  where  taught  in  Scripture  that  an  habitual 
regard  to  God,  to  his  presence  and  approbation,  must  in- 
fluence our  whole  conduct.  This  is  expressed  by  our 
walking  before  the  Lord,  and  walking  worthy  of  the  Lord, 
unto  all  pleasing.  We  are  directed  to  refer  all  to  God;  to 
make  it  our  constant  care  and  endeavour  to  glorify  him  in 
the  world  with  our  bodies  and  spirits  which  are  his;  and 
are  commanded  whether  we  eat  or  drink,  or  whatsoever  we 
do,  to  do  all  to  the  glory  of  God  (i). 

As  God  is  the  great  original  of  all  perfection,  and  ex- 
cellence, and  his  moral  attributes  are  in  an  especial  manner 
very  clearly  revealed  to  us  in  the  Sacred  Writings,  so  it  is 
there  represented  as  a  noble  part  of  our  dut\'  to  aspire  after 
a  conformity  to  him  in  them,  as  far  as  he  is  imitable  by  such 
frail  creatures  as  we  are.  It  is  required  of  us  that  we  en- 
deavour to  be  holy  as  he  is  holy,  perfect  (as  far  as  our  limit- 
ed capacities  will  allow)  as  our  Heavenly  Father  is  periect, 
and  to  be  followers  or  imitators  of  God  as  becometh  dear 
children  (/).  And  for  this  we  have  peculiar  advantages  un- 
der the  Gospel,  as  we  have  his  moral  excellencies  and  per- 
fections, his  holiness  and  purity,  his  love  and  goodness,  his 
faithfulness  and  truth,  his  condescending  grace  and  mercy, 
most  beautifully  exemplified  in  his  well  beloved  Son,  the 
unspotted  image  of  his  own  excellence.  It  is  then  we  best 
resemble  God,  when  the  same  mind  is  in  us  that  was  in 
Christ  Jesus. 

With  respect  to  the  worship  we  are  to  render  to  the 
Supreme  Being,  we  are  required  to  worship  him  who  is  an 
infinite  Spirit  in  spirit  and  in  truth.  The  worshipping 
false  gods,  and  the  worshipping  the  true  God  under  cor- 


(Ar)  Gen.  xvii.  1.  Psal.  cxvi.  9.  Col.  i.  10.  1  Cor.  vi.  20.  x.  3U 
(0  Matt.  V.  48.  Eph.  v.  1,  2.  I  Pet.  i.  15,  16. 


240  A  Summary  of  the  Gospel  Morality      Part  II* 

poreal  images  and  representations,  is  most  expressly  for- 
bidden (w).  The  multiplicity  of  idol  deities  which  were 
adored  in  the  Pagan  world,  whilst  the  only  true  God  was 
neglected,  together  with  the  cruel,  the  impure,  and  absurd 
rites  of  their  worship,  are  rejected.  And  under  the  Gospel 
we  are  also  freed  from  the  various  rices  and  sacrifices  pre- 
scribed in  the  law  of  Moses,  which  though  originally  in- 
stituted for  wise  ends,  well  suited  to  that  time  and  state  of 
things,  yet  were  burdensome  in  the  observance,  and  not  so 
fitted  to  that  more  spiritual  and  perfect  dispensation  which 
our  Saviour  came  to  introduce.  There  is  a  noble  purity 
and  simplicity  in  the  Gospel-worship  as  represented  in  the 
New-Testament;  and  the  sacred  rites  and  ordinances  there 
prescribed  are  few  in  number,  and  excellent  in  their  use 
and  significancy.  And  at  the  same  time  great  care  is  taken 
to  instruct  us,  that  no  external  rites  will  be  of  any  advan- 
tage or  avail  to  our  acceptance  with  God  without  real  ho- 
liness of  heart  and  life. 

As  to  the  spiritual  sacrifices  of  prayer  and  praise,  we 
have  both  the  best  directions  given  us  in  the  sacred  Writ- 
ings, and  the  noblest  patterns  set  before  us  of  a  pure  and 
elevated  devotion.  We  are  there  taught  to  celebriUe  and 
adore  his  transcendent  excellencies  and  perfections,  as 
shining  forth  in  his  wonderful  works;  and  in  the  revela- 
tions of  his  word,  and  to  give  him  the  praise  that  is  due  to 
his  great  and  glorious  name  (/z).  To  him  we  are  directed 
to  offer  up  our  thankful  acknowledgments  for  all  the  mer- 
cifes  we  receive,  and  our  petitions  and. supplications  for  all 
the  good  things  we  stand  in  need  of:  which  tends  to  keep 


(;n)'Exod.  xx.  3.  4,  5.  Matt.  iv.  10.  John  iv.  24.  Gal.  iv.  8. 
1  Tliess.  i.  9.  Acts  xiv.  15. 

(n)  See  Psal.  ciii.  civ.  cxiviii.  Nehem.  ix.  5,  6.  I  Tim.  i.  17. 
vi.  15,  16.  Rev.  iv.  10,  11.  v.  13.  xv.  3,  4. 


Chap.  XIII.     as  delivered  in  the  Scriptures^  241 

up  in  our  minds  a  constant  sense  of  our  absolute  depen« 
dence  upon  God,  and  our  great  obligations  to  his  good- 
ness (o).  We  must  also  confess  our  sins  before  him  with 
penitent  and  .contrite  hearts,  humbling  ourselves  on  the 
account  of  them,  and  imploring  his  meres ;  which  is  a  part 
of  religion  justly  becoming  sinful  creatures,  and  frequently- 
recommended  in  the  Holy  Scriptures  (/?). 

It  is  farther  to  be  observed,  that  we  are  required  in  the 
Gospel  to  offer  up  our  prayers,  praises,  and  solemn  acts 
of  dt  volion  to  God  in  the  name  of  Jesus  Christ,  the  great 
Mediator  whom  he  hath  in  his  wisdom  and  goodness  ap- 
pointed for  the  great  work  of  redeeming  and  saving  tnim- 
kind.  This  is  the  stated  order  of  the  Gospel- worship  f^). 
And  the  regard  we  are  obliged  to  have  in  all  things  to  the 
Mediator,  through  whom  we  have  access  bv  one  Spirit 
unto  the  Father,  is  a  wise  and  gracious  provision  for  God's 
dispensing  his  blessings  to  us  in  such  a  way  as  is  most  be- 
coming his  own  infinite  majesty,  and  the  honour  of  his 
government  and  perfections.  It  tendeth  both  to  impress  our 
hearts  with  a  just  sense  of  God's  infinite  greatness  and 
spotless  purity,  and  of  the  evil  of  sin,  which  rendereth  us 
unfit  to  approach  immediately  to  so  holy  and  glorious  a 
majesty;  and  is  at  the  same  time  excellently  fitted  to  dispel 
our  guilty  jealousies  and  fears,  and  to  inspire  us  with  an 
ingrnuous  trust  and  affiance  in  him.  For  we  cannot  now 
reasonably  doubt  of  God's  kind  intentions  towards  us,  and 
of  his  gracious  acceptance  of  our  sincere  though  imperfect 
services,  since  he  requires  us  to  offer  them  to  him  in  the 
name   of  his  well-beloved   Son,   in   whom   he   *'  is  always 


(o)  Psal.  evil,  cxxxvi.  1    Thess.  v.  17,  18.  Mat.  vi.  6—13.  viL 
7—11.  Phil.  iv.  6.  Psal.  Ixv.  2 

{p.)  Psal.  xxxii.  5.  Prov.  xxviii.  13.   1  John  i.  9, 
(^r)  John  xvi.  23.   Col.  iii.  17.  Eph.  ii.  18. 
Vol.  II.  2  H 


242  A  Summary  of  the  Gospel  Morality      Part  IIv 

well-pleased,"  who  by  his  wise  appointment  offered  him- 
self a  sacrifice  for  our  sins,  and  who  "  is  able  to  save 
unto  the  uttermost  all  them  that  come  unto  God  by  him,, 
seeing  he  ever  livcth  to  make  intercession  for  us  (r)."  The 
Gentiles  had  some  notion  of  the  propriety  of  applying  to 
God  through  a  Mediator,  which  perhaps  might  be  owing 
to  some  remains  of  an  antient  tradition  derived  from  the 
first  ages.  But  this,  like  other  branches  of  the  primitive 
religion,  became  greatly  perverted  and  obscured.  As  they 
had  a  multiplicity  of  idol  gods,  so  also  of  idol  mediators: 
and  these  being  all  of  their  own  devising,  without  any  di- 
vine warrant  and  appointment,  spread  a  strange  confusion 
through  their  worship.  They  had,  as  St.  Paul  expresseth  it, 
"  gods  many,  and  lords  many,"  whom  they  worshipped  and 
adored:  but  to  us  Christians,  "  there  is  but  one  God  the 
Father,  of  whom  are  all  things,  and  we  in  him;  and  one 
Lord  Jesus  Christ,  by  whom  are  all  things,  and  we  by 
him."  And  he  elsewhere  observes,  that  "  there  is  one  God 
and  one  Mediator  between  God  and  man,  and  that  Jesus 
Christ  is  he  (<y)."  And  our  regard  to  this  great  Mediator, 
instead  of  taking  off  our  regards  from  God  our  heavenly 
Father,  tends  rather  to  heighten  our  reverence  of  his  Di- 
vine Majesty,  our  love  to  him,  our  confidence  in  him,  and 
to  fill  us  with  the  highest  admiration  of  his  wisdom  and 
goodness.  For  it  is  he  that  in  his  sovereign  grace  and  love 
hath  appointed  his  only  begotten  Son  to  be  the  Saviour  of 
mankind,  through  whom  he  communicateth  to  us  the  most 
valuable  blessings  {t). 


(r)  Heb.  iv.  14,  15,  16.  vii.  25.  I  John  ii.  12. 

(s)  1  Cor.  viii.  5,  6.   1  Tim.  ii.  5. 

(0  )  have  elsewhere  more  larj^cly  vindicated  the  Gospel 
doctrine  of  the  Mediator,  as  highly  tei.ding  to  the  glory  of  God, 
and  the  j^ond  ^f  m  unkind.  Answer  to  Cnrist.  as  old  as  the  Crea- 
tion, vol.  11.  cap.  XV. 


Chap.  XIII.     as  delivered  in  the  Scriptures.  243 

Not  only  doth  Christianity  give  the  most  excellent  pre- 
cepts and  directions  with  respect  to  the  duties  we  more 
immediately  owe  to  God,  but  also  with  regard  to  the 
duties  incumbent  upon  us  towards  our  fellow-creatures. 

These  m..y  be  ranked  under  two  comprehensive  heads, 
the  doing  justly  and  loving  mercy;  and  the  precepts  de- 
livered to  us  in  the  Holy  Scriptures,  and  particularly  in 
the  Gospel  of  Jesus,  a  •  ac'mira  .e  with  respect  to  both 
these.  It  may  be  sufficient  to  point  to  a  ^tw  of  them. 

It  is  required  of  us  that  we  be  far  from  offering  the  least 
wrong  or  injury  to  others,  in  their  persons,  their  proper- 
ties, or  reputations:  that  we  render  unto  all  their  dues:  that 
we  lie  not  one  to  another,  but  speak  every  man  truth  to  his 
neighbour,  and  provide  things  honest  in  the  sight  of  all 
men.  All  fraud  and  falsehood  in  our  words  and  dealings, 
and  all  injustice  and  violence,  is  most  expressly  forbid- 
den (w).  Not  only  must  we  abstain  from  injurious  actions, 
but  we  are  required  not  to  be  angry  at  our  brother  without 
a  cause,  to  speak  evil  of  no  man,  and  neither  to  raise  evil 
reports  ourselves  against  our  neighbour,  nor  spread  them 
abroad  when  raised  by  others  (x).  We  are  forbidden  to 
pass  rash  judgments  upon  others,  lest  we  ourselves  should 
be  judged  of  God:  on  the  contrary,  we  must  put  the  best 
constructions  upon  their  words  and  actions  which  the 
case  will  bear  (z/).  And  our  Saviour  inculcates  it  in  the 
strongest  manner,  that  no  seeming  acts  of  piety  and  devo- 
tion, or  a  diligence  in  the  ritual  observances  of  religion, 
will  compensate  for  the  wrongs  or  injuries  done  to    our 


(u)  Micah  vi.   8.  Levit.  xix.  11.  13.  15.  35,  36.  Rom.  xiii.  7. 

Eph.  iv.  25.  2  Cor.  viii.  21. 

{x)  Psal.  XV.  3.  Malt,  v   21,  22.  Tit.  iii.  2.     ^ 

(y)  Matt.  vii.  1,2.  Rom.  xiv.  10.  1   Cor.  xiii.  5,7*  James  iv. 

11. 


244  A  summary  of  the  Gospel  Morality     Part  IL 

neighbours,  nor  will  be  accepted  of  God  without  making 
reparation,  as  far  as  is  in  our  power,  for  those  injuries  and 
wrongs  (2). 

Not  only  doth  the  Gospel  forbid  the  injuring  our  neigh- 
bour in  any  respect  whatsoever,  but  it  most  expressly  binds 
it  upon  us  as  our  duty  to  do  good  to  all  men  as  far  as  we 
have  ability  and  opportunity.  We  are  required  to  assist 
them  in  their  necessities  and  distresses,  to  sympathize  with 
them  in  their  afflictions  and  sorrows,  as  well  as  to  rejoice 
in  the  good  things  which  befal  them,  to  be  ready  to  dis- 
tribute to  them  of  our  worldly  substance  for  supplying  their 
wants,  to  endeavour  to  convert  them  from  the  error  of  their 
way,  and  to  reprove  them  when  guilty  of  faults  in  the  spirit 
of  meekness,  and  finally,  to  do  all  we  can  to  promote  their 
welfare  spiritual  and  temporal  {a).  Our  Saviour  the  more 
effectually  to  shew  the  great  importance  of  the  duties  of 
charit>'  and  mercy  assures  us,  that  particular  notice  shall 
be  taken  of  them  at  the  great  day  of  judgment,  and  that 
men  shall  then  be  rewarded  or  condemned,  according  to 
their  abounding  in  or  neglecting  the  practice  of  those 
duties. 

And  whereas  the  most  di'fficult  part  of  the  duty  required 
of  us  towards  mankind  relates  to  the  temper  and  conduct 
we  are  to  observe  towards  our  enemies  and  those  that  have 
injured  us,  our  blessed  Lord  hath  given  us  in  this  respect 
the  most  admirable  precepts  and  directions.  If  we  have  suf- 
fered injuries  from  others,  he  enjoineth  us  to  exercise  a 
forgiving  temper  towards  them,  and  not  to  give  way  to  the 
bitterness  of  revenge.   Some  of  our  Lord's  precepts  to  this 


(z)  Matt.  V.  23,  24.  xxiii.  23.  Is.  i.  1 1  — 18. 
(a)  Is.  i.  17.  Iviii.    6—11.  Gal.   vi.    10.    1  Tim.  vi.  18.  Hebr. 
xiii.  3.  16.  James  v.  20.  Gal.  vi.  1.  Levit.  xix.  17.  Rom.  xii.  15. 


Chap.  XIII.     as  delivered  in  the  Scriptures.  245 

purpose  in  his  admirable  sermon  on  the  mount,  are  express- 
ed in  a  proverbial  way,  and  not  to  be  urged  in  the  utmost 
rigour;  but  the  design  of  them  is  obvious  and  excellent,  to 
suppress  as  fgir  as  possible  the  motions  of  a  furious  and  vin- 
dictive spirit,  which  hath  done  so  much  mischief  in  the 
world,  and  to  signify  to  us,  that  it  is  better  patiently  to  bear 
injuries,  than  to  be  forward  to  retaliate  them.  He  hath  re- 
quired us  to  insert  it  in  our  prayers,  that  God  would  forgive 
us  our  sins,  as  we  forgive  others  the  offences  committed 
against  us.  The  same  is  the  design  of  some  of  his  excellent 
parables.  And  in  this  as  well  as  other  instances  the  apos- 
tles taught  the  same  doctrine  with  their  divine  Lord  and 
Master,  that  we  should  recompense  to  no  man  evil  for  evil, 
and  instead  of  being  overcome  of  evil,  should  overcome 
evil  with  good  (^). 

This  leads  me  to  add,  that  our  Lord  not  only  forbiddeth 
the  rendering  evil  for  evil,  but  commandeth  us  to  render 
good  for  evil.  This  is  the  design  of  that  glorious  precept, 
whereby  we  are  commanded  to  love  our  enemies,  to  bless 
them  that  curse  us,  to  do  good  to  them  that  hate  us,  and 
to  pray  for  them  that  despitefuUy  use  us  and  persecute  us. 
Instead  of  cursing  we  must  pray  to  God  for  them,  not  in- 
deed that  they  may  go  on  and  prosper  in  their  evil  courses, 
but  that  they  may  be  brought  to  a  right  temper  of  mind,  and 
so  may  become  the  objects  of  the  divine  favour:  and  if  they 
be  reduced  to  distress,  we  must  be  ready  to  assist  and  serve 
them  in  the  kind  offices  of  humanity.  "  If  thine  enemy  hun- 
ger, feed  him;  if  he  thirst,  give  him  drink  (c)."  And  this  cer- 
tainly is  carrying  benevolence  to  the  noblest  height.   And 


(6)  Rom.  xii.  17,  18,  19,  20,  21.  1  Thess.  v.  J 5.  1  Pet.  iii.  9. 
Levit.  xix.  18. 

(c)  Matt.  V.  43,  44.  Rom.  xii.  20.  Prov.xxv.  21. 


246  A  Summary  of  the  Gospel  Morality        Part  II. 

though  there  have  been  high  pretenders  to  reason  who  have 
found  fault  with  it,  yet  some  of  the  most  eminent  among 
the  antient  philosophers,  as  was  observed  before,  have  been 
sensible  of  the  beauty  and  excellency  of  such  a  conduct,  but 
they  wanted  the  authority  necessary  to  make  it  a  law  obli- 
gatory on  mankind.  But  in  the  Gospel  of  Jesus  it  is  more 
strongly  enforced,  urged  with  more  powerful  motives  than 
ever  it  was  before,  and  is  bound  upon  us  by  a  most  express 
divine  authority.  To  this  it  may  be  added,  that  our  Lord 
hath  expressly  condemned  that  spirit,  which  carries  men  to 
persecute  and  do  hurt  to  others,  under  pretence  of  zeal  for 
the  cause  of  God  and  religion  (^). 

Upon  the  whole,  it  is  the  manifest  and  uniform  design 
and  tendency  of  the  Gospel  of  Jesus  to  recommend  and 
enforce  an  universal  benevolence.  It  lays  the  foundation  of 
the  duties  we  owe  to  mankind  in  love.  It  is  there  given  as 
a  comprehensive  summary  of  the  duties  we  owe  to  man- 
kind: "  Thou  shalt  love  thy  neighbour  as  thyself  (^)."  And 
by  our  neighbour  we  are  taught  to  understand  not  merely 
those  of  the  same  country,  nation,  and  religion  with  our- 
selves, but  all  of  the  human  race  that  stand  in  need  of  our 
kindness,  and  to  whom  we  have  an  opportunity  of  doing 
good.  This  is  beautifully  exemplified  by  our  Saviour,  in  the 
parable  of  the  good  Samaritan  (^f)»  To  which  may  be 
added,  that  other  remarkable  precept,  "  Whatsoever  ye 
would  that  men  should  do  unto  you,  do  ye  even  so  to 
them  (^)."  A  rule  which,  if  rightly  considered,  would  be 
of  great  use  in  regulating  our  conduct,  towards  our  fellow- 
creatures. 


{d)  Luke  ix.  54,  55,  56. 

(e)  Matt.  xxii.  39.  Rom.  xiii.  8,  9.  Jam.  ii.  8.  Levit.  xix.  18. 

{J)  Luke  X.  33,  34,  Z5, 

(g)  Matt.  vii.  12. 


Chap.  XIII.     as  delivered  in  the  Scriptures.  247 

But  though  we  are  required  to  love  and  do  good  to  all 
men,  the  design  is  not,  as  some  who  are  desirous  to  im- 
peach the  Gospel  morality  would  insinuate,  that  we  should 
have  the  sanie  degree  of  affection  for  all.  The  special  love 
and  esteem  which  good  men  should  have  for  one  another, 
the  peculiar  ties  by  which  they  are  united,  additional  to 
the  common  ties  of  humanity,  are  recommended  and  en- 
forced in  the  strongest  and  most  engaging  manner,  and  lay 
the  properest  foundation  for  all  the  intimacies  of  sacred 
friendship  (A). 

Besides  the  general  precepts,  prescribing  the  duties  of 
justice  and  benevolence  towards  all  mankind,  there  are  also 
particular  injunctions  given  us  with  respect  to  the  duties 
incumbent  upon  us  in  the  several  stations  and  relations  we 
bear  in  the  civil  and  social  life.  And  these  are  of  great  im- 
portance to  the  welfare  of  nations,  families,  and  particular 
persons.  The  duties  of  princes,  magistrates,  and  subjects, 
are  excellently  represented,  every  way  sufficient,  if  duly  at- 
tended to,  to  preserve  the  good  order  and  welfare  of  socie- 
ty. It  is  required,  that  they  that  rule  over  men  be  just,  rul- 
ing in  the  fear  of  God.  Kings  and  all  in  authority  are  taught 
to  consider  themselves  as  under  the  dominion  of  the  great 
and  universal  Sovereign,  the  King  of  kings  and  Lord  of 
hosts,  to  whom  they  must  be  accountable  for  their  conduct, 
who  hath  appointed  them  for  the  good  of  the  people,  over 
whom  he  hath  placed  them,  that  they  may  administer  jus- 
tice and  judgment  without  respect  of  persons,  and  be  a  ter- 
ror not  to  good  works,  but  to  the   evil  (i).    Subjects  are 


Qi)  John  xiii.  34,  35.  Gal.  vi.  10.  Eph.  iv.  1—6.  Phil.  ii.  1 
—5.   I  Pet.  i.  22.   1  Johniii.  16. 

(i)  Deut.  i.  16,  17.  2  Sam.  xxiii.  3.  2  Chron.  xix.  6,  7. 
Psal.  ixxxii.  l — 4.  Piov.  xx.  26 — 28.  xxix.  11.  14.  Eccles.  v.  8. 
Rom.  xiii.  3,  4.  1  Pet.  ii.  13,  14,  15. 


248  A  Summary  of  the  Gospel  Morality         Part  II. 

taught  to  be  submissive  and  obedient  to  the  higher  powers^ 
to  pray  for  them,  to  fear  God  and  honour  the  king,  to  give 
unto  Csesar  the  things  which  are  Csesar's,  to  render  tribute 
to  whom  tribute  is  due,  custom  to  whom  custom,  fear  to 
whom  fear,  honour  to  whom  honour;  and  to  dt)  all  this,  not 
merely  because  the  civil  laws  require  it,  and  for  fear  of  pu- 
nishment from  men,  but  for  conscience  sake,  and  in  obedience 
to  the  laws  of  God  (^k).  In  like  manner  it  is  urged  as  a  ne- 
cessary part  of  religion,  for  servants  to  obey  and  serve  their 
masters,  with  all  proper  respect,  fidelity,  and  diligence,  not 
purloining,  not  answering  again,  with  good-will  doing  ser- 
vice as  unto  the  Lord,  and  not  unto  men,  knowing  that 
whatsoever  good  thing  any  man  doeth,  that  shall  he  receive 
of  the  Lord,  whether  he  be  bond  or  free.  These  things,  when 
really  believed,  and  duly  considered,  will  have  a  much 
stronger  influence  to  engage  them  to  a  faithful  and  cheerful 
discharge  of  their  duty,  than  mere  custom,  or  the  laws  of 
the  country.  On  the  other  hand,  masters  are  r^  quired  to 
give  unto  their  servants  that  which  is  just  and  equal,  for- 
bearing threatenings,  knowing  that  they  also  have  a  Master 
in  heaven,  and  that  with  him  there  is  no  respect  of  per- 
sons (/).  The  duties  of  husbands  and  wives  are  also  admi- 
rably described,  and  enforced  by  motives  proper  to  the 
Christian  dispensation,  additional  to  those  drawn  from  the 
law  of  nature  and  reason  (m).  Fhe  same  thing  may  be  said 
of  the  duties  of  parents  and  children  (w).   In  like  manner, 


{k)  Matt.  xxii.  21.  Ilom.  xiii.  1,  2.  5,  6,  7.  1  Tim.  ii.  2.  Tit. 
iii.,  1.   1  Pet.  ii.  13,  14. 

(/)  Eph.  vi.  5—9.  Col.  ill.  22—25.  iv.  1.  I  Tim.  vi.  1,  2.  Tit. 
ii.  9,  10,  1 1.  Deut.  xxiv.  14,  15.  Job  xxxi    13,  14,  15. 

(m)  Eph.  V.  22—3,3.  Col.  iii.  18,  19.  fit.  ii.  4,  5.  1  Pet.  iii. 
1—8. 

(w)  Exod.  XX.  16.  Eph.  vi.  1—4.  Col.  iii.  20,  21.  1  Tim.  v. 
4—8. 


Chap.  XIII.       as  delivered  in  the  Scriptures*  249 

superiors  and  inferiors,  the  elder  and  younger,  the  rich  and 
the  poor,  are  directed  to  a  proper  conduct  towards  one  ano^ 
ther:  and  rules  are  given  which  tend  to  regulate  the  deport- 
ment of  equals  among. themselves,  that  they  should  be  cour- 
teous, in  honour  preferring  one  another,  not  willingly  giving 
offence  to  any,  and  endeavouring  as  far  as  possible  to  live 
peaceably  with  all  men  (o).  In  a  word,  all  the  various  offices 
of  humanity,  justice,  and  charity,  due  from  one  man  to  ano^ 
ther,  are  frequently  described  in  the  Sacred  Writings,  en- 
forced by  the  most  powerful  motives,  and  by  the  authority 
of  God  himself,  which,  where  it  is  firmly  believed,  must 
come  with  greater  force  upon  the  conscience  than  the  mere 
institutions  of  human  legislators,  or  the  reasonings  of  phi- 
losophers and  moralists. 

These  hints  may  give  us  an  idea  of  the  excellency 
of  the  Scripture  precepts  with  respect  to  that  part  of 
morality  which  relates  to  the  duties  we  owe  to  man-^ 
kind. 

As  to  that  part  of  our  duty  which  relates  more  imme-^ 
diately  to  ourselves,  to  the  governing  our  affections,  appe-^ 
tites,  and  passions,  and  to  the  due  regulation  and  improve- 
ment of  our  temper,  the  Gospel  law  is  peculiarly  excellent,. 
With  regard  to  the  angry  passions,  wrath,  hatred,  and  re- 
venge, it  hath  been  already  shewn,  that  great  care  is  taken 
to  restrain  and  moderate  their  exorbitances,  and  to  engage 
men  to  exercise  meekness,  lorbearance,  and  long-suffering^ 
and  above  all,  to  cultivate  that  friendly  temper  and  univer- 
sal benevolence,  which  is  one  of  the  most  excellent  and  ami- 
able dispositions  of  the  human  mind  {p).  As  to  the  concu-^ 
piscible  and  voluptuous  appetites  and   passions,  th.  se  at  the 


(o)  Rom.  xii.  10.  12.  18.   1  Cor.  x.  32.  Phil.ii.^3.  1  Pet.  ii.  \1. 
iii.  8.  V.  5. 

{p)  Eph.  iv.  26,  27.  31,  32.  Col.  iii.  12,  13,  14.  1  Cor.  xiii.  4,  I 
Vol.  II,  2  1  ,  • 


25.0  A  Summary  of  the  Gospel  Morality         Part  II. 

time  of  our  Saviour's  coming  into  the  world  bad  broken 
over  all  bounds,  and  had  introduced  an  universal  corruption 
and  dissoluteness  of  manners.  One  excellent  design,  there- 
fore, of  the  Christian  law,  was  to  rportify  and  subdue  the 
fleshly  concupiscence,  and  to  deliver  men  from  their  base 
servitude  to  the  lusts  of  uncleanness,  which,  where  they  ob- 
tain the  dominion,  dishonour  and  defile  our  nature,  and  are 
of  the  most  pernicious  consequence  to  the  interests  of  reli- 
gion and  virtue.  The  Gospel,  wherever  it  is  sincerely  be- 
lieved and  embraced,  inspires  the  utmost  abhorrence  of 
those  unnatural  lusts  and  impurities,  which  had  made  so 
monstrous  a  progress  in  the  most  civilized  parts  of  the 
Heathen  world,  and  which,  as  hath  been  shewn,  were  abet- 
ted and  countenanced  by  the  maxims  and  practices  of  their 
wise  men  and  philosophers  (^).  All  manner  of  uncleanness 
and  lasciviousness  is  forbidden;  not  adultery  only,  but  for- 
nication also  (r),  which  among  the  Pagans  passed  for  no 
fault  at  all,  or  a  very  slight  one.  Polygamy  and  divorces 
upon  slight  occasions,  which  had  been  greatly  abused  among 
the  Jews,  gratifying  their  corrupt  lusts,  are  not  allowed  in 
the  religion  of  Jesus.  And  not  only  are  the  outward  gross 
acts  of  uncleanness  forbidden,  but  even  the  cherishing  and 


(q)  I  Cor.  vi.  9,  10.  1  Tim.,i.  9,  10.  And  these  abominations 
are  also  condemned  in  the  strongest  manner  in  the  Old  Testa- 
ment. 

(r)  See  what  St.  Paul  saith  to  this  purpose,  1  Thess.  iv.  3,  4, 
5.  7.  which  I  have  cii'ed  above,  p.  141.  And  whosoever  imparti- 
ally considers  what  the  same  great  apostle  hath  said  concerning 
it,  I  Cor  vi.  from  ver.  13.  to  ver.  20.  will  find  several  considera- 
tions there  urged,  which  are  of  the  highest  moment,  and  far  su- 
perior to  any  thing  that  can  be  lound  in  the  most  refined  of  the 
Pagan  moralists.  See  also  Prov.  v.  5—1 1. 


Chap.  XIII.         as  delivered  in  the  Scriptures.  251 

indulging  impure  and  vicious  inclinations,  which  are  repre- 
sented as  criminal  in  the  sight  ol  God  (s). 

We  are  frc  quently  warned  against  rioting  and  drunken- 
ness, gluttony. and  intemperance,  which  likewise  tend  great- 
ly to  debase  and  dishonour  our  nature.  And  what  ought 
especially  to  be  observed,  Christ  and  his  apostles  urge  their 
exhortations  against  the  several  kinds  of  fleshly  lusts  which 
have  been  mentioned,  not  merely  from  the  many  evil  conse- 
quences they  bring  along  with  them  in  this  present  state, 
but,  Which  is  of  far  greater  force,  from  the  express  autho- 
rity and  command  of  God,  from  the  strict  account  we  must 
give  of  the  things  done  in  the  body  at  the  day  of  judgment, 
and  the  terrors  of  the  wrath  to  come  (t).  They  are  also  re- 
presented as  peculiarly  inconsistent  with  the  dignity  and 
privileges  to  which  we  are  called  by  the  Gospel,  and  as  al- 
together unworthy  of  those  who  have  the  honour  of  being 
the  children  of  God,  the  members  of  Christ,  the  living  tem- 
ples of  God  and  his  Holy  Spirit,  and  the  heirs  and  expect- 
ants of  the  heavenly  inheritance  (w).  But  it  is  the  great 
praise  of  Christianity,  as  delivered  in  the  Gospel,  that 
though  chastity,  purity,  and  temperance  is  there  bound 
upon  us  by  the  most  sacred  obligations,  yet  care  is  taken 
to  guard  against  superstitious  extremes.  Neither  our  Sa- 
viour nor  his  apostles,  under  pretence  of  extraordinary  pu- 
rity, forbid  and  condemn  marriage,  as  some  of  the  Essenes 
then  did,  and  as  others  by  a  false  refinement  have  since  done. 
On  the  contrary,  it  is  declared,  that  "  marriage  is  honour- 
able in  all,  and  the  bed  undefiled  C^)."  And  though  all  in- 


(s)  Matt.  V.  27,  28. 

(0  Luke  xxi.  34.  Gal.  v.  19.  21.  Eph.  v.  6.  1  Pet.  3,  4,  5.  See 
also  Pro V.  xxiii.  1,  2,3.20,21.29 — 35.  Is.  v    11,^12. 

(m)  Rom.  xiii.  12—14.  1  Cor.  vi.  13.  19,  20.  Eph.  v.  18.  I 
Thess.  V.  5.  8. 

{oc)  1  Cor.  vii.  9.  Heb.  xiii.  4. 


253  A  Summary  of  the  Gospel  Morality       Part  II. 

temperance  and  excess  is  expressly  forbidden,  and  we  are 
required  to  keep  the  body  under,  yet  we  are  allowed  the 
moderate  use  of  sensible  enjoyments;  and  it  is  declared, 
that  every  creature  of  God  is  good,  and  nothing  to  be  re- 
fused, if  it  be  received. with  thanksgiving,  for  it  is  sanctified 
by  the  word  of  God  and  prayer  (?/). 

It  is  another  instance  of  the  excellency  of  the  Gospel 
precepts,  that  particular  care  is  taken  to  guard  us  against  an 
immoderate  passion  for  worldly  riches.  Our  Saviour  fre- 
quently takes  occasion  to  shew  the  great  folly  ot  placing  our 
confidence  and  h.tppiness  in  such  things  as  these,  and  re- 
presents in  strong  terms  the  inconsistency  of  a  predominant 
love  of  V  orldly  wei  1th  with  the  love  of  God,  and  with  real 
piety  and  virtue  (z).  The  possession  and  enjoyment  of 
riches  is  not  absolutely  forbidden;  but  we  are  directed  to 
make  a  proper  use  of  them,  and  to  regard  them  as  a  trust 
committed  to  us  by  God,  of  which  we  are  only  the  stewards, 
and  for  which  we  must  be  accountable;  we  are  taught  to  em- 
ploy them  not  as  incentives  to  luxury,  but  as  opportunities 
of  doing  good,  of  honouring  God,  and  being  useful  to  man- 
kind: and  we  are  assured  for  our  encouragement,  that  riches 
so  employed  will  recommend  us  to  the  divine  favour,  and 
open  a  v\  ay  for  us  to  everlasting  happiness  in  the  world  to 
come  (a). 

Pride  is  frequently  represented  in  Scripture  as  a  very 
wrong  temper  of  mind,  and  highly  displeasing  in  the  sight 
of  God  (b).  Many  passages  in  the  Gospel  are  particularly 
designed  to  correct  and  -ubdue  it  in  all  its  various  branches 


(t/)  1  Tim.  iv.  3,  4»  5. 

(z)  Mat.  vi.  24.  Mark  X.  24.  Luke  xii.  15 — 21.  1  Tim.  vi.  9, 
10.  See  also  Psal.  xxxvii.  16.  Ixii.  10.  Prov.  xi,  28.  xxiii.  4,  5, 
xxviii.  20. 

(a)  Luke  xvi.  9,  10.  1  Tim.  vi.  17,  18,  19. 

(6)  Prov.  viii.  13.  xvi.  5.  James  iv.  6. 


CiiAP.  XIII.       as  delivered  in  the  Scriptures,  253 

and  appearances,  whether  as  it  signifies  an  inordinate  am- 
bition whicfi  puts  men  upon  contending  who  shall  be 
greatest,  or  an  eager  thirst  after  the  applause  of  men  ra- 
ther than  the  favour  and  approbation  of  God,  or  a  pre- 
sumptuous haughty  arrogance,  and  a  high  conceit  of  our- 
selves and  our  own  righteousness,  and  a  contempt  of  others: 
never  was  an  amiable  humility  recommended  and  enforced 
in  such  an  engaging  manner  as  by  our  Lord  Jesus  Christ, 
who  also  gave  the  most  perfect  and  lovely  pattern  of  it  in 
his  own  example  (c). 

It  is  the  design  of  several  of  our  Saviour's  precepts  to  in- 
struct and  direct  us  to  posspss  our  souls  in  patience,  equa- 
nimity, and  contentment.  As  nothing  tends  more  to  dis- 
compose and  disturb  the  mind  than  anxious  cares,  or  ex- 
cessive sorrows  and  desponding  fears,  the  Gospel  provides 
the  most  effectual  remedies  against  all  these:  not  by  repre- 
senting worldly  evils  and  calamities  as  no  evils  at  all,  or 
prescribing  an  unfeeling  apathy,  and  suppressing  the  natu- 
ral affections  and  passions,  but  by  keeping  them  within 
proper  bounds.  No  where  are  there  such  powerful  con- 
siderations for  supporting  us  under  afflictions  and  adversi- 
ties with  a  calm  resignation  and  a  lively  hope.  We  are 
taught  to  regard  them  as  sent  by  God  for  the  wisest  and 
best  purposes,  and  are  assured  that  he  will  graciously 
support  us  under  them,  and  over-rule  them  to  our  greater 
benefit,  and  that  if  duly  improved  they  shall  issue  in  a  com- 
plete everlasting  felicity  (d).  Nothing  can  possibly  be  bet- 


(c)  Matt,  xxiii.  6 — 12.  Mark  ix.  33,  34,  S5.  Luke  xviii.  9 — 14, 
John  V.  44.  Matt.  xi.  29.  John  xiii.  12—17.  Phil.  ii".  3-— 7.  1  Pet. 
V.  5. 

(rf)  Matt.  V.  4.  Rom.  v.  4,  5.  viii.  18.  28.  2  Cor.  iv.  17.  Heb. 
xii.  5—12.  Psal.  Iv.  22.  Psal.  ciii.  9,  10.  13,  14.  Lam.  iii.  31,  32, 
33. 


254  A  Summary  of  the  Gospel  Morality         Part  II. 

ter  fitted  to  deliver  us  irom  anxious  disir  cting  cares  rind 
solicitudes,  and  a  distrust! ul  thoughtfulness  for  to-morrow, 
than  the  excellent  precepts  and  directions  given  us  by  our 
Saviour  and  his  apostles  {e).  But  though  vi^e  are  directed  to 
cast  our  cares  upon  God  in  a  cheerful  and  steady  depend- 
ence upon  his  wise  and  good  Providence,  yet  we  are  caution- 
ed not  to  neglect  the  use  of  proper  means  and  endeavours 
on  our  parts.  It  is  urged  as  our  duty  not  to  be  slothful  in 
business,  to  exercise  ourselves  with  diligence  in  the  work 
of  our  several  callings  and  employments,  that  we  may  have 
lack  of  nothing,  and  we  may  have  to  give  to  him  that 
needeth.  Those  who  lead  idle  lives  are  represented  as  walk- 
ing disorderly,  and  it  is  declared,  that  if  .nny  man  will  not 
work,  neither  should  he  eat  (/)'  To  this  it  may  be  added 
that  our  Saviour's  precepts  and  instructions  are  admirably 
fitted  to  inspire  us  with  a  true  divine  fortitude,  and  to  raise 
us  above  the  slavish  fear  of  men,  who  can  only  kill  the  body, 
and  after  that  have  no  more  that  they  can  do,  or  of  any 
worldly  evils  and  sufferings.  And  yet  he  is  far  from  en- 
couraging a  forward  enthusiastic  rashness:  he  directeth  his 
disciples  not  needlessly  to  expose  themselves  to  dangers,  but 
to  take  all  proper  precautions  for  avoiding  the  rage  and 
malice  of  their  persecutors  (^):  but  when  this  could  not 
be  done,  without  betraying  the  cause  of  God,  of  truth  and 
righteousness,  they  were  to  exert  a  noble  fortitude,  and  to 
endure  the  greatest  sufferings  with  constancy  and  even  with 


(e)  Matt,  vi-  25—34.  Luke  xii.  22—31.  Phil.  iv.  6.  1  I,  12.  1 
Tim.  vi.  6    8.  Heb.  xiii.  5.  1  Pet.  v.  7. 

(/)  Rom.  xii.  11.  Eph.  iv.  28,  1  Thess.  iv.  11,  12.  2  Thess. 
iii.  10,  11,  12. 

{g)  Matt.  vii.  6.  x.  16.  23. 


Chap.  XIII.     as  delivered  in  the  Scriptures,  it 5 5 

joy,  being  assured  of  divine  supports,  and  that  great  should 
be  their  reward  in  heaven  Qi), 

As  knowledge  is  one  of  the  noblest  improvements  of  the 
mind,  an^l  of  mighty  advantage  to  a  life  of  piety  and  vir- 
tue, it  is  frequently  urged  upon  us  as  our  duty,  to  endea- 
vour to  get  our  minds  furnished  with  divine  and  useful 
knowledge.  And  the  knowledge  there  required  is  not 
merely  of  the  speculative  notional,  kind  or  science  falsely 
so  called,  but  such  a  knowledge  of  those  things  which  are 
of  the  highest  importance  to  our  happiness,  as  may  help 
us  to  make  a  progress  in  all  holiness  and  goodness;  we  must 
endeavour  to  grow  in  wisdom  and  spiritual  understanding, 
so  as  to  discern  the  things  which  are  excellent,  and  to 
prove  what  is  that  good,  and  acceptable,  and  perfect  will 
of  God  (i). 

It  is  proper  farther  to  observe,  that,  as  the  foundation 
of  all  the  virtues  which  have  been  mentioned,  and  of  the 
right  ordering  of  ourselves,  we  are  directed  to  endeavour 
get  our  hearts  purified.  Our  Saviour  represents  the  heart 
as  the  fountain,  from  whence  good  or  evil  thoughts,  words, 
and  actions  flow.  And  therefore  one  principal  part  of  the 
work  required  of  us  is  to  exercise  a  proper  discipline  over 
the  heart,  and  to  maintain  a  constant  watch,  not  only  over 
our  outward  conduct  and  deportment,  but  over  our  inward 
frame  and  temper.  We  must  not  take  up  with  any  thing 
short  of  a  real  universal  purity  and  sanctity  of  soul,  that 
truth  in  the  inward  parts,  that  simplicity  and  godly  sin- 
cerity, free  from  all  hypocrisy  and  guile,  without  which 
the  most  pompous  external  services  are  of  no  avail  in  the 


(Ji)  Matt.  V.  10,  1 1,  12.  Luke  xii.  4,  5.  1  Pet.  iii.  14.  iv.  12,  13. 
(0  John  xvij.  3.  Phil,  i,  9,  10.  Rom.  xii.  2.  Ep\i.  v.  17.  Col.  i. 
9,  10.  1  Thess.  V.  31.  Tit.  i.  1.  Prov.  ii.  3,  4,  5. 


256  A  Summary  of  the  Gospel  Morality      Part  IL 

sight  of  God  (i).  Finally,  it  is  required  of  us,  that  we  make 
it  our  continual  endeavour  to  grow  in  grace,  and  in  evt  ry 
divine  virtue.  And  in  order  to  this  we  must  live  and  walk 
by  faith,  "  which  is  the  substance  of  things  hoped  ior,  and 
the  evidence  of  things  not  seen."  And  as  that  future  life 
and  immortality  is  now  brought  into  the  most  clear  and 
open  light,  we  are  required  to  carry  our  desires  and  views 
beyond  this  transitory  W(  rid,  and  all  its  enjoyments,  and 
to  seek  the  things  which  are  above,  and  place  <  ur  choicest 
affections  there  (/).  Accordingly  the  Christian  life  is  re- 
presented under  the  noble  notion  of  a  conversation  with 
heaven,  and  communion  with  the  Father,  and  with  his  son 
Jesus  Christ:  it  is  a  continual  aspiring  towards  the  perfec- 
tion of  our  nature  in  a  conformity  to  the  divine  goodness 
and  purity,  and  an  endeavour  to  do  the  will  of  God  on 
earth,  as  it  is  done  in  heaven  (/«)• 

To  all  which  may  be  added,  that  it  is  the  distinguishing 
character  of  the  religion  of  Jesus,  that  at  the  same  time 
that  it  directeth  us  to  aspire  to  the  highest  degree  of  mo- 
ral excellence,  it  teacheth  us  to  maintain  a  constant  sense 
of  our  own  weaknesses  and  defects  and  of  our  insufficiency 
in  ourselves.  In  the  Gospel  all  boasting  and  confidence  in 
our  own  righteousness  and  merits  is  excluded:  and  we 
are  instructed  to  place  our  whole  dependence  upon  the 
grace  of  God  in  Jesus  Christ  our  Lord,  giving  him  the 
glory  of  every  good  thing  that  is  in  us,  or  which  we  are 
enabled  to  perform. 
•  Upon   this   general  view  of  the  Gospel  precepts,  it  ap- 


{k)  Prov.  iv.  23.  Matt,  xxiii.  26.  2  Cor.  i.  12.  Eph.  iv.  21—24, 
1  Pet.  ii.  1,  2.  John  iii,  3.  6.  2  Cor.  v.  17.  Rom.  ii.  28,  29.  GaL 
Ti.  15. 

(/)  2  Cor.  V.  7.   Col.  iii.  I,  2.  Heb  xiii.  14. 

(m)  Phil.  iii.  20.  1  John  i.  3.  Phil.  iii.  12,  13,  14. 


Chap.  XIII.     as  delivered  in  the  Scriptures,  257 

pears  that  they  are  of  a  most  excellent  nature  and  tendency: 
they  exhibit  a  beautiful  harmonious  scheme  of  practical 
religion.  The  best  systems  of  the  most  celebrated  Pagan 
moralists,  are^  in  several  respects  deficient,  and  in  some 
very  wrong;  but  here  there  is  nothing  deficient,  our  whole 
duty  is  set  before  us  in  its  just  extent,  without  the  least 
mixture  of  any  thing  that  is  wrong.  But  though  it  sets  be- 
fore us  the  noblest  idea  of  moral  excellence,  it  does  not 
carry  it  to  any  unwarrantable  extremes,  or  to  a  degree  of 
strictness  unsuitable  to  the  human  nature:  which  is  an  ob- 
jection that  some  have  made  against  it.  We  are  indeed 
there  taught  to  deny  ourselves,  but  the  intention  is  only  that 
we  should  endeavour  to  keep  the  inferior  appetites  and 
passions  in  a  due  subjection  to  the  nobler  part  of  our  na- 
tures, and  that  the  pleasures  and  interests  of  the  flesh  and 
of  the  world  should  be  made  to  gave  way  to  the  duty  we 
owe  to  God,  and  to  the  love  of  truth,  virtue,  and  righte- 
ousness, whenever  they  happen  to  stand  in  competition;  in 
which  case  our  temporary  self-denial  shall  be  crowned  with 
the  most  glorious  rewards.  We  are  required  not  to  make 
provision  for  the  flesh  to  fulfil  the  lusts  thereof;  but  neither 
our  Saviour  nor  his  apostles  have  urged  it  upon  us  as  a  duty 
to  macerate  our  bodies  with  those  unnatural  rigors  and 
austerities,  or  to  chastise  them  with  that  bloody  dis- 
cipline, which  superstition  hath  often  enjoined  under  pre- 
tence of  extraordinary  mortification  and  devotion.  We  are 
to  be  heavenly-minded,  and  to  set  our  affections  upon  the 
things  which  are  above,  yet  so  as  not  to  neglect  the  duties 
and  offices  incumbent  on  us  in  this  present  state.  We  are 
not  commanded  absolutely  to  quit  the  world;  but,  which  is 
a  much  nobler  attainment,  to  live  above  the  wt)rld  whilst 
we  are  in  it,  and  to  keep  ourselves  free  from  its  pollutions; 
not  wholly  to  renounce  our  present  enjoyments,  but  to  be 
moderate  in  the  use  of  them,  and  so  "  to  use  this  world  as 
not  to  abuse  it."  Finally,  the  Gospel  Morality  takes  in  all 
Vol.  II.  '  2  K  , 


258  The  Gospel  Morality  inferred  by  the    Part  II. 

that  is  included  in  that  comprehensive  precept,  "  whatso- 
ever things  are  true,  whatsoever  things  are  venerable,  erzf^vx^ 
whatsoever  things  are  just,  whatsoever  things  are  lovely, 
whatsoever  are  of  good  report,  if  there  be  any  virtue, 
and  if  there  be  any  praise,  think  on  these  things."  Phil, 
iv.  8. 

But  let  a  rule  of  moral  duty  be  never  so  complete  and 
excellent  in  itself,  it  will  hardly  be  sufficient  to  answer 
the  end  in  the  present  state  of  mankind,  unless  it  be  bound 
upon  us  by  a  proper  authority,  and  enforced  by  the  most 
powerful  motives.  And  in  this  the  religious  and  moral  pre- 
cepts of  the  Gospel  have  a  vast  advantage  (;z).  They  are 
not  to  be  regarded  as  the  mere  counsels  aqd  dictates  of 
wise  men  and  moralists,  who  can  only  advise  and  endea- 
vour to  persuade,  but  cannot  pretend  to  a  proper  authority 
over  mankind;  nor  as  the  injunctions  of  fallible  human  le- 
gislators armed  with  civil  authority,  who  cannot  pretend  to 
judge  of  the  heart,  or  of  men's  inward  dispositions,  and 
who  have  nothing  farther  in  view  than  the  external  order 
and  welfare  of  society,  and  frequently  make  the  rules  of 
morality  give  way  to  their  political  interests;  but  they  are 
urged  upon  us  as  the  command  of  God  himself,  the  sove- 
reign Lord  of  the  universe,  who  knoweth  our  most  secret^ 
thoughts,  and  to  whom  we  must  give  an  account,  not  only 
of  our  outward  actions,  but  of  the  inward  affections  and 
dispositions  of  our  souls. 

Another  great  advantage  is,  that  our  Lord  Jesus  Christ, 
who  was  sent  into  the  world  to  publish  these  excellent  laws 
of  God  to  mankind,'  and  hath  given  us  the  most  illustrious 


(w)  Lord  Boline^broke  himself  se'^ms  to  acknowledge,  that  the 
Christian  Revelaiion  may  be  of  use  to  enforce  the  pi"actice  of  mo- 
rality by  a  superior  authority.  See  his  works,  Vol.  V.  p.  294.  edit. 
4to. 


CttAP.  XIII.    highest  Authority  and  powerful  Motive,    259 

proofs  of  his  divine  mission,  hath  himself  exemplified  those 
laws  and  precepts  to  us  in  his  own  sacred  life  and  prac- 
tice. Examples  have  usually  a  greater  force  than  bare  pre- 
cepts. And  what  example  so  proper  and  engaging  as  that  of 
the  Son  of  God  in  human  flesh,  the  most  perfect  image  of 
the  invisible  Deity,  in  v/hom  the  divine  perfections  are 
brought  nearer  to  our  view,  and  within  the  reach  of  our 
imitation?  In  him  we  may  behold  a  most  complete  pattern 
of  universal  holiness  and  spotless  purity,  of  the  most  ar- 
dent love  to  God,  the  most  wonderful  love  to  mankind,  the 
most  perfect  obedience  and  resignation  to  the  divine  will, 
the  most  exemplary  patience  under  the  greatest  sufferings, 
the  most  admirable  humility,  meekness,  and  condescen- 
sion, and  of  every  amiable  virtue.  And  should  not  we  be 
desirous  to  tread  in  his  illustrious  footsteps?  and  to  live 
and  act  as  so  glorious  and  divine  a  person,  to  whom  we  are 
under  such  infininite  obligations,  lived  and  acted  before  us? 

It  tends  farther  to  recommend  and  enforce  the  precepts 
of  the  Gospel,  that  all  the  charms  of  the  divine  grace  and 
goodness  are  here  opened  to  our  view.  Motives  to  obedi- 
ence drawn  from  love  are  fitted  to  work  upon  the  best 
principles  of  our  nature.  And  never  was  there  such  a  dis- 
plav  of  the  wonderful  -love  of  God  to  mankind  as  in  the 
methods  of  our  redemption  and  salvation  by  Jesus  Christ. 
Where  this  mystery  of  godliness  is  heartily  received  with 
a  true  and  living  faith,  it  will  have  a  happy  influence  to  en- 
gage and  draw  us  to  a  holy  and  dutiful  obedience:  since  it 
is  every  where  inculcated  in  the  Gospel  that  the  design  of 
God's  sending  his  own  Son  into  the  world,  and  of  all  the 
great  things  which  have  been  done  for  us,  is  to  oblige  us 
to  die  more  and  more  unto  sin,  and  to  live  urfto  righte- 
ousness. 

The  excellent  privileges  of  the  Gospel  do  also,  as  was 
before  hinted,  furnish  very  powerful  motives  to  a  holy 
and  virtuous  practice.   For  this   purpose  we  are   called  to 


260  Excellency  of  the  Gospel  Morals  an  argument  Part  II. 

be  saints,  honoured  to  be  the  members  of  Christ's  church 
and  kingdom,  the  children  of  God,  and  heirs  of  the  hea- 
venly inheritance,  that  we  may  be  a  people  zealous  of 
good  works,  shewing  forth  the  praises  and  virtues  of  him 
that  hath  called  us  out  of  darkness  into  his  marvellous 
light. 

To  all  which  may  be  added  the  important  motives 
drawn  from  the  rewards  and  punishments  of  a  future 
state,  of  which  the  Gospel  exhibits  far  clearer  discove- 
ries, and  gives  fuller  assurances,  than  were  ever  given  to 
the  world  before,  as  will  be  shewn  in  the  following  part 
of  this  work. 

Finally,  for  our  greater  encouragement,  divine  assistances 
are  provided  for  us.  This  is  a  consideration  of  great  mo- 
ment, as  every  one  must  acknowledge  that  has  a  due  sense 
of  the  weakness  and  corruption  of  the  human  nature  in  its 
present  state,  and  the  manifold  temptations  to  which  we  are 
here  exposed.  We  are  not  left  merely  to  our  own  unassisted 
strength,  but  have  the  most  express  promises  and  assur- 
ances given  us  in  the  Gospel,  that  God  will  send  his  Holy 
Spirit  to  enlighten  and  sanctify  us,  to  strengthen  and  assist 
us  in  the  performance  of  our  duty,  if  from  a  sense  of  our 
own  insufficiency  in  ourselves  we  humbly  apply  to  him  for 
his  gracious  assistances,  and  at  the  same  time  are  diligent 
»  in  the  use  of  all  proper  means  and  endeavours  on  our  parts. 
For  it  must  be  considered,  that  those  divine  influences  and 
aids  are  communicated  in  such  a  way  as  is  agreeable  to 
the  just  order  of  our  rational  faculties^  and  not  so  as  to  ren- 
der our  own  endeavours  needless,  but  to  assist  and  animate 
our  endeavours. 

Upon  the  whole,  considering  the  great  darkness  and  cor- 
ruption into  which  mankind  had  fallen,  nothing  was  more 
wanted,  than  to  have  a  pure  system  of  morals,  containing 
the  whole  of  our  duty  in  its  just  extent,  delivered  in  plain 
and  express  precepts,  as  the  laws  of  God  himself,  enforced 


Chap.XIII.  of  the  Divinity  of  the  Christian  Revelation,  261 

by  all  the  sanctions  of  a  divine  authority,  and  by  all  the 
charms  of  the  divine  love  and  goodness;  and  this  is  fully 
done  by  the  Gospel  of  Jesus. 

It  is  a  natural  inference  from  v/hat  hath  been  offered  on 
this  subject,  that  the  admirable  purity  of  the  Gospel  mo- 
rals, and  the  uniform  tendency  of  the  Christian  doctrines, 
precepts,  privileges,  and  ordinances,  to  promote  real  holi- 
ness of  heart  and  life,  furnisheth  a  very  convincing  proof 
of  the  divinity  of  the  Christian  revelation.  This  is  an  ar- 
gument that  strikes  the  mind  with  great  force,  and  which 
ought  mightily  to  recommend  it  to  the  esteem  and  venera- 
tion of  mankind,  especially  of  all  the  impartial  lovers  of 
truth  and  virtue.  The  first  publishers  of  it  were  men  of 
great  simplicity,  plainness  and  integrity,  destitute  of  all 
worldly  advantages,  and  the  remotest  that  can  be  supposed 
from  the  character  of  artful  impostors.  Animated  by  a  pure 
and  fervent  and  well  regulated  zeal  for  the  glory  of  God 
and  the  salvation  of  men,  they  exposed  themselves  to  the 
greatest  sufferings,  reproaches,  and  persecutions,  to  establish 
a  scheme  of  religion,  the  design  of  which  was  to  promote  the 
practice  of  universal  righteousness;  a  godlike  purity  shines 
through  the  whole  of  it:  there  is  nothing  in  it  to  sooth  and 
flatter  the  lusts  and  vices  of  men,  nothing  that  breathes  the 
spirit  of  this  world,  of  ambition,  avarice,  and  sensuality. 
And  as  little  can  the  Gospel  be  supposed  to  be  the  work  of 
weak  hot-brained  enthusiasts,  as  of  artful  self-designing  im- 
postors. When  we  consider  that  the  first  publishers  of  Chris- 
tianity were  for  the  most  part  men  of  no  learning  and  edu- 
cation, and  yet  taught  men  to  form  the  most  just  and  sub- 
lime notions  of  religion,  contrary  in  several  instances  to  the 
prejudices  which  they  themselves  had  deeply  iii>bibed,  and 
far  exceeding  what  the  world  had  known  before,  and  that 
they  also  advanced  the  most  perfect  scheme  of  morals, 
vastly  superior  to  what  had  been  taught  by  the  most  admir- 
ed philosophers  of  the   Pagan  world,  men  of  the  greatest 


262  Excellency  of  the  Gospel  Morals  an  argument  Part  II. 

parts  and  genius,  and  even  by  the  most  celebrated  Jewish 
doctors,  who  had  by  their  corrupt  glosses  depraved  the  true 
sense  of  the  law  and  prophets,  this  is  a  strong  confirmation 
of  the  truth  of  their  pretensions;  that  the  doctrines  they 
taught,  and  the  precepts  they  delivered  in  the  name  of  God, 
were  not  of  their  own  invention,  a  thing  of  which  they  were 
evidently  incapable,  but  were,  as  they  themselves  professed, 
of  a  divine  original.  This  was  farther  confirmed  by  the 
many  glorious  attestations  given  from  heaven  to  the  divine 
mission  of  our  Saviour,  and  of  those  that  were  sent  to 
publish  the  Gospel  in  his  name.  Never  were  there  any  facts 
better  attested,  or  which  exhibited  more  illustrious  proofs 
of  an  extraordinary  divine  interposition.  They  manifestly 
transcended  all  human  power;  and  therefore  must  have 
been  wrought  either  immediately  by  the  power  of  God  him- 
self, or  of  good  beings  superior  to  mankind,  acting  under 
his  direction,  and  who  would  never  have  given  their  attes- 
tation to  an  imposture.  And  as  to  evil  beings,  whatever  we 
suppose  their  power  to  be,  it  cannot  be  imagined  that  they 
would  lend  their  assistance  to  give  credit  to  a  scheme  of 
religion  and  morals,  the  plain  tendency  of  which  was  to 
turn  men  from  idolatry,  vice,  and  wickedness,  to  the  know- 
ledge, obedience,  and  adoration  of  the  only  true  God,  and 
to  the  practice  of  piety  and  virtue.  So  convincing  was  the 
evidence  of  these  proofs,  that  the  religion  of  Jesus  soon 
made  an  amazing  progress,  notwithstanding  the  obstacles 
and  opposition  it  met  with,  which  humanly  speaking,  it 
seemed  impossible  to  overcome.  And  wherever  it  was  really 
believed  and  embrace'd,  it  wrought  a  wonderful  and  happy 
change.  Never  was  there  a  body  of  men  in  the  world,  so 
holy  and  virtuous,  of  such  exemplary  piety,  charity,  purity, 
and  temperance,  as  the  primitive  Christians.  And  accord- 
ingly one  of  the  topics,  which  the  antient  apologists  for 
Christianity  constantly  insisted  upon,  and  for  the  truth  of 
which   they  appealed  to  the  Heathens  themselves,  was  the 


Ch  AP.XIII.  of  the  Divinity  of  the  Christian  Revelation,  263 

remarkable  reformation  it  wrought  in  the  lives  and  man- 
ners of  those  that  embraced  it.  They  shone  as  lights  in  the 
world  in  the  midst  of  a  vicious  and  corrupt  generation. 
And  so  they  continued  whilst  they  kept  close  to  the  reli- 
gion and  morality  laid  down  in  the  Holy  Scriptures.  And 
in  proportion  as  they  deviated  from  that  perfect  rule,  they 
either  became  loose  in  their  practices,  and  fell  from  their 
primitive  virtue,  or  under  pretence  of  an  extraordinary 
purity  above  what  the  Gospel  required,  ran  into  the  extremes 
of  superstition.  So  wise,  so  admirable,  so' justly  temper- 
ed is  the  Gospel  scheme  of  morality,  as  delivered  by  Christ 
and  his  apostles,  that  all  the  attempts  of  after- ages  to  raise 
it  to  a  higher  degree  of  excellency,  really  fell  short  of  its 
original  perfection. 

It  must  be  acknowledged,  indeed,  and  has  been  often 
objected  by  the  enemies  of  the  Gospel  Revelation,  that 
there  is  a  great  corruption  of  manners  among  Christians. 
But  this  does  not  prove  either  that  Christianity  was  not  a 
signal  advantage  to  the  world  when  it  was  first  published, 
or  that  it  is  not  now  of  great  use  and  benefit,  and  what 
we  ought  to  be  highly  thankful  for.  The  best  institutions 
in  the  world  may  be  abused;  and  the  guilt  of  those  who  go 
on  in  a  course  of  vice  and  wickedness,  in  opposition  to  the 
clear  light  and  laws  of  the  Gospel,  admits  of  peculiar  aggra- 
vations. If  there  are  many  professed  Christians,  v.'ho  live 
immoral  and  dissolute  lives,  they  are  generally  such  as 
either  content  themselves  with  the  bare  name  of  Christians, 
without  taking  any  pains  to  get  a  just  acquaintance  with  the 
religion  they  profess,  or  who  do  not  allow  themselves 
seriously  to  consider  and  lay  to  heart  its  doctrines  and  pre- 
cepts, or  who  do  not  really  believe  it,  or  at  least  yield  but 
a  doubtful  and  wavering  assent  to  it.  And  this  is  often  very 
much  owing  to  the  purity  of  the  Gospel^  morals,  which 
creates  prejudices  against  it  in  the  minds  of  those  who  are 
under  the  power  of  evil  habits  and  vicious  affections.   The 


264  Excelleticy  of  the  Gospel  Morals  an  argument  Part  II. 

infidelity  and  scepticism  of  many  in  the  present  age,  and  the 
growing  indifferency  to  all  religion,  which  is  too  visible 
among  us,  is,  I  doubt  not,  one  great  cause  of  that  abound- 
ing dissoluteness  and  corruption,  which  is  so  much  com- 
plained of.  But  still  it  is  certainly  true,  that  if  the  restraints 
which  the  Christian  religion  lays  upon  vice  and  wickedness 
were  remo\  ed,  the  corruption  v/ould  be  much  greater  and 
more  general  than  it  is.  Many  thousands,  who  would  other- 
wise be  vicious  and  dissolute,  are  influenced  by  the  doc- 
trines and  precepts  of  Christianity  to  lead  sober,  righteous, 
and  godly  lives.  And  notwithstanding  the  degeneracy  of 
Christians,  there  is  just  reason  to  conclude,  that  there  are 
incomparably  more  and  greater  instances  of  a  sublime  and 
rational  piety,  and  an  exemplary  purity  of  manners  among 
those  that  profess  to  believe  and  receive  the  Gospel,  than  are 
to  be  found  among  those  of  any  other  profession  or  charac- 
ter. The  most  effectual  way,  therefore,  of  recovering  men  to 
the  practice  of  real  piety  and  virtue,  is  to  endeavour  to  en- 
gage them  to  a  close  adherence  to  the  heavenly  doctrines, 
and  the  pure  and  excellent  laws  of  the  Gospel,  which  un- 
deniably gives  the  best  and  greatest  helps  and  encourage- 
ments to  a  holy  and  virtuous  life.  And  it  is  an  advantage 
which  calls  for  our  highest  thankfulness,  that  whatever 
corruptions  in  doctrine  and  practice  professed  Christians 
have  fallen  into,  or  may  fall  into,  we  have  still  a  perfect 
rule  or  standard  laid  down  in  the  Holy  Scriptures,  to  which 
we  may  have  recourse,  and  by  a  close  attention  to  which, 
we  may  have  sure  directions  given -us  as  to  every  part 
of  religion,  and  the 'practice  of  universal  piety  and  righte- 
ousness. 

I  shall  conclude  this  part  of  the  subject  with  the  suffrage 
of  two  learned  and  ingenious  gentlemen,  who  are  generally 
thought  not  to  have  been  much  inclined  to  superstition  and 
bigotry.  The  one  is  the  author  of  the  Lettres  Juives,  who, 
in  the  person  of  a  Jew,  acknowledges,  that  "  the  first  Na- 


Chap.  XIII.  of  the  Divinity  of  the  Christian  Revelation,  265^ 

zarenes  preached  a  doctrine  so  conformable  to  equity,  and 
so  useful  to  society,  that  their  greatest  adversaries  now 
agree,  that  their  moral  precepts  are  infinitely  superior  to 
the  wisest  philosophers  of  antiquity  (o)."  The  other  is  the 
justly  admired  Mons.  de  Montesquieu.  We  are  informed 
by  good  authority,  that  he  declared  with  his  dving  hr(rath, 
to  those  that  stood  around  him,  and  particularly  to  the  Du- 
chess D'Aiguillon,  that  "the  morality  of  the  Gospel  is  a 
most  excellent  thing,  and  the  most  valuable  present  which 
could  possibly  have  been  received  by  man  from  his  Creator 


(o)  "  Les  premiers  docteurs  Nazarenes  ont  preche  une  doc- 
trine si  conforme  a  I'equite,  et  si  utile  a  la  societe,  que  leurs  plus 
grands. ad versaires  conviennent  aujourdhui,  que  leurs  precepts 
moraux  sont  infiniment  au  dessus  des  plus  sages  philosophes  de 
Tantiquite."  Lettres  Jiiives,  lettre  142. 

{fi)  See  L'Eloa:e  de  Monsieur  de  Montesquieu,  par  Mons.  de 
Maupertuis,  Hamburgh  1755. 


THE    END    OF    PART    II, 


Vol.  II.  2  L 


THE 

ADVANTAGE  AND  NECESSITY 

OF  THE 

CHRISTIAN  REVELATION, 

SHEWN  FBOM  THE 

STATE  OF  RELIGION 

IN  THE 

AJ^TTIEJS'T  HEATHEN  WORLD. 


PABT  III 


WITH  RESPECT  TO  THE  BELIEF  OF  A  FUTURE  STATE  OF 
REWARDS  AND  PUNISHMENTS. 


CHAPTER    I. 

The  importance  of  the  doctrine  of  a  future  state.  It  is  agreeable  to  right  reason. 
The  natural  and  moral  arguments  for  a  future  state  of  great  weight  Yet  not 
so  evident,  but  that  if  men  were  left  merely  to  their  own  unassisted  reason, 
they  would  be  apt  to  labour  under  great  doubts  and  difficulties.  A  Revelation 
from  God  concerning  it  would  be  of  great  advantage. 

IT  is  a  point  of  vdst  consequence  to  religion,  and  to  the 
cause  of  virtue  in  the  world,  whether  there  be  a  life  to 
come,  in  which  men  shall  be  rewarded  or  punished,  accord- 
ing to  their  behaviour  in  this  present  state;  or  whether  this 
present  life  be  the  whole  of  our  existence,  beyond  which 
there  is  nothing  to  be  hoped  for  or  feared,  in  a  way  of  re- 
tributioa  for  our  present  moral  conduct. 


Chap.  I.    Importance  of  the  Doctrine  of  a  Future  State,  267 

If  there  were  no  future  state  of  retribution,  or  men  gene- 
rally believed  there  were  none,  they  would  look  no  farther 
than  the  pains  and  pleasures  of  this  present  life:  it  could  not 
ordinarily  be  expected  that  they  should  have  any  thing  in 
view,  but  the  gratifying  their  appetites  and  inclinations,  and 
promoting  what  they  apprehend  to  be  their  present  worldly 
interest,  to  which  every  other  consideration  must  be  subor- 
dinate: flesh  and  sense  would  be  their  governing  principles: 
good  men  would  be  deprived  of  those  hopes  which  are  a 
a  source  of  joy  and  comfort  to  them  in  their  greatest  afflic- 
tions and  distresses,  and  which  tend  to  animate  them  to  a 
patient  continuance  in  well-doing:  and  bad  men  would  t)e 
freed  from  those  terrors,  than  which  nothirig  can  be  better 
fitted  to  put  a  stop  to  the  exorbitancies  of  their  evil  courses, 
and  to  avert  them  even  from  secret  acts  of  wickedness.  Ac- 
cordingly, it  has  been  always  accounted  a  principal  advan- 
tage of  the  Christian  Revelation,  that  it  gives  us  the 
strongest  assurances  of  a  future  state,  and  of  the  rewards 
and  punishments  of  the  life  to  come.  The  ablest  patrons  of 
Natural  Religion,  as  opposed  to  Revelation,  have  been  sen- 
sible of  this,  and  therefore  have  pretended  that  the  doc- 
trine of  the  immortality  of  the  soul,  and  a  state  of  future 
retributions,  is  so  obvious  to  the  common  reason  of  all 
mankind,  that  there  needs  no  extraordinary  revelation, 
either  to  discover  it  to  us,  or  strengthen  our  belief  of  it. 
And  yet  there  is  too  much  reason  to  think,  that  they  have 
asserted  this  rather  with  a  view  to  depreciate  the  use  and 
need  of  Divine  Revelation,  than  that  they  really  believed 
that  doctrine;  since  at  other  times  they  have  thrown  out 
suspicions  against  it,  and  represented  it  as  a  matter  of  un- 
certainty; and  some  of  them  have  used  their  utmost  efforts 
to  invalidate  the  proofs  which  are  brought  for  it. 

I  readily  acknowledge,  that  the  natural  and  moral  argu- 
ments for  the  immortality  of  the  soul,  and  a  future  state  of 
retributions,  are,  when  duly  considered,  of  great  weight. 


265  Importance  of  the  Doctrine  Part  III. 

And  none  have  set  these  proofs  in  a  stronger  light  than  the 
Christian  philosophers  and  divines.  Whosoever  impartially 
considers  their  manner  of  treating  this  subject,  will  find  it 
vastly  superior  to  that  which  was  made  use  of  by  the  most 
eminent  Pagan  philosophers  who  lived  before  the  coming 
of  our  Saviour.  In  this,  as  well  as  other  instances,  Reve- 
lation has  been  of  great  advantage  for  assisting  and  im- 
proving our  reason  in  matters  of  the  highest  importance. 
It  has  been  shewn,  with  great  strength  and  clearness  of 
argument,  that  matter,  as  far  as  we  can  judge  of  it  from 
its  known  essential  properties,  is  in  its  own  nature  in- 
capable of  thought,  however  diversified  or  modified;  that 
a  substance  compounded  of  innumerable  parts,  as  all  own 
matter  to  be,  cannot  be  the  subject  of  an  individual  con- 
sciousness, the  seat  of  which  must  be  a  simple  and  undi- 
vided substance  (a):  that  intellect  and  will  are  of  a  quite 
different  nature  from  corporeal  figure  and  motion;  and  the 
sublime  faculties  and  operations  of  the  human  soul,  its 
power  of  rising  above  material  and  temporal  objects,  and 
contemplating  things  spiritual  and  invisible,  celestial  and 
eternal,  appear  to  be  the  properties  of  a  substance  of  a  far 
nobler  and  higher  kind  than  this  corruptible  flesh:  and  that 
therefore  there  is  no  reason  to  think  it  will  die  with  the 
body;  but  that  being  of  a  quite  different  nature,  essentially 
active,  simple,  and  indivisible,  it  is  designed  by  the  Creator, 
who  made  it  so,  for  an  immortal  existence.  To  this  may  be 
added  the  strong  apprehensions  of  a  future  state,  so  natural 
to  the  human  mind,  and  which  are  not  to  be  found  in  any 
of  the  inferior  animals:  and  that  men  alone  of  all  the  crea- 


(a)  This  is  very  well  arpjued  by  the  learned  Dr.  Samuel  Clarke, 
in  his  Letter  lo  Mr.  Dodwell,  and  his  several  defences  of  it 
against  an  acute  and  ini^enious  adversary.  Nor  have  I  ever  seen 
a  sufficient  answer  to  that  book. 


Chap.  I.  of  a  Future  State.  269 

tures  in  this  lower  world  are  capable  of  being  governed  by 
the  hopes  and  fears  of  the  world  to  come.  This  yields  a 
reasonable  presumption,  that  the  Author  of  their  frame  de- 
signed they  should  be  so  governed:  and  it  is  scarce  consis- 
tent with  the  best  ideas  we  can  form  of  the  Divine  Wisdom 
and  Goodness,  to  suppose  that  he  designed  and  formed 
them  to  be  governed  by  a  lie.  It  strengthens  this,  when  we 
consider,  that  it  seems  absurd  to  imagine  that  so  noble  a 
creature  as  man,  endued  with  such  admirable  faculties,  by 
which  he  is  capable  of  making  immortal  proficiencies  in 
knowledge  and  virtue,  should  be  designed  for  no  other  life 
than  this  short  and  transitory  existence,  in  which  he  is  in- 
capable of  arriving  at  the  true  perfection  and  felicity  of 
his  nature.  These  reasonings  receive  a  mighty  additional 
force  from  the  moral  arguments  for  a  state  of  future  re- 
tributions, drawn  from  the  present  seemingly  unequal  dis- 
pensations of  Divine  Providence;  the  many  evils  and  suffer- 
ings to  which  the  best  and  worthiest  of  men  are  ofttn  ex- 
posed in  this  present  state;  and  the  prosperous  condition  of 
bad  and  wicked  men,  many  of  whom  have  continued  in 
flourishing  and  splendid  circumstances  to  the  end  of  their 
lives.  From  these  and  several  other  considerations  which 
might  be  mentioned,  it  seems  reasonable  to  conclude,  that 
this  is  not  the  only  life  man  is  designed  for,  and  that  there 
is  a  state  before  us,  in  which  good  men  shall  be  amply  re- 
warded, and  the  wicked  punished:  and  even  those  secret 
good  or  evil  actions  and  dispositions  which  did  not  come 
under  the  cognizance  of  earthly  tribunals,  shall  be  brought 
into  judgment,  and  meet  with  a  suitable  recompense  from 
the  supreme  and  most  righteous  Lord  and  Governor  of  the 
world.  These  things  carry  a  great  deal  of  probability  to  se- 
rious and  contemplative  minds,  and  shew  that  what  is  re- 
vealed to  us  in  the  Gospel  on  this  subject  ii  suited  to  the 
best  notions  we  can  form  of  the  nature  of  man,  and  the  wis- 
dom and  righteousness  of  the  divine  administrations. 


270  Revelation  makes  the  most  eertain  Discovery  Part  III. 

But  vet  it  must  be  acknowledged,  that  there  are  objec- 
tions and  difficulties  brought  on  the  other  side,  which,  if 
men  were  left  merely  to  themstlves,  and  to  their  own  un- 
assisted reason,  might  be  apt  to  raise  doubts  in  their  minds, 
and  very  much  weaken  their  belief  ol  this  great  trutn.  The 
metaphysical  arguments  drawn  from  the  different  nature  of 
Ibody  and  spirit,  howevei  just  in  themselves,  are  only  fitted 
to  make  impressions  on  a  few  persons  of  philosophical 
minds,  and  who  have  been  accustomed  to  abstracted  specu- 
lations, but  carry  no  great  light  of  evidence  and  conviction 
to  the  generality  of  mankind;  who,  having  from  their  birth 
been  wholly  conversant  with  sensible  and  material  objects, 
cannot  easily  form  a  n(  tion  of  a  spiritual  being  distinct  irom 
matter.  After  the  enquiries  and  disquisitions  of  men  of  the 
greatest  genius  and  ability  in  all  ages,  we  yet  know  very 
little  of  the  nature  and  essence  of  our  own  souls,  of  the  ori- 
gin of  our  ideas,  and  the  proper  difference  between  body 
and  spirit,  and  what  influence  the  one  of  them  may  have 
upon  the  other.  Experience  convinces  us  of  the  intimate 
connection  and  close  union  there  is  between  our  bodies  and 
souls  in  this  present  state:  and  that  the  exercise  of  our  fa- 
culties, and  the  operations  of  our  souls,  very  much  depend 
upon  the  due  disposition  of  the  bodily  organs.  To  which  it 
may  be  added,  that  the  soul  often  seems  to  decay  with  the 
body,  and  to  outward  appearance  is  extinguished  with  it. 
Even  those  who  most  firmly  believe  the  soul's  immortality, 
find  it  very  difficult  to  form  a  distinct  conception  how  it 
exists  and  operates  when  separated  from  the  body.  The 
world  to  come  is  hidden  from  our  view:  it  is  not  the  object 
of  any  of  our  senses:  it  is  a  state  which  we  are  wholly  un- 
acquainted with,  and  of  which,  if  left  merely  to  ourselves, 
we  are  scarce  capable  of  forming  a  clear  and  satisfactory 
idea;  and  therefore  is  the  proper  object  of  a  Divine  Reve- 
lation, and  of  the  exercise  of  that  faith  "  which  is  the  evi- 
dence of  things  not  seen."  And  as  the  soul  of  man  does  not 


Chap.  I.  of  a  Future  State.  271 

exist  independently  by  an  absolute  necessity  of  nature,  but 
depends  for  the  continuation  of  its  existence  upon  the  will 
of  God,  we  can  be  no  farther  sure  of  its  immortal  duration, 
than  we  are  &ure  that  it  is  the  will  of  God  that  it  should 
be  so:  and  though  this  may  be  probably  gathered  from  seve- 
ral considerations,  yet  nothing  could  give  us  so  full  an  as- 
surance of  it,  as  a  Revelation  from  God,  containing  an  express 
discovery  of  his  will  concerning  it.  The  moral  arguments 
for  a  future  state  are  indeed  of  great  force;  yet  it  must  be 
owned,  that  there  are  such  secrets  and  depths  of  Provi- 
dence, which  we  are  not  able  to  account  for;  we  have  such 
narrow  views  of  things,  and  know  so  little  of  the  divine 
counsels,  and  of  the  reasons  and  ends  of  the  divine  admi- 
nistrations, and  what  measures  it  may  please  Infinite  Wis- 
dom to  take  in  the  government  of  the  world,  that  there  may 
still  be  room  for  doubts  and  uncertainties  in  a  .serious  and 
thoughtful  mind,  which  nothing  less  than  the  light  of  Di- 
vine Revelation  can  effectually  dispel. 

But  the  surest  way  of  judging  of  what  may  be  expected 
from  human  unassisted  reason,  with  respect  to  the  immor- 
tality of  the  soul  and  a  future  state,  is  to  consider  what 
men  of  the  greatest  abilities  in  the  Pagan  world,  and  who 
seem  to  have  been  capable  of  carrying  reason  to  its  highest 
improvement,  have  said  and  thought  upon  it.  This  was 
for  many  ages  the  subject  of  their  philosophical  enquiries, 
and  which  was  debated  among  them  with  all  the  strength 
of  argument  they  were  masters  of.  And  how  far  they  suc- 
ceeded in  their  enquiries,  will  appear  from  the  following 
treatise. 


272       The  belief  of  the  immortality  of  the  Soul    Part  IIL 


CHAPTER  II. 

Some  notions  of  the  immortality  of  the  soul  and  a  future  state  obtained  among 
mankind  from  the  nio&t  antient  times,  and  spiead  very  generally  through  the 
nations.  This  was  not  originally  the  effect  of  human  reason  and  philosophy, 
nor  was  it  merely  the  invention  of  legislators  for  political  pur[>oses:  but  was 
derived  to  them  by  a  most  antient  tracjition  from  the  earliest  ages,  and  was 
probably  a  tiart  of  the  primitive  I'eiigion  communicated  by  Divine  Revelation 
to  the  first  of  the  human  race. 

Before  we  enter  upon  an  examination  of  the  senti- 
ments of  philosophers  on  this  subject,  it  is  proper  to  ob- 
serve, that  the  belief  of  the  immortality  of  the  soul  and  a 
future  state  obtained  among  mankind  in  the  earliest  ages; 
of  which  we  hav^e  all  the  proof  that  a  matter  of  this  nature 
is  capable  of.  This  is  acknowledged  by  some  who  are 
otherwise  no  great  friends  to  that  doctrine.  Lord  Boling- 
broke  owns,  that  "  the  doctrine  of  the  immortality  of  the 
soul,  and  a  future  state  of  rewards  and  punishments,  began 
to  be  taught  before  we  have  any  light  into  antiquity.  And 
when  we  begin  to  have  any,  we  find  it  established,  that  it 
was  strongly  inculcated  from  times  immemorial,  and  as 
early  as  the  most  antient  and  learned  nations  appear  to 
us  (^)."  And  we  find  it  equally  obtained  among  the  most 
barbarous  as  among  the  most  civilized  nations.  The  antient 
Scythians,  Indians,  Gauls,  Germans,  Britons,  as  well  as  the 
Greeks  and  Romans,  believed  that  souls  are  immortal, 
and  that  men  shall  live  in  another  state  after  death, 
though  it  must  be  confessed  their  ideas  of  it  were  very  ob- 
scure (c).  There  were  scarce  any  of  the  American  nations, 


{b)  Bolingbroke's  Works,  Vol.  V.p.  237   edit.  4to. 
(c)  Grotius  de  Verit.  Relig.  Christ,  lib.  i.  sect,  22. 


Chap,  II.     and  a  future  State  of  great  Antiquity,  273 

wbrn  the  Europeans  first  came  among  them,  but  had  some 
notion  of  it. 

It  is  observed  by  a  celebrated  writer,  that  the  most 
antient  Greek  poets,  who  represent  the  manners  and  cus« 
toms  of  their  own  and  other  nations,  still  sptak  of  this  as 
their  popular  opinion  and  belief  {d).  Timaeus  the  Pythago- 
rean commends  the  lonean  poet  [Homer]  for  the  account 
he  gives  frotn  antient  tradition  of  future  punishments  {e)i 
and  if  this  was  an  antient  tradition  in  Homer's  time,  it 
must  have  been  of  very  great  antiquity.  Socrates,  as  repre- 
sented by  Plato,  endeavoured  to  prove  the  immortalitv 
of  the  soul  in  a  way  of  reason  and  argument,  but  he  never 
pretended  to  be  the  first  inventor  of  this  doctrine,  or  to 
have  himself  found  it  out  merely,  by  his  own  enquiries,  but 
frequently  speaks  of  it  as  a  most  antient  and  venerable  tra- 
dition. Thus  in  the  Phaedo  Socrates  saith,  "  I  am  in  good 
hope,  that  there  is  something  remaining  for  those  that  are 
dead;  and  that,  as  hath  be;_n  said  of  old,  [&)T7rt^  y\  ^  Tr^xca 
yzysrxi]  it  is  much  better  for  good  than  for  bad  men  (/")." 
Piato  in  this  agreed  with  his  great  master.  In  his  seventh 
epistle  written  to  Dion's  friends  and  relations,  he  says, 
*■'  That  we  ought  always  to  believe  the  antient  and  sacred 
words,"  [which  plainly  points  to  some  traditions  of  great 
antiquity,  and  supposed  to  be  of  divine  original]  ''  which 
shew  both  that  the  soul  is  immortal,  and  that  it  hath 
judges,  and  suffers  the  greatest  punishments,  when  it  is 
disengaged  from    the   body   (^')."    From   whence   he   con- 


(cf)  Divine  Legation  of  Moses,  Vol.  I.  book   ii.  sect.  1.  p.  90. 
4th  edit. 

(e)  See  his  treatise  of  the  Soul  of  the  World,  at  the  latter  end» 

(/)  Platen  Opera,  p.  378.  A.  edit.  Lugd. 

{g)  Ibid.  p.  7  16.  A.  niiB-i(76iit  Ti  'irax;  am  x,e,^  rolg  rccXxiotg  >^  il^oiq 

Vol.  II.  o  M 


274       The  belief  of  the  Immortality  of  the  Soul    Part  III. 

eludes,  that  it  is  a  less  evil  to  sufft:r  tlie  greatest  acts  of  in- 
justice than  to  do  them.  Aristotle,  as  cited  by  Plutarch, 
speaking  of  the  happiness  of  men  after  their  departure  out 
of  this  life,  represents  it  as  a  most  antient  opinion,  so  old 
that  no  man  knows  when  it  began,  or  who  was  the  author 
of  it,  that  it  hath  been  handed  down  to  us  by  tradition  from 
infinite  ages  (Ji),  Cicero  speaking  of  the  immortality  of  the 
Soul,  supposes  it  to  have  been  held  "  by  those  of  the  best 
authority,  which  in  every  case  is  and  ought  to  be  of  great 
weight:  and  that  all  the  antients  agreed  in  it,  who  were 
the  more  worth}^  of  credit,  and  the  more  likely  to  know  the 
truth,  the  nearer  they  approached  to  the  first  rise  of  man- 
kind, and  to  their  divine  original  (?)•"  He  also  observes, 
that  "  the  antients  believed  it,  before  they  became  ac- 
quainted with  natural  philosophy,  which  was  not  cultivated 
till  many  years  afterwards:  and  that  they  were  persuaded 
of  things  by  a  kind  of  natural  admonition,  without  enquir- 
ing into  the  reasons  and  causes  of  them  (i)."  He  after- 
wards argues  from  the  consent  of  all  nations  concerning  it. 
"Permanere  animos  arbitramur  consensu  nationum  om- 
nium (/)."  And  Seneca  in  his  117th  epistle  represents  this 
universal  consent  as  of  no  small  moment  in  this  argument. 


(A)  Plutarch,  in  Consol.  ad  Apollon.  Oper.  torn.  II.  p.  115.  C. 
edit  Xyl. 

(f)  "  Autoribus  quidem  ad  istam  sententiam  uti  optumis  pos- 
sumus  quod  in  omnibus  causis,  et  debet  et  solet  valere  plurimum: 
et  primum  quidem  oiTini  aniiquitate,  quae  quo  propius  aberat  ab 
ortu  et  divina  progenie,  hoc  melius  ea  fortasse  quae  crant  vera 
cernebat."  Tuscul.  Disput.  lib.  i.  cap.  12. 

{k)  *'  Qui  nondum  ea  quae  multis  post  annis  tractari  cepissent 
physicu  'lidicissent,  tanlum  sibi  persuaserant,  quantum  natura  ad- 
raonente  cognoverant,  rationes  et  causas  rerum  non  tenebant." 
Tuscul    Disput.  lib.  i.  cap.  13. 

(/)lbid.  cap.  16. 


Chap.  II.     and  a  future  state  of  great  Antiquity,  275 

Plutarch  in  his  consolation  to  Apollonius,  not  only  ap- 
proves the  passage  of  Aristotle  produced  above  concerning 
the  great  antiquity  of  this  tradition,  but  represents  it  as  an 
opinion  delivered  by  the  most  antient  potts  and  philoso- 
phers [o  Tiuv  rrxXuTcifv  rt  Tirosiirifv  Kxi  (PiXo^oipav  Xeyoi"]  that  some 
kind  of  honour  and  dignity  shall  be  conferred  upon  excel- 
lent persons,  after  their  departure  out  of  this  life;  and  that 
there  is  a  certain  region  appointed,  in  which  the  souls  of 
such  persons  reside  (w).  The  same  eminent  philosophtr  in 
his  consolatory  letter  to  his  wife  on  the  death  of  their  little 
child,  supposes  that  the  souls  of  infants  pass  after  death 
into  a  better  and  more  divine  state.  And  that  this  is  what 
may  be  gathered  from  their  antient  laws  and  customs  de- 
rived by  tradition  from  their  ancestors  (n). 

I  think  it  sufficiently  appears  from  the  several  testimo- 
nies which  have  been  produced,  that  the  doctrine  of  the 
immortality  of  the  soul  and  a  future  state  obtained  very 
generally  among  mankind  in  the  earliest  ages.  It  is  true 
that  some  have  pretended  to  assign  the  first  authors  of  this 
opinion.  Cicero  himself  says,  that,  as  far  as  appears  from 
written  accounts,  Pherecydes  Syrius  was  the  first  who 
taught  that  the  souls  of  men  are  sempiternal  or  immortal. 
For  Cicero  uses  these  words  as  synonvmous.  Thus  he 
speaks  of  the  body's  being  buried  after  death  in  a  sempi- 
ternal sleep,  i.  e.  not  a  sleep  that  never  had  a  beginning, 
but  which  shall  never  have  an  end   (o).  "  Credo  equidem 


(m)  Plutarch,  ubi  supra,  p.  120.  B. 

(n)  Plutarch.  Oper.  tom.  II.  p.  612. 

(o)  Tuscul.  Disput.  lib.  i.  cap.  16.  The  author  of  Le  Discours 
sur  la  Vie  heureuse,  published  at  the  end  of  the  Pensees  Phiioso- 
phiques,  after  having  asserted  that  from  the  most  remote  anti- 
quity, the  entire  destruction  of  our  being  at  death  was  a  doctrhie 
believed  among  the  philosophers,  tells  us,  that  Cicero  names  the 


276       The  Belief  of  the  Immortality  of  the  Soul    Part  III. 

etiam  alios  tot  saeculis;  seel  quod  Uteris  extet,   Pherecydes 
Syrius    primum    dixit    animos    esse    hominum    sempiter- 


man  who  first  took  upon  him  to  believe  that  the  soul  is  immortal. 
But  it  is  manifest  that  it  was  not  Cicero's  intention  to  insinuate 
that  Pherecydes  was  the  first  man  that  ever  believed  the  im- 
mortality of  the  soul.  The  san^e  confident  writer  adds,  that"  in 
the  present  enlightened  a^e,  it  is  demonstrated  by  a  thousand 
proofs,  thcit  there  is  only  one  life  and  one  happiness,"  i.  e.  a  hap- 
piness confined  in  this  present  life.  Di.ns  un  siecle  aussi  eclaire 
que  le  notre,  il  est  enfin  demontre  par  mille  preuves  sans  repli- 
que,  qui'l  n'y  a  qu'une  vie,  et  qu'une  felicite."  An  excellent 
instance  this  of  the  extraoidinary  sagacity  of  the  present  age: 
i.  e.  of  those  who  set  up  for  masters  of  rea-on  in  opposition  to 
revelation.  And  indeed  this  author  plainly  and  without  disguise 
pushes  this  system  of  the  mortality  of  the  soul,  and  the  utter  ex- 
tinction of  our  existence  at  death,  '.o  its  natural  consequences, 
utterly  subversive  of  all  religion  and  morality.  See  here  above 
p.  37.  of  this  v>lunie. 

To  what  is  there  observed  I  now  add,  that  Virtue  and  Vice, 
according  to  this  writer,  are  only  different  modifications  of  mat- 
ter, like  a  clock's  going  right  or  wrong:  and  a  man  has  no  reason 
to  blame  himself  for  doing  what  he  could  not  possibly  help  This 
is  a  consequence  he  pkinly  avows.  *' When  I  do  g(jod  or  evil," 
says  he,  "  if  I  be  vicious  in  the  morning,  and  virtuous  in  the  even- 
ing, it  is  ray  blood  that  is  the  cause  of  it;  and  yet  I  believe  I  did 
it  by  choice,  and  applaud  myself  upon  my  liberty  "  He  asserts^ 
that  an  absolutely  necessary  determination  draws  us,  une  deter- 
mination absolument  necessaire  nous  entraine;  and  yet  we  ima- 
gine we  are  free.  Upon  which  he  exclaims,  "  What  fools  are  we! 
and  fools  by  so  much  the  more  miserable,  that  we  incessantly 
reproach  ourselves  for' not  having  done  that  which  it  was  not  in 
our  power  to  do!"  Que  nous  sommes  fous!  et  fous  d'autant  plus 
malheureux,  que  nous  nous  reprochons  sans  cesse  de  ne  pas 
avoir  fait  ce  qu'il  n'etoit  pas  au  notre  pouvoir  de  faire.  Here  he 
evidently  discards,  as  far  as  in  him  lies,  all  remorse  of  conscience 
for  evil  deeds,  as  a  foolish  and  unreasonable  thing.  A  doctrine 
this,  which  besides  the  impiety  of  it,  is  of  the  worst  consequence 
to  the  good  order  of  civil  communities. 


Chap.  II.     and  a  future  State  of  great  Antiquity.  277 

nos  (/>)•"  But  it  is  evident  that  he  does  not  here  intend  to 
affirm,  that  Pherecydes  was  absolutely  the  first  that  ever 
held  the  immortality  of  the  soul.  For  he  himself  represents 
it  as  having  been  believed  from  all  antiquity,  by  those  who 
were  nearest  the  origin  of  the  human  race.  And  in  this 
very  paragraph  he  declares  it  as  his  own  opinion,  that 
there  were  others  in  the  succession  of  so  many  ages  who 
had  taught  it,  though  their  names  are  not  recorded.  His 
meaning  therefore  is  probably  this,  that  though  others  had 
believed  and  maintained  it  long  before,  and  it  stood  on  the 
foot  of  antient  tradition,  Pherecydes  was  the  first  of  the 
philosophers,  of  whom  there  was  any  account  then  extant, 
who  taught  it  to  his  scholars  as  part  of  his  philosophical 
doctrine.  Diogenes  Laertius  tells  us,  that  some  affirmed 
that  Thales  was  the  first  who  said  that  souls  are  immor- 
tal (^).  Pausanias  gives  the  honour  of  it  to  the  Chaldeans 
and  Persian  Magi,  from  whom  he  thinks  the  Greeks  had 
it  (r).  And  Laertius  also  mentions  it  as  the  doctrine  of 
the  Magi,  that  men  shall  live  again  and  be  immortal  (^). 
According  to  Athenaeus,  Homer  was  the  first  who  said- 
that  the  soul  is  immortal  (^).  Others  name  Pythagoras  for 
the  author  of  it.  Herodotus  ascrib^s  it  to  the  Egyptians  (li). 
And  in  this  he  has  been  followed  by  others.  Lord  Boling- 
broke,  after  having  declared  in  the  passage  above  referred 
to,  that  it  began  to  be  taught  before  we  have  any  light  into 
antiquity,  yet  pretends  to  assign  the  origin  of  it,  and  that 
it  was   invented    in   Egypt,   and   came   from    thence  to  the 


(fi)  Tuscul.  Disput.  lib.  i.  cap.  16. 
(q)  Laert,  lib.  i.  segm.  24. 
(r)  In  Messeniacis,  cap.  32. 
(s)  Laert.  in  Procem.  segm.  9. 
(?)  Deipnos.  lib.  xi.  p.  507. 
(w)  Lib.  ii.  cap.  122. 


278  The  Notion  of  a  future  State  derived    PARf  III. 

Greeks,  and  from  whom  it  was  derived  to  the  Romans  (at). 
All  that  can  justly  be  concluded  from  those  different  ac- 
counts is,  that  the  author  of  this  doctrine  was  not  known: 
that  the  several  persons  which  have  been  mentioned  taught 
the  immortality  of  the  soul,  but  that  this  doctrine  was 
really  of  more  antient  date  than  any  of  them,  and  even  from 
times  immemorial.  There  is,  therefore,  just  ground  to  con- 
clude that  it  was  not  originally  the  result  of  philosophical 
disquisitions,  to  which  men  did  not  much  apply  themselves 
in  those  early  ages.  Nor  was  it  merely  the  invention  of 
lawgivers  for  political  purposes,  as  some  have  represented 
it.  The  noble  author  above-mentioned  expressly  asserts, 
"the  antient  theists,  polytheists,  philosophers,  and  legis- 
lators, invented  the  doctrine  of  future  rewards  and  punish- 
ments, to  give  an  additional  strength  to  the  sanctions  of  the 
law  of  nature  (t/)."  That  it  gives  a  mighty  sanction  to  that 
Jaw  will  be  readily  allowed;  and  its  great  utility  this  way, 
as  the  learned  bishop  of  Gloucester  has  very  properly  ob- 
served, is  no  small  argument  of  its  truth.  It  has  been  al- 
ready hinted,  that  men's  being  capable  of  being  governed 
by  the  hopes  and  fears  of  the  life  to  come,  which  cannot 
be  said  of  any  of  the  inferior  animals,  seems  plainly  to 
shew  that  the  author  of  the  human  frame  designed  man  not 
merely  for  the  present,  but  for  a  future  state  of  existence. 
For  who  would  undertake  to  propose  such  sanctions  to  the 
brutes?  The  wisest  of  the  antient  legislators  encouraged 
the  belief  of  a  future  state,  as  they  did  that  of  the  existence 
of  a  God  and  a  Providence.  But  they  were  not  the  authors 
or  inventers  of  these' doctrines.  They  took  advantage  of  the 
notions  of  these  things,  which  had  already  obtained  among 
the   people,  and  endeavoured   to   make   their  own   use  of 


{x)  Bolingbroke*s  Works,  Vol.  V.  p.  288. 
(t/)  Ibid. 


Chap.  II.     by  Tradition  from  the  fir  at  Ages,  279 

them.  The  most  reasonable  account  which  can  be  given 
of  the  early  and  universal  spreading  oi"  the  doctrine  of  a 
future  state  among  the  nations,  is,  that  it  was  parr  of  the 
primitive  religion  communicated  to  the  first  parents  and 
ancestors  of  the  human  race,  and  which  came  originally  by 
divine  revelation,  and  was  from  them  transmitted  to  their 
posterity.  Grotius  speaking  of  the  notion  that  the  souls  of 
men  survive  their  bodies,  says,  that  ''this  most  antient 
tradition  spread  from  our  first  parents  (for  from  whom 
else  could  it  come?)  to  almost  all  civizcd  nations.*'  "  Qua 
antiquissima  traditio  a  primis  (unde  enim  aiioqui?)  paren- 
tibus,  ad  populos  moratiores  pene  omnes  manavit  (z)."  And 
indeed  it  cannot  well  be  conceived,  that  the  first  men  in  the 
rude  illiterate  ages,  when  they  were  little  used  to  abstracted 
reasonings,  should  be  able  to  form  notions  (if  left  merely 
to  themselves)  of  spiritual  immaterial  beings,  or  that  they 
had  souls  within  them  which  should  survive  their  bodies, 
and  continue  to  think  and  act  without  the  assistance  of  the 
bodily  organs:  how  should  they  pursue  the  refined  specu- 
lations concerning  the  nature  and  qualities  of  the  soul,  which 
so  puzzled  and  embarrassed  the  acutest  philosophers,  and 
the  greatest  masters  of  reason,  in  the  ages  of  learning  and 
science?  The  first  men  could  not  so  much  as  know,  till  they 
were  taught  by  observation  and  experience,  or  had  informa- 
tion of  it  by  foreign  instruction,  that  they  were  to  die  and 
have  an  end  put  to  their  lives  by  the  dissolution  of  the 
bodily  frame,  much  less  that  there  was  to  be  another  life 
after  this,  in  which  they  w^ere  to  be  rewarded  or  punished 
according  to  their  present  conduct.  Since  therefore  it  can- 
not be  denied  that  some  notion  of  a  future  state  obtained 
very  early  in  the  world,   and  spread  very  generally  among 


(z)  Grot,  de  Verit.  Relig.  Christ,  lib.  i.  cap.  22. 


280         The  Notion  of  a  future  State  derived    Part  IIL 

mankind,  and  since  there  is  little  likelihood  that  mf^n  in 
those  first  ages  came  to  the  knowledge  of  it  in  the  way  of 
reasoning  and  abstracted  speculation,  it  is  most  reasonable 
to  resolve  it  into  a  primitive  universal  tradition,  derived 
from  the  first  ages.  And  to  this  several  of  the  passages 
which  have  been  produced  from  the  mdst  eminent  Pagan 
writers  plainly  refer,  and  some  of  them  represent  that  tra- 
dition as  having  been  of  a  divine  original.  And  of  this 
there  are  plain  intimations  given  us  in  the  Holy  Scrip- 
tures. It  is  indeed  urged  by  a  learned  and  ingenious  writer, 
who  is  not  willing  to  allow  that  the  nations  received  any 
part  of  their  religion  by  tradition  from  the  first  parents  of 
mankind,  that  '^  it  does  not  appear  that  either  Adam  or 
Noah  received  from  God  any  thing  concerning  the  immor- 
tality of  the  soul,  or  a  state  of  future  rewards  and  punish- 
ments; and  that  no  passage  can  be  produced,  which  con- 
tains such  revelation  (<:/)•"  But  it  appears  from  the  express 
testimony  of  the  sacred  writer  to  the  Hebrews,  that  Abra- 
ham and  other  patriarchs,  w^ho  lived  but  a  few  ages  after 
the  flood,  looked  forward  beyond  this  present  transitory 
state  to  a  better  heavenly  country.  He  represents  both 
them,  and  some  of  those  who  lived  before  the  flood,  as  hav- 
ing lived  and  walked  by  faith,  which  he  describes  to  be  the 
"  substance,  or  confident  expectation  (as  the  word  there 
used  in  the  original  might  properly  be  rendered)  of  things 
hoptd  for,  and  the  evidence  of  things  not  seen."  And  this 
faith  must  be  supposed  to  have  been  originally  founded  on 
a  divine  revelation  or  promise.  And. since  it  appears  from 
the  Mosaic  writings,  that  God  communicated  by  revelation 
the  knowledge  of  several  things  relating  to  religion  and 
their  duty  to  the  first  parents  of  mankind,  it  may  be  rea- 


(a)  Dr.  Sykes's  Connection  and  principles  of  Natural  and  Re- 
vealed Religion,  p.  438,  439,  440. 


Chap.  II.     hy  Tradition  from  the  first  Ag^es.  281 

sonably  concluded,  that  some  notion  was  also  given  them 
of  the  immortality  of  the  soul  and  a  future  state;  especially 
after  the  sentence  of  death  pronounced  upon  them  after  the 
fall.  Some  notices  of  this  kind  seem  to  have  been  particu- 
larly necessary  on  occasion  of  the  death  of  Abel,  who  pro- 
bably was  the  first  man  that  died,  and  who  seemed  to 
perish  in  his  righteousness;  and  afterwards,  by  the  transla- 
tion of  Enoch,  God  gave  a  manifest  proof  of  a  future  state, 
prepared  for  those  who  had  obeyed  and  served  him  in  a 
holy  and  virtuous  life  here  on  earth.  And  as  this  must  be 
known  to  Noah,  he  could  not  be  ignorant  of  the  life  to 
come,  and  would  undoubtedly  be  careful  to  instruct  his 
posterity  in  a  point  of  such  vast  importance.  This,  which  is 
plainly  intimated  concerning  the  antediluvian  patriarchs,  is, 
as  hath  been  already  hinted,  still  clearer  with  respect  to 
Abraham,  and  other  patriarchs  after  the  flood;  as  any  one 
may  see  that  will  consider  what  is  said  concerning  them  in 
the  eleventh  chapter  of  the  epistle  to  the  Hebrews,  verse 
9,  10.  13,  14,  15,  16.  To  which  may  be  added,  that  St. 
Paul  seems  to  refer  to  some  very  antient  promise  or  revela- 
tion concerning  this  matter,  when  he  speaks  of  God's  hav- 
ing "  promised  eternal  life,  wgo  x^^^^^  utmim-,  before  antient 
times,"  or  as  Chrvsostom,  Theodoret,  and  Oecumenius 
render  it,  uvcHv  utt*  m^x^s^  "  of  old  time  from  the  beginning 
of  ages."  Titus  i.  2.  (^) 

Thus  we  have  the  testimony  of  the  Holy  Scriptures,  and 
of  the  most  eminent  Heathen  writers,  concerning  the  great 
antiquity  of  the  doctrine  of  a  future  state.  But  in  process 
of  time,  in  this  as  well  as  other  instances,  the  antient  pri- 
mitive traditions  became  greatly  corrupted:  and  at  the  time 
of  our  Saviour's  coming  the  belief  of  it  was  very  much  ob- 


(b)  See  Dr.  Whitby's  Commentary  on  Tit.  i.  2.   See  also  Dr. 
Benson's  Paraphrase  and  notes  on  that  place. 

Vol.  II.  2  N  •        ' 


282   The  Notion  of  a  future  State  derived^  ^c.  Part  III. 

scured  and  almost  lost,  even  in  the  most  learned  and  ci- 
vilized parts  of  the  Heathen  world.  There  was  therefore 
great  need  of  a  divine  revelation,  which  should  exhibit  far 
clearer  discoveries,  and  give  fuller  assurances  of  it  than 
had  been  ever  given  to  the  world  before.  This  was  done  to 
the  greatest  advantage  by  the  Christian  revelation:  so  that 
it  may  be  justly  said,  that  our  Lord  J'  sus  Christ  hath 
"brought  life  and  immortality  to  light  through  the  Gospel." 


283 


CHAPTER  III. 

The  antient  traditions  concerning  the  immortality  of  the  soul  and  a  future  state 
became  in  process  of  time  greatly  obscured  and  corrupted.  It  was  absolutely 
denied  by  many  of  the  philosophers,  and  rejected  as  a  vulgar  error.  Others 
represented  it  as  altogethei-  uncertain,  and  having  no  solid  foundation  to  sup- 
port it. The  various  and  contradictory  sentiments  of  the  philosophers  concerning 
the  naiuie  of  the  human  soul  Many  of  the  Peripatetics  denied  the  subsistence 
of  the  soul  after  death,  and  this  seems  to  have  been  Aristotle's  own  opinion. 
The  Stoics  had  no  settled  or  consistent  scheme  on  this  head:  nor  was  the  doc- 
trine of  the  immortality  of  the  soul  a  doctrine  of  their  school  A  future  state 
not  acknowledged  by  the  celebrated  Chinese  philosopher  Confucius,  nor  by 
the  sect  of  the  learned  who  profess  to  be  his  disciples. 

It  has  been  shewn,  that  the  belief  of  the  immortality 
of  the  soul,  and  a  future  state,  obtained  very  early  among 
the  nations,  even  in  ages  that  were  accounted  rude  and 
illiterate.  One  would  have  hoped  that  afterwards  in  the 
ages  of  learning  and  philosophy,  a  doctrine  so  useful  to 
mankind,  and  so  agreeable  to  right  reason,  would  have  ac- 
quired new  strength.  But  the  fact  was  otherwise:  many  of 
those  who  pretended  to  a  wisdom  and  penetration  above 
the  vulgar,  quitting  the  antient  traditions,  and  affecting  to 
govern  themselves  by  the  pure  dictates  of  reason,  abso- 
lutely denied  the  doctrine  of  the  immortality  of  the  soul 
and  a  future  state,  and  exploded  it  as  a  vulgar  error,  un- 
worthy of  men  of  sense,  and  fit  only  to  be  left  to  the  un- 
thinking multitude.  There  were  whole  sects  of  philoso- 
phers, whose  professed  tenet  it  was,  that  the  soul  died 
with  the  body.  Such  were  Democritus  and  his  followers, 
the  Cynics,  Cyrenaics,  and  especially  the  numerous  and 
wide  extended  sect  of  the  Epicureans:  and  many  other  phi- 
losophers agrvcd  with  them  in  this  point.  The  several  sorts 
of  Sceptics,  according  to  their  manner,  employed  all  the 
subtilty  they  were  masters  of  against  the  doctrine  of  the 
immortality  of  the   soul,   and   a   future   state,   as  well  as 


284   The  Doctrine  of  the  Immortality  of  the  Soul  Part  III. 

against  other  articles  of  popular  belief.  The  famous  Aris- 
totle expresses  himself  in  such  a  manner  as  leaves  his 
greatest  admirers  in  doubt  what  his  real  sentiments  were 
on  this  subject.  Plutarch  seems  to  give  it  as  Aristotle's 
opinion,  "that  death  belongs  only  to  the  bodv,  not  to  the 
soul;  for  that  there  is  no  death  of  the  soul."  Qxivxrov  ehen  fAa- 
V09  tS  cra)f^etroq<)  k  -^^Xt^^^i  rctvT^i  yec^  is^  vziru^^ti  B-civetToi  (^c).  But  Iq 
the  first  book  of  the  Nicomachian  Ethics,  the  eleventh 
chapter,  having  put  the  question,  whether  any  man  can  be 
happy  after  death,  Aristotle  intimates  that  it  would  be  al- 
together absurd  for  those  to  say  so,  who  make  happiness  to 
consist  in  operation,  which  was  his  own  opinion  (<f ).  And 
in  the  end  of  that  chapter  he  represents  it  as  a  matter  of 
doubt  and  dispute,  concerning  those  that  are  dead,  whether 
they  are  partakers  of  any  good,  or  of  the  contrary  (e).  But 
in  the  third  book  of  those  Ethics,  the  ninth  chapter,  he 
himself  seems  plainly  to  determine  that  point  in  the  ne- 
gative. He  there  asserts,  that  "  death  is  the  most  dreadful 
of  all  things:  for  that  it  is  the  end  [of  our  existence]:  and 
that  to  him  that  is  dead  there  seems  nothing  farther  to  re- 
main, whether  good  or  evil."  ^o^e^aTurov  21  'o  B-uvetrog^  tstz^xs 
yet^^  Kelt  »5sv  'in  tS  rehecoTt  SoxcT,  are  ciyccBov-,  are  xctKov  uvoti  (f^» 
Origen  who  was  well  acquainted  with  the  doctrine  of  the 
philosophers,  says,  that  Aristotle,  after  having  been  for 
twenty  years  a  hearer  of  Plato,  going  off  from  his  master, 
accused  his  doctrine  of  the  immortality  of  the  soul  (^); 
and  AtticLis  a  noted  Platonic  philosopher  directly  charges 


(c)  Plutarch,  de  Placit.  iPhilos.  lib.  v.  cap.  25. 

(d)  Aristot.  Oper.  torn.  II.  p.  13.  B.  edit.  Paris  1629. 

(e)  Ibid:  p.  15.  A. 

(/)  Ibid.  torn.  II.  p.  36.  B. 

(5")  Origen  cont.  Cels.  lib.  ii.  p.  67.  edit.  Spenser. 


Chap.  III.     rejected  by  many  of  the  Philosophers.         285 

him  with  denying  it.  {h).  Dicsearchus  an  eminent  Peri- 
patetic philosopher,  whom  Cicero  highly  commends,  writ 
books  to  prove  that  souls  are  mortal  (i).  Others  of  the  Pe- 
ripatetics were  of  the  same  opinion.  Many  of  them  held, 
as  Stobsus  informs  us,  that  the  soul  is  a  mere  quality, 
like  the  harmony  of  a  musical  instrument,  which  vanishes 
when  the  body  is  dissolved,  and  suddenly  passes  into  a 
state  of  non-existence.  £<«  to  (/.vi  ilvxi  ^e6i?ecrx(  (^).  What  that 
great  man  Cicero  says  of  the  philosophers  in  his  time  is 
remarkable.  In  that  celebrated  treatise  where  he  sets  him- 
self to  prove  the  immortality  of  the  soul,  he  represents  the 
contrary  as  the  prevailing  opinion;  that  there  were  crowds 
of  opponents,  not  the  Epicureans  only,  but,  which  he 
could  not  well  account  for,  those  that  were  esteemed  the 
most  learned  persons  had  that  doctrine  in  contempt.  "  Ca- 
tervae  veniunt  contradicentium,  nee  solum  Epicureorum,  ' 
sed  nescio  quomodo  doctissimus  quisque  contemnit  (/)." 
There  needs  no  more  to  convince  any  man  of  the  strange 
confusion  among  the  philosophers  on  this  head,  than  to  read 
the  account  Cicero  gives  of  their  various  sentiments  con-  i 
cerning  the  nature  of  the  soul.  Some  said  it  was  the  heart,  I 
others  the  blood,  others  the  brain,  others  breath,  others  ^ 
fire,  others  said  it  was  nothing  but  an  empty  name,  others 
that  it  was  harmony,  others  that  it  was  number,  others  that 
it  was  of  a  threefold  nature  of  which  the  rational  soul  is 
the  principal,  others  supposed  it  to  be  a  fifth  essence.  Many' 
held  it  not  to  be  distinct  from  the  bodily  temperament:  and 
of  those  who  held  it  to  be  distinct  from  the  body,  some 
were  of  opinion  that  it  was  extinguished  with  it  at  death, 


(h)  Apud  Euseb.  Praepar.  Evangel,  lib.  xv.  cap.  5. 
(0  1  uscul.  Disput.  lib.  i.  cap.  31. 
Ik)  Stob.  Eclog.  Phys.  p.  1 16.  edit.  Plantin.      - 
(/)  Tuscul.  Disput.  lib.  i.  cap.  3 1 . 


286  The  Immortality  of  the  Soul         Part  TIL 

or  at  least  that  it  was  soon  after  dissipated,  and  did  not 
continue  long  (w).  Seneca  says,  "there  are  innumerable 
questions  about  the  soul,  whence  it  comes,  of  what  quality- 
it  is,  when  it  begins  to  be,  how  long  it  shall  continue,  and 
whether  it  passes  from  one  place  to  another,  and  changes 
its  habitation,  being  cast  into  different  forms  of  animals." 
"  Innumerabiles  sunt  qusesiiones  de  animo:  unde  sit,  qualis 
sit,  quando  esse  incipiat,  quamdiu  sit,  an  aliunde  alio  tran- 
seat,  et  domicilium  mutet,  ad  alias  animantium  formas 
aliasque  conjectus  (/z)."  The  reader  may  also  consult  what 
Plutarch  says  concerning  the  different  opinions  of  philoso- 
phers on  the  nature  of  the  soul,  in  his  treatise  de  Placit. 
Philos.  lib.  iv.  cap.  2,  3.  (o).  The  famous  Galen,  who  was 
a  man  of  great  learning  and  abilities,  was  particularly  in- 
quisitive about  the  nature  of  the  human  soul,  but  could  not 
come  to  any  satisfaction  about  it.  He  declares,  that  he  was 
quite  ignorant  of  the  nature  of  the  soul,  but  that  he  vio- 
lently, suspected  that  its  essence  is  corporeal,  which  he 
was  led  to  think  by  observing  that  it  depends  in  all  its 
powers  and  operations  upon  the  dispositions  and  tempera- 
ment of  the  body.  (/>). 

In  enquiring  into  the  opinions  of  the  philosophers  on  this 
subject,  it  is  particularly  proper  to  take  notice  of  the  Stoics. 
As  none  of  the  philosophers  were  stricter  moralists,  or  pro- 
fessed greater  zeal  for  the  cause  of  virtue  than  they  did, 
one  might  be  apt  to  expect,  that  they  would  have  been 
strong  advocates  for  the  immortality  of  the  soul,  and  a  fu- 


(w)  Tuscul.  Disput.  lib.  i.  cap.  9,  10,  11. 

(n)  Senec.  Epist.  88. 

(o)  Plutarch.  Oper.  torn.  II.  p.  898.  edit.  Xyl. 

(//)  Galen  quod  animi  mores,  &c.  cap.  1,  2,  3.  5.  9.  as  cited 
by  Dr.  Campbell,  Neces.  Revel,  p.  185.  et  seq.  where  the 
reader  may  see  it  at  large. 


Chap.  III.     not  the  Doctrine  of  the  Stoic  School.  287" 

ture  state  of  rewards  and  punishments.  But  this  was  far 
from  being  the  case.  Lactantius  indeed  tells  us  concern- 
ing Z  .^no  the  father  of  the  Stoic  sect,  that  he  taught  that 
"the  abodes  of  good  men  in  the  subterraneous  regions 
were  distinct  and  separate  from  those  of  the  wicked;  the 
former  inhabit  pleasant  and  delightful  regions,  the  latter 
suffer  punishments  in  dark  places,  and  in  horrid  gulphs  full 
of  filth  and  nastiness."  "  Esse  inferos  Zeno  Stoicus  docuit, 
et  stdes  piorum  ab  impiis  esse  discretas,  et  illos  quidem 
quietas  et  delectabiles  incolere  regiones,  hos  vero  luere 
pccnas  in  tenebrosis  locis  atque  cceni  voraginibus  hor- 
rendis  (^)."  This  was  agreeable  to  the  representations 
made  of  these  things  in  the  mysteries.  And  it  might  well 
be,  that  Zvuo  expressed  the  popular  opinion  in  this  mat- 
ter rather  than  his  own.  But  whatever  were  his  sentiments 
upon.it,  certain  it  is  that  the  doctrine  of  the  immortality  of 
the  soul,  and  a  future  state  of  rewards  and  punishments, 
was  not  the  professed  doctrine  of  his  school,  nor  was  it 
ever  reckoned  among  the  avowed  principles  of  the  Stoic 
sect.  I  cannot  indeed  say  with  a  very  learned  writer,  "  we 
know  that  the  philosophic  principle  of  his  school  was  that 
the  soul  died  with  the  body,"  for  which  he  refers  to  Plu- 
tarch's treatise  de  Placit.  Philos.  lib.  iv.  cap.  7.  But  Plu- 
tarch there  only  gives  it  as  their  opinion,  that  when  the 
soul  goes  out  of  the  body,  "that  of  the  weaker,  that  is,  of 
the  unlearned,  is  mixed  with  the  concretions,  or  earthly 
elements;  but  that  which  is  more  strong  and  vigorous, 
such  as  are  the  souls  of  the  wise,  shall  continue  to  the  con- 
flagration." And  he  there  distinguishes  the  sentiments  of 
the  Stoics  from  that  of  Democritus  and  Epicurus,  who,  he 
says,  taught  that  the  soul  is  corruptible,  and  p^risheth  with 


(y)  Lactan.  Divin.  Instit.  lib.  vii.  cap.  7. 


288  The  Immortality  of  the  Soul        Part  IIL 

the  body.  Cicero  expressly  ascribeth  to  the  Stoics  the 
opinion  that  the  soul  surviveth  the  body,  and  subsisteth  in 
a  separate  state  for  some  time  after  death,  but  not  always. 
I  "  Aiunt  manere  animos  cum  a  corpore  excesserint,  sed  non 
/'  semper."  And  he  blames  them,  for  that  when  they  ac- 
knowledged that  the  soul  continues  to  subsist  separately 
from  the  body,  which  is  the  most  diflBcult  part  of  the  con- 
troversy, yet  they  would  not  allow  that  which  is  the  na- 
tural consequence  of  it,  that  the  soul  shall  never  die  (r). 
Agreeable  to  this  is  that  which  Laertius  saith,  that  the 
Stoics  held  that  "  the  soul  remaineth  afttr  death,  but  that 
it  is  corruptible."  -^vx^-^v  ^6T«e  ^xmrh  iTrtf^ivuv.  <p6»^ry)V  Tittvxt  (^), 
The  same  Laertius  informs  us,  that  Cleanthes  maintained, 
that  all  souls  shall  continue  to  the  conflagration;  Chry- 
sippus,  that  only  the  souls  of  the  wise  shall  continue  so 
long  (^).  Numenius,  as  cited  by  Eusebius,  Prsep.  Evan, 
lib.  XV.  cap.  20.  gives  it  as  the  opinion  of  many  of  the 
Stoics,  that  "the  soul  is  corruptible,  but  does  not  die  or 
perish  immediately  upon  its  departure  from  the  body,  but 
continues  for  some  time  by  itself,  that  which  is  wise  to  the 
dissolution  of  all  things,  that  of  fools  for  some  short  time." 
It  is  however  true  that  some  of  the  Stoics  seem  to  have 
held  that  the  soul  dies  immediately  with  the  body,  or  at 
least  that  it  is  immediately  resolved  or  resumed  into  one 
common  nature,  or  the  universal  soul,  so  as  to  lose  its  in- 
dividual existence.  Some  passages  in  Epictetus  and  Anto- 
ninus seem  to  look  this  way.  From  all  which  it  may  be 
gathered  that  the  Stoics  had  very  confu&ed  notions  on  this 
head,  and  seem  not  to  'have  formed  any  settled  or  con- 


(r)  Tuscul.  Disput.  lib.  i.  cap.  32. 
(s)  Laert.  lib.  vii.  segm.  156. 

(?)  Ibid.  segm.  137.  See  also  Menagius's  observations  upon  it} 
p.  326.  edit,  Wetstein. 


Chap.  III.     not  the  Doctrine  of  the  Stoic  School.  289 

sistent  scheme.  It  is  observed  in  a  note  on  the  excellent 
translation  of  Antoninus's  Meditations  published  at  Glas- 
gow, that  "the  Stoics  spoke  doubtfully  about  a  future  state, 
whether  the  rational  souls  subsisted  as  separate  intelli- 
gences, or  were  absorbed  in  the  Divinity.  Many  believed 
a  separate  existence  of  good  souls  for  a  thousand  years, 
and  of  the  eminently  virtuous  for  eternity,  in  the  dignity 
of  gods,  which  we  would  call  that  of  angels,  with  dele- 
gated powers  for  governing  certain  parts  of  the  uni- 
verse (w)."  To  which  may  be  added,  what  is  said  in  ano- 
ther note,  "that  we  cannot  conclude  from  their  speaking  of 
the  re-union  after  death,  that  individual  persons  cease  to 
be  distinct  persons  from  the  Deity,  and  from  each  other; 
since  it  was  the  known  tenet  of  the  Stoics,  that  heroic 
souls  were  called  to  the  dignity  of  gods  or  immortal  angels; 
and  they  mean  no  more  than  an  entire  moral  union  by  re- 
signation and  a  complete  conformity  of  will  (^^)."  But  this 
does  not  seem  to  me  to  be  a  just  representation  of  the 
Stoical  doctrine.  They  certainly  meant  more  by  the  re- 
fusion into  the  universal  soul  than  a  moral  union  or  con- 
formity to  the  will  of  God.  It  is  capable  of  a  clear  proof 
from  the  best  of  the  antient  writers  who  have  mentioned  it, 
that  this  re-union  of  the  soul  was  understood  not  merely 
in  a  moral  but  in  a  physical  sense.  The  reader  may  see  this 
fully  proved  by  the  learned  and  judicious  author  of  the 
"  Critical  Enquiry  into  the  Opinions  and  Practices  of  the 
antient  Philosophers  concerning  the  Nature  of  the  Soul 
and  a  future  State,"  ch.  v.  where  thc-re  is  an  accurate  ac- 
count given  of  the  opinion  of  the  Stoics  in  this  matter.  At 
present  1  shall  only  observe  that  it  is  a  known  part  of  the 
Stoical  doctrine,  that  at  certain  periods  and  conflagrations, 


{u)  See  the  Glasgow  translation  of  Antoninus,  p.  226, 

ly)  Ibid.  p.  454. 

Vol.  II.  2  0 


290  The  Immortality  of  the  Soul         Part  III. 

a  succession  of  which  they  believed  would  happen,  all 
things  were  to  be  consumed  and  resolved  into  the  sub- 
stance of  God  himself,  which  they  supposed  to  be  of  a 
fiery  nature:  that  nothing  would  remain  but  the  chief  God, 
and  that  all  the  other  gods,  much  more  the  heroic  souls, 
were  corruptible  and  would  die.  For  which  notion  they  are 
severely  exposed  by  Plutarch  in  his  two  treatises  against 
the  Stoics.  To  this  notion  Epictetus  refers  when  he  talks 
of  "  Jupiter's  being  alone  at  the  conflagration,  and  having 
neither  Juno,  nor  Pallas,  nor  Apollo,  nor  brother,  nor  son, 
nor  dependent,  nor  relation  (^)."  Seneca  speaking  of  the 
conflagration  or  dissolution  of  the  world,  saith,  that  "  those 
souls  which  were  happy,  and  had  obtained  eternal  felicity, 
shall  then  be  involved  in  the  common  ruin,  and  return 
to  the  antient  elements."  "  Nos  quoque  felices  animse,  et 
seterna  sortitae,  cum  Deo  visum  erit  iterum  ista  moliri, 
labentibus  cunctis,  et  ipsi  parva  ruinse  ingentis  accessio,  in 
antiqua  elementa  vertemur  (^/)."  Thus  it  was  to  be  even 
with  the  most  privileged  souls.  The  Stoics  therefore  did 
not  believe,  as  is  supposed  in  the  above-mentioned  note, 
that  eminently  virtuous  souls  were  to  continue  in  a  sepa- 
rate existence,  and  in  the  dignity  of  gods  to  eternity,  ex- 
cept by  eternity  be  meant  no  more  than  Seneca  intends  by 
his  "  felices  animse  et  seterna  sortitse,"  which  yet  were  to 
be  consumed  at  the  general  conflagration.  But  as  to  the 
common  kind  of  souls,  they  were  in  the  opinion  of  many 
of  the  Stoics,  to  be  immediately  refunded  into  the  "  anima 
mundi,"  and  thereby  lose  their  individual  existence  much 
sooner  (z). 


{jc)  Epictet.  Dissert,  book  iii.  chap.  13.  sect.  1. 
(z/)  Senec.  in  Consol.  ad  Marciam,  in  fine, 
(z)  It  is  to  be  observed  that  these  periodical  conflagrations  were 
designed  to  be  so  many  renovations  of  the  world.  All  things  were 


Chap.  III.     not  the  Doctrine  of  the  Stoic  SceooL  291 

The  three  most  eminent  Stoics,  whose  writings  are  come 
down  to  us,  are  Seneca,  Epictetus,  and  the  emperor  Marcus 
Antoninus.  As  to  the  first  of  these  great  men,  he  seems  to 


to  be  refunded  into  the  divine  substance  in  order  to  their  being 
produced  anew.  Many  of  the  Sioics  supposed,  that  then  the  same 
order  and  course  of  things  m  every  respect  would  be  repeated 
which  was  before:  the  very  same  persons  would  appear  again  on 
this  earthly  stage,  and  act  their  whole  foimer  life  again,  exactly 
in  the  same  manner  as  they  had  done  before,  and  be  subject  in 
every  thing  to  the  same  events  and  accidents.  Others  who  saw 
the  inconveniency  of  this,  explained  it  not  of  the  very  same  indi- 
vidual persons,  but  of  other  persons  perfectly  similar  to  them, 
and  exactly  resembling  them  in  their  characters,  actions,  and  all 
the  circumstances  which  attended  them  They  held  that  such 
revolutions  always  have  been,  and  always  shall  be  repeated  in  a 
perpetual  succession  throughout  an  infinite  duration,  and  they 
supposed  them  to  be  the  effects  of  physical  necessity*.  It  is  evi- 
dent that  upon  this  hypothesis,  there  could  be  no  proper  state 
of  future  retributions.  The  same  face  and  state  of  things  is  con- 
tinually to  return  at  certain  periods:  and  the  present  seemingly 
unequal  dispensations  of  Providence  to  be  repeated  and  renewed. 
It  may  not  be  improper  to  observe  here,  that  the  notion  of  suc- 
cessive dissolutions  and  renovations  of  the  world  has  penetrated 
to  the  farthest  parts  of  the  East,  and  perhaps  from  the  East  it  was 
originally  derived.  F.  Longobardi,  whom  I  have  cited  before,  in 
his  treatise  concerning  the  learned  sect  in  China,  observes  that 
it  is  a  doctrine  of  theirs,  that  when  the  years  of  the  world's  con- 
tinuance are  at  an  end,  and  among  the  rest  Tien  Chu,  and  Xang- 
li,  the  Lord  of  Heaven,  or  King  of  the  upper  Region:  all  things 
shall  return  to  the  first  principle,  which   shall  produce  another 

*  Concernuig  this  see  Numenius  apud  Euseb.  Praepar.  Evangel,  lib.  xv. 
cap.  18  et  19.  And  Nemes.  de  Fato,  cap.  38. — The  reader  naay  see  these 
and  other  testimonies  produced  by  the  learned  author  of  the  Critical  En- 
quiry above-mentioned,  ch.  V. — To  this  Antoninus  refers,  when  he  talks  of 
the  periodical  renovation  of  the  whole  or  of  the  unlvers^.— Twv  ^i§io^iv.i)v 
tscx.xtyyivi(Tia.y  ruv  oxuv.  Anton.  Medit.  book  xi.  sect.  1.  See  also  ibid,  book 
v.  sect.  13.  32.  and  book  x.  sect.  7. 


292     Immortality  of  the  Soul  an(ta  future  State    Part  III. 

have  been  strangely  unsettled  in  his  notions  with  regard  to 
the  immortality  of  the  soul,  and  a  future  state.  Sometimes 
he  speaks  in  a  clear  and  noble  manner  of  the  happiness  of 
souls  after  death,  when  freed  from  the  incumbrance  of  the 
body,  and  received  into  the  place  or  region  of  departed 
souls.  See  his  Consol.  ad  Polyb.  cap.  28.  et  Consol.  ad 
Marc.  cap.  25.  But  especially  his  102d  epistle  to  Lucilius, 
where  he  has  some  sublime  thoughts  on  this  subject;  and 
among  other  things  declares,  that  the  last  day  of  this  pre- 
sent life  is  to  be  regarded  as  the  birth-day  of  an  eternal 
one.  "  Dies  iste  quern  tanquam  extremum  reformidas  seter- 
ni  natalis  est."  At  other  times  he  expresses  himself  with 
great  doubt  and  uncertainty.  In  that  very  epistle  to  Lu- 
cilius, he  represents  it  as  a  kind  of  pleasing  dream,  and 
that  it  was  an  opinion  embraced  by  great  men,  very  agree- 
able indeed,  but  which  they  promised  rather  than  proved. 
'*  Credebam  facile  opinionibus  magnorum  virorum  rem 
gratissimam  promittentium  magis  quam  probantium."  And 
in  his  sixty-third  epistle,  '*  Perhaps,"  saith  he,  "  if  the  re- 
port of  wise  men  be  true,  and  some  place  receives  us  after 
death,  he  whom  we  think  to  have  perished  is  only  sent  be- 
fore." "  Fortasse,  si  modo  sapientum  vera  fama  est,  reci- 
pitque  nos  locus  aliquis,  quem  putamus  perisse,  prsemissus 
est."  And  again,  in  his  seventy-sixth  epistle,  "  If  it  be  so, 
(says  he,)  that  souls  remain  after  they  are  set  loose  from 
the  body,  a  happier  state  awaits  them,  than  whilst  they  are 


world  after  the  same  manner.  And  this  also  ending,  another  will 
succeed,  and  so  another  without  end.  And  he  observes,  that  the 
interval  between  the  beginning  and  end  of  the  world  is  called 
by  them  the  great  year.  See  F.  Longobardi's  treatise  in  the  fifth 
book  of  Navarctte's  account  of  the  empire  of  China,  p.  184.  The 
Stoics  also  called  the  interval  between  the  periodical  conflagra- 
tions the  great  year.  Euseb.  Praep.  Evang.  lib.  xv.  cap.  19. 


Chaf.  III.      not  the  Doctrine  of  the  Stoic  School.  293 

in  ihe  body."  "  Si  modo  solutae  corporibus  animse  manent, 
felicior  illis  status  restat,  quam  est  dum  versantur  in 
cor  pore" 

Thesv:,  and  other  passages  of  the  like  kind,  shew  the 
doubt  and  uncertainty  he  was  in;  but  he  sometimes  carries 
it  farther,  and  seems  plainly  to  deny  that  the  soul  has  any 
existence  after  death,  or  at  least  that  it  has  any  sense  of 
good  or  evil.  What  he  sa\  s  in  his  55th  epistle  to  Lucilius 
is  very  remarkable  to  this  purpose.  He  tells  him  of  a  vio- 
Itnt  disorder  which  seized  him  on  a  sudden,  and  seemed 
to  threaten  immediate  death.  And  he  informs  him  what  the 
thoughts  were  which  supported  and  comforted  him,  even 
when  he  was,  as  he  thought,  in  his  last  agony:  "  Ego  ve- 
ro  et  in  ipsa  sufFocatione  non  dv  sii  cogitationibus  laetis  ac 
fortibus  acquiescere."  And  what  was  it  that  yielded  him 
comfort  in  a  dying  hour?  Was  it  the  hope  of  a  happy  im- 
mortal existence  beyond  the  grave,  of  which  he  sometimes 
speaks  in  magnificent  terms?  No;  but  it  was  the  thought,  that 
he  should  be  in  the  same  insensible  state  after  death  that 
he  was  in  before  he  was  born,  and  should  return  to  a  state 
of  non-existence  {a),   "  I  have  had  long  experience  of  death 


(a)  "Ego  illam  [mortem]  diu  expertus  sum.  Quamdiu,  inquis? 
Antequam  nascerer.  Mors  est  non  esse:  id  quale  sit,  jam  scio: 
hoc  erit  post  me,  quod  ante  me  fuit:  siquid  in  hac  re  tormen- 
ti  est,  necesse  erit,  et  fuisse  antequam  prodiremus  in  lucem. 
Atqui  nullam  sensimus  tunc  vexationem.  Ro  o,  non  stultis- 
simum  dicas,  siquis  existimet  lucernae  pejus  esse  cum  exiincta 
est,  quam  antequam  accenderetur?  Nos  quoque  et  accendimur 
et  cxtinguimur:  medio  ilio  tempore  aliquid  patimur:  utro- 
bique  auiem  alta  securitasest.  In  hoc  enim,  mi  Luci'li,  nisi  fallor, 
erramus  quod  mortem  judicamus  sequi,  quum  ilia  et  precesserit, 
et  secutura  sit.  Quicquid  ante  nos  fuit  mors  est.  ^Quid  enim  re- 
fert  utrum  non  incipias,  an  desinas?  Utriusque  rei  hie  est  effec- 
tus,  non  esse."  Senec.  epist.  55.  edit.  Commelin.  1594. 


294      Immortality  of  the  Soul  and  a  future  State    Part  III. 

(says  he).  How  long?  say  you.  Before  I  was  born.  Death 
is  not  to  be:  what  that  is,  I  already  know.  That  shall  be 
after  me  which  was  before  me.  If  there  be  any  torment  in 
this,  we  must  needs  have  experienced  it,  before  we  came 
into  the  light.  But  we  then  felt  no  vexation.  Would  you 
not  think  it  a  very  foolish  thing,  if  any  man  should  think 
that  the  candle  is  in  a  worse  condition  after  it  is  put  out, 
than  before  it  was  lighted^  We  also  are  lighted  and  extin- 
guished. We  suffer  something  in  the  interval  between  these, 
but  both  before  and  after  there  is  a  profound  security. 
For  in  this,  my  Lucilius,  if  I  be  not  mistaken,  we  err,  that 
we  imagine  death  only  to  follow,  whereas  it  both  went  be- 
fore this  life,  and  shall  follow  after  it.  Whatsoever  was  be- 
fore us  is  death.  For  where  is  the  difference  between  not 
beginning  to  be  at  all,  and  ceasing  to  exist?  The  effect  of 
both  is  the  same,  not  to  be."  He  repeats  the  same  thought 
in  Consol.  ad  Polyb.  cap.  ^7.  as  also  in  Consol.  ad  Mar- 
ciam,  cap.  19.  where  he  absolutely  rejects  the  notion  of  fu- 
ture punishments,  and  asserts,  that  a  dead  man  is  affected 
with  no  evils,  but  is  in  the  same  state  of  tranquillity  he  was 
in  before  he  was  born  (^).  Again  he  says,  that  no  sense  of 
evil  can  reach  to  him  that  is  dead:  which  he  proves,  because 
nothing  can  hurt  him  who  is  not.  "  Nullum  mali  sensum  ad 
cum  qui  perit  pervenire;  nam  si  pervenit  non  periit,  nulla 
inquam,  eum  res  Isedit  qui  nullus  est  (c)." 

That  excellent  Stoic  Epictetus  never  takes  any  notice  of 


(^)  Torquatus  the  Epicurean,  who  defends  the  Epicurean  sys- 
tem in  Cicero's  first  book  De  Finibus,  talks  after  the  same  man- 
ner: "  Robustus  et  excellens  animus,  onini  est  Uber  cura  et  an- 
gore,  cum  et  mortem  contemnit,  qua  qui  adfecti  sunt,  eadem 
causa  sunt  qua,  antequam  nati,  et  ad  dolores  ita  paratus  est,  ut 
meminerit  maxumos  morte  finiri."  De  Finib.  lib.  i.  cap.  15.  p. 
50.  edit.  Davis. 

(c)  Sen.  cpist.  99. 


Chap.  III.     not  the  Doctrine  of  the  Stoic  School,  295 

a  future  state  of  rewards  and  punishments;  though,  had  he 
been  persuaded  of  the  truth  of  them,  the  subjects  he  treats 
of  would  have  led  him  to  mention  them:  especially  consi- 
dering that  he  treats  things  in  a  popular  way,  and  designed 
his  philosophy  not  merely  for  speculation,  but  for  use.  He 
frequently  asserts,  as  I  had  occasion  to  observe  before,  that 
a  good  man  needs  no  other  reward  than  his  goodness  and 
virtue,  nor  has  the  wicked  man  any  other  punishment  than 
his  own  vices.  And  the  comfort  he  gives  against  death  is, 
that  it  is  natural  and  necessary;  and  therefore  can  be  no 
evil,  for  all  evils  may  be  avoided.  He  elsewhere  observes, 
that  at  death  we  go  to  nothing  dreadful.  We  then  return  to 
the  elements  of  which  we  w^ere  made,  fire,  air,  earth,  and 
water.  There  is  no  Hades,  nor  Acheron,  nor  Cocytus,  nor 
Pyriphlegethon:  but  all  is  full  of  gods  and  dsemons  {d^» 

That  great  emperor  and  philosopher  Marcus  Antoninus, 
always  expresses  himself  very  doubtfully  on  this  point,  as 
the  learned  Gataker,  who  was  so  well  acquainted  with  his 
works,  and  his  great  admirer,  observes,  "  De  statu  animo- 
rum  post  mortem  ambigendo  passim  Marcus  sermonem  in- 
stituit  (^)."  And  again,  "  De  animi  statu  post  mortem 
incertus  fluctuat  passim  Marcus  (/)."  He  generally  speaks 
of  it  waveringly,  and  in  a  way  of  alternative.  "  Concerning 
death  (says  he)  it  is  either  a  dispersion,  or  atoms,  or  exina- 
nition  «ii6>(r<?,  or  an  extinction,  or  a  translation  to  another 
state."  '^Ht<><  6€go-<5i' ^£T^5-«o-<j  (^).  And  again,  "Remember 
(says  he)  that  either  this  corporeal  mixture  must  be  dis- 
persed, or  that  the  spirit  of  life  must  be  either  extinguish- 


(rf)  Epict.  Dissert,  book  iii.  chap.  13.  sect.  1. 

(e)  Gataker  Annoi.  in  Anton  p.  91. 

(/)  Ibid.  p.  423 

(§-)  Anton.  Medit.  book  vii.  sect.  32. 


296    Immortality  of  the  Soul  and  a  future  State    PartIIL 

ed  or  removed,  and  brought  into  another  place  (Z^)."  And 
in  another  passage  he  supposes,  that  as  dead  bodies,  after 
remaining  a  while  in  the  earth,  are  changed  and  dissipaced, 
to  make  room  for  other  bodies,  so  the  animal  souls  removed 
to  the  air,  after  they  have  remained  some  lime,  are  changed, 
diffused,  rekindled,  and  resumed  into  the  original  produc- 
tive spirit,  [«*5  Tflv  ra*  cXov  crTri^tiurtKh  Xoyov^  into  the  seminal 
reason  of  the  universe]  and  give  place  to  other  souls  in  like 
manner  to  cohabit  with  them."  He  adds,  that  "  this  answer 
may  be  made  on  supposition  that  the  souls  survive  their 
bodies  (i)*"  Gataker  observes  in  his  annotations  upon  this 
passage,  that  Antoninus  does  not  seem  here  to  think  that 
souls  shall  continue  to  the  conflagration,  but  shall  be  ex- 
tinguished or  resumed  sooner,  that  they  may  give  place  lo 
other  souls.  And  he  adds,  that  "  the  Stoics  dreamed  of  one 
common  universal  soul,  from  whence  all  other  souls  were 
as  it  were  cut  off,  or  which  was  a  kind  of  fountain  of  all 
the  rest,  and  into  which  they  were  all  to  be  again  refund- 
ed (/^)."  I  shall  only  mention  one  passage  more  of  Antoni- 
nus, in  which  after  having  said,  "  I  consist  of  an  active  and 
a  material  principle,"  he  adds,  "  every  part  of  me  shall  be 
disposed,  upon  its  dissolution,  into  the  correspondent  part 
of  the  universe;  and  that  again  shall  be  changed  into  some 
other  part  of  the  universe,  and  thus  to  eternity  (/)."  To 
this  may  be  added,  what  was  laken  notice  of  before,  that 
neither  Antoninus  nor  Epictetus  ever  give  the  least  hint  of 


(A)  Anton.  Medit.  book  viii.  sect.  25. 

(i)    Ibid.  iv.  sect.  21.  Glasi^ow  translation. 

(>{•)"  Unam  animam  communem  et  universalcm  somniabant 
Stoici,  unde  reliquae  omnes  essent  quasi  decisae,  sive  quae  reli- 
quarum  omnium  fons  quidam  existeret,  in  quem  etiam  denuo 
quasi  refunderenter.*'  Gat.  Annot.  in  Antonin.  p.  141. 

(/)  Anton.  Med.  book  v.  sect.  13.  See  also  book  vii.  sect.  10. 


Chap.  III.       7iot  acknowledged  by  Confucius,  297 

men's  being  judged  or  called  to  an  account  after  death  for 
their  conduct  in  this  lite,  or  that  the  wicked  shall  be  pu- 
nished in  a  future  state. 

It  is  observed  by  the  celebrated  Mons*  de  Montesquieu, 
that  "  the  religion  of  Confucius  denies  the  immortality  of 
the  soul,  and  the  sect  of  Zeno  did  not  believe  it."— *••  La' 
religion  de  Confucius  nie  I'immortalite  de  I'ame,  et  la 
secte  de  Zenon  ne  la  croyoit  pas  (?w)."  I  have  already  consi- 
dered the  sentiments, of  the  sect  of  Zeno  on  this  head.  As  to 
the  famous  Chinese  philosopher  Confucius  and  his  disciples^ 
who,  like  the  Stoics,  have  always  professed  to  make  morals 
their  chief  study,  it  appears  by  the  best  accounts  which 
are  given  of  them,  that  they  do  not  acknowledge  the  im- 
mortality of  the  soul  and  a  state  of  future  retributions* 
Father  Navarette,  who  was  a  long  time  in  China,  and  well 
acquainted  with  their  books,  affirms,  that  Confucius  knew 
nothing  of  the  rewards  and  punishments  of  another  life  (/z). 
He  also  observes  concerning  the  second  great  Chinese  phi- 
losopher Meng  Zu,  who  lived  one  hundred  years  after 
Confucius,  and  to  whom  the  Chinese  erect  temples,  hold- 
ing him  in  great  veneration  next  to  Confucius,  that  he  has 
admirable  moral  sentences;  but  in  his  books  there  is  not 
the  least  appearance  of  his  having  the  knowledge  of  God^ 
of  the  immortality  of  the  soul,  and  the  rewards  and  pu- 
nishments of  a  future  life:  and  he  would  have  mentioned 
this  in  his  writings,  if  he  had  found  any  such  thing  in  the 
doctrine  of  Confucius,  which  he  diligently  learned  and 
studied  {p).  The  same  author  observes,  that  the    Chinese 


(m)  L'Esprit  des  Loix,  Vol.  11.  liv.  24.  chap.  19.  p.  166.  edit. 
Edinb.  ^ 

(w)  See  his  Account  of  the  Empire  of  China,  in  the  first  vo- 
lume  of  Churchill's  Collection  of  Travels  and  Voyages,  p.  113* 

(o)  Ibid.  p.  139. 

Vol.  II.  2  P  . 


298      Immortality  of  the  Soul  and  a  future  State  Part  IIL 

often  speak  of  heaven's  rewarding  the  virtuous  and  punish- 
ing the  wicked;  but  that  most  certain  it  is,  that  they  speak 
not  of  what  is  in  the  other  life,  but  in  this.  They  look  upon 
rewards  and  punishments  to  be  the  natural  and  necessary 
attendants  of  virtue  and  vice,  which  accompany  them  as  the 
shadow  does  the  body  (/?).  F.  Longobardi,  in  the  treatise 
I  have  cited  before,  says  it  is  the  general  opinion  of  the 
Chinese,  that  he  who  does  well  shall  be  naturally  and  of  ne- 
cessity rewarded,  and  he  that  does  ill  punished;  as  he  is 
warmed  that  draws  near  the  fire,  and  he  grows  cold  that 
is  in  the  snow  (^).  The  same  father  shews,  both  from  their 
classical  books  of  greatest  authority,  and  from  the  unani- 
mous profession  of  the  most  learned  mandarins,  that  the 
doctrine  of  future  rewards  and  punishments  is  not  received 
or  acknowledged  by  the  learned  sect.  Speaking  of  himself 
and  other  missionaries  that  were  with  him,  he  says,  "  We 
asked  doctor  King  Lun  Ju,  a  mandarin  of  the  court  of  rites, 
whether,  according  to  the  sect  of  the  learned,  there  was  any 
reward  or  punishment  in  the  other  life?  He  laughed  at  the 
question;  and  then  answered,  that  it  could  not  be  denied 
that  there  were  virtues  and  vices  in  this  world;  but  that 
all  ended  with  death,  when  the  man  in  whom  v/ere  these 
things  expired:  and  therefore  there  was  no  need  of  providing 
for  the  next  life,  but  only  for  this."  F.  Longobardi  produces 
several  other  testimonies  to  the  same  purpose,  which  I 
need  not  particularly  mention,  and  declares,  that  he  had 
often  conversed  with  their  most  learned  mandarins  in  se- 
veral parts  of  China  during  the  time  he  resided  there,  and 


(/i)  See  his  Account  of  the  Empire  of  China,  in  the  first 
volume  of  Churchill's  Collection  of  Travels  and  Voyages,  p.  137, 
138. 

{q)  Ibid.  p.  185. 


Chap.  III.       not  acknoxvledged  by  Confucius,  299 

found  that  they  all  agreed  unanimously  in  this  (r).  He  also 
mentions  a  conversation  he  had  with  Dr.  Michael,  a  learn- 
ed Chinese  Christian,  who  himself  was  of  the  sect  of  the 
learned,  and  perfectly  well  acquainted  with  their  tenets,  and 


(r)  Navarette's  Account  of  the  empire  of  China,  in  the  first 
volume  of  Churchill's  Collection  of  Voyages  and  Travels,  p.  197, 
198.  I  shall  on  this  occasion  mention  what  a  mandarin  said  to  F. 
Math.  Riccio  when  he  discoursed  with  him  about  the  Christian 
faith,  and  eternal  life.  After  having  treated  what  the  father  had 
said  concerning  a  future  state  as  nothing  but  talk  and  vain  words, 
which  the  wind  driveth  away,  the  mandarin  plainly  declared,  that 
he  looked  for  no  higher  happiness  than  what  ariseth  from  things 
present  and  visible.  "  What  we  see  (said  he)  is  the  advantage  of 
governing  and  commanding  others.  Gold,  silver,  wives  and  con- 
cubines, as  also  a  numerous  train,  goods,  feastings,  diversions, 
and  all  sorts  of  happiness,  honoi5r  and  glory,  are  the  consequen- 
ces of  being  a  mandarin.  This  is  the  happiness  we  covet,  and 
which  we  enjoy  in  our  great  and  mighty  empire;  and  not  the 
happiness  you  talk  of,  which  is  as  unprofitable  as  it  is  invisible,  and 
impossible  to  obtain."  And  in  this  he  seems  to  have  spoke  the 
sense  of  the  mandarins  in  general.  These  notions  of  theirs  have 
a  very  bad  influence  on  their  moral  conduct.  As  they, look  upon 
the  enjoyment  of  this  present  world,  its  riches,  honours,  and 
pleasures,  to  be  the  highest  and  only  happiness,  they  stick  at  no 
methods,  how  unfair  or  unjust  soever,  to  obtain  them.  It  is  agreed 
by  all,  even  by  those  that  are  most  prejudiced  in  favour  of  the 
Chinese,  that  though  the  learned  mandarins  speak  highly  of  vir- 
tue, and  profess  to  make  the  doctrine  of  morals,  and  the  good  or- 
der of  the  state  in  general,  and  the  happiness  of  each  particular 
person,  their  whole  study,  there  is  a  great  and  general  corrup- 
tion among  them,  and  little  regard  is  had  to  justic,e  and  honesty, 
but  cvery.thing  is  carried  by  the  force  of  money  at  their  tribu- 
nals. See  among  others,  Gemelli  Carreri's  Acc^ount  of  China,  in 
his  Voyage  round  the  World,  Part  IV.  book  ii.  chap.  4.  p.  310. 
and  ibid.  chap.  vii.  p.  328.  330.  in  Churchill's  Collection  of  Tra- 
vels, &c.  Vol.  IV. 


300  Immortality  of  the  Soul,  ^c.  Part  III. 

was  one  of  those  who  were  willing,  as  far  as  possible,  to  in- 
terpret them  so  as  to  bring  them  to  a  conformity  "v^ith  the 
Christian  doctrine.  Being  asked  by  the  fatiier,  "  Whether 
after  death  there  be  any  rewards  or  punishments  for  good 
or  wicked  men  according  to  the  doctrine  of  the  learned  sect? 
He  answered,  they  make  no  mention  of  any  such  things. 
Here  he  sighed,  and  complained  of  the  professors  of  that 
sect,  for  not  teaching  the  things  of  another  life:  which,  said 
he,  is  the  cause  that  the  multitude  is  not  encouraged  to  prac- 
tise virtue  in  earnest.  And  he  commended  the  sect  of  Foe 
for  preaching  up  heaven  and  hell  (^)." 

Confucius  being  asked  by  one  of  his  disciples  what  an- 
gels or  spirits  are,  answered,  that  they  are  air.  And  this 
is  the  notion  that  the  Chinese  have  of  the  soul.  They  look 
upon  it  to  be  a  material  thing,  though  highly  rarified:  and 
that  when  the  soul  is  separated  from  the  body,  both  of  them 
lose  the  individual  being  they  had  before,  and  nothing  re- 
mains but  the  substance  of  heaven  and  earth,  which  had 
before  concurred  to  the  composition  of  man,  and  which, 
as  general  causes,  ever  continue  in  their  substantial  being, 
and  are  only  changed  in  their  accidental  forms  (^). 

This  may  suffice  concerning  the  opinions  of  the  learned 
sect  in  China,  with  respect  to  the  immortality  of  the  soul, 
and  a  future  state  of  rttributions.  The  reader  may  also  con- 
sult to  the  same  purpose  a  tract  of  a  Chinese  philosopher 
in  Du  Halde's  collection  of  Chinese  pieces,  in  the  third 
volume  of  his  History  of  China. 


(s)  Navarette*s  Account  of  the  Empire  of  China,  in  the  first 
volume  of  Churchill's  Collection  of  Travels  and  Voyages,  p.  199. 
(0  Ibid.  p.  195. 


301 


CHAPTER  IV. 

Concerning  the  philosophers  who  professed  to  believe  and  teach  the  immortality 
of  tie  soul.  Of  these  Pythntjoras  is  generally  esteemed  one  of  the  most  emi* 
nent.  His  doctrine  on  this  head  shewn  to  be  not  well  consistent  with  a  state  of 
future  rewards  and  punishments.  Socrates  believed  the  immortality  of  the  soul, 
and  a  future  state,  and  argued  for  it.  In  this  he  was  followed  by  Plato.  The 
Doct  ine  ot  Cicero  with  regard  to  the  immortality  of  the  soul  ©onsidered.  As 
also  that  of  Plutarch. 

It  sufficiently  appears  from  what  was  observed  In  the 
former  chapter,  what  confusion  there  was  among  the  Hea- 
then Philosophers,  with  regard  to  the  doctrine  of  the  im- 
mortality of  the  soul  and  a  future  state:  that  great  num- 
bers of  them  absolutely  denied  it;  and  others  treated  it  as 
a  mere  uncertainty,  and  did  not  teach  it  as  a  doctrine  of 
their  schools. 

But  then  it  must  be  acknowledged,  that  there  were  other 
celebrated  philosophers  whose  professed  tenet  it  was  that 
the  soul  is  immortal.  This  is  said  to  have  been  the  doc- 
trine of  the  Persian  Magi,  and  the  Indian  Gymnoso- 
phists  (w).  But  what  I  shall  particularly  consider  is  the 
doctrine  of  those  among  the  Greek  philosophers,  who  held 
the  immortality  of  the  soul.  Of  these  the  most  eminent 
were  the  Pythagoreans  and  Platonists.  Let  us  therefore  en- 
quire into  their  sentiments  on  this  head,  and  whether  they 
were  likely  to  lead  the  people  into  right  notions  concerning 
it,  and  which  might  be  of  real  service  to  the  cause  of  reli- 
gion and  virtue. 


(m)  Concerning  the  Indian  Gymnosophists,  and  the  wrong  use 
they  and  others  made  of  this  doctrine,  see  what  is  said  above,  p. 
198,  199.  of  this  volume. 


302  The  Doctrine  of  Pythagoras        Part  III. 

The  Pythagoreans  were  generally  reckoned  among  the 
most  strenuous  asserters  of  the  immortality  of  the  soul:  but 
in  asserting  it  they  went  upon  a  wrong  principle.  Pytha- 
goras, as  was  observed  before  {x)^  taught  that  the  soul 
was  a  part  of  the  divinity  or  universal  soul,  which  was  every 
where  diffused;  and  in  this,  as  Cicero  assures  us,  he  was 
followed  by  all  the  Pythagoreans  (z/).  And  hence  he  argued, 
that  the  soul  is  immortal;  because  that  out  of  which  it  is 
discerped  is  immortal  (2).  Plutarch  asserts,  that  Pytha- 
goras and  Plato  held,  that  the  soul  is  immortal  or  incor- 
ruptible, "because  when  it  departs  out  of  the  body,  it 
goes  to  the  soul  of  the  universe,  to  that  which  is  congenial 
with  itself."  n§o$  to  oj^oyiih  (a).  But  then  this  returning  into 
the  soul  of  the  world  must  not  be  understood,  according  to 
Pythagoras's  notion,  to  take  place  immediately,  till  after 
the  soul  had  gone  through  several  transmigrations.  For  it 
is  a  known  doctrine  of  his,  that  the  souls  of  men  after  death 
transmigrate  from  one  body  to  another,  and  even  to  the 
bodies  of  beasts  as  well  as  men.  Porphyry,  after  having 
observed  that  what  Pythagoras  delivered  to  his  auditors, 
i.  e.  to  his  own  proper  disciples,  cannot  be  certainly  affirm- 
ed, for  there  was  a  great  and  strict  silence  obiserved  amongst 
them,  says,  that  his  doctrines  known  to  all  are  these:  first, 
that  "  the  soul  is  immortal,  then  that  it  enters  into  other 
kinds  of  living  creatures.''  He  held  also,  that,  "  after  cer- 
tain periods,  the  things  that  were  formerly  done  are  done 
over  again."  Or,  as  Mr.  Stanley  renders  it,  "  the  same 
things  that  are  now  generated  are  generated  again,  and  that 


{x)  See  here  above,  Vol.  I.  chap.  xii. 

{y)  Cic.  Cato  Major,  cap.  21.  et  De'Nat.  Deor.   lib.  i.  cap.  1 1. 

(2)  Laert.  lib.  vii.  segm.  28. 

(fl)  Plutarch,  de  Placit.  Philos.  lib.  iv.  cap.  11. 


Chap.  IV.  concerning'  the  Immortality  of  the  Soul,  £s?c.  303 

there  is  nothing  absolutely  new:  and  that  all  animals  are 
near  a-kin,  and  of  a  like  kind  (^)." 

Diodorus  Siculus  affirms,  that  he  learned  his  doctrine  of 
the  transmigration  of  souls  from  the  Egyptians  (c).  And 
Herodotus  informs  us,  that  the  antient  Egyptians  said, 
"  that  the  soul  of  man  is  immortal,  and  that  the  body 
being  corrupted,  the  soul  goes  into  the  body  of  one  animal 
after  another,  and  after  it  has  gone  round,  ^gp<sA.^>j,  or  per- 
formed 4ts  circuit,  through  all  terrestrial  and  marine  ani- 
mals and  birds,  it  again  entereth  into  some  human  body, 
and  that  this  circuit  or  circumvolution  was  completed  in 
three  thousand  years."  He  adds,  that  this  opinion  some  of 
the  Greeks  usurped,  as  if  it  was  their  own  invention,  and 
that  he  knew  their  names,  but  chose  not  to  mention  them, 
in  which  probably  he  had  a  particular  view  to  Pythagoras  (d). 
This  transmigration  of  souls  taught  by  the  Egyptians,  as 
here  represented  by  Herodotus,  seems  to  be  physical,  and 
necessary  by  a  natural  and  fatal  necessity,  and  is  a  quite 
different  thing  from  a  future  state  of  rewards  and  punish- 
ments designed  for  moral  purposes.  Agreeable  to  this  is 
the  representation  Laertius  makes  of  Pythagoras's  doctrine, 
That  "  the  soul,  passing  through  the  circle  of  necessity, 
lives  at  several  times  in  different  living  creatures  (^)."  But 
he  is  mistaken  in  supposing  Pythagoras  to  have  been  the  first 
author  of  this  doctrine,  for  the  Egyptians  had  taught  it 
before  him.  But  though  this  transmigration  as  taught  by 
the  Egyptians,  according  to  Herodotus,  was  natural  and 
necessary,   yet   they   endeavoured   so  to   explain  it,  as   to 


{b)  Porphyr.  Vita  Pythag. 

(c)  Biblioth.  lib.  i.  p.  86.  et  Euseb.  Prsepar.^ Evangel,  lib.  x, 
cap.  8.  p.  482. 
(rf)  Herod,  lib.  ii. 
(e)  Laert.  lib.  viii.  segm.  14. 


304  The  Doctrine  of  Pythagoras        Part  IIL 

,  apply  it  to  moral  purposes.  And  so  also  Pythagoras  seems 
to  have  done,  at  least  in  his  popular  discourses.  Laertius 
tells  us,  that  "  he  held  that  the  soul  being  cast  out  upon  the 
earth,  wanders  in  the  air,  like  to  a  body,  and  that  M  rcury 
is  the  keeper  and  conductor  of  souls,  and  brings  them  out 
of  bodies,  both  from  earth  and  sea;  and  that  pure  souls  are 
led  into  high  places;  but  that  the  impure  neither  come 
near  them,  nor  to  one  another,  but  are  bound  by  the  furies 
into  indissoluble  chains  (y)."  Theodoret  represents  it  as 
his  opinion  as  well  as  that  of  Plato,  that  "  souls  are  pre- 
cxistent  to  bodies,  and  that  those  which  transgress  are  sent 
again  into  bodies,  that  being  purifi-d  by  such  discipline, 
they  may  return  to  their  own  place:  that  those  which 
whilst  they  are  in  the  body  lead  a  wicked  life,  are  sent 
down  farther  into  irrational  creatures,  hereby  to  receive 
punishment  and  right  expiation;  the  angry  and  malicious 
into  serpents,  the  ravenous  into  wolves,  the  audacious  into 
lions,  the  fraudulent  into  foxes,  and  the  like  (^  )."  Timseus 
the  Locrian,  an  eminent  Pythagorean,  in  that  celebrated 
passage  at  the  end  of  his  treatise  of  the  Soul  of  the  world, 
gives  pretty  much  the  same  account.  That  "souls  trans- 
migrate or  change  their  habitations:  those  of  the  cowards 
and  effeminate  are  thrust  into  the  bodies  of  women;  those 
of  murderers,  into  the  bodies  of  savage  beasts;  the  lascivi- 
ous, into  the  forms  of  boars  or  swine;  the  vain  and  incon- 
stant are  changed  into  birds,  and  the  slothful  and  ignorant 
into  fishes  (/0»"  He  represents  it  as  necessary  to  teach 
these   things   to  the  pepple,  and    to   instil  into    them  the 


(/)  Laert.  lib.  viii.  seg:m.  31. 

(^)  Stanley's  History  oi  Philosophy,  p.  559.  edit.  2d,  Lend. 

(A)  The  reader  may  see  the  whole  passage  quoted  from  th© 
original,  and  elegantly  translated.  Divine  Legation  of  Moses,  VoL 
11.  book  iii.  p.  143,  144.  edit.  4th. 


Chap.  IV.  concerning  the  immortality  of  the  Soul^  ££?c.    305 

dread  of  foreign  torments:  though  he  plainly  intimates,  that 
they  were  false  relations,  and  that  he  himself  did  not  be-* 
lieve  them  to  be  literally  true,  which  probably  was  the 
case  of  Pythagoras  himself*  Ovid,  in  his  Metamorphosis, 
introduces  Pythagoras  as  delivering  his  doctrine  to  the 
people  of  Crotona,  and  represents  him  as  directing  them 
not  to  be  afraid  of  punishments  after  death,  of  Styx,  dark- 
ness, vain  names,  and  false  terrors:  that  they  were  not  to 
think  that  the  body  can  feel  any  evil;  and  as  to  the  soulsj 
they  are  immortal,  and  are  always  changing  their  habita- 
tions, and  leaving  their  former  abodes,  are  received  into 
new  ones. 

-     "  O  genus  attonitum  stolidae  formidine  mortis! 

Quid  Styi^a,  quid  tenebras,  et  nomina  vana  timeti&j 
.   Materiem  vatum,  falsiqiie  piacula  mundi? 
Corpora  sive  rogus  flamma,  sou  tabe  ve'ustas 
Abstulerit,  mala  posse  pati  non  ulla  puietis. 
Morte  careni  animae,  semperque  priore  relicta 
Sede,  novis  domibus  vivunt,  habitantque  receptae." 

Metamorph.  lib.  xv.  ver,  153,  et  seq- 

Mr.  Sandys  translates  it  thus: 

**  O  you,  whom  horrors  of  cold  death  aflPright, 
Why  fear  you  Styx,  vain  names,  and  endless  nightj 
The  dreams  of  poets,  and  feign*d  miseries 
Of  forged  hell?  Whether  last  flames  surprize? 
Or  age  devours  your  bodies;  they  nor  grieve, 
Nor  suffer  pain    Our  souls  forever  live: 
Yet  evermore  their  antient  houses  leave 
To  live  in  new,  which  them  as  guests  receive." 

Ovid  here  represents  Pythagoras  as  maintaining  perpetual 
transmigrations  of  the  soul  into  other  bodies,  and  this  by 
a  kind  of  physical  necessity:  which  seems  not  well  to  con^ 
sist  with  what  Plutarch  gives  as  Pythagoras*s  opinion,  thai 

Vol.  IL  .^  Q 


306  The  Doctrine  of  Pythagoras         Part  III. 

the  soul,  when  it  departs  out  of  the  body,  recedes  to  the 
soul  of  the  world,  as  being  of  the  same  kind  with  it. 

It  is  farther  to  be  observed,  that  though  Pythagoras 
seemed  to  make  a  transmigration  into  other  bodies  common 
and  necessary  to  all  souls;  yet  he  made  an  exception  in 
favour  of  some  highly  privileged  souls,  as  if  they  were  ex- 
empted from  the  common  law  and  necessity  to  which  others 
are  subject.  Laertius  represents  it  as  one  of  his  tenets,  that 
some  souls  become  daemons  and  heroes  (i).  And  the  golden 
verses  of  Pythagoras,  which  contain  a  summary  of  his 
moral  doctrine,  conclude  with  promising  to  him  who  should 
obey  his  precepts,  that  he  should,  upon  leaving  the  body, 
go  into  the  free  aether,  and  become  an  immortal  god,  incor- 
ruptible, and  no  more  obnoxious  to  death. 

Whosoever  impartially  considers  and  compares  the  dif- 
ferent accounts  that  are  given  us  of  the  Pythagoric  doctrine, 
will  find  it  very  difficult  to  form  them  into  a  consistent 
scheme.  Plutarch,  as  was  before  observed,  represents  it  as 
Pythagoras's  opinion,  that  the  souls  of  men  return  to  the 
universal  soul,  out  of  which  they  were  taken,  immediately 
upon  their  quitting  the  body  {k).  But  if  that  were  the  case, 


(f)  Laert.  lib.  viii.  seg^m.  32.  Plutarch  ascribes  the  same  opinion, 
not  oTjly  to  Pythagoras,  but  to  Thales,  Plato,  and  the  Stoics.  De 
Placii.  Philos.  lib.  i   cap.  8.  Oper.  torn.  II.  p.  882.  edit.  Xyl. 

(^)  In  like  manner  Numenius  represents  it  as  the  doctrine  of 
some  of  the  Stoics,  who,  as  well  as  the  Pythagoreans,  held  the  re- 
fusion of  the  soul  into  the  universal  nature,  that  the  "soul  of  the 
univer'oe  was  eternal,  and  other  souls  would  be  mixed  with  it  at 
death,  \-sr)  reXivrvi*'  Apud  Euseb.  Prsep.  Evang.  lib.  xv.  cap.  20. 
And  Antoninus  in  a  passage  cited  above,  p.  296.  supposes  that 
souls  shall  continue  after  leaving  the  body,  for  some  short  time 
in  the  air,  and  then  be  resumed  into  the  universal  soul.  And  he 
elsewhere  speaks  of  the  resumption  of  the  active  principle,  or 
the  soul,  into  the  intelligence  of  the  whole,  as  done  rei^i^tti  "  very 


Chap.  IV.  concerning' the  Immortality  of  the  Saul,  ^c.    307 

it  must  be  said,  either  that  there  are  no  transmigrations  at 
all,  which  is  contrary  to  Pythagoras's  known  opinion,  or 
that  after  the  soul  has  been  for  a  while  re-united  to  the  uni- 
versal soul  of  the  world,  it  is  again  separated  from  it,  in 
order  to  animate  other  bodies,  and  undergo  different  trans- 
migrations. Others  represent  Pythagoras's  doctrine,  as  if 
the  transmigration  of  souls  were  to  commence  immediate- 
ly upon  their  departure  out  of  the  body,  and  that  after  hav- 
ing accomplished  the  course  of  transmigrations  appointed 
them,  they  should  be  refunded  into  the  universal  soul. 

Some  authors,  who  in  this  as  well  as  other  instances  affix 
Christian  ideas  to  the  passages  they  meet  with  in  Pagan  au- 
thors, have  represented  this  refusion  of  the  soul  as  a  state 
of  complete  happiness,  peculiar  to  the  souls  of  good  men, 
and  consisting  in  the  beatific  vision  and  enjoyment  of  the 
Deity.  But  this  is  not  the  idea  the  Pagan  writers  them- 
selves give  us  of  it.  The  learned  and  ingenious  author  of 
the  Critical  Enquiry,  &:c.  whom  I  have  before  referred  to, 
has  proved  by  express  testimonies,  that  this  refusion  of  the 
soul  was  not  supposed  to  be  a  privilege  peculiar  to  the 
righteous  and  innocent;  that  all  souls  without  distinction 
were  to  be  absorbed  at  length  into  the  universal  soul,  and 
that  this  refusion  was  of  a  physical  nature,  not  properly  for 
any  moral  purpose  or  design,  but  to  furnish  the  "  anima 
mundi"  with  materials  for  the  reproduction  and  renovation 
of  things  (/).  If  there  were  any  happiness  for  departed 
souls,  it  was  to  be  before  the  refusion,  which  was  supposed 
to  put  an  end  to  their  separate  individual    existence  (m). 


soon,  quam  celerrime,"  as  Gataker  renders  it.  Anton,  lib.  vii* 
sect.  10.  X 

(/)  See  Critical  Enquiry  into  the  Opinions  of  the  Antients,  Sec. 
chap.  5. 

(m)  They  explained  it,  as  an  eminent  writer  observes,  bj^  a  hot- 


308  The  Doctrine  of  Pythagoras  Part  III. 

Seneca  has  a  remarkable  passage  in  his  72d  epistle,  which 
it  is  proper  to  mention  here.  "  Magnus  animus  Deo  pareat, 
et  quicquid  lex  universi  jubet  sine  cunctatione  patiatur." 
**  Aut  in  meliorcm  emittitur  vitam,  lucidius  tranquilliusque 
inttr  divina  mansurus,  aut  certe  sine  uUo  futurus  incom- 
modo,  naturae  suas  remiscebitur,  et  revertetur  in  totum." 
Where  he  represents  it  as  the  part  of  a  great  mind  cheer- 
fully to  submit  to  what  the  law  of  the  universe  requires, 
and  that  either  he  shall  go  free  into  a  better  life,  where  he 
shall  remain  in  a  luminous  and  serene  abode  among  the 
gods,  or  he  shall  without  any  evil  or  inconvenience  be  re- 
mingled  with  his  nature,  and  return  into  the  whole.  The 
utmost  that  he  says  of  this  re-union  to  ihe  whole,  is  that 
the  soul  shall  then  be  without  any  evil  or  inconvenience, 


tie  filled  with  sea-water,  which,  swimming  a  while  upon  the 
ocean,  does  upon  the  bottle's  breyking  mingle  with  common  mass. 
To  this  purpose  he  cites  a  remarkable  passage  from  Gaffendus, 
in  which  that  very  learned  author  says,  "  Vix  ulli  fuere  (quae 
humanse  mentis  caligo  et  imbecillitas  est)  qui  non  incideiint  in 
errorem  ilium  de  refusione  in  animam  mundi.  Nimirum  sicut 
existimarunt  singulorum  animas  particulas  esse  animae  mundana?) 
quarum  quae  libet  sue  corpore,  ut  aqua  vase  includitur,  ita  et  re- 
putarunl  unamquamque  animam,  corpore  dissoluto,  quasi  diffract© 
vase  effluere,  atque  animae  mundi  e  qua  deducta  fuerit  iterum 
uniri.'*  See  Divine  Legation,  vol,  II.  bouk  iii.  sect.  4.  p.  205,  206, 
4th  edition.  TertuUian  indeed  tells  us,  that  the  Egyptian  Hermes 
taiiglu  that  the  soul,  when  departed  from  the  body,  is  not  refund- 
ed into  the  nature  of  the  liniverse,  but  retains  its  distinct  deter- 
minate existence.  "  Mercurius  -/Ejijyptius  animam  digrcssam  a 
corpore  non  refund!  in  naturam  universi,  sed  manere  determina- 
tam."  Terlul.  de  Anima,  cap.  33.  But  besides  that  'l'rismegistus*s 
writings  are  of  suspected  authority,  it  is  here  plainly  implied, 
that  if  the  human  soul  was  refunded  into  the  universal  soul,  which 
certainly  was  the  common  opinion  of  the  Pagan  philosophers,  it 
^vould  lose  its  individual  existence, 


Chap.  IV.  concerning-  the  Immortality  oftheSoul^^c.  309 

"animus  sine  uUo  futurus  incommodo,"  which,  as  the 
learned  author  of  the  Enquiry  observes,  is  the  account  he 
elsewhere  gives  of  death,  on  supposition  of  its  being  an  ex- 
tinction of  our  individual  existence.  "  D^ath,"  says  he, 
"  brings  no  evil  or  inconvenience  along  with  it;  for  that  must 
have  an  existence  which  is  subject  to  any  inconvenience." 
*'  Mors  nullum  habet  incommodum:  esse  enim  debet  ali- 
quid,  cujus  sit  incommodum."  Epist.  34.  Pythagoras  in^ 
deed  supposed,  as  the  Stoics  did  afterwards,  that  all  things 
that  were  done  in  the  former  world  were  to  be  done  again, 
when  the  soul  of  the  universe  was  to  go  forth  into  new  pro- 
ductions, and  form  another  world  at  stated. periodical  revo- 
lutions, or  at  the  end  of  the  great  year:  but  this  was  the  ef- 
fect of  a  physical  necessity,  and  without  any  respect  in  a 
way  of  moral  retribution  to  the  good  or  evil  actions  which 
had' been  done  in  the  former  world. 

I  think  therefore  it  may  be  justly  said,  that  the  doctrine 
of  the  immortality  of  the  soul  in  the  sense  in  which  Pytha- 
goras taught  it,  could  be  of  no  great  advantage  to  mankind, 
with  regard  to  the  belief  of  a  future  state  of  rewards  and 
punishments.  And  though  those  of  his  school  generally  so 
far  asserted  the  immortality  of  the  soul  as  to  maintain  that 
it  did  not  die  with  the  body,  but  lived  to  animate  other 
bodies,  yet  some  of  them  supposed  death  to  be  common  to 
the  soul  and  body,  and  expressed  themselves  in  a  manner 
which  has  a  near  affinity  with  the  doctrine  of  Epicurus* 
This  is  what  the  learned  author  of  the  Critical  Enquiry  has 
shewn,  to  whom  I  refer  the  reader  (n). 

I  shall  conclude  what  relates  to  Pythagoras  with  observ- 
ing, that  we  cannot  lay  any  stress  upon  the  doctrines  he 
publickly  taught,  as  containing  his  real  sentiments,  because 


(n)  See  the  Critical  Enquiry,  &c.  chap.  i.  p.  4,  5,  6,  1st  edit. 


310  The  Doctrine  of  Socrates  and  Plato      Part  III* 

he  made  no  scruple  of  imposing  upon  the  people  things 
which  he  himself  could  not  but  know  were  false,  and 
which,  we  may  be  sure,  he  did  not  himself  believe.  Se- 
veral instances  of  his  frauds  might  be  produced;  but  I 
shall  only  mention  one  relating  to  his  celebrated  doctrine 
of  the  transmigration  of  souls.  Not  con  Lent  with  affirm- 
ing that  doctrine  in  general,  he  pretended  to  mention  the 
several  transmigrations  which  he  himself  had  undergone, 
and  to  name  the  particular  persons  whom  his  soul  had  ani- 
mated in  a  succession  of  some  ages,  and  that  he  himself 
had  a  distinct  remembrance  of  it. 

Let  us  next  proceed  to  take  some  notice  of  Socrates  and 
Plato,  who  are  generally  regarded  as  the  principal  of  the 
antient  Pagan  philosophers  before  the  coming  of  our  Sa- 
viour, who  taught  the  immortality  of  the  soul  and  a  future 
state.  As  to  Socrates,  the  learned  Bishop  of  Gloucester 
acknowledges  that  he  really  believed  not  only  the  immor- 
tality of  the  soul,  but  a  state  of  future  rewards  and  punish- 
ments, though  he  seems  not  willing  to  allow  that  any  of 
the  other  antient  philosophers  believed  it  (o).  His  senti- 
ments are  most  fully  represented  in  Plato's  Phaedo,  which 
contains  the  discourse  he  had  with  his  friends  the  last  day 
of  his  life,  and  in  which  he  sets  himself  to  prove  the  im- 
mortality of  the  soul.  And  though  it  is  probable  that  Plato 
in  this  dialogue  very  much  enlarges  upon  what  Socrates 
then  said  to  his  friends  and  disciples,  yet  he  had  too  great 
a  regard  to  decency  to  put  any  thing  upon  him  on  such  an 
occasion,  but  what  was  agreeable  to  his  known  sentiments. 
And  if  he  had  done  so,  others  would  not  have  failed  to  ex- 
pose him  for  it.  The  same  may  be  said  of  Socrates's  apology 
as  delivered  by  Plato. 


(o)  Divine  Legation  of  Moses,  &c.  vol.  II.  book  iii.  sect,  4,  p. 
235.  4th  edit. 


€hap.  IV.  concerning  the  Immortality  of  the  Soul^  csfc.  311 

In  the  beginning  of  the  Phsedo  Socrates  declares  to  Ce- 
bes,  and  the  others  who  then  came  to  see  him,  that  did  he 
not  think  that  he  should  go  to  wise  and  just  gods,  and  to 
men  that  had^  departed  this  life,  and  who  were  better  than 
those  who  were  then  living  upon  the  earth,  it  would  be 
wrong  in  him  not  to  be  troubled  at  death;  "  but  know 
assuredly,"  says  he,  ''  that  I  hope  I  am  now  going  to  good  , 
men,  though  this  I  would  not  take  upon  me  peremptorily  1 
to  assert:  but  that  I  shall  go  to  the  gods,  lords  that  are 
absoluteh  good,  this,  if  I  can  affirm  any  thing  of  this  kind, 
I  would  certainly  affirm.  And  for  this  reason  I  do  not  take 
it  ill  that  I  am  to  die,  as  otherwise  I  should  do;  but  am  in 
good  hope  that  there  is  something  remaining  for  those  that 
are  dead,  and  that  (as  it  hath  been  said  of  old)  it  will  then 
be  much  better  for  good  than  for  bad  men."  He  then  pro- 
poses to  offer  reasons,  why  a  man  that  had  all  his  life  ap- 
plied himself  to  philosophy  should  expect  death  with  confi- 
dence, and  should  entertain  good  hope  that  he  should  ob- 
tain the  best  of  good  things  after  his  departure  out  of  this 

In  other  parts  of  that  dialogue  Socrates  says  excellent 
things  concerning  the  happiness  to  be  enjoyed  in  a  future 
state.  But  then  he  seems  to  regard  this  as  the  special 
privilege  of  those  who  having  an  earnest  thirst  after  know- 
ledge addicted  themselves  to  the  study  of  philosophy.  He 
talks  of  the  soul's  going  at  his  departure  hence,  "  into  a 
place  like  itself,  noble,  pure,  invisible,  to  a  wise  and  good 
God,  whither,"  says  he,  "  if  it  pleases  God,  my  soul  shall 
soon  go  (^)."  And  again,  that  "  the  soul  which  gives  itself 
up  to  the  study  of  wisdom  and  philosophy,  and  lives  ab- 
stracted from  the  body,  goes  at  death  to  that  which  is  like 


{ti)  Plato  Oper.  p.  377.  H.  378.  A,  B.  edit.  Lugd, 
{q)  Ibid.  p.  385.  G.  edit.  Lugd. 


312  Socrates  taught  the  Immortality  of    Part  lit. 

itself,  divine,  immortal,  wise,  to  which  wh^n  it  arrives,  it 
shall  be  happy,  freed  from  error,  ignorance,  fears,  disor- 
derly loves,  ity^im  IfaTav^  and  other  human  evils,  and  lives, 
as  is  said  of  the  initiated,  the  rest  of  its  life  with  the 
gods  (r)."  He  adds,  that  they  who  only  minded  the  body 
and  its  appetites  and  pleasures,  having  something  in  theni 
ponderous  and  earthy,  shall  after  their  departure  out  of 
the  body  be  drawn  down  to  the  earth,  and  hover  about 
the  sepulchres,  being  punished  for  their  former  ill-spent  life, 
T»!)»  ^ixiiv  rivacrui  tS?  'nr^ors^x^  r^o<pKii  till  having  Still  a  hankering 
after  cc«  poreal  nature  they  enter  again  into  bodies,  suited 
to  their  former  manners:  those  who  were  wholly  given  to 
their  belly  and  to  intemperance,  enter  in  the  bodies  of  asses 
and  other  like  beasts;  the  tyrannical,  injurious^  and  rapa- 
cious in  the  bodies  of  wolves,  hawks,  kites,  &c.  (*);  but 
that  those  of  them  are  the  happiest  and  go  to  the  best 
place,  who  diligently  practise  the  popular  and  civil  virtue, 
which  is  called  temperance  and  justice,  having  acquired  it 
by  custom  and  exercise,  without  philosophy  and  intellect. 
And  to  the  question,  how  are  these  the  happiest?  Socrates 
answers,  that  ''  they  go  into  the  bodies  of  animals  of  a  mild 
and  social  kind,  and  who  have  some  sort  of  polity  among 
them,  such  as  bees,  ants,  &c.  or  into  human  bodies,  of  a 
like  kind  with  their  own,  and  sq  become  men  of  modera- 
tion and  sobriety.  But  that  no  man  is  allowed  to  be  ad- 
mitted to  the  fellowship  of  the  gods,  but  he  that  being  a 
lover  of  knowledge,  hath  applied  himself  to  philosophy,  and 
departed  hence  altogether  pure  (^)."  He  afterwards,  in  the 
conclusion  of  that  discourse,  says,  that  "  they  who  live 
holy  and  excellent  lives,'  being   freed  from   these  earthly 


(r)  Plato  Oper  p.  386.  A. 
(»)  Ibid.  p.  386.  B,  C,  D. 
[t)  Ibid.  p.  386,  E,  h\ 


Chap.  IV.        the  Soul  and  a  future  State.  313 

places  as  from  prisons,  ascend  to  a  pure  region  above  the 
earth,  where  they  dwell:  and  those  of  xhem  who  were  suf- 
ficiently purged  by  philosophy  live  all  their  time  without 
bodies,  and  ascend  to  still  more  beautiful  habitations  (w)." 

It  appears  then  from  this  account  of  Socrates's  senti- 
ments, that  he  had  very  high  ideas  of  the  happinrss  which, 
he  supposed,  would  be  provided  after  death  for  some  souls, 
especially  the  souls  of  those  who  had  applied  themselves  to 
the  study  of  wisdom  and  philosophy,  who  went  immediately 
to  the  gods:  yet  with  respect  to  the  bulk  of  mankind, 
whether  good  or  bad,  he  held  the  transmigration  of  souls, 
with  this  only  difference,  that  bad  and  vicious  men,  after 
having  hovered  a  while  disconsolate  about  the  sepulchres, 
pass  into  the  bodies  of  animals  of  like  dispositions  with 
their  own,  wolves,  kites,  foxes,  asses,  &c.  But  the  common 
sort  bf  good  men,  who  hacf  exercised  justice  and  temper- 
ance, go  into  the  bodies  of  animals  of  a  more  gentle  and 
civil  kind,  or  returned  into  human  bodies,  such  as  they 
had  before.  A  mighty  encouragement  this  to  the  practice 
of  virtue,  that  they  who  applied  themselves  to  it  were  to 
have  the  privilege  of  animating  the  bodies  of  ants  or  bees, 
and  at  the  utmost  they  were  to  return  to  the  labours  and 
offices  of  this  mortal  life:  and  on  the  other  hand,  the  wicked 
had  nothing  else  to  fear,  but  the  being  thrust  into  the 
bodies  of  animals  suited  to  their  own  natures,  and  in  which 
they  might  have  it  in  their  power  to  gratify  their  darling 
lusts  and  appetites  under  another  form. 

Cicero  gives  a  summary  account  of  Socrates's  doctrine 
in  the  Phsedo,  in  which  he  does  not  confine  himself  to  his 
expressions,  but  represents  the  general  sense  and  design 
of  them  to  this  purpose:   That  when  the  souls  of  men  de- 


(w)  Plato  Oper.  p.  400. 
Vol.  IL  2  R 


314  Plato  held  the  Immortality  of        Part  III, 

part  out  of  their  bodies,  they  go  two  different  ways:  to 
those  who  being  wholly  abandoned  to  their  corrupt  lusts 
and  appetites,  have  contaminated  themselves  with  vices, 
whether  of  a  public  or  private  nature,  a  devious  road  is  ap- 
pointed, secluded  from  the  council  of  the  gods:  but  to  them 
who  have  preserved  themselves  chaste  and  uncorrupt,  free 
from  the  contagion  of  their  bodies,  and  who  in  human  bodies 
have  imitated  the  life  of  the  gods,  an  easy  way  lies  open 
for  returning  to  those  from  whom  they  came  (y). 

Socrates,  in  the  apology  he  makes  to  his  judges,  ex- 
presses his  hope  that  it  would  be  better  for  him  that  he  was 
put  to  death:  and  he  tells  them,  that  this  one  thing  ought 
to  be  considered  as  a  certain  truth,  that  no  evil  can  befal 
a  good  man,  whether  living  or  dying,  nor  shall  his  affairs 
be  ever  neglected  by  the  gods.  Cicero  renders  it  thus; 
"  Id  unum  cogitare  verum  esse,  nee  cuiquam  bono  mali 
quicquam  evenire  posse,  nee  vivo  nee  mortuo:  nee  unquam 
ejus  res  a  diis  immortalibus  negligentur  (^)."  And  this 
general  assertion  seems  to  be  the  utmost  that  a  man  can  at- 
tain to,  by  the  mere  light  of  reason  and  philosophy,  without 
the  assistance  of  divine  revelation. 

What  has  been  said  of  Socrates  may  in  a  great  measure 


(y)  "  Ita  enim  censebat,  itaque  disseruit:  duas  esse  vias,  du- 
plicesque  cursus  animorum  e  corpore  excedentium.  Nam  qui  se 
humanis  vitiis  contaminavissent.  et  se  totos  libidinibus  dedissent, 
quibus  excaecati,  vel  domesticis  vitiis  atque  flagjiiiis  se  inquina- 
vissent,  vel  republica  violanda  fraudesinexpiahiles  concepissent, 
his  devium  quoddam  iter  esse,  seclusum  a  concilio  deorum;  qui 
autem  se  integros  castosque  servavissent,  quibusquc  esset  mi- 
numa  cum  corporibus  contagio,  seseque  ab  his  semper  sevoca- 
vissent,  essenique  in  corporibus  humanis  vitam  imitati  deorum, 
his  ad  illos  a  quibus  essent  piofecti,  reditum  facilem  patere." 
Tuscul.  Disput  lib.  i.  cap.  30. 

{x)  Ibid.  cap.  41. 


.  Chap.  fV.  the  Soul  and  a  future  State.  315 

be  applied  to  Plato  the  most  eminent  of  his  disciples:  the 
dialogues  in  which  he  introduces  Socrates  discoursing  con- 
cerning the  immortality  of  the  soul  and  a  future  state,  are 
generally  and  I  think  justly  regarded,  as  containing  not 
only  Socrates's  sentiments  but  his  own.  The  same  doctrine 
in  this  respect  runs  through  all  Plato's  works,  under  what- 
soever class  we  range  them,  whether  as  esoteric  or  ex- 
oteric. The  antients  as  well  as  moderns  have  generally 
entertained  this  notion  of  them.  Cicero  says,  that  Plato 
seems  to  have  designed  to  convince  others  of  the  immor- 
tality of  the  soul  by  the  reasons  which  he  has  offered:  but 
that,  however  this  might  be,  he  seems  certainly  to  have 
been  persuaded  of  it  himself.  '*  Tot  rationes  attulit,  ut 
velle  cseteris,  sibi  certe  persuasisse  videatur  (^/).'*  He  often 
speaks  of  a  future  state  of  rewards  and  punishments  in  the 
gross  popular  sense,  and  talks  of  the  judges  in  Hades,  of 
Tartarus  and  Styx,  Cocytus,  Acheron  and  Pyriphlegethon. 
So  he  does  in  his  Georgias,  in  his  tenth  Republic,  and  even 
in  his  Phsedo.  This  he  did  in  a  way  of  accommodation  to 
the  popular  notions.  He  generally  introduces  them  as 
f^v^ot^  fables,  i.  e.  fabulous  representations  and  traditions; 
and  it  appears  from  other  passages  in  his  works,  that  he 
did  not  himself  believe  them  in  the  literal  sense:  but  it 
does  not  follow  from  this,  that  therefore  he  did  not  believe 
future  rewards  or  punishments.  There  are  some  passages 
which  seem  to  shew  that  he  believed  them  in  a  more  re- 
fined sense.  In  his  Theaetetus  having  observed,  that  we 
should  use  our  utmost  endeavours  to  be  as  like  God  as 
possible;  and  that  this  likeness  to  God  consists  in  being 
just  and  holy,  together  with  prudence;  and  that  nothing 
is  more  like  God  than  he  that  is  the  justest  among  nrien, 
he  adds,  "  if  we  should   say,  that  as  to  ba4  men,  if  they 


(j/)  Tuscul.  Disput.  lib.  i.  cap.  2  i 


316      -  Plato  held  the  Immortality  of        Part  III. 

be  not  freed  from  their  depravity  in  this  life,  that  place 
which  is  pure  from  evil  will  not  receive  them  when  they  die, 
ai)d  that  they  shall  carry  with  them  the  siiiiilitude  of  their 
former  life  and  manners;  and  being  evil  themselves  shall 
be  associated  to  them  that  are  evil:  the  crafty  and  malici- 
ous when  they  hear  these  things  will  treat  them  as  the 
ravings  of  mad  men  (z)."  Plato's  sentiments  here  are  no- 
ble, but  he  intimates  that  they  met  with  little  credit  or  re- 
gard. A  learned  author,  who  is  not  very  favourable  to  that 
philosopher,  reckons  the  Theaetetus  from  whence  this  pas- 
sage is  taken  among  his  Esoterics,  which  are  supposed  to 
contain  his  real  opinions.  The  same  doctrine  is  taught  in 
his  tenth  Republic,  which  the  same  author  supposes  to  be 
of  the  popular  and  exoteric  kind.  He  there  introduces  So- 
crates as  saying;  *^  in  the  first  place  you  will  grant  me 
this,  that  it  is  not  concealed  from  the  gods,  what  sort  of  a 
man  any  one  is,  whether  just  or  unjust;  and  if  this  be  not 
concealed  from  them,  the  one  is  beloved  of  God,  or  of  the 
gods  [for  the  word  S-sc^/a^?  there  used  may  be  translated 
either  way,  as  he  had  spoken  of  the  gods  just  before]  the 
other  hated  of  God  or  of  the  gods,  B-eoftia-lii.  And  shall  we 
not  acknowledge  that  to  him  that  is  beloved  of  God, 
whatsoever  things  are  done  by  the  gods  are  the  best  that 
can  be,  except  some  necessary  evil  come  upon  him  from 
a  sin  he  was  formerly  guilty  of?  It  must  therefore  be 
supposed  concerning  the  just  man,  that  if  he  be  in  po- 
verty or  sickness,  or  under  any  of  those  things  which  are 
accounted  evils,  these  things  shall  in  the  issue  be  for  good, 
either  v^hen  he  is  living  or  after  he  is  dead.  For  that  man 
shall  never  be  neglected  by  the  gods,  who  earnestly  desires 
to  become  just;  and  appl,  ing  himself  to  the  practice  of 
virtue,  endeavours  to  be  made  like  to  God  as  far  as  is  pos- 


(z)  Plato  Oper.  p.  128.  G.  129.  A.  edit.  Lugd. 


Chap.  IV.         the  Soul  and  a  future  State-.  317 

sible  for  a  man  to  be:"  he  adds,  "  that  the  contrary  of  aH  this 
Tnust  be  concluded  concerning  the  unjust  man."  He  after- 
wards observes,  that  bad  men,  when  once  they  are  found 
out  to  be  so,*  for  they  may  conceal  their  vices  for  a  while, 
incur  the  contempt  and  hatred  of  their  fellow-citizens,  and 
are  exposed  to  many  calamities  in  this  life:  and  on  the 
other  hand,  he  takes  notice  of  the  "  rewards  and  gifts 
which  are  conferred  upon  the  just  man,  whilst  he  is  yet  alive, 
both  by  gods  and  men,  besides  those  good  things  which 
are  containtd  in  righteousness  or  virtue  itself."  He  adds, 
that  "  thesf ,  viz.  the  punishments  of  the  wicked,  and  re- 
wards of  good  men  in  this  life  which  he  had  mentioned, 
are  nothing  either  in  number  or  greatness  to  those  which 
remain  for  each  of  them  after  death  (a)."  This  is  a  re- 
markable passage,  in  which  he  asserts  rewards  for  good 
men,  and  punishments  for  bad,  both  in  this  life  and  after 
death,  distinct  from  what  are  contained  in  the  nature  of 
virtue  and  vice  itself,  and  supposes  the  rewards  and  punish- 
ments of  another  life  to  be  much  greater  than  any  in  this. 
He  then  goes  on  to  relate  the  famous  story  of  Erces  Ar- 
menius,  who  having  fallen  in  battle,  and  continued  among 
the  dead  several  days,  on  the  twelfth  day  after,  when  they 
were  going  to  bury  him,  revived,  and  gave  an  account  of 
the  things  he  had  seen  in  the  other  world,  the  rewards 
bestowed  upon  good  men,  and  the  punishments  inflicted  on 
the  wicked.  But  it  is  to  be  observed  that  in  the  account 
Plato  gives  of  this,  he  makes  both  the  one  and  the  other, 
except  a  few  who  were  extremely  wicked  and  incorrigible, 
to  return  again  after  a  certain  time  into  other  bodies  of  men 


jct  l*«TSg«v  zfe^i^ivu.  Plat.  Oper.  p.  5 19.  E.  F. 


318  Plato  held  the  Immortality  of  Part  III. 

or  beasts,  such  as  were  suitable   to  them,  or  which  they 
themselves  should  chuse  (J?), 

To  this  may  be  added  what  he  saith  at  the  latter  end  of 
his  tenth  book  of  laws,  where  he  observes,  that  the  soul 
being  appointed  sometimes  to  one  body,  sometimes  to  ano- 
ther, runs  through  all  kinds  of  transmigrations:  and  the 
only  thing  that  remains  for  him  to  do  who  orders  these 
matters  as  it  were  by  lot,  is  to  remove  those  of  better  man- 
ners to  a  better  place,  those  of  worse  manners  to  a  worse, 
as  is  proper  for  every  one,  that  each  may  receive  that  por- 
tion which  is  most  suitable  to  him  (c).  He  afterwards  adds, 
that  according  to  the  different  qualities  of  men's  souls,  and 
their  actions,  they  have  different  abodes  assigned  them,  and 
undergo  divers  changes  according  to  the  law  and  order  of 
fate;  that  "  those  who  have  been  guilty  of  smaller  sins  do 
not  sink  so  deep,  but  wander  about  near  the  surface  of  the 
region;  but  they  that  have  sinned  more  frequently  and  more 
heinously,  shall  fall  into  the  depth,  and  into  those  lower 
places'which  are  called  Hades,  and  by  other  names  of  the 
like  kind,  which,  both  the  living,  and  they  that  have  de- 
parted out  of  their  bodies,  are  afraid  and  dream  of  (^)." 
And  after  some  other  things  to  the  same  purpose,  he  adds, 
"  this,  O  young  man,  who  thinkest  the  gods  take  no  notice 
of  thee,  this  is  the  judgment  of  the  gods  who  dwell  in  hea- 
ven; that  he  that  is  bad  should  go  to  the  souls  which  are 
bad,  and  he  that  is  better  to  better  souls  both  in  this  life 
and  at  death.  Wherefore  neither  do  thou,  nor  let  any  other, 
expect  to  be  so  lucky  as  to  escape  this  judgment  of  the  gods. 
For  thou  shalt  never  be  neglected  or  pass  unnoticed,  neither 
if  thou  shouldst  be  so  small  as  to  hide  thyself  in  the  lowest 


{b)  Plat.  Oper.  p.  521. 
(c)  Ibid.  p.  672.  A. 
{d)  Ibid.  D. 


Chap.  IV.  the  Soul  and  a  future  State.  319 

part  of  the  earth,  nor  if  thou  shouldest  take  thy  flight  as 
high  as  heaven,  but  shalt  suffer  a  suitable  punishment, 
either  whilst  thou  remainest  here,  or  when  thou  goest  to 
Hades,  or  art  transported  to  some  wilder  and  more  horrid 
place  {dy 

I  think  from  the  passages  which  have  been  produced,  to 
which  others  might  be  added,  it  sufficiently  appears  that 
Plato,  as  well  as  his  master  Socrates,  taught  the  immortality 
of  the  soul,  and  a  state  of  future  rewards  and  punishments. 
But  it  is  to  be  observed  that  neither  of  them  pretended  to 
have  found  this  out  merely  by  their  own  reason,  but  fre- 
quently represent  it  as  a  matter  of  very  antient  tradition, 
which  they  endeavoured  to  support  and  improve.  They 
both  of  them  seem  to  have  believed  in  general  that  there 
would  be  a  difference  made  in  a  future  state  between  good 
and  bad  men,  and  that  the  one  should  be  in  a  greater  or  less 
degree  rewarded,  and  the  other  punished.  But  they  greatly 
weakened  and  obscured  that  doctrine  by  mixing  with  it 
that  of  the  transmigration  of  souls  and  other  fictions,  as 
well  as  by  sometimes  talking  very  waveringly  and  uncer- 
tainly about  it.  And  it  is  remarkable,  that  though  there 
were  several  sects  of  philosophers,  which  professed  to  de- 
rive their  original  from  Socrates,  scarce  any  of  them  taught 
the  immortality  of  the  soul  as  the  doctrine  of  their  schools, 
except  Plato  and  his  disciples,  and  many  even  of  these 
treated  it  as  absolutely  uncertain. 

That  great  man  Cicero  was  a  mighty  admirer  of  Plato, 
and  may  be  justly  reckoned  among  the  most  eminent  of 


**T«  TO  tSs  ytii  Qti6c^.  a^i  ir^nXoi  yivo^ivo^  el?  rov  ii^uvov  utetvivivvi:  nrsii 

^iv6iii  eiTi  Kxi  rarm  «/$  tcy^iaTS^ov  sVs  'hietKo^ihU  royrov,  Plato   Oper. 
672.  F. 


320  Cicero  argued  for  the  Immortality  of    Part  II  L 

those  philosophers,  who  argued  for  the  immortality  of  the 
soul.  For  though,  according  to  the  custom  of  the  new 
academy,  of  which  sect  he  was,  he  disputed  pro  and  con 
upon  every  subject,  yet  it  appears  from  several  passages  in 
his  works,  that  his  judgment  strongly  inclined  him  to  that 
opinion  (f'),  as  at  least  more  probable  than  the  contrary. 
He  does  not  merely  mention  this  in  some  single  detached 
passages,  but  he  argues  the  matter  at  large,  in  one  of  the 
finest  pieces  antiquity  has  left  us.  He  argues  from  the  na- 
ture of  the  soul,  and  its  uncompounded  and  indivisible  es- 
sence, of  a  quite  different  kind  from  these  common  elemen- 
tary natures,  from  its  wonderful  powers  and  faculties,  which 
have  something  divine  in  them,  and  incompatible  with 
sluggish  matter,  from  the  ardent  thirst  after  immortality 
natural  to  the  human  mind,  but  which  is  most  conspicuous 
in  the  most  exalted  souls,  and  from  some  other  topics, 
which  the  reader  may  see  in  the  first  book  of  his  Tusculan 
Disputations.  He  speaks  to  the  same  purpose  in  his  Cato 
Major,  and  in  his  Somnium  Scipionis,  and  on  several  other 
occasions.  It  is  true,  there  are  two  or  three  passages  in  his 
epistles  to  his  friends,  in  which  he  seems  to  express  himself 
in  a  different  strain.  In  an  epistle  to  Torquatus,  he  comforts 
himself  with  this  thought:  "  Whilst  I  shall  exist,  I  shall  not 


(e)  The  learned  Dr.  Middleton,  in  his  Life  of  Cicero,  observes, 
that  *'he  held  the  immortality  of  the  soul,  and  its  separate  exis- 
tence alter  death,  in  a  state  of  happiness  or  misery.'*  But  in  the 
latter  part  of  this  assertion,  that  ingenious  writer  seems  to  be 
mistaken:  for  Cicero  did  not  hold  that  any  separate  soul  was  in 
a  stale  of  misery  after  death.  His  whole  ari;unient  in  the  first 
book  of  his  Tusculan  Disputations  turns  upon  this  point,  that 
either  the  soul  shall  be  extinguished  at  death;  or  if  it  survives, 
which  is  what  he  endeavours  to  prove,  it  shall  be  happy.  Future 
misery  and  tormer)ts  he  entirely  rejects.  But  this  shall  be  con- 
sidered more  particularly  afterwards. 


Chap.  IV.         the  Soul  and  a  future  State.  321 

be  troubled  at  any  thing,  since  I  have  no  fault  to  charge 
myself  with;  and  if  I  shall  not  exist,  I  shall  be  deprived  of 
all  sense.'* — *'  Nee  enim  dum  ero,  angar  uUa  re;  cum  omni 
caream  culpa;  et  si  non  ero,  sensu  omni  carebo(^/)."  In  an- 
other epistle  to  the  same  Torquatus,  he  tells  him,  that  "  if 
he  was  called  to  depart  out  of  this  life,  he  should  not  be 
snatched  from  that  republic  he  would  desire  to  continue  in, 
especially  since  he  should  then  be  without  any  sense." — 
"  Deinde  quod  mihi  ad  consolandum  commune  tecum  est, 
si  jam  vocer  ad  exicum  vitse,  non  ab  ea  republica  avellar  qua 
carendum  esse  doleam,  prsesertim  cum  id  sine  uUo  sensu 
sit  futurum  (^')*"  And  in  an  epistle  to  L.  Mescinius,  he 
says,  death  ought  to  be  despised,  or  even  wished  for,  be- 
cause it  will  be  void  of  all  sense.  "  Propterea  quod  nullum 
sensum  esset  habitura."  And  in  an  epistle  to  Toranius,  he 
gives  it  as  a  reason  for  bearing  with  moderation  whatsoever 
should  happen,  that  death  is  the  end  of  all  things.  "  Una 
ratio  videtur,  quicquid  evenerit  ferre  moderate,  prsesertim 
cum  omnium  rerum  mors  sit  extremum  (/^)."  But  I  think 
it  would  be  carrying  it  too  far  to  conclude,  from  a  few 
short  hints  thrown  out  occasionally  in  letters  written  in 
haste,  that  Cicero's  real  opinion  was  that  the  soul  died  with 
the  body,  when  he  had  so  often  given  his  reasons  for  the 
contrary,  in  books  where  he  professedly  treats  on  that  sub- 
ject. The  persons  he  writ  to  were  probably  Epicureans; 
such  was  Torquatus;  and  the  same  may  be  supposed  of  the 
rest,  it  being  then  the  fashionable  opinion  among  the  gen- 
tlemen of  Rome.  The  letters  were  written  in  a  political  way, 
relating  to  the  then  melancholy  state  of  the  republic,  and  it 
would  have  been  absurd,  whatever  Cicero's  private  opinion 


(/)  Cic.  Epist.  lib.  vi.  epist.  3. 
{g)  Ibid.  lib.  vi.  epist.  4. 
{h)  Ibid.  lib.  vi.  epist.  21. 
Vol.  II.  2  S 


322  Plutarch* s  Sentiments  concerning         Part  III. 

might  have  been,  to  have  offered  consolations  to  Epicu- 
reans, drawn  from  the  hope  of  a  happy  existence  after  death. 
But  though  I  think  it  cannot  be  absolutely  concluded  from 
those  passages  that  Cicero  was  in  his  real  sentiments  against 
the  immortality  of  the  soul,  yet  it  is  not  probable  that  he 
would  have  expressed  himself  in  the  manner  he  has  done  in 
those  letters,  if  he  had  been  uniform  and  steady  in  the  be- 
lief of  it.  It  may  well  be  granted,  that  he  had  doubts  in 
his  mind  concerning  it,  and  therefore  in  the  uncertainty 
he  was  under  expressed  himself  differently  at  different 
times. 

There  is  another  philosopher  of  great  note,  whom  I  shall 
here  mention,  though  he  lived  after  Christianity  had  made 
some  progress  in  the  world,  and  therefore  does  not  come 
so  properly  under  our  present  consideration;  and  that  is 
Plutarch,  who  was  extremely  well  versed  in  the  writings  of 
the  philosophers  who  had  flourished  before  his  time.  He 
not  only  represents  the  doctrine  of  the  immortality  of  the 
soul  and  a  future  state  as  a  matter  of  antient  tradition,  and 
which  was  countenanced  by  the  laws,  from  which  we  ought 
not  to  recede  (i),  but  he  produces  reasons  for  it,  especially 
in  his  excellent  treatise  De  Sera.  Numinis  vindicta.  He 
gives  it  as  the  sum  of  his  discourse,  that  the  Deity  exer- 
ciseth  an  inspection  over  us,  and  distributeth  to  us  according 
to  our  deserts:  and  that  from  thence  it  follows,  that  souls  are 
altogether  incorruptible  and  immortal,  or  that  they  remain 
for  some  time  after  death.  He  adds,  that  it  would  suppose 
God  to  be  meanly  and  idly  employed  in  concerning  himself 
so  much  about  us,  if  we  had  nothing  divine  within,  or 
which  resembleth  his  own  perfections,  nothing  that  is  stable 
and    firm,    but  were  only  like   leaves,   which,   as   Homer 


(0  Plut.  Consol.  ad  uxorem^  Oper.  torn.  II.  p.  612.  edit.  Xyl. 


Chap.  IV.         the  Immortality  of  the  Soul.  323 

speaks,  wither  and  fall  in  a  short  time.  And  he  represents 
it  as  absurd  to  imagine  that  souls  are  made  only  to  blossom 
and  flourish  lor  a  dav  in  a  tender  and  delicate  body  of  flesh, 
and  then  to  be  immediately  extinguished  on  every  slight 
occasion  {k).  He  argues  farther,  that  if  the  deceased  vanish 
like  clouds  or  smoke,  the  oracle  of  Apollo  would  never 
have  appointed  propitiations  to  be  made  for  the  dead,  and 
honours  to  be  rendered  to  them.  And  he  declares,  that  the 
same  reasons  confirm  the  providence  of  God,  and  the  per- 
manency of  the  human  soul;  and  that  the  one  of  these  can- 
not he  maintained,  if  the  other  be  denied.  *^E<5  ht  Aoy®-  0  tS 

B-ccre^ov  UK    i<f(v   UTToMwtTv   uveci^^vrec  B-ciTi^ov  (/).     He  adds,    "  NoW 

then,  since  the  soul  existeth  after  death,  it  is  probable  that 
it  partakes  both  of  rewards  and  punishments:  for  in  this 
life  the  soul  is  in  a  state  of  conflict,  like  a  wrestler,  but  when 
it  has  finished  its  conflict,  it  receives  suitable  retributions." 
Yet  in  what  follows,. he  intimates  that  these  things  wtrenot 
commonly  believed.  And,  indeed,  he  himself  is  far  from, 
being  consistent  and  uniform  on  this  head;  for  though  the 
passages  now  produced  from  him  have  a  fair  aspect,  there 
are  other  passages  in  his  works  which  have  a  contrary  ap- 
pearance, as  I  shall  have  occasion  to  shew. 


(k)  Plut.  Consol.  ad  uxorem,  Oper.  torn.  II.  p.  560.  B,  C. 
(/)  Plut.  de  Sera  Numinis  Vind.  Oper.  torn.  IL  p.  560.  D,  F. 
edit.  Xyl. 


324  The  Philosophers  placed  the  Immortality  of  Part  III. 


CHAPTER  V. 

Those  of  tlie  aiitieiit  philosophers  who  argued  for  the  immortality  of  the  soui, 
placed  it  on  wrong  foundations,  and  mixed  things  with  it  which  weakened  the 
belief  of  it.  Some  of  them  asserted,  that  the  soul  is  immortal,  as  being  a  por- 
tion of  the  Divine  Essence.  They  universally  held  the  pre-existence  of  the  hu- 
man soul,  and  laid  the  chief  stress  upon  this  for  proving  its  immortality  Their 
doctrine  of  the  transmigration  of  souls  was  a  great  corruption  of  the  true  doc- 
trine of  a  future  state.  Those  who  said  the  highest  things  of  future  happiness, 
considered  it  as  confined  chiefly  to  persons  of  eminence,  or  to  those  of  philoso- 
phical minds,  and  afforded  small  encouragement  to  the  common  kind  of  pious 
and  virtuous  persons.  The  rewards  of  Elvsium  were  but  temporary,  and  of  a 
short  duration:  and  even  the  happiness  of  those  privileged  souls,  who  were 
supposed  to  be  admitted  not  merely  into  Elysium,  but  into  heaven,  was  not 
everlasting  in  the  strict  and  proper  sense.  The  Gospel  doctrine  of  eternal  life 
to  all  good  and  righteous  persons  was  not  taught  by  the  antient  Pagan  philo- 
sophers. 

Jn  AVING  endeavoured  to  lay  before  the  reader  the  sen- 
timents of  those  Pagan  philosoph  rs,  who  are  generally- 
looked  upon  as  having  been  the  ablest  asserters  of  the  im- 
mortality of  the  soul  and  a  future  state,  I  shall  now  make 
some  observations,  by  which  it  may  appear  how  far  their 
instructions  were  to  be  depended  upon,  and  were  of  real  ser- 
vice to  mankind,  with  regard  to  this  important  article. 

And  the  first  thing  I  would  observe  is,  that  the  best  of 
those  philosophers  placed  it  on  wrong  foundations,  or  mix- 
ed things  with  it,  which  tended  greatly  to  weaken  the  belief 
or  defeat  the  influence  6f  it.  This  appears  partly  from  what 
has  been  already  observed.  Some  of  them,  as  the  Pythago- 
reans, argued  for  the  soal's  immortality,  because  the  divine 
nature  from  which  it  is  taken,  and  of  which  it  is  a  detached 
part  or  portion  immersed  in  a  human  body,  is  immortal. 
This  certainly  was  putting  it  on  a  false  foundation,  and 
building  it  upon  a  notion  absurd  in  itself,  and  which,  if  pur- 


Chap.  V.         the  Soul onwron^  Foundations.  325 

sued  to  its  just  consequences,  tends  to  the  subversion  of  all 
religion,  by  confounding  God  and  the  creature,  and  making 
them  both  of  the  same  nature  and  essence.  A  celebrated 
author  has  argued,  from  the  notion  which  the  Pythagoreans 
and  many  other  antient  philosophers  had  of  the  soul's  being 
a  part  of  God,  that  they  did  not  and  could  not  really  believe 
a  future  state  of  rewards  and  punishments.  And,  in- 
deed, it  seems  to  be  a  natural  consequence  of  that  notion, 
that  at  least  there  could  not  be  future  punishments.  But 
men  do  not  alwa}  s  see  and  acknowledge  ihe  consequences 
of  their  own  principles.  And  they  might  as  reasonably  sup- 
pose this  notion  to  be  reconcileable  to  future  rewards  and 
punishments,  as  to  present  ones.  For  since  they  supposed, 
that  the  soul,  though  it  be  a  part  of  God,  is  capable  in 
this  life  of  being  both  rewarded  and  punished;  and  that 
whilst  it  is  here  in  this  body,  it  is  subject  to  vice,  igno- 
rance, and  a  variety  of  evils  (m);  I  see  no  reason  why  it 
might  not  be  supposed  to  be  also  obnoxious  to  punishments 
in  a  future  state:  for  the  absurdity  is  equal  in  the  one  case 
as  in  the  other. 

The  notion  of  the  soul's  being  a  portion  of  the  Divine 
Essence  was  common  to  other  philosophers,  as  well  as  the 
Pythagoreans.  It  has  been  already  shewn,  that  this  was  the 
opinion  of  the  Stoics,  though  they  seem  not  to  have  argued 
the  soul's  immortality  from  it.  What  were  Plato's  senti- 
ments on  this  head  the  learned  are  not  agreed.  Plutarch,  in 
his  Platonic  questions,  gives  it  as  Plato's  opinion,  that  "  the 
soul,  being  partaker  of  understanding,  reason,  and  harmony, 
is  not  the  work  of  God  only,  Lut  also  a  part  of  him;  and  is 


(m)  The  absurdity  of  this  is  well  exposed  by*Velleius  the  Epi- 
curean, in  Cicero's  first  book  De  Nat.  Deor.  cap.  xi.  p.  28.  edit. 
Davis. 


326   The  Philosophers  placed  the  Immortality  of  Part  III. 
not  made  by  him,  but  from  him,  and  out  of  him."  "Ovx  \yoi 

yiy«vtv  (;i).  But  the  same  author  seems  elsewhere  to  repre- 
sent Plato's  opinion  otherwise.  Speaking  of  the  rational 
soul,  he  gives  it  as  the  opinion  of  Pythagoras  and  Plato, 
that  "  it  is  immortal,  and  that  it  is  not  God,  but  the  work 
of  the  eternal  God."  Kxn  yd^  t«»  •^vy,^v  k  S-eov  uXyC  i^yot  tS  at^ta 
B-iS  vTTx^xuv,  And  it  is  observable  that  he  had  declared  a  few 
lines  before,  that  Pythagoras  and  Plato  held  that  the  human 
soul  is  immortal;  because  "  when  it  departs  out  of  the  body, 
it  recedes  to  the  soul  of  the  universe,  to  that  which  is  of  the 
same  kind  or  nature  with  it."  n^o?  to  of^oytvk.  It  is  not  easy 
to  reconcile  these  things.  But  it  is  proper  to  observe,  that 
the  soul  of  the  world  was  not  the  absolutely  Supreme  God 


(n)  Plutarch.  Opera,  torn.  11.  p.  100 1.  Edit.  Xyl.  Francof  1620. 
A  very  able  and  learned  writer,  who  is  a  zealous  advocate  for 
the  antient  philosophers,  observes,  "  That  the  Egyptians  ima- 
gined the  soul  to  be  a  part  or  portion  of  God  himself,  a  section  of 
God's  substance,  which  always  did  and  always  must  exist.  And 
that  this  was  the  philosophic  notion  from  the  time  of  Pythagoras 
among  the  Greeks;"  and  that  **  he  made  the  soul  to  be  a  pan  of 
the  TO  ?»."  See  Dr.  Sykes*s  Principles  and  Connection  of  Natural 
and  Revealed  Religion,  chap.  xiv.  p.  392.  394.  By  representing 
it  as  the  philosophic  notion  from  the  time  of  Pythagoras  among 
the  Greeks,  he  seems  to  suppose  that  it  was  the  doctrine  of  Pla- 
to himself.  And  if  this  be  a  true  representation,  it  is  a  remarkable 
instance  to  shew  how  much  philosophers  of  the  greatest  abilities 
were  mistaken  in  points  of  high  consequence.  Nor  can  I  see  how 
this  ingenious  author  could  justly  affirm,  as  he  has  done,  that  in 
what  relates  to  the  Deity,  "  Those  who  followed  the  mere  light 
of  nature  (by  whom  he  particularly  understands  the  philosophers) 
seem  to  be  very  clear,  and  made  use  of  the  faculties  God  had 
given  them  to  great  and  good  purposes:"  and  that  "  they  closely 
pursued  truth  in  what  they  discerned  about  the  Governor  of  the 
universe."  Ibid.  p.  362.  379. 


Chap.  V.         the  Soul  on  wrong  Foundations.  327 

in  the  Platonic,  though  it  was  so  in  the  Stoic  system  (o). 
Plotinus  represents  the  human  soul,  as  o^onh?^  of  the  same 
species  with  the  mundane  soul,  which  is  his  third  hyposta- 
sis, and  which  he  calls  the  eldest  sister  of  our  human 
«ouls  (/?).  And  yet  he  does  not  seem  to  have  supposed  the 
human  soul  to  be  in  the  strictest  sense  a  part  of  that  God 
whom  he  looked  upon  to  be  absolutely  supreme.  But  Dr. 
Cudworth  is  very  right  in  the  censure  he  has  passed  upon 
it,  that  "  as  this  savours  highly  of  philosophic  pride  and 
arrogance,  to  think  so  magnificently  of  themselves,  and  to 
equalize  in  a  manner  their  own  souls  with  that  mundane 
soul,  so  was  it  a  monstrous  degradation  of  the  third  hypo- 
stasis of  their  trinity:"  and  which  according  to  that  learned 
writer,  they  supposed  to  be  of  the  same  nature,  though  in- 
ferior to  the  first.  He  adds,  that  "  they  did  doubtless  there- 
in   designedly  lay  a  foundation  for  their    polytheism  and 


(o)  Plato  represents  the  Supreme  God,  the  to  uyuBov,  as  of  a 
most  singular  and  transcendent  nature,  not  to  be  named  or  com- 
prehended There  is  a  remarkable  passage  at  the  latter  end  of 
his  sixth  republic,  the  purport  of  which  is  this,  That  "  as  the  sun 
not  only  gives  the  power  of  being  seen  to  the  things  which  are 
seen,  but  is  also  the  cause  of  their  generation,  growth,  and  nu- 
trition, but  is  not  the  generation  itself;  in  hke  manner,  God  with 
respect  to  the  things  that  are  known,  is  not  only  the  cause  of 
their  being  known,  but  also  of  their  essence  and  existence,  yet 
is  not  that  essence,  but  is  above  essence  in  dignity  and  power*." 
Here  he  seems  plainly  to  distinguish  the  Supreme  God  from  the 
world  and  all  things  in  it.  He  supposes  him  to  be  the  author  and 
cause  of  knowledge,  wisdom,  truth,  and  good,  of  the  essence  and 
existence  of  every  thing,  but  that  his  essence  is  entirely  distinct 
from  that  of  every  thing. 

(fi)  Plotin.  Ennead.  v.  lib.  i.  cap.  2. 

*  Platon.  Opera,  p.  479.  C.  edit.  Lugd. 


328   The  Philosophers  placed  the  Immortality  of  Part  III, 

creature- worship,  for  their  cosmolatry,  astrolatry,  and  dse- 
ttionolatry  (^)." 

But  not  to  insist  longer  upon  this,  certain  it  is,  that  those 
philosophers  who  argued  for  the  immortality  of  the  soul 
universally  held  its  pre-existence  before  it  animated  the  hu- 
man body,  and  laid  the  stress  of  the  argument  for  its  eter- 
nal existence  after  its  departure  from  the  body,  upon  its 
existence  from  times  immemorial,  or  even  from  everlasting 
before  its  entrance  into  it.  This  is  what  the  very  learned 
writer  last  mentioned  affirms  concerning  all  the  antient  as- 
serters  of  the  soul's  immortality.  That  "  they  held  that  it 
was  not  generated  or  made  out  of  nothing,  for  then  it  might 
return  to  nothing.  And  therefore  they  commonly  began  with 
proving  its  pre-existence,  proceeding  thence  to  prove  its 
permanency  after  death  (r)."  This  is  the  method  used  by 
Socrates  in  Plato's  Phsedo.  He  first  endeavours  to  prove, 
that  the  soul  existed  before  its  entrance  into  the  body,  and 
that  the  knowledge  we  now  have,  is  only  a  reminiscence  of 
that  which  we  had  in  the  pre-existent  state,  and  then  pro- 
ceeds to  prove  that  it  shall  exist  after  its  being  separated 
from  it  (s).  Thus  they  argued  for  the  soul's  immortality 
upon  a  principle  which  it  was  impossible  for  them  to  prove, 
and  which  really  weakened  the  doctrine  they  intended  to 
establish.  Hence  it  was,  that  they  who  thought  there  was 
no  reason  to  believe  that  the  soul  had  an  existence  before 
it  animated  the  human  body,  would  not  allow  it  survived 
the  body:  for  it  was,  as  Cicero  represents  it,  "  a  principle 
universally  acknowledged,  that  whatever  is  born  and  hath  a 
beginning,  must  also  have  an  end."  And  upon  this  founda- 
tion it  was,  that  the  famous  Stoic  Pansetius,  who  was  other- 


(y)  Cudworth's  Intel.  Syst.  p.  593. 

(r)  Ibid.  p.  38,  39.  2d  edit. 

(*)  Plato  Oper.  p.  384,  385.  edit.  Lugd. 


Cha?.  V.         the  Soul  onivrong  ToundationSi  329 

wise  a  great  admirer  of  Plato,  denied  the  soul's  immortalitye 
*' Volt  enim,"  says  Cicero^  speaking  of  Pansetius,  "quod 
nemo  negat,  quicquid  natum  sit  interire:  nasci  autem  ani- 
mos,  quod  declarat  eorum  similitudo,  qui  proereantur,  quae 
etiam  in  ingeniis,  non  solum  in  corporibus,  appareat  (?)." 
Cicero  himself,  in  arguing  for  the  immortality  of  the  souljj 
asserts  its  pre-existence  from  eternity.  There  is  a  remarka- 
ble passage  to  this  purpose  in  his  book  de  Consolatione, 
quoted  by  himself  in  the  first  book  of  his  Tusculan  Dispu- 
tations. He  there  says,  that  "  the  soul  has  not  its  original 
from  the  earth;  for  that  it  has  nothing  in  it  mixed  or  com- 
pounded, or  which  seems  to  be  sprung  or  formed  out  of  the 
earth,  nothing  watery,  or  airy,  or  fiery  in  its  constitution: 
for  in  these  natures  there  is  nothing  which  hath  the  notion 
of  memory  and  understanding,  which  can  both  retain  the 
things  which  are  past,  and  look  forward  to  things  futuf-e^  and 
comprehend  the  present:  which  alone  are  divine:  nor  can  it 
ever  be  found  from,  whence  these  things  should  come  to 
man  but  from  God."  I  think  this  is  very  justly  argued:  but 
afterwards  he  carries  it  farther:  "  Whatsoever  thing  is  in 
us,"  says  he,  "  which  perceives,  which  understands,  which 
lives,  which  has  a  force  and  vigour  of  its  own,  it  is  celestial 
and  divine;  and  for  that  reason  must  of  necessity  be  eter- 
nal." "  Ita  quicquid  est  istud  quod  sentit,  quod  sapit,  quod 
vivit,  quod  viget,  cceleste  ac  divinum  est,  ob  eamque  rem 
seternum  sit  necesse  est  ft/)."  This  looks  as  if  Cicerc) 
thought  that  the  human  soul  was  really  and  properly  a  part 
of  the  divine  essence.  But  I  think  this  does  not  necessarily 
follow.  It  may  perhaps  signify  no  more,  than  that  he  calls 
the  soul  divine,  to  signify  its  near  cognation  tp  the  Divine 


(?)  Tuscul.  Disput.  lib.  i.  cap.  32.  edit.  Davis. 
(u)  Ibid.  cap.  27.  p.  67.  edit.  Davis* 

Vol.  XL  %  T 


330  The  Philosophers  placed  the  Immortality  o/*  Part  III» 

Nature,  and  the  resemblance  it  bears  to  it,  and  in  opposi- 
tion to  things  which  are  of  an  earthly  and  elementary  na- 
ture. In  the  words  immediately  preceding  these  last  men- 
tioned, he  expresses  himself  thus;  "  Singularis  est  igitur 
qusedam  natura  atque  vis  animi,  sejuncta  ab  his  usitatis 
notisque  naturis."  Where  he  intimates  that  the  soul  is  of  a 
singular  nature  and  force,  different  from  those  known  and 
common  natures,  that  is,  from  earthly  and  corporeal  things, 
of  which  he  had  been  speaking  before:  and  in  contradis- 
tinction to  which  he  calls  it  divine.  And  he  introduces  this 
whole  passage,  with  observing,  that  besides  the  four  ele- 
ments of  the  material  world,  there  is  a  fifth  nature,  which 
was  first  taught  by  Aristotle,  which  belongs  to  the  gods  and 
human  souls;  and  intimates  that  this  was  the  opinion  which 
he  himself  followed  in  the  quotation  produced  from  his 
book  de  Consolatione.  "  Sin  autem  estquinta  qusedam  natura 
ab  Aristotele  inducta  primum,  hsec  et  deorum  est  et  ani- 
morum.  Hanc  nos  sententiam  secuti  his  ipsis  verbis  in  Con- 
solatione hsec  expressimus."  If  Cicero  had  thought  that 
Aristotle  intended  by  the  fifth  nature  the  divine  essence 
properly  so  called,  it  could  not  have  been  said,  that  he  was 
the  first  that  introduced  it,  for  Pythagoras  had  taught  it  be- 
fore: it  is  therefore  probably  to  be  understood  of  a  nature 
distinct  both  from  these  lower  elementary  natures,  and  from 
the  essence  of  the  Supreme  Being,  though  near  a-kin  to  it 
and  perfectly  like  it;  of  which  both  the  gods,  i.  e.  the  infe- 
rior deities,  and  human  souls  were  partakers.  And  this  also 
seems  to  be  plainly  intimated  in  the  words  with  which  he 
concludes  that  fragment.'  "  Nee  vero  Deus  ipse,  qui  intel- 
ligitur  a  nobis  alio  modo  intelligi  potest,  nisi  mens  soluta 
qusedam  et  libera,  segregata  ab  omni  concretione  mortali 
omnia  sentiens  et  movens,  ipsaque  prsedita  motu  sempiter- 
na."  Where  immediately  after  having  said,  that  the  soul  is 
a  celestial  and  divine  thing,  and  must  for  that  reason  be 
eternal;  he  adds,  that  '^  God  himself,  as  far  as  he  is  appre- 


Chap.  V.         the  Soul  on  -wrong  Foundations.  331 

bended  by  us,  can  be  conceived  of  no  otberwise,  than  as  a 
mind  disengaged  from  all  mortal  concretion  or  mixture, 
perceiving  and  moving  all  things,  and  itself  endued  with  an 
eternal  motion."  Here  he  seems  plainly  to  distinguish  God 
himself,  "  Deus  ipse,"  in  the  highest  sense,  from  human 
souls,  which  yet  he  supposes  to  be  of  a  similar  and  conge- 
nial nature;  and  a  little  before  he  represents  vital  activity, 
understanding,  invention,  and  memory,  as  divine  things  or 
qualities,  on  the  account  of  which  the  soul  might  be  called 
divine,  as  he  chuses  to  express  it,  or,  as  Euripides  ven- 
tures to  call  it,  a  god;  where  he  seems  to  look  upon  the 
calling  the  soul  a  god  to  be  a  daring  manner  of  expression 
even  in  a  poet.  *'  Quae  autem  divina?  vigere,  sapere,  inve- 
nire,  meminisse.  Ergo  quidem  animus,  qui  (ut  ego  dico  di- 
vinus)  est  ut  Euripides  audet  dicere  Deus  (at)."  And  else- 
where having  represented  the  soul  as  much  superior  to  the 
brute  animals,  and  decerped  from  the  divine  mind,  he  saith, 
*'it  can  be  compared  with  no  other  but  with  God  himself, 
if  it  be  lawful  to  say  so."  "  Humanus  autem  animus,  de- 
cerptus  ex  mente  divina,  cum  alio  nuUo  nisi  cum  ipso  Deo 
(in  hoc  fas  est  di  eta)  comparari  potest  {tj)*"* 


{x')  He  there  adds,  that  if  God  be  either  air  or  fire,  "  anima 
aut  ignis,"  the  soul  of  man  is  the  same:  for  as  that  celestial  na- 
ture is  free  from  earth  and  moisture,  so  the  soul  of  man  is  free 
from  both  these:  and  that  if  there  be  a  fifth  nature,  it  is  common 
both  to  gods  and  men.  Tuscul.  Disput.  lib.  i.  cap.  26.  p.  65,  66. 
edit.  Davis. 

(y)  Tuscul.  Disput.  lib.  v.  cap.  13.  p.  371.  edit.  Davis.  Plato 
expresses  himself  after  the  same  manner.  In  his  tenth  Republic, 
he  talks  of  a  man's  endeavouring,  by  applying  himself  to  the  prac- 
tice of  virtue,  "  to  be  made  like  to  God,  as  far^as  it  is  possible 
for  men  to  be*."    And  in  his  Philebus,  he  talks  of  taking  "our 

*  Plato  Oper,  p.  518.  C.  edit.  Lugd.    See  also  his  Thesetetus,  ibid.  p. 

128.  F.  ,         . 


^32  The  Philosophers  placed  the  Immortality  of  Part  III, 

♦  But  if  we  should  allow  that  it  was  not  Cicero's  opinion 
that  the  human  soul  is  in  the  strictest  and  properest  sense 
a  part  of  God,  yet  he  certainly  supposed  that  its  nature  is 
of  the  same  kind,  and  is  like  his  naturally  and  necessa- 
rily eternal.  Thus  he  asserts  in  the  passage  above  cited: 
*'  Coeleste  ac  divinum  est,  ob  eamque  rem  seternum  sit 
necessQ  est."  And  in  the  same  discourse  he  produces  a 
passage  from  Plato's  Phsedrus,  which  he  seems  highly  to 
approve;  and  which  he  had  also  cited  in  his  sixth  book  de 
Republica.  Plato  begins  with  observing,  that  every  soul  is 
immortal,  sreirti  -^v^Ji  uQelyetToi.  And  the  argument  he  uses  to 
prove  it  is  elegantly  translated  by  Cicero.  It  is  to  this 
purpose:  that  "that  which  always  moves  is  eternal:  that 
which  is  moved  by  another  must  come  to  an  end  of  mo- 
tion, and  consequently  of  life:  but  that  which  moves  itself 
will  never  cease  to  move,  because  it  is  never  deserted  by 
itself.  Moreover  it  is  the  fountain  and  principle  of  motion 
to  all  other  things  which  are  moved.  And  that  which  is  the 
principle  can  have  no  original  or  beginning:  for  from  it  all 
things  arise,  but  it  cannot  arise  from  any  other.  And  if  it 
never  had  a  beginning,  it  shall  never  have  an  end.  Since 
therefore  it  is  manifest  that  that  is  eternal  which  has  the 
principle  of  motion  within  itself,  who  will  deny  that  this 
nature  belongs  to  souls  (z)?"  He  concludes  with  saying, 
that  ^' this  is  the  proper  nature  and  force  of  the  soul.  And 


manners  from  God,  as  far  as  it  is  possible  for  man  to  partake  of 
God,'*  K«cB'  otrov  Sy»«Td»  5-sa  uvS^a^c^^  f^STecT^th. 
'  (2)  Pluiarch.  de  Placit.  Philos.  lib.  iv.  cap.  2.  says,  that  Thales 
was  the  first  who  taught  thai  the  soul  is  in  a  perpetual  motion, 
^nd  that  this  motion  proceeds  irrm  itself,  (p'vo-iv  ueixivyiTcv  xeti  uv- 
TMfvnrpy.  This  is  an  argument  often  made  use  of  by  those  of  the 
?iniients  who  pleaded  for  the  immortality  of  the  soul.  See  Dr. 
Davis's  note  on  Tuscul.  Disput.  lib.  i.  cap.  23.  p.  53. 


Chap.  V.         the  Soul  on  wrong  Foundations.  333 

since  it  is  the  only  thing  which  always  moves  itself,  it 
never  had  a  beginning,  but  is  eternal."  "  Nam  hsec  est 
propria  natura  animi  atque  vis:  quae  si  est  una  ex  omnibus 
quae  se  ipsa  semper  moveat,  neque  certe  nata  est,  et  aeterna 
est."  Plato  has  it  thus,  el  uvx[KVii  uycvuTh  n  >^  uiumrh  zr^v^k 
if  unt  '*of  necessity  the  soul  must  be  an  ungenerated 
and  immortal  thing  («)." 

Cicero  highly  commends  this  as  both  elegantly  and 
acutely  argued,  and  afterwards  sums  it  up  himself  thus: 
"  The  soul  perceives  that  it  moves,  and  at  the  same  time 
perceives  that  it  moves  not  by  a  foreign  force,  but  by  its 
own;  and  it  can  never  happen  that  it  should  be  deserted  by 
itself:  from  whence  it  follows,  that  it  must  be  eternal." 
"Sentit  igitur  animus  se  moved,  quod  cum  sentit  illud 
una  sentit,  se  vi  sua  non  aliena  moveri,  nee  accidere  posse 
ut  ipsa  unquam  a  se  deseratur:  ex  quo  efficitur  aeter* 
pitas  (^)."  This  way  of  arguing  so  much  admired  by 
Cicero  might  be  made  use  of  to  prove  the  eternal  exis^ 
tence  of  the  one  self-existent  independent  Being,  the  first 
cause  of  all  things,  and  the  principle  and  original  of  all 
motion.  But  when  applied  to  the  human  soul,  if  it  proved 
any  thing,  would  prove  that  it  is  self-originate,  independent, 
and  necessarily  eternal  by  the  force  of  its  own  nature.  So 
that  if  it  be  not  strictly  of  the  same  essence  with  the  su- 
preme God,  it  is  of  a  nature  perfectly  like  his,  underived, 
and  which  existed  of  itself  from  everlasting,  and  continueth 
always  to  exist  by  its  own  force,  and  can  never  be  des- 
troyed or  cease  to  exist  (c).  Hence  it  was  that  some  of  the 


(a)  Plato  in  Phaedro,  Opera,  p.  344.  D,  E.  edit^  Lugd.  1590. 

(Jb)  Cic.  Tuscul.  Disput.  1.  i.  cap.  23.  p.  52.  et  seq  e'it.  Davis. 

(c)  This  seems  to  be  the  course  of  Plato's  argument  for  the 
immortality  of  the  soul,  as  urged  by  Plato  in  hi-.  Phaedrus,  and 
after  him  by  Cicero.  And  yet  the   same  Plato  in,  his   Timaeiis 


334  The  Philosophers  placed  the  Immortality  of  Part  III, 

antient  fathers  found  fault  with  the  doctrine  of  the  natural 
immortality  of  the  soul  as  taught  by  the  Heathen  philoso- 
phers; because  they  thought  it  tended  to  prove  that  the 
soul  continued  to  exist  by  a  necessity  of  nature,  and  was 
independent  on  God.  Arnobius  particularly  charges  them 
with  holding,  that  the  soul  was  equally  immortal  with 
God  himself;  which,  he  thought,  had  a  tendency  to  take 
away  the  dread  of  the  supreme  power,  and  of  a  future 
judgment  and  punishment;  and  thereby  to  encourage  men 
to  all  manner  of  wickedness,  and  the  licentious  indulgence 
of  their  lusts  and  appetites.  "  Quid  enim,"  says  he,  "  pro- 
hibebit  quo  minus  hsec  faciat?  metus  supremse  potestatis, 
judiciumque  divinum?  Et  qui  poterit  territari  formidinis 
alicujus  horrore,  cui  fuerat  persuasam,  tam  se  esse  immor- 
talem,  quam  ipsum  Deum  primum?  nee  ab  eo  judicari 
quicquam  de  se  posse:  cum  sit  una  immortalitas  in  utro- 
que,  nee  in  alterius  altera  conditionis  possit  sequalitate 
vexari." 

It  has  been  shewn  that  the  principal  arguments  made  use 
of  by  the  antient  Pagan  philosophers  to  prove  the  immor- 
tality of  the  soul  placed  it  on  wrong  foundations.  I  shall 
not  enter  on  a  particular  consideration  of  the  other  argu- 
ments offered  by  them  in  proof  of  that  important  article. 
One  would  have  expected  to  have  met  with  some  solid 
and  satisfactory  reasonings  on  this  subject  in  Plato's  Phsedo, 
a  treatise  highly  celebrated  by  antiquity,  and  the  professed 
.design  of  v/hich  is  to  prove  the  immortality  of  the  soul. 
And  it  may  reasonably  be  supposed,  that  Plato  has  there 
laid  together,  and  put  into  the  mouth  of  Socrates,  whatever 
he  judged  to  be  of  the  greatest  force,  whether  it  had  been 


makes  the  immortality  of  the  secondary  gods  to  depend  not  mere- 
ly upon  their  own  nature,  but  upon  the  will  of  the  supreme  God. 
And  surely  this  equally  holds  concerning  human  souls. 


Chap.  V.       the  Soul  on  wrong  Foundations,  335 

advanced  by  Socrates,  or  was  of  his  own  invention.  But 
I  am  sorry  to  observe,  that,  abstracting  from  the  fine  man- 
ner of  carrying  on  that  dialogue,  there  is  not  much  strength 
of  argument  even  in  those  things  on  which  he  seems  to  lay 
the  greatest  stress:  and  that  some  of  them  are  obscure  and 
trifling,  and  what  one  would  not  have  expected  from  so 
great  a  man  {d),  Socrates  and  Plato  seem  to  be  among  the 
first  that  undertook  to  prove  this  point  in  a  way  of  reason 
and  argument.  But,  as  was  before  observed,  they  both  re- 
present it  as  having  been  transmitted  by  antient  traditions, 
to  which  it  was  just  to  give  credit  as  being  of  a  divine 
original. 

Another  remarkable  instance,  in   which    those   of   the 


(c?)  The  reader  that  would  see  a  summary  of  Socrates's  argu- 
ments for  the  immortality  of  the  soul,  as  represented  in  Plato's 
Phaedo,  may  consult  the  account  given  of  them  by  Dr.  Campbell 
in  his  Necessity  of  Revelation,  sect.  3.  p.  100.  et  seq.  upon  all 
which  that  learned  writer  observes,  that  "  Socrates  by  no  means 
arrived  at  this  truth,  in  pursuing  any  series  of  ideas  or  notions 
that  could  arise  in  one's  mind  from  the  nature  and  relation  of 
things.  He  is  much  like  a  man  who  has  some  way  or  other  pick- 
ed up  a  truth,  but  can  give  no  account  of  it,  but  casts  abroad  to 
find  out  something  to  justify  his  opinion  in  the  best  manner  he 
can,  without  advancing  any  thing  to  the  purpose."  Ibid.  p.  lOT. 
Indeed  some  of  the  latter  Platonists  and  Pythagoreans  who  lived 
after  life  and  immortality  was  brought  into  the  most  clear  and 
open  light  by  the  Gospel,  seem  to  have  managed  the  argument 
with  much  greater  advantage  than  Plato  himself  This  may  be 
particularly  observed  concerning  Plotinus;  and  indeed  this  great 
article  seems  then  to  have  been  more  generally  acknowledged 
among  the  philosophers,  than  it  was  before.  And  yet  Porphyry, 
one  of  the  most  learned  of  them,  and  a  great  admirer  of  Plotinus, 
observes,  that  the  reasons  whereby  the  philosophers  endeavoured 
to  demonstrate  the  immortality  of  the  soul  were  easy  to  be  over- 
thrown. Ap.  Euseb.  Praepur.  Evangel,  lib.  xiv.  cap.  10.  p.  741.  C. 


:^36   The  Philosophers  placed  the  Immortality  of  Part  III^ 

antients  who  professed  to  believe  the  immortality  of  the 
soul,  and  a  state  of  future  rewarris  and  punishments,  greatly 
weakened  and  corrupted  that  doctrine,  relates  to  the  notion 
they  universally  held  of  the  transmigration  of  souls.  This 
has  been  already  mentioned;  but  it  is  proper  to  take  some 
further  notice  of  it  in  this  place* 

As  they  maintained  the  pre-existence  of  human  souls 
before  their  entrance  into  their  present  bodies,  so  also  that 
they  transmigrated  after  their  departure  out  of  these  bo^ 
dies,  from  one  body  to  another.  These  notions  were  looked 
upon  as  having  a  near  connexion;  and  those  that  held  the 
former  maintained  the  latter  too.  And  indeed  they  who  be-* 
lieved  that  their  souls  had  existed  long  before  they  ani- 
mated their  present  bodies,  would  find  no  difficulty  in  con- 
ceiving that  after  quitting  these  bodies  they  passed  into 
others.  And  what  might  contribute  to  the  general  reception 
and  propagation  of  this  notion,  both  among  the  more  learn- 
ed and  the  vulgar,  was,  that  they  believed,  upon  the  credit 
of  a  very  antient  tradition,  that  the  soul  did  not  die  with 
the  body,  and  that  it  survived  in  a  future  state,  and  yet 
could  not  well  conceive  how  it  could  live  and  subsist  with- 
out animating  some  body:  this  led  them  to  suppose  that^ 
when  it  was  dislodged  from  one  body,  it  animated  another. 
And  as  they  believed  that  the  inferior  animals  had  souls  as 
well  as  men,  they  might  suppose  that  human  souls  might 
transmigrate  into  the  bodies  of  those  animals  {e). 

But  whencesoever  this  notion  of  the  transmigration  of 
souls  had  its  rise,  it  spread  very  generally  among  the  na- 
tions, and  was  embraced  not  only  by  the  vulgar,  but  by  the 


(e)  Some  suppose  that  the  doctrine  of  transmigration  might 
have  been  owing  to  an  abuse  or  perversion  of  an  antient  tradition 
concerning  the  resurrection  of  the  body:  concerning  which  see 
below,  chap.  viii. 


Chap.  V.       The  Soul  on  -vbrong  Foundations.  337 

most  wise  and  learned.  And  it  proved  to  be  a  great  cor- 
ruption and  depravation  of  the  true  original  doctrine  of  the 
immortality  of  the  soul,  and  a  future  state.  They  endea- 
voured indeed  to  explain  it  so  as  to  accommodate  it  to 
moral  purposes,  by  supposing  different  kinds  of  bodies 
which  they  were  appointed  to  animate,  in  order  to  preserve 
some,  appearance  of  future  rewards  and  punishments.  But 
in  reality  upon  this  scheme  there  could  be  no  proper  retri- 
butions in  another  life  for  what  was  done  in  the  present. 
For  in  the  several  transmigrations  from  one  body  to  ano- 
ther, the  soul  Vvas  generally  supposed  to  have  no  remem- 
brance in  a  succeeding  body  of  the  actions  it  had  done,  and 
the  events  which  had  happened  to  it  in  a  former.  Py- 
thagoras indeed  pretended  to  remember  the  several  trans- 
migrations he  had  passed  through,  and  what  he  had  done, 
and  what  had  bef.dlen  him  in  the  S'  veral  bodies  he  had 
animated:  but  this  was  represented  as  a  peculiar  and  ex- 
traordinary privilege,  granted  to  him  by  Mercury,  and 
which  was  not  supposed  to  be  the  common  case  of  trans- 
migrated souls.  And  if  the  soul  in  its  several  removes 
forgets  what  was  done  in  the  former  body,  it  cannot,  when 
entered  into  another  body,  be  properly  said  to  be  rewarded 
or  punished  for  what  it  had  done  before,  and  of  which  it 
had  no  consciousness. 

It  is  plain  therefore  that  the  doctrine  of  the  transmigra- 
tion of  souls,  on  supposition  that  this  transmigration  was 
to  begin  immediately  upon  the  soul's  departure  from  the 
present  body,  which  seems  to  be  the  notion  that  many  en- 
tertained of  it,  and  probably  Pythagoras  himself,  left  no 
proper  place  for  a  state  of  future  retributions. 

Others  therefore  supposed  that  souls  were  first  to  go  to 
Hades  or  the  Inferi,  where  they  were  supposed  to  have  a 
remembrance  of  their  past  actions,  and  to  be  rewarded  or 
punished  accordingly.  And  when  they  had  abode  there 
for  some  time  they  were   to  enter  into  bodies  of  various* 

Vol.  II.  2  U  .        ' 


338  Their  Doctrine  of  Future  Rewards     Part  III. 

kinds,  and  after  a  succession  of  transmigrations  were  to  be 
refunded  into  the  universal  soul,  and  to  lose  their  indi- 
vidual subsistence. 

The  transmigrations  which  have  been  mentioned  were 
supposed  to  belong  to  all  human  souls  in  general.  But 
there  were  exceptions  made  in  favour  of  some  privileged 
persons. 

This  leads  me  to  another  observation  upon  the  doctrine 
of  those  philosophers  who  professed  to  believe  a  future 
state;  and  that  is,  th^it  when  they  speak  in  the  highest 
strains  of  future  happiness,  it  relates  chiefly  to  some  pri- 
vileged souls  of  distinguished  eminence,  but  affords  no 
great  comtort  or  encouragement  to  the  common  sort  of 
pious  and  virtuous  persons.  With  regard  to  these  last,  So- 
crates and  Plato  suppose  them  to  go  to  Elysium  and  the 
Islands  of  the  blessed,  but  after  temporary  abode  there  (^ ), 
to  pass  through  several  transmigrations,  and  were  at  length 
to  return  to  life  again  in  such  bodies  of  men  or  beasts  as 
were  best  suited  to  them,  or  as  they  themselves  should 
chuse  (^).  But  both  these  philosophers  give  a  high  idea 


(/)  The  learned  Bishop  of  Gloucester  has  observed,  that 
"  the  antients  distinguished  the  souls  of  men  into  three  species, 
the  human,  the  heroic,  and  the  daemonic.  The  two  last  were 
indeed  believed  to  enjoy  eternal  happiness  for  their  public  ser- 
vices on  earth,  not  indeed  in  Elysium,  but  in  heavent  where  they 
became  a  kind  of  demigods.  But  all  of  the  first  which  include  the 
great  body  of  mankind,  were  understood  to  have  their  designa- 
tion in  purgatory,  Tartarus,  or  Elysium.  The  first  and  last  of 
which  abodes  were  temporary,  and  the  second  only  eternal." 
Div.  Leg.  vol.  I.  p.  396.  2d  edit. 

(g)  See  here  above  p.  311.  312.  and  compare  what  Plato  says 
in  his  Gorgias,  Oper.  p.  312.  F.  with  what  is  said  in  the  Phaedo, 
ibid.  p.  386.  E,  F.  and  in  his  tenth  Republic,  ibid.  p.  521.  edit. 
Lugd. 


Chap.  V.       unfavourable  to  common  Persons.  339 

of  the  happiness  which  some  persons  shall  be  raised  to 
after  their  departure  hence,  that  they  shall  be  admitted  to 
the  fellowship  of  the  gods  in  celestial  abodes,  but  these 
were  only  such  as  having  applied  themselves  to  the  study 
of  philosophy,  had  lived  abstracted  from  the  body  and  all 
corporeal  things,  and  had  arrived  to  an  eminent  degree  of 
wisdom  and  purity:  or  such  great  and  heroic  souls  as  had 
been  eminently  useful  to  the  public.  Plato  in  his  fifth  Re- 
public says,  that  they  who  died  in  war,  after  having  behaved 
with  courage  and  bravery,  become  holy  and  terrestrial 
daemons,  averters  of  evil,  and  guardians  of  mankind,  and 
that  their  sepulchres  should  be  honoured,  and  they  them- 
selves should  be  worshipped  as  daemons  Qi),  But  it  cannot 
be  denied,  that  a  person  might  behave  with  great  courage 
and  bravery,  and  die  in  the  war  in  the  cause  of  his  country, 
and  yet  in  other  respects  be  far  from  deserving  the  charac- 
ter of  a  good  and  virtuous  man.  And  in  that  very  book  he 
allows  such  a  man,  as  a  reward  of  his  bravery,  liberties  in 
indulging  his  amorous  inclinations,  in  no  wise  consistent 
with  the  rules  of  purity  and  virtue.  But  in  this,  as  well  as 
other  instances,  Plato  and  the  other  philosophers  took  care 
to  adapt  their  notions  of  a  future  state  and  its  rewards  to 
political  ends  and  views,  and  had  not  so  much  a  regard  to 
what  they  themselves  thought  to  be  the  truth,  as  to  what 
they  judged  to  be  for  the  public  utility,  and  the  interest  of 
the  state.  Cicero  places  those  who  had  been  serviceable  to 
their  country,  in  preserving  and  assisting  it,  and  enlarging 
its  dominion,  not  merely  in  Elysium,  which  was  only  a  tem- 
poral felicity,  but  in  heaven,  where  they  were  to  be  happy  for 
ever.  "  Omnibus  qui  patriam  conservarint,  juverint,  auxe- 
rint,  certum  esse  in  ccelo  ac  definitum  locum,  ubi  beati  aevo 


(A)  Plato  Oper.  p.  464,  465.  edit.  Lugd. 


340  The  Gospel  Doctrine  of  Eternal  Life    Part  III. 

sempiterno  fruentur  (i)*"  The  Stoics  held  that  the  common 
souls  at  death,  or  soon  after  it,  were  to  be  resolved  into 
the  universal  nature,  but  that  great  and  eminent  ones  were 
to  continue  to  the  conflagration,  and  that  some  of  them 
should  be  advanced  to  the  dignity  of  gods.  The  Egyptians, 
notwithstanding  their  notions  of  the  transmigration  of  souls, 
supposed  that  some  souls  might  be  taken  immediately  into 
the  fellowship  of  the  gods;  as  appears  from  the  remarkable 
prayer  addressed  to  the  sun,  and  all  the  gods  the  givers  of 
life,  on  the  behalf  of  the  person  deceased;  of  which  some 
notice  was  taken  above  (i).  But  this  seems  to  have  been 
confined  to  persons  of  eminence,  and  was  not  supposed  to 
extend  to  the  vulgar.  In  like  manner  the  Indian  Gymno- 
sophists,  who  were  zealous  abettors  of  the  doctrine  of 
transmigration,  seem  to  have  made  exceptions  to  the  ge- 
neral law  in  their  own  favour,  as  having  attained  to  an  ex- 
alted degree  of  sanctity;  and  that  by  burning  themselves 
in  the  fire  they  should  go  out  of  the  body  perfectly  pure, 
and  have  an  immediate  access  to  the  gods.  It  is  also  sup- 
posed in  the  Golden  Verses  of  Pythagoras,  that  they  who 
came  up  to  the  height  of  the  Pythagorean  precepts,  and 
lived  an  abstracted  and  philosophical  life,  would  at  their 
death  be  made  heroes  or  daemons,  and  taken  into  the  fel- 
lowship of  the  gods  (  /).  To  this  notion  of  many  of  the  phi- 
losophers concerning  the  happiness  reserved  in  a  future 
state  for  some  eminent  souls,  Tacitus  seems  to  refer  in  his 
life  of  Agricola,  when  he  saith,  "  Si,  ut  sapieniibus  placet, 
non  cum  corpore  extinguuntur  animse'  magnse,  &c."  where 
he  seems  to  make  it  the'special  privilege  of  great  souls,  not 


(i)  Cic.  in  Somnio  Scipionis,  cap.  3. 
(k)  Page  39  of  this  volume. 
(0  Ibid. 


Chap.  V.  promised  to  all  Good  Men.  341 

to   be   extinguished  with    the   body:  and  even  of  this  he 
speaks  doubtfully. 

It  appears  then  that  the  Gospel  doctrine  of  eternal  life 
and  happiness,  promised  and  prepared  for  all  good  men 
without  exception,  whether  in  a  high  or  low  condition, 
learned  or  unlearned,  who  live  soberly,  righteously,  and 
godly  in  this  present  world,  and  go  on  in  a  patient  con- 
tinuance in  well  doing,  was  not  taught  by  the  most  emi- 
nent of  those  philosophers,  who  professed  to  believe  the  im- 
mortality of  the  soul  and  a  future  state.  The  happiness 
proposed  to  be  enjoyed  even  in  their  Elysium,  was  to  be 
comparatively  but  of  a  short  duration:  Virgil  fixes  it  to  a 
thousand  years.  And  though  they  talked  of  some  eminent 
and  privileged  souls  of  great  men  and  philosophers,  who 
were  supposed  to  be  raised  to  h<  aven,  and  there  to  enjoy 
eternal  happiness,  or  even  to  become  demi-gods  or  daemons, 
yet  they  could  not,  in  consistency  with  their  schemes,  un- 
derstand this  of  a  happiness  which  was  in  the  strict  and 
proper  sense  eternal,  and  never  to  have  an  end.  For,  as 
hath  been  already  shewn,  it  was  a  notion  which  generally 
obtained  among  them,  that  at  certain  periods  which  the 
Stoics  termed  conflagrations,  and  which  w^ere  to  happen 
at  the  end  of  what  they,  as  well  as  the  Pythagoreans  and 
Platonists,  called  the  great  year,  there  should  be  an  utter 
end  put  to  the  present  state  of  things;  and  the  souls  of  all 
men,  and  even  of  those  of  them  which  had  become  gods, 
daemons,  or  heroes,  were  to  be  resumed  into  the  universal 
soul,  and  thereby  lose  their  individual  existence:  after 
which  there  was  to  be  an  universal  renovation  or  repro- 
duction of  all  things;  and  a  new  course  was  to  begin  in 
every  respect  like  the  old;  and  that  such  periodical  de- 
structions and  renovations  should  succeed  gne  another  in 
infinitum. 

The  observations  which  have  been  made  are  sufficient  to 
shew  that  those  antient    philosophers,  who  are  generally 


7- 


342  The  Gospel  Doctrine,  ^c.  Part  III. 

looked  upon  as  the  ablest  asserters  of  the  immortality  of 
the  soul  and  a  future  state,  had  wrong  and  confused  no- 
tions concerning  it;  and  that  those  Christian  writers  are 
much  mistaken  who  represent  the  antient  Pagan  philoso- 
phers as  having  taught  the  same  doctrine  concerning  a  fu- 
ture state,  which,  to  our  unspeakable  comfort  and  advan- 
tage, is  brought  into  a  clear  and  open  light  by  the  Gospel. 


343 


CHAPTER  VI. 

Tho3e  that  seemed  to  be  the  most  strenuous  advocates  for  the  immortality  of  the 
soul  and  a  future  state  among  the  antients,  did  not  pretend  to  any  certainty 
concerning  it.  The  uncertainty  they  were  \mder  appears  from  their  way  of 
managing  their  consolatory  discourses  on  the  death  of  their  friends.To  this  also 
it  was  owing,  that  in  their  exhortations  to  virtue  they  laid  little  stress  on  the 
rewards  of  a  future  state.  Their  not  having  a  certainty  concerning  a  future 
state,  put  them  upon  schemes  to  supply  the  want  of  it.  Hence  they  insisted 
upon  the  self-suflRciency  of  virtue  for  complete  happiness  w  ithout  a  future  re- 
compence:  and  asserted,  that  a  short  happiness  is  as  good  as  an  eternal  one. 

Another  important  observation  with  regard  to  those 
antient  philosophers,  who  were  esteemed  the  ablest  advo- 
cates for  the  immortality  of  the  soul  and  a  future  state,  is, 
that  after  all  the  pains  they  took  to  prove  it,  they  did  not 
pretend  to  an  absolute:  certainty,  nor  indeed  do  they  seem 
to  have  fully  satisfied  theaiselves  about  it.  The  passages 
to  this  purpose  are  well  known,  and  have  been  often  quoted, 
but  cannot  be  entirely  omitted  here. 

Socrates  himself,  when  he  was  near  death,  in  discours- 
ing with  his  friends  concerning  the  immortality  of  the  soul, 
expresses  his  hope  that  he  should  go  to  good  men  after 
death,  "but  this  (says  he)  I  would  not  absolutely  affirm." 
He  indeed  is  more  positive  as  to  what  relates  to  his  going 
to  the  gods  after  death,  though  this  he  also  qualifies,  by 
saying,  that  "  if  he  could  affirm  any  thing  concerning  mat- 
ters of  such  a  nature,  he  would  affirm  this. — 'Emg  rl  uXXorm 
Ttiirui  ^ao-^v^iTec/^et  av  tj  rSro  (w)."  And  he  concludes  that 
long  discourse  concernmg  the  state  of  souls  after  death  with 
saying,    "  That  these  things  are  so  as  I  haye  represented 


(m)  See  Platens  Phaedo,  Opera,  p.  377.  H.  edit.  Lugd. 


344  The  best  of  the  Philosophers  did  not  pretend  to  Part  IIL 

them  it  does  not  become  any  man  of  undv^rs landing  to  af- 
firm:" though  he  adds,  "  that  if  it  appears  that  th  soul  is 
immortal,  it  seems  reasonable  to  think,  that  either  such 
things  or  something  like  them  are  true,  with  regard  to  our 
souls  and  their  habitations  after  death:  and  that  it  is  worth 
making  a  trial,  for  the  trial  is  noble  («)." 

And  in  his  apology  to  his  judges,  he  comforts  himself 
with  this  consideration,  that  "  there  is  much  ground  to 
hope  that  death  is  good:  for  it  must  necessarily  be  one  of 
these  two;  either  the  dead  man  is  nothing,  and  hath  not  a 
sense  of  any  thing;  or  it  is  only  a  change  or  migration  of 
the  soul  hence  to  another  place,  according  to  what  we  are 
told,  X'ecTtc  7U  >,eyofAsvu.  If  there  is  no  sense  left,  and  death 
is  like  a  profound  sleep,  and  quiet  rest  without  dreams,  it 
is  wonderful  to  think  what  gain  it  is  to  die;  but  if  the  things 
■which  are  told  us  are  true,  that  death  is  a  migration  to  ano- 
ther place,  this  is  still  a  much  greater  good.''  And  soon 
after,  having  said,  that  those  "  who  live  there  are  both  in 
other  respects  happier  than  we,  and  also  in  this,  that  for  the 
rest  of  their  time  they  are  immortal,"  he  again  repeats  what 
he  said  before;  "  If  the  things  which  are  told  us  are  true," 
'^EiTFtp  Tu,  Xi'yoiu,ivu  <«A)j3-jJ  hiv:  where  he  seems  to  refer  to  some 
antient  traditions  which  were  looked  upon  as  divine,  and 
which  he  hoped  were  true,  but  which  he  was  not  absolutely 
sure  of. 

And  he  concludes  his  apology  w^ith  these  remarkable 
words;  "  It  is  now  time  to  depart  hence:  I  am  going  to 
die;  you  shall  continue  in  life;  but  which  of  us  shall  be  in 
a  better  state,  is  unknown  to  all  but  God  (o)." 

What  has  been  observed  concerning  Socrates,  holds 
equally    concerning  Plato,  who   generally  speaks   his  own 


(n)  See  Plato's  Phaedo,  Opera,  p.  401.  A. 

(o)  Ibid.  p.  368.  H.  369.  A.  C>  D.  edit.  Lugd, 


Chap^  VI.  n  full  certainty  concerning  a  Future  State,    345 

Sentiments,  especially  in  what  relates  to  the  immortality  of 
the  soul  and  a  future  state,  by  the  mouth  of  Socrates. 

None  of  the  antient  philosophers  has  argued  better  for 
the  immortality  of  the  soul  than  Cicero:  but  at  the  same 
time  he  takes  care  to  let  us  know,  that  he  followed  only 
that  which  appeared  to  him  the  most  probable  conjecture, 
and  which  was  the  utmost  he  could  attain  to,  but  did  not 
take  upon  him  to  affirm  it  as  certain.  This  is  what  he  de- 
clares in  the  beginning  of  his  discourse  upon  that  subject: 
"  Ut  homunculus  unus  a  multis  probabilia  conjectura  se- 
quens,  ultra  enim  quo  progedior,  quam  ut  verisimilia  videam j 
non  habeo  (/>)•"  And  after  having  mentioned  a  grfeat  variety 
of  opinions  about  the  human  soul,  and  particularly  whether 
it  dies  with  the  body,  or  survives  itj  and  if  the  latter,- 
•whether  it  is  to  have  a  perpetual  existence,  or  is  only  w 
continue  for  a  time  after  its  departure  from  the  body;  he 
concludes  with  saying,  *'  Which  of  these  opinions  is  true, 
some  god  must  determine.  Which  is  most  probable,  is  a 
great  question."^—"  Harum  sententiarum  quae  vera  sit 
deus  aliquis  viderit:  quas  verisimillima  magna  questio? 
est  (y).» 

The  uncertainty  of  the  most  excellent  Pagan  philosophers 
were  under  with  regard  to  a  future  state  farther  appeafs,  in 
that  in  their  disputations  and  discourses,  which  were  de- 
signed to  fortify  themselves  or  others  against  the  feiir  of 
death,  as  also  in  their  consolatory  discourses  on  the  death 
of  deceased  friends,  they  still  proceeded  upon  alternatives^ 
that  death  is  either  a  translation  to  a  better  state,  or  is  an 
utter  extinction  of  being,  or  at  least  a  state  of  insensibilityo 
It  was  with  this  consideration  that  Socrates  comforted  him- 
self under  the  near  prospect  of  death,  as  appears  from  the 


Qi)  Tuscul.  Disput.  lib.  i.  cap.  9. 
{q)  Ibid.  cap.  U. 

Vol,  II,  ^  X 


346  The  best  of  the  Philosophers  did  not  pretend  to  Part  III. 

passages  already  produced.  In  like  manner  Cicero's  whole 
disputation  in  his  celebrated  book  above-mentioned,  the 
professed  design  of  which  is  to  fortify  men  against  the  fear 
of  death,  turns  upon  this  alternative,  with  which  he  con- 
cludes his  discourse:  That  "  if  the  day  of  our  death  brings 
with  it  not  an  extinction  of  our  being,  but  only  a  change 
of  our  abode,  nothing  can  be  more  desirable;  but  if  it 
absolutely  destroys  and  puts  an  end  to  our  existence,  what 
can  be  better  than,  amidst  the  labours  and  troubles  of 
this  life,  to  rest  in  a  profound  and  eternal  sleep?" — Si  su- 
premus  ille  dies  non  extinctionem,  sed  commutationem  ad- 
fert  loci,  quid  optabilius?  Sin  autem  perimit  ac  delet  om- 
nino,  quid  melius  quam  in  mediis  vitse  laboribus  obdormis- 
cere,  et  ita  conniventem  somno  consopiri  sempiterno  (r)?'* 
And  this  is  the  consideration  that  he  seems  to  me  to  rely 
principally  upon. 

There  are  several  passages  of  Seneca  to  the  same  pur- 
pose, some  of  which  are  cited  above,  p.  292.  To  which  I 
shall  add  one  more  from  his  Consolation  to  Polybius,  who 
was  grieved  for  the  death  of  his  brother.  He  directs  him 
to  argue  with  himself  thus:  "  If  the  dead  have  no  sense, 
my  brother  has  escaped  from  all  the  incommodities  of  life, 
and  is  restored  to  that  state  he  was  in  before  he  was  born: 
and  being  free  from  all  evil,  fears  nothing,  desires  nothing, 
suffers  nothing.  If  the  dead  have  any  sense,  the  soul  of  my 
brother,  being  let  loose  as  it  were  from  a  long  confinement, 
and  entirely  his  own  master,  exults,  and  enjoys  a  clear 
sight  of  the  nature  of  things,  and  looks  down  as  from  a 
higher  situation  upon  all  things  human  with  contempt;  and 
he  has  a  nearer  view  of  divine  things,  the  reasons  of  which 
he   has  long  sought  in  vain.  Why  therefore  do  I  languish 


(r)  Tuscul.  Disput.  lib.  i.  cap.  49. 


Chap.  VI.   a  full  certainty  concerning  a  Future  State.     347 

for  the  want  of  him,  who  is  either  happy,  or  not  at  all?  To 
lament  one  that  is  happy  is  envy,  and  one  that  has  no  exist- 
ence is  madness  (*)." 

Plutarch,  as  was  before  observed,  has  several  passages, 
from  which  it  may  be  concluded  that  he  looked  upon  the 
immortality  of  the  soul  as  a  probable  opinion,  yet  he  some- 
times expresses  himself  in  a  manner  which  seems  to  shew 
that  he  either  did  not  believe  it,  or  was  not  certain  of  it. 
In  his  consolation  to  ApoUonius  he  observes,  that  Socrates 
said  that  death  is  either  like  to  a  deep  sleep,  or  to  a 
journey  afar  off  and  of  a  long  continuance,  or  to  the  en- 
tire extinction  of  soul  and  body.  This  he  quotes  with  ap- 
probation, and  sets  himself  distinctly  to  shew,  that  in  none 
of  these  views  can  death  be  considered  as  an  evil  {t).  And 
in  the  treatise  which  is  designed  to  prove  that  no  man  can 
live  pleasantly  according  to  the  tenets  of  Epicurus,  speak- 
ing of  the  hope  of  immortality,  he  calls  it  «  TCifi  to  fAv^uTu 


(«)  Senec.  Consol.  ad  Polyb.  cap.  27.  "  Si  nullus  defuncus 
sensus  sit,  evasit  omnia  frater  meus  vitas  incommoda;  et  in  eum 
restitutus  est  locum,  in  quo  fuerat  antequam  nasceretur,  et  expers 
omnis  mali  nihil  timet,  nihil  cupit,  patilur.  Si  est  aliquis  defunc- 
tis  sensus,  nunc  animus  fratris  mei,  velut  ex  diutino  carcere 
missus,  tandem  sui  juris  et  arbitrii,  gestit,  et  rerum  naturae  spec- 
taculo  fruitur,  et  humana  omnia  ex  superiore  loco  despicit,  di- 
vina  vero,  quorum  rationem  tamdiu  frustra  quaesierat,  propius 
inluetur.  Quid  itaque  ejus  desiderio  maceror,  qui  aut  beatus 
aut  nullus  est?  Beatum  deflere,  invidia  est,  nulhim  dementia.'* 

(?)  Plutarch.  Opera,  torn.  II.  p.  107.  D.  Here  one  part  of  the 
alternative  is  the  utter  extinction  of  being;  and  he  endeavours  to 
shew,  that  on  that  supposition  death  is  not  an  evil;  and  yet,  ibid. 
p.  1105.  A.  in  his  treatise  Non  posse  suaviter  viv>he  very  justly 
argues,  that  the  notion  of  utter  dissolution  and  extinction  at  death 
does  not  take  away  the  fear  of  death,  but  rather  confirms  it;  since 
this  very  thing  is  what  nature  has  a  strong  aversion  to. 


348     Th^  Uncertainty  of  the  best  Philosophers     Part  III, 

fSt  4<3«'tjjt(^  iXTciq^  "  the  fabulous  hope  of  immortality."  Or, 
as  the  learned  Mr.  Baxter  renders  it  in  his  English  transla^ 
tion  of  that  tract,  "  The  hope  conceived  of  eternity  from 
the  tales  and  fables  of  the  antients  (ji)»'''  And  in  his  treatise 
of  superstition,  he  supposes  death  to  be  the  final  period  of 
our  existence,  and  that  the  fear  of  any  thing  after  it  is  the 
effect  of  superstition:  "  Death  (says  he)  is  to  all  men  the  end 
of  life,  but  to  superstition  it  is  not  so.  She  stretches  out  her 
l^ounds  beyond  those  of  life,  and  makes  her  fears  of  a  long- 
er duration  than  our  existence."   Ut^x^  t5  /3/«  zr»s-iv  ecvB-^coTreie, 

pfiKStytt  TK  ^tiv,  fAXK^oTS^ov  T»  (o<W  ^tiStrx  rev  ^oQot  (z"). 

So  great  is  the  inconsistency  which  frequently  appears  in 
the  writings  of  the  antient  philosophers  on  this  and  other 
articles  gf  importance.  They  are  so  often  varying  in  their 
doctrine,  seeming  to  affirm  in  one  place  what  they  treat  as 
fabulous  and  uncertain  in  another,  that  some  very  learned 
persons  have  thought  it  could  not  be  otherwise  accounted 
for,  than  by  supposing  a  great  difference  between  what  is 
called  the  exoteric  and  esoteric  doctrine;  i.  e.  the  doctrine 
they  taught  openly  to  the  people,  and  that  which  they 
taught  privately  to  their  disciples,  whom  they  let  into  the 
secrets  of  their  scheme.  I  shall  not  enter  into  the  contro- 
versy about  the  meaning  of  the  distinction  between  the  exo- 
teric and  esoteric  doctrine  of  the  antients.  I  am  apt  to  think 
that  it  relates  sometimes  to  their  treating  on  different  subr 
jects,  and  sometimes  to  their  different  manner  of  treating 
the  same  subject.  For  the  same  doctrine  was  often  deliver-^ 
ed  by  the  philosophers  both  to  their  disciples  and  to  the 
peoplej;  to  the  one  in  a  gross  and  popular,  to  the  other  in  a 


(«)  Plutarch.  Opera,  torn.  II.  p.  1 104.  C. 

(x)  Plutarch,  de  Superstit.  Opera,  torn.  II.  p.  1^6.  F.  edit.  Xyl, 


Chap.  VI.         concerning  a  Future  State,  349 

more  philosophical  and  abstracted  way.  That  this  was  one 
principal  thing  intended  by  that  distinction,  may  be  justly 
concluded  from  thac  noted  passage  of  Cicero,  where,  speak- 
ing of  the  doctrine  of  the  Peripatetics  concerning  the  sum- 
mum  bonum  or  chief  good,  he  mentions  two  kinds  of  books 
published  by  them;  some  written  in  the  popular  way, 
which  they  called  exoteric,  the  other  more  accurately  and 
philosophically,  which  they  left  in  commentaries;  and 
that  though  they  do  not  always  seem  to  say  the  same  things, 
yet  in  the  main  there  was  in  reality  no  difference  or  disa- 
greement between  them.  ''  De  summo  autem  bono,  quia 
duo  genera  librorum  sunt,  uaum  populariter  scriptum  quod 
l^ari^iKov  adpellarunt,  alterum  limatius  quod  in  commentariis 
reliquerunt,  non  semper  idem  dicere  videntur:  nee  in  summa 
tamen  ipsa  aut  varietas  est  ulla  apud  hos  quidem  quos  no- 
minavi,  aut  inter  ipsos  dissensio  (z/)."  But  whatever  mav 
be  supposed  to  be  the  precise  meaning  of  exoterical  and 
esoterical,  as  applied  to  the  writings  of  the  antient  philoso* 
phers,  and  though  it  is  not  a  proof,  or  even  a  presumption,  of 
a  doctrine's  not  being  agreeable  to  their  real  sentiments,  be- 
cause it  was  taught  in  their  exoterical  or  popular  discourses, 
yet,  on  the  other  hand,  it  cannot  well  be  denied,  that  they 
sometimes  chose  to  disguise  their  sentiments,  and  conceal 
them  from  the  people:  and  that  we  cannot  always  be  sure 
that  what  they  delivered  in  their  popular  discourses  was 
what  they  themselves  believed  to  be  true.  It  was  a  maxim 
among  many  of  the  antients,  that  it  was  lawful  to  deceive 
the  people  for  the  public  good.  They  were  for  the  mosi 
part  not  very  strict  in  their  notions  with  respect  to  the  ob- 
ligations of  truth;  and  thought  there  was  no  harin  in  making 
use  of  falsehood  when   it  was  profitable.  This  was  what 


(y)  Cic.  de  Finib.  Bon.  et  Mai.  lib.  v.  cap.  5.  p.  358.  Davis. 


350     The  Uncertainty  of  the  best  Philosophers    Part  III, 

Plato  himself  made  no  scruple  to  avow;  concerning  v/hich, 
see  above,  p.  225.  And  in  this  he  was  followed  by  other 
Platonists,  of  which  we  have  a  remarkable  instance  in  Sy- 
nesius.  He  was  raised  to  a  bishopric  in  the  Christian  church, 
but  continued  to  be  a  determined  Platonist,  and  had  so  far 
imbibed  the  spirit  and  doctrine  of  that  school,  as  to  declare, 
that  "philosophy,  when  it  has  attained  to  the  truth,  allows 
the  use  of  lies  and  fictions."  He  adds,  "  As  darkness  is 
most  proper,  and  commodious  for  those  who  have  weak 
eyes,  so  I  hold  that  lies  and  fictions  are  useful  to  the 
people,  and  that  truth  would  be  hurtful  to  those  who  are 
not  able  to  bear  its  light  and  splendour;  and  he  promises  if 
the  laws  of  the  church  would  dispense  with  it,  that  he 
would  philosophize  at  home,  and  talk  abroad  in  the  com- 
mon strain,  preaching  up  the  general  and  received  fa- 
bles (2)."  In  this   he  certainly  acted  not  according  to  the 


(2)  The  reader  may  see  this,  and  other  testimonies  to  the  same 
purpose,  produced  by  the  celebrated  author  of  the  Divine  Lega- 
tion of  Moses,  Vol.  II.  book  iii.  sect.  2.  p.  92.  et  seq.  edit,  4th. 
2nd  also  by  the  learned  and  judicious  author  of  the  Critical  En- 
cuiry  into  the  Opinions  and  Practices  of  the  antient  Philosophers, 
chap.  11.  To  this  I  would  add,  that  this  method  of  the  double 
c^octrine,  the  one  supposed  to  be  strictly  and  philosophically  true, 
the  other  in  several  instances  false,  but  accommodated  to  the 
people,  and  designed  for  moral  and  political  purposes,  has  long 
been  in  use  in  the  east,  and  continues  still  to  be  so.  This  is  parti- 
cularly observed  concerning  the  learned  sect  in  China*.  F.  Lon- 
gobardi  assures  us,  that  some  of  their  doctors  made  no  scruple 
tc  declare  to  him,  that  the  better  to  govern  the  people,  they 
taught  them  several  things  which  they  themselves  did  not  be- 
lieve to  be  true.  See  his  treatise  in  Navarette's  Account  of  the 
Empire  of  China,  p.  174,  175.  and  also  p.  186,  and  198.  And  in 

'  See  the  former  volume  of  this  work,  chap.  11.  in  the  beginning. 


Chap.  VI.  concerning'  a  Future  State*  S&t 

spirit  of  the  Gospel,  which  allows  no  such  methods  of  false- 
hood and  deceit;  but  it  was  not  unsuitable  to  the  maxims 
of  many  of  the  philosophers.  And  this  tends  not  a  little  to 
weaken  their  credit,  and  often  makes  it  difficult  to  know 
their  real  sentiments,  especially  if  in  different  parts  of  their 
works,  they  advance  different  notions  on  the  same  subject. 
It  seems  to  be  a  reasonable  rule  which  is  laid  down  by 
some  learned  critics,  that  when  in  one  place  they  express 
themselves  agreeably  to  the  popular  opinions,  and  in  ano- 
ther seem  to  contradict  them,  in  the  former  case  they  ac- 
commodate themselves  to  the  notions  of  the  people,  and 
in  the  other  speak  their  own  sentiments.  But  yet  I  am  apt 
to  think,  that  the  inconsistencies  which  may  be  observed 
in  the  writings  of  the  antients,  particularly  with  regard  to 
the  immortality  of  the  soul  and  a  future  state,  are  not  al- 
ways to  be  charged  upon  this;  bat  are  often  owing  to  their 
not  having  fixed  notions,  or  a  full  assurance  of  those  things 
in  their  own  minds.  The  uncertainty  they  were  under  was, 
I  doubt  not,  often  the  true  source  of  their  variations,  and  of 
their  ambiguous,  and  sometimes  contradictory  way  of  talk- 
ing on  this  subject. 

To  this  uncertainty  it  was  owing,  that,  in  their  moral 
systems,  they  did  not  apply  the  doctrine  of  a  future  state  to 
the  excellent  ends  and  purposes  for  which  it  seems  natu- 
rally to  be   fitted  and    designed.  There  are  two  principal 


the  account  Navarette  there  gives  of  the  tenets  of  the  sect  of 
Foe,  he  takes  notice  of  their  exterior  and  interior  doctrine:  the 
latter  of  which  is  contrary  to  the  former,  especially*  with  regard 
to  a  future  state.  They  publicly  preach  it  up  to  the  people,  but 
their  interior  doctrine  rejects  it.  The  same  is  s«iid  concerning 
the  Bonzes.  See  Navarette's  Account  of  the  Empire  of  China, 
bookii.  chap.  11.  p.  78,  79.  in  the  first  volume  of  Churchiirs- 
CoUection  of  Travels  and  Voyages. 


352  Doctrine  of  a  Future  State  7iot  applied  by  the  Pari*  IIL 

uses  to  be  made  of  it,  where  it  is  heartily  believed.  The 
one,  is  to  support  men  against  the  troubles  and  sorrows  of 
this  present  state,  and  the  fear  of  death:  the  oher  is,  to  ani- 
mate men  to  the  practice  of  virtue  amidst  the  many  diffi- 
culties and  discouragements  to  which  they  are  here  ex- 
posed. 

As  to  the  former  of  these,  any  one  that  is  acquainted 
with  the  writings  of  those  philosophers  who  lived  before 
the  coming  of  our  Saviour,  will  find  that  there  is  little 
stress  laid  on  the  doctrine  of  a  future  state,  for  supporting 
or  comforting  m^^n  under  the  various  troubles  and  sorrows 
of  this  present  life,  or  for  raising  them  above  the  fear  of 
death. 

Cicero  indeed,  in  his  first  book  of  the  Tusculan  Dispu- 
tations, the  title  of  which  is  De  morte  contemnend^,  has 
brought  many  arguments,  which  he  manages  with  great 
eloquence,  to  prove  the  immortality  of  the  soul:  but,  as 
has  been  already  observed,  the  consideration  he  seems  prin- 
cipally to  rely  upon  for  supporting  men  against  the  fears  of 
death,  proceeds  upon  an  alternative,  which  includes  a  sup- 
position that  the  soul  may  die.  For  he  argues,  that  either 
the  soul  shall  be  immortal  and  go  to  another  state,  or  it 
shall  be  extinguished  at  death^  and  deprived  of  all  sense: 
and  that  on  either  of  these  suppositions,  death  is  not  an 
evil,  nor  therefore  to  be  feared.  And  in  his  following  dis- 
putations, he  makes  no  use  of  the  doctrine  of  the  immor- 
tality of  the  soul  and  a  future  state,  though  the  subject  he 
treats  of  naturally  led  him  to  take  some  notice  of  it,  if  he 
had  thought  it  might  be  depended  upon.  The  subject  of 
the  second  of  these  disputations  is  De  tolerando  dolore. 
That  of  the  third  De  aegritudine  lenienda.  The  fourth  treats 
De  reliquis  animi  perturbationibus.  But  though  a  variety  of 
considerations  are  offered,  yet  in  none  of  these  treatises  is 
there  one  word  of  comfort  or  support  drawn  from  the 
hope  of  immortality.  All  terminates  in  a  man's  supporting. 


Chap.  VI.  Philosophers  to  its  proper  Ends  and  Uses*  353 

himself  by  the  strength  of  his  own  mind,  and  the  force 
of  his  virtue;  and  in  endeavouring  to  persuade  men  that 
none  of  the  things  which  are  generally  accounted  good  or 
evil,  are  really  good  or  evil,  but  are  so  in  opinion  only. 
And  when  he  mentions  the  several  methods  of  consolation 
proposed  and  insisted  upon  by  the  philosophers,  not  the 
least  hint  is  given  of  a  happier  state  of  existence  after  this 
life  is  at  an  end  (a).  The  fifth  book  of  those  disputations 
is  designed  to  shew,  that  virtue  is  of  itself  sufficient  for  a 
happy  life,  "virtutem  ad  beatc  videndum  seipsa  esse  con- 
tentam."  And  in  this  whole  disputation  he  abstracts 
entirely  from  the  consideration  of  a  future  happiness  or 
reward. 

The  same  observation  may  be  made  on  his  five  cele- 
brated books  De  Finibus  Bonorum  et  Malorum.  The  de- 
sign of  them  is  to  enquire  into  the  summum  bonum,  or 
chief  happiness  of  man.  But  in  this  whole  enquiry  no 
notice  is  taken  of  a  future  state.  It  is  all  along  supposed 
that  a  man  is  capable  of  attaining  to  a  perfect  happiness  ia 
this  present  life,  and  he  is  never  directed  to  look  beyond  it 
to  any  future  recompence,  or  to  expect  a  complete  happi- 
ness in  the  world  to  come. 

As  to  the  other  main  use  to  be  made  of  the  doctrine  of 
a  future  state,  for  animating  men  to  the  practice  of  virtue, 
this  also  had  little  or  no  place  in  their  moral  systems. 
They  seem  to  have  looked  upon  this  as  too  uncertain  a 
thing  to  be  relied  upon,  and  therefore  endeavoured  to  find 
out  motives  to  virtue,  independent  on  the  belief  of  the 
rewards  prepared  for  good  men  after  this  life  is  at  an  end. 
They  represented  in  an  elegant  and  beautiful  manner  the 
present  conveniences  and  advantages  of  virtue,  and  the  s.a- 


(a)  See  particularly  Tuscul.  Disput.  lib.  iii.  cap.  31  et  32, 
Vol.  II.  2  Y  .        ' 


354  The  Philosophers  extolled  the  self- sufficiency  Part  III. 

tisfaction  which  attends  it;  but  especially  they  insisted  upon 
its  intrinsic  excellency,  its  dignity  and  beauty,  and  agree- 
ableness  to  reason  and  nature,  and  its  self-sufficiency  to  hap- 
piness, which  many  of  them,  especially  the  Stoics,  the 
most  rigid  moralists  among  them,  carried  to  a  very  high 
degree.  Cicero  in  his  Offices,  and  those  excellent  philoso- 
phers Epictetus  and  Marcus  Antoninus  in  their  works, 
which  seem  to  be  the  best  moral  treatises  Pagan  antiquity 
has  left  us,  go  upon  this  scheme.  They  were  sensible  in- 
deed, that  in  order  to  recommend  virtue  to  the  esteem  of 
mankind,  and  engage  them  to  pursue  it,  it  was  necessary 
to  shew  that  it  would  be  for  their  own  highest  advantage. 
Cicero  observes,  that  all  men  naturally  desire  profit,  and 
cannot  do  otherwise  (^):  and  thnt  if  virtue  be  not  profita- 
ble, men  will  not  pursue  it:  and  therefore  he,  as  Socrates 
had  done  before,  finds  great  fault  with  those  who  were  for 
separating  profit  from  honesty.  He  treats  that  maxim, 
which  he  says  is  a  common  one,  that  a  thing  may  be 
honest  without  being  profitable,  and  profitable  without 
being  honest,  as  the  most  pernicious  notion,  and  the  most 
destructive  of  all  goodness,  that  ever  entered  into  the 
minds  of  men  (c):  and  that  to  separate  profit  from  honesty 
is  to  pervert  the  first  principles  of  nature  {d).  He  there- 
fore prefers  the  doctrine  of  the  Stoics,  who  affirm,  that 
whatsoever  is  honest  must  be  also  profitable,  and  that  no- 
thing is  profitable  but  what  is  also  honest,  to  that  of  the 
Peripatetics,  who  say,  there  are  some  things  honest  which 
are  not  profitable,  and  some  things  profitable  which  are  not 
honest  (e).  This  maxim  of  the  Stoics,  that  virtue  is  always 


(6)  De  Offic.  lib.  iii.  cap.  28. 

(c)  Ibid.  lib.  ii  cap.  3.  et  lib.  iii.  cap.  12, 

(«/)  Ibid.  lib.  iii.  cap.  28. 

{e)  Ibid.  lib.  iii.  cap.  4. 


Chap.  VI.  of  Virtue  ^abstracted from  all  future  Rewards,  355 

most  profitable,  would  certainly  have  been  very  just,  if  they 
had  taken  in  the  consideration  of  a  future  state,  and  argued, 
that  besides  the  considt  ration  of  its  natural  excellency  and 
good  tendency,  the  all- wise  and  good  Governor  of  the 
world  will  take  care,  that  if  good  men  be  exposed  to 
grievous  temporal  evils  and  sufferings,  which  he  may  per- 
mit for  the  trial  and  exercise  of  their  virtue  in  this  present 
state,  they  shall  be  compensated  with  glorious  rewards  in 
the  world  to  come;  so  that  in  the  final  issue  of  things  the 
greatest  profit  and  happiness  will  upon  the  whole  attend 
the  practice  and  pursuit  of  real  virtue  and  righteousness. 
But  this  was  not  the  way  the  Stoics  and  the  most  eminent 
philosophers  took.  They  affirmed  that  honest  and  profitable 
were  exactly  the  same  thing,  and  distinguishable  only  by 
an  act  of  the  mind  (y).  That  virtue  is  the  most  profitable 
thing  in  the  world,  as  being  its  own  reward,  and  carrying 
a  complete  happiness  in  its  own  nature  inseparable  from  it, 
abstracting  from  all  consideration  of  a  future  recompence, 
or  of  any  reward  conferred  upon  those  that  practise  it  by 
the  holy  and  beneficent  Governor  of  the  world.  They  had 
nothing  therefore  left  but  to  persuade  men,  as  well  as  they 
could,  that  supposing  a  good  and  virtuous  man  to  be  under 
the  greatest  outward  torments  which  can  be  supposed,  still 
he  was  at  that  very  instant  happy,  uninterruptedly  happy 
in  the  highest  degree,  merely  by  the  independent  force  of 
his  own  virtue,  abstracting  from  all  other  considerations 
whatsoever.  But  though  this  was  a  very  magnificent  way 
of  talking,  and  seemed  to  shew  a  high  sense  of  the  dignity 
and  excellency  of  virtue,  it  was  too  extravagant  to  have 
any  great  effect  on  the  minds  of  men,  or  to  support  them 
in  the  practice  of  virtue   under   strong  temptations,   and 


(/)  De  Oific.  lib.  ii.  cap.  3. 


356    Their  pretence  that  a  temporary  happiness  Part  III. 

severe  difficulties  and  trials.  The  Peripatetic  maxim,  which 
Cicero  finds  so  much  fault  with,  that  there  are  some  things 
honest  which  are  not  profitable,  and  some  things  profitable 
which  are  not  honest,  is  agreeable  to  observation  and  ex- 
perience, if  we  confine  our  views  to  this  present  life  and 
state  of  things.  Many  instances  may  be  supposed,  and 
have  actually  happened,  in  which  a  man  may  be  a  loser  in 
this  present  state  by  his  steady  adherence  to  the  cause  of 
truth  and  righteousness,  and  his  virtue,  instead  of  turning 
to  his  advantage,  may  bring  upon  him  great  calamities  and 
sufferings  of  various  kinds.  The  observation  of  that  ex- 
cellent critic  and  historian  Dionysius  Halicarnasseus  is 
founded  in  common  sense,  and  was  no  doubt  the  sentiment 
of  many  persons  of  learning  and  judgment  in  the  Htathen 
world.  "  If,"  saith  he,  "  along  with  the  dissolution  of  the 
body,  the  soul  also,  whatsoever  it  is,  be  dissolved,  I  know 
not  how  those  can  be  supposed  to  be  happy,  who  have  en- 
joyed no  advantage  by  virtue,  but  have  perished  on  the 
account  of  it.''  £/  (aIi  ist  kftx  rots  Teifiucrt  to7$  2istX6Xu^ivogy  f^  t«  rifS 

v^oXuZtif  TtS9  f^vi^h  UTToXcti^a-xyTeci  t^$  agir^i  uyec^ov^  2i  ecvTity  ds  rivrnv 

As  the  uncertainty  the  philosophers  were  under  with  re- 
gard to  a  future  state  seems  to  have  been  one  principal 
reason  of  their  crying  up  the  absolute  sufficiency  of  virtue 
to  happiness,  abstracted  from  all  consideration  of  a  future 
reward,  so  it  was  probably  from  the  same  views  that  se- 
veral of  them,  especially  the  Stoics,  advanced  that  strange 
maxim,  that  the  duration  v of  happiness  contributes  nothing 
,tp  the  rendering  it  more  complete  and  desirable.  It  was  a 
.  principle  with  Chrysippus,  and  which,  as  Plutarch  informs 


{§)  Dionys.  Halicar.  Andq.  lib.  viii.  p.  529. 


Chap.  VI.  is  as  good  as  an  eternal  one  considered^  357 
us,  he  frequently  re  peatecl,  that  '^  the  length  of  time  does 

not  increase  any  good.'"    "Ot<  ay^flev  ;t;g<'<'e?  »«  <«y|«<  ^g-poerygvo^siej. 

And  in  a  passage  quoted  by  Pluiarch  irom  his  sixth  book 
of  Moral  Questions,  he  directly  asserts,  that  "  men  are 
neither  more  happy  for  being  longer  so,  nor  is  eternal  feli- 
city more  eligible  than  that  which  is  but  for  a  moment." 
Plutarch  justly  exposes  this  way  of  talking  as  contrary  to 
common  sense,  and  shews  that  in  this  as  well  as  several 
other  instances  Chrysippus  contradicted  himself  (/z).  Nor 
was  this  merely  an  extraordinary  flight  of  Chrysippus,  but 
was  the  common  doctrine  of  the  Stoics.  Cato  says,  "  Stoicis 
non  videtur  optabilior,  nee  magis  expetenda  beata  vita,  si 
sit  longa,  quam  si  brevis  (i)."  Marcus  Antoninus  himself 
frequently  intimates,  that  length  of  time  makes  no  diffe- 
rence as  to  the  perfection  of  virtue  and  happiness,  that 
*' three  hours  of  such  a  life  are  sufficient  (z^)."  And  he 
supposes,  that  though  a  man  has  lived  but  a  short  time, 
the  action  of  life  may  be  a  complete  whole  without  any  de- 
fect; «r;ijj^e5  Ktt\  itTe^tvttXi  (/),  So  that  he  may  attain  in.  this 
short  life  to  the  complete  happiness  and  perfection  of  his 
nature.  These  maxims,  understood  as  they  were  by  the 
Stoics,  proceeded  upon  a  wrong  supposition.  It  is  true, 
that  a  good  man  may  in  a  short  time  so  far  fulfil  the  work 
which  is  given  him  to  do,  and  so  well  act  the  part  ap- 
pointed him  here  on  earth,  as  to  be  graciously  accepted  of 
God,  though  not  absolutely  without  defect,  and  to  be  ren- 
dered meet  for  that  future  state,  where  he  shall  attain  to 
the  true  perfection  and  felicity  of  his  nature;  but  to  sup- 


(Ji)  Plutarch  de  Stoic.  Repugn.  Oper.  torn.  II.  p.  1046.  et  de 
Commun.  Notit.  ibid.  p.  1060,  1061.  \ 

(?)  Apud  Cic.  de  Finib.  lib.  iii.  cap.  14. 
{k)  Anton,  lib.  vi.  sect.  23. 
(0  Anton,  lib.  xi,  sect.  1. 


358  They  acknowledged  the  Importance     Part  III. 

pose  that  in  the  present  state  of  the  human  nature,  he  can 
in  the  short  compass  of  this  mortal  life  arrive  to  the 
utmost  perfection  of  virtue  and  happiness  "  without  any 
defect,"  and  that  the  narrow  term  of  this  present  life  is  as 
sufficient  for  this  purpose,  as  if  ht^  were  to  live  for  ever 
in  a  future  happy  state  of  existence,  is  an  extravagant  way 
of  talking,  and  of  pernicious  consequence,  as  it  tends  to 
quench  the  generous  aspirations  after  immortality,  which, 
as  Cicero  observes,  are  the  strongest  in  the  noblest  minds. 
For  why  should  they  aspire  after  it,  if,  as  Balbus  the  Stoic 
affirms,  "  immortality  conduces  nothing  to  an  happy  life?" 
"  Nihil  ad  beate  vivendum  pertinet."  But  how  much 
juster  is  the  observation  of  Plato;  "  what  can  be  truly 
great  in  so  small  a  proportion  of  time?  The  whole  age  of 
man  from  his  earliest  childhood  to  extreme  old  age,  being 
very  small  and  inconsiderable  (w)." 

And  indeed  notwithstanding  the  expedients  contrived  by 
the  philosophers  for  making  the  perfection  of  virtue  and 
happiness  complete,  abstracting  from  all  consideration  of  a 
future  state,  yet  some  of  them  could  not  help  acknow- 
ledging, that  the  belief  of  a  future  state  is  of  great  impor- 
tance to  the  cause  of  virtue  in  the  world.  Socrates,  who,  as 
the  learned  bishop  of  Gloucester  allows,  really  believed  a 
future  state  of  retributions,  after  having  mentioned  the 
judges  in  Hades,  and  their  assigning  rewards  to  good  men 
and  punishments  to  the  wicked,  adds,  "by  such  sayings  as 
these  I  am  persuaded,  and  make  it  my  aim,  that  I  may  ap- 
pear before  my  judges  [^Eacus  or  Minos]  having  a  most 
pure  and  sf>und  mind."  And  he  goes  on  to  declare,  that 
therefore  he  "  would  endeavour,  to  the  utmost  of  his  power, 
to  live   and   die  a  good  man:    and  exhorts  others    to   do 


(tw)  Plato's  Republ.x. 


Chap.  VI.     of  a  future  State  to  the  cause  of  Virtue.      359 

so  too  (n)."  And  he  concludes  his  discourse  in  the  Phsedo 
with  observing,  that  on  the  account  of  what  he  had  said 
concerning  the  rewards  and  happy  abodes  prepared  for 
good  men  in  a  future  state,  *'  it  is  necessary  to  do  what 
we  can  to  attain  wisdom  and  virtue  in  this  life.  For,  (says 
he,)  the  prize  or  reward  of  the  conflict  is  excellent,  andthe^ 
hope  is  great."  KabAok  y«p  to  osS-Aav,  Koii  k  'ix%ig  f^iyttM.  He  adds, 
that  it  does  not  become  any  man  of  understanding  peremp- 
torily to  affirm  that  these  things  are  as  he  represented  them; 
but  that  it  is  reasonable  to  think  that  these  things,  or  some- 
thing like  them,  are  true,  and  that  it  is  worth  making  a 
trial  though  with  hazard,  for  the  trial  is  noble  (o). 

Plutarch  in  his  treatise,  that  no  man  can  live  happily  ac- 
cording to  the  tenets  of  Epicurus,  represents  those  who 
have  led  pious  and  just  lives  as  expecting  glorious  and  di- 
vine things  after  death;  and  "  it  is  admirable  to  think  how 
carefully  they  apply  their  minds  to  virtue,  «/«!/  (pg^yQa-i  rij  ^^ur?,- 
who  believe  that  as  the  athlette  in  the  public  games  do  not 
receive  the  crown  till  after  they  have  gone  through  the  con- 
test and  proved  victorious,  so  the  reward  of  the  victory 
achieved  by  good  men  in  this  life  is  reserved  for  them 
after  this  life  is  at  end  (/?)•"  And  he  afterwards  says,  that 
*'  they  who  look  upon  death  to  be  the  beginning  of  another 
and  a  better  life,  have  both  more  pleasure  in  the  good 
things  they  now  enjoy  than  other  men,  as  expecting  still 
greater  hereafter;  and  if  things  do  not  go  according  to  their 
mind  they  do  not  take  it  much  amiss;  but  the  hopes  of  good 
things  after  death,  which  contain  ineffable  pleasures  and 
expectations,    take   way  and   obliterate   every  defect    and 


(n)  See  at  the  end  of  Plato's  Gorgias,  Opera,  p.  3U.  B.  edit. 
Lugd. 

(o)  Ibid.  p.  401.  A. 

Ifi)  Plutarch.  Opera,  torn.  II.  p.  1105.  C.  .    . 


360  They  acknowledged  the  Importance     Part  III/ 

offence  out  of  the  soul;  which  thereby  is  enabled  to  bear  the 
things  which  befal  it  with  ease  and  moderation  (y)."  I  can- 
not but  remark  on  this  occasion,  that  at  the  time  when 
Plutarch  flourished,  Christianity  had  made  a  considerable 
progress  in  the  world,  and  with  it  the  knowledge  and  hope 
of  life  and  immortality,  or  of  eternal  happiness  for  the  good 
and  righteous,  was  far  more  generally  diffused  than  before. 
It  is  true,  that  some  notion  of  the  immortality  of  the  soul, 
and  the  rewards  and  punishments  ,of  a  future  state,  had  ob- 
tained among  the  nations  from  the  most  remote  antiquity, 
though  mixed  with  much  obscurity  and  many  fables;  but  at 
the  time  of  our  Saviour's  coming  the  belief  of  these  things 
was,  as  I  shall  have  occasion  to  shew,  very  much  lost  even 
among  the  people,  especially  in  the  Roman  empire,  then 
the  most  knowing  and  civilized  part  of  the  Gentile  world. 
But  wherever  the  light  of  Christianity  shone,  the  doctrine 
of  eternal  life  was  openly  professed  by  those  that  embraced 
it;  and  the  notion  of  it  came  to  spread  more  and  more 
among  the  Heathens  themselves.  The  belief  of  that  future 
happiness  had  produced  wonderful  effects  in  the  converts 
to  Christianity,  both  in  their  constancy  and  even  joy  under 
the  greatest  sufferings,  taken  notice  of  by  the  Pagan  writers 
themselves  (rj,   and  in  the   purity  and  innocency  of  their 


(9)  Plutarch.    Opera,  torn.  II/p.  1106.  A,  B. 

(r)  Epictetus  and  Marcus  Antoninus,  among  others,  represent 
the  Christians  as  shewing  great  fortitude,  and  a  contempt  of 
death,  but  attribute  it  to  habit  and  obstinacy,  though  it  was  built 
on  a  much  nobler  foundation  than  Stoicism  could  pretend  to. 
Epict.  Dissert,  book  iv.  chap.  7.  sect.  2.  and  Anton.  Medit,  book 
xi.  sect.  3.  In  the  Glasgow  translation  of  Antoninus  there  is  a 
note  upon  the  passage  now  referred  to,  which  deserves  to  be 
transcribed  here.  "  It  is  well  known,  that  the  ardor  of  Christians 
for  the  glory  of  martyrdom  was  frequently  immoderate,  and  was 


Chap.  VI.     of  a  future  State  to  the  cause  of  Virtue*      361 

lives  and  manners.  To  this  Pliny  gives  a  noble  testimony 
in  his  celebrated  epistle  to  Trajan,  who  lived  about  the 
same  time  with  Plutarch.  The  Christian  apologists,  in  their 
public  writings  addressed  to  the  emperors,  frequently  men- 
tion the  virtuousness  and  regularity  of  their  lives,  as  a 
thing  that  could  not  be  denied  even  by  their  bitterest  ad- 
versaries. Celsus  himself,  notwithstanding  his  strong  pre- 
judices against  Christianity,  yet  owns  that  there  were 
among  Christians  temperate,  modest,  and  understanding 
persons,  kx)  ^er^tag  »ci}  WtetKug^  x-ul  (^werisg  (^),  I  do  not  there- 
fore see  any  absurdity  in  supposing,  that  when  Plutarch 
speaks  of  pious  and  just  persons  that  expected  such  glori- 
ous and  divine  things  after  death,  he  might  have  a  secret 
reference  to  the  Christians,  the  purity  of  whose  lives,  and 
their  being  strongly  animated  by  the  hopes  of  a  blessed 
immortality,  was  well  known;  and  if  he  thought  them  in  an 
error,  he  might  think  them  "  felices  errore  suo,"  happy  in 
their  error,  as  Lucan.  expresses  it,  and  that  thtir  hope  of 
future  happiness  had  a  good  effect  upon  them,  which  was 
very  proper  to  the  purpose  he  had  in  view  in  that  treatise; 
his  never  expressly  mentioning  the  Christians  in  all  his 
works,  though  a  man  so  curious  as  he  was  may  well  be 
supposed  to  have  had  some  knowledge  of  them,  as  they 
were  then  very  numerous  both  in  Greece  and  Rome  and  in 


censured  by  some  even  of  the  primitive  fathers.  This  is  no 
dishonour  to  Christianity,  that  it  did  not  quite  extirpate  all  sorts 
of  human  frailty.  And  there  is  something  so  noble  in  the  stead- 
fast lively  faith,  and  the  stable  persuasion  of  a  future^state,  which 
must  have  supported  that  ardor,  that  it  makes  a  sufficient  apolo- 
gy for  this  weakness,  and  gives  the  strongest  contirmution  of  the 
divine  power  accompanying  the  Gospel.'* 

(s)  Orig.  cont.  Gels.  lib.  i.  p.  22.  edit.  Spenser. 

Vol.  II.  2  Z 


362       The  Importance  of  a  future  State,  &?g.     Part  III. 

several  parts  of  the  Lesser  Asia,  seems  to  be  an  affected 
silence:  and  it  may  possibly  be  owing  to  this,  that  as  he  did 
not  think  proper  to  give  a  favourable  account  of  them,  so 
on  the  other  hand  he  had  no  mind  to  speak  ill  of  them,  and 
therefore  chose  not  to  speak  of  them  at  all. 


.363 


CHAPTER  VII. 

▲  state  of  future  rewards  necessarily  connotes  future  punishments.  The  beli^ 
of  the  former  without  the  latter  might  be  of  pernicious  consequence.  The  an- 
tient  philosophers  and  legislators  uere  sensible  of  the  importance  and  necessity 
of  the  doctrine  of  future  punishments.  Yet  they  generally  rejected  and  dis- 
carded them  as  vain  and  superstitious  terrors.  The  maxim  universally  held  by 
the  philosophers,  that  the  gods  are  never  angry,  and  can  do  no  hurt,  consi' 
dered. 

1  HE  doctrine  of  a  future  state  comprehends  both  the  re» 
wards  conferred  upon  good  men,  and  the  punishments  which 
shall  be  inflicted  upon  the  wicked  in  the  world  to  come. 
The  one  of  these  cannot  be  rightly  separated  from  the  other. 
And'  the  belief  of  the  latter  is  at  least  as  necessary  as  the 
former;  and  without  which  the  consideration  and  belief  of 
a  future  state  will  have  no  great  influence  on  the  moral  state 
of  mankind. 

It  is  a  good  observation  of  M.  de  Montesquieu,  that  the 
idea  of  a  place  of  future  rewards  necessarily  imports  that 
of  a  place  or  state  of  future  punishments:  and  that  whea 
the  people  hope  for  the  one  without  fearing  the  other,  civil 
laws  to  have  no  force  (t).  It  would  probably  among  other 
ill  effects  encourage  self-murder,  which  is  said  to  be  very 
common  amongst  the  disciples  of  Fo  in  China,  who  hold  the 
immortality  of  the  soul  (li).  Several  passages  might  be  prO"? 
duced  to  shew  that  the  wisest  of  the  Heathens  were  sensi- 
ble of  the  great  importance  and  necessity  of  the  doctrine  of 


(0  L'Esprit  des  Loix,  vol.  II.  liv.  24.  chap.  14^  p.  162.  edit, 
Edinb. 

(u)  See  a  treatise  of  a  Chinese  philosopher  in  Du  Halde*s 
History  of  China,  vol.  III.  p.  272.  English  translation. 


364  The  Notion  of  a  future  State  includes     Part  III*. 

future  punishments  as  well  as  rewards,  to  the  well-being  of 
society.  Accordingly  this  always  made  a  part  of  the  repre- 
sentations of  a  future  state  exhibited  in  the  mysteries, 
which  were  under  the  direction  of  the  civil  magistrate. 
Zaleucus  in  his  excellent  preface  to  his  laws  represents  it  as 
a  thing  which  ought  to  be  believed,  that  the  gods  inflict 
punishments  upon  the  wicked.  And  he  concludes  with 
taking  notice  of  the  happiness  of  the  just,  and  the  vengeance 
attending  the  wicked  (a).  Future  punishments  are  here 
plainly  implied,  though  not  directly  mentioned.  Timoeus 
the  Pythagorean,  at  the  latter  end  of  his  treatise  of  the  soul 
of  the  world,  praises  the  Ionian  poet  for  recording  from  an- 
tient  tradition  the  endless  or  irremissiljle  torments  prepared 
for  the  unhappy  dead.  And  he  adds,  that  there  is  a  necessi- 
ty of  inculcating  the  dread  of  these  strange  or  foreign  pu- 
nishments. Plato  in  his  fourth  book  of  Laws  takes  notice 
of  an  antient  tradition  concerning  the  justice  of  God  as  pu- 
nishing the  transgressors  of  his  law.  ''  God,  as  antient 
tradition  teacheth,  having  or  holding  in  himself,  the  begin- 
ning, the  end,  and  middle  of  all  things  that  are,  pursues  the 
right  way,  going  about  according  to  nature,  and  justice  al- 
ways accompanies  and  follows  him,  which  is  a  punisher  of 
those  that  fall  short  of  the  divine  law  (//)•"  This  passage 
represents  C»od  as  a  just  punisher  of  transgressors,  but 
makes  no  express  mention  of  the  punishments  of  a  future 
stats.  But  in  another  passage  in  his  seventh  epistle,  written 
to  Dion^s  friends,  which  I  had  occasion  to  mention  before, 
see  above  p.  273.  he  says,  "  we  ought  always  to  believe  the 


(jr)  Apud  Stob.  scrm.  42, 
Plat.  Oper.  p.  600.  G.  edit.  Lugd. 


Chap.  VII.  future  Punishments  as  xvell  as  Rewards.      365 

antient  and  sacred  words,  or  traditions,  which  shew  both 
that  the  soul  is  immortal,  and  that  it  hath  judges,  and  suf- 
fers the  greatest  punishments,  when  it  leaves  the  body  (2)." 
Ami  on  several  other  occasions,  when  speaking  of  a  future 
state,  he  takes  notice  of  the  punishments  which  shall  be  in- 
flicted upon  the  wicked,  and  describes  them  in  .1  popular 
and  poetical  manner.  In  the  conclusion  of  his  Phaedo,  iie 
introduces  Socrates,  in  one  of  his  most  serious  and  solemn 
discourses  just  before  his  death,  talking  after  the  manner 
of  the  poets  of  the  judges  after  death,  of  Tartaruy,  Acheron, 
the  Archerusian  lake,  Pyriphhgethon,  and  Cocytus:  that 
some  after  having  gone  througli  various  punishments  shall 
be  purged  and  absolved,  and  alter  certain  periods  shall  be 
freed  from  their  punishments:  '■'■  Hut  those  who  l)y  reason 
of  the  greatness  of -their  sins  seem  to  be  incurable,  who  have 
comniitted  many  and  great  sacrileges,  or  unjust  and  unlaw- 
ful murders  and  other  crimes  of  the  like  nature,  shall  have 
a  fate  suitable  to  them,  being  thrown  down  into  Tartarus, 
from  whence  they  never  shall  escape  (<'/)•"  The  like  repre- 
sentation is  made  at  the  latter  end  of  Plato's  tenth  Republic, 
in  the  story  of  Erus  Armcnius.  In  his  Gorgias  also  he  sup- 
poses the  wicked,  and  those  who  were  incurable,  to  be  sent 
to  Tartarus,  where  they  shall  be  punished  with  endless  tor- 
ments, as  an  example  to  others:  and  he  approves  of  Homer, 
for  representing  wicked  kings  who  had  tyrannized  over 
mankind,  among  those  who  shall  be  so  punished  (/;).  There 
is  another  passage  in  his  Phsedo  which  ought  not  to  be 
omitted.  He  says,  that  "  if  death  were  to  be  the  dissolution 
of  the  whole,  it  would  be  good  news  to  bad  men  when  they 
die,  t^f^cttov  h  roiq  KicKOig  u7ro6etvS<rtj  to  have  an  end  put  to  their 


(z)PlatoOper.  p.  716.  A. 

(a)  Ibid.  p.  400.  F. 

(t>)  Ibid.  p.  313.  E,  F.  edit.  Lugd, 


366      The  wisest  Heathens  were  sensible  of  the  Part  III, 

body,  and  to  their  own  pravlty,  as  well  as  to  their  souls: 
but  that  since  the  soul  appears  to  be  immortal,  there  is  no 
other  way  of  escaping  evil,  no  other  safety,  but  to  become 
as  good  and  as  wise  as  they  can  (c)."  Cicero  in  his  second 
book  of  Laws,  shewing  the  usefulness  of  religion  to  society, 
observes,  that  many  have  been  reclaimed  from  wickedness 
by.  the  fear  of  divine  punishment.  '*•  Quam  multos  divini 
supplicii  metus  a  scelere  revocavit  (^)." 

Plutarch  in  his  treatise,  That  it  is  not  possible  to  live 
pleasurably  according  to  the  doctrine  of  Epicurus,  observes, 
that  Epicurus  himself  says,  there  is  no  other  way  of  re- 
straining bad  men  from  doing  evil  and  unju  t  actions,  but 
by  fear  of  punishment:  and  Plutarch  gives  it  as  his  own 
opinion,  that  therefore  it  is  proper  to  propose  to  them  all 
kinds  of  terrors  and  punishments,  both  from  heaven  and 
earth:  and  that  it  is  for  tb^ir  own  advantage  to  be  deterred 
from  perpetrating  criminal  actiuns  by  the  fear  of  those 
things  which  are  to  follow  after  death  {e).  And  in  his  trea- 
tise De  sera  Numinis  vindic^a,  he  observes,  that  *^  if  no- 
thing remains  to  the  soul  after  the  expiration  of  this  life, 
but  death  puts  an  end  to  all  favour  and  all  punishment,  one 
might  say  that  the  Deity  dealt  very  tenderly  and  remissly 
with  those  bad  men,  who  are  punished  quickly,  and  die 
soon  (/)." 

If  we  proceed  from  the  philosophers  to  the  poets,  who 
were  the  popular  divines,  and  generally  spoke  agreeably  to 
the  common  notions  and  anient  tr  .ditions,  they  often 
speak  of  future  punishments.  This  is  particilarly  true  of 
Homer.  Euripides  represents   it   as   a   certain  thing,  that 


Cc)  Plato.  Oper.  p.  397.  H.  p.  398.  A. 

(d)  Cic.  de  Leg.  lib.  ii.  cap.  7. 

(c)  Plutarch,  Opera,  torn.  II.  p.  1 105.  edit.  Xyl.  Francof.  1620. 

(/)  Ibid.  torn.  II.  p.  5  55.  C. 


Chap.  VII.  importance  of  the  Doctrine  of  future^  ^c.    367 

whosoever  among  mortals  is  bad  and  vicious  is  punished 
by  the  gods. 

■  '  K«t}  y/ig  «V/c  uv  Z^arav 

KdCKO^   TFI^VKIH   l^1ifAiH(ni  0(  S'Cfl/. 

Eurip.  Ion. 

There  is, a  passage  which  Justin  Martyr  ascribes  to  Phi- 
lemon, Clemens  Alexandrinus  and  Theodoret  toDiphylus,  in 
which,  after  having  said,  that  there  are  in  Hades  two  several 
paths,  the  one  of  the  just,  the  other  of  the  unjust,  he  adds, 
"  don't  be  deceived;  there  is  a  judgment  in  Hades,  which 
God  the  Lord  of  all,  whose  dreadful  name  I  dare  not  so 
much  as  mention,  will  certainly  execuce."  And  soon  after 
he  says  to  those  who  imagine  there  is  no  God,  "  there  is, 
there  is  a  God;  and  if  any  man  does  evil,  he  will  at  length 
suffer-  punishment  for  it  (^)." 

Virgil  in  his  sixth  iEneid,  where  he  probably  has  a  par- 
ticular reference  to  the  representations  made  of  a  future 
state  in  the  mysteries,  as  well  as  to  those  made  by  Homer, 
represents  several  sorts  of  persons,  who  had  been  guilty  of 
very  heinous  crimes,  as  adjudged  to  grievous  punishments 
in  Tartarua.   Vers.  565  et  seq. 

The  passages  which  have  been  produced  shew  that  the 
wisest  among  the  Heathens  saw  the  importance  of  the  doc- 
trine of  future  punishments;  and  how  necessary  it  was  in 
their  opinion  to  the  preserving  good  order  in  the  world. 
Celsus  was  so  sensible  of  this,  that  he  would  not  allow 
Christianity  the  honour  of  being  thought  to  have  taught 
this  doctrine  to  mankind.  He  says,  that  "  they  [the  Chris- 
tians] rightly'maintain,  that  these  persons  who  lead  good 
lives  shall  be  happy,  and  that  the  unjust  shall  be  subject 


(g*)  See  Dr.  Sykes's  Principles  and  Connection  of  Natural 
and  Revealed  Religion,  cap.  xiv.  375. 


368        Future  Punishments  generally  rejected    Part  IIL 

to  eternal  evils,''  «><  5e  ahMoi  (arocf^Trui  uavioi^  xxKoJi  (ran^ovrcct'  and 
he  adds,  that  '-''  trom  i':i<  doctrine  neither  tliey  {lOr  any  one 
else  should  depart  (^)."  What  makes  this  testimony  more 
remarkable  is,  thac  Ctlsus  was  an  Epicurean,  and  therefore 
did  not  himself  really  believe  this  doctrine.  It  must  there- 
fore be  only  owing  to  the  conviction  he  had  that  it  was  a 
doctrine  useful  to  society.  And  it  is  proper  to  observe  upon 
this  occasion,  that  those  among  the  Heathens  who  professed 
to  believe,  or  would  have  the  people  to  believe  future  pu- 
nishments, thought  it  would  not  be  sufficient  to  answer  the 
end,  if  some  of  the  punishments  for  incorrigible  sinners, 
guilty  of  enormous  crimes,  were  not  eternal. 

Notwithstanding  what  has  been  said,  it  cannot  be  denied, 
that  many  of  the  most  celebrated  philosophers  have  endea- 
voured to  weaken  and  explode  that  doctrine  of  future 
punishments,  which  they  themselves  could  not  but  acknow- 
ledge to  be  useful  and  even  necessary  to  society. 

It  has  been  already  shewn  that  Pythagoras,  according  to 
the  account  Ovid  gives  of  his  sentiments,  which  seems  to 
be  a  just  one,  rejects  the  stories  of  future  punishments  as 
vain  terrors.  And  Timseus,  a  celebrated  disciple  of  his,  at 
the  same  time  that  he  says  there  is  a  necessity  of  inculcating 
the  doctrine  of  those  foreign  torments,  plainly  intimates  that 
he  looks  upon  the  accounts  which  are  given  of  them  to  be 
fabulous  and  false. 

Though  Plato  has  many  passages  concerning  future  pu- 
nishments, and  even  in  some  of  his  most  serious  discourses 
adopts  the  representations  made  of  them  by  the  poets;  yet 
at  other  times  he  rejects  them,  as  giving  too  frightful  an 
idea  of  Hades,  or  the  future  state.  In  the  begmning  of  his 
third   Rtpublic  he  declares  his  disapprobation  of  them  be- 


.(Ji)  Origen  cent.  Cels.  lib.  viii.  p.  409.  edit.  Spenser. 


Chap.  VII.  "by  the  Philosophers,  369 

cause  they  tended  to  intimidate  the  soldiery.  After  saying 
that  no  man  can  be  brave  who  fears  death,  he  asks  "  do  you 
think  that  man  will  face  death  with  coarage,  and  in  battle 
prefer  death  to  slavery,  who  believes  that  the  things  which 
are  said  concerning  the  state  of  the  dead  are  true,  and  as 
dreadful  as  they  are  represented?"  He  therefore  blames 
those  who  make  such  a  discouraging  representation  of 
Hades,  and  would  have  them  rather  commend  and  praise 
it,  "  otherwise  they  neither  say  the  things  that  are  true,  nor 
what  is  proper  for  military  men  to  hear.  Therefore,"  says 
he,  "  all  those  direful  and  terrible  names  are  to  be  rejected, 
Cocytus,  and  Styx,  and  the  Inferi,  and  the  ghosts  of  the 
dead,  and  all  the  names  of  that  kind,  which  cause  all  that 
hear  them  to  shudder  and  tremble  (?).  '  Nothing  can  be  a 
more  express  condemnation  of  the  doctrine  he  himself  in- 
troduces Socrates  as  delivering  in  his  Phsedo,  the  very  day 
of  his  death;  and  the  reason  he  here  gives  for  rejr^cting 
these  things,  viz.  the  not  rendering  death  frightful,  will  hold 
not  merely  against  the  poetical  representation,  but  against 
all  future  punishments  after  death,  which  yet  he  elsewhere 
represents  as  antient  and  sacred  traditions,  to  which  an  en- 
tire credit  is  to  be  given.  We  must  therefore  either  say, 
that  Plato  himself  did  not  believe   future    punishments,  or 


(it)  Oviciv  iTi  f^  rot    Ts-i^i  rctvret   Ofo/u.xrec    -aeivrcc    ^uvu    ri.    icj  (po^epeb 

T8T»  T»  Ty-T»  ovof4,u^ojt^evee.  (P^iletv  5g  zro,c7,  &15  oiov  re,  zroivTct^  t»^ 
uxiiovretg.  Flaton.  Oper.  p.  432.  E.  It  may  also  be  observed,  that 
in  his  Cratylus  Plato  introduces  Socrates,  as  blaniintj;  those  who 
represent  Hades  as  a  dark  and  gloomy  abode,  and  derive  the 
word  from  to  AeiUi.  as  if  it  were  void  of  light;  and  is  rather  foP 
deriving  it  uto  ra  "srcivret  ret  kuXu  ii^ivuh  from  kncwiKg  all  things 
good  and  beautiful.  Here  he  excludes  every  thini^  from  the  no- 
tion of  a  future  siate  that  might  be  apt  to  create  terror,  and  seems 
to  leave  n  >  room  for  future  misery. 

Vol.  II.  3  A  ' 


370        Future  Punishments  g'^ner ally  rejected    Part  III, 

that  from  political  views  he  judged  it  not  proper  to  teach 
them  to  the  people,  that  they  might  not  have  too  frightful 
notions  of  death,  which  he  thought  would  intimidate  the 
citizens  and  soldiers.  1  would  observe  however,  that  he 
was  not  very  consistent  in  his  politics,  since  he  sometimes 
declares  for  rejecting  the  future  punishments  in  Hades,  as 
not  fit  to  be  laid  btjfore  the  people,  and  yet  at  other  times 
represents  them  as  of  great  use  for  restraining  men  from 
vice  and  wickedness;  which  seems  also  to  be  the  notion  that 
the  managers  of  the  mysteries,  who  considered  them  in  a 
political  view,  entertained  of  them. 

None  of  the  philosophers  argued  better  for  the  immor- 
tality of  the  soul,  and  a  future  state  in  general,  than  Cicero. 
And  yet  in  that  very  treatise  where  he  takes  the  most 
pains  to  prove  it,  he  discards  the  notion  of  future  punish- 
ments, and  openly  disavows  and  ridicules  them.  Having 
mentioned  Cocytus,  Acheron,  and  the  infernal  judges,  and 
the  punishments  which  were  supposed  to  be  inflicted  upon 
bad  men  after  death,  he  introduces  his  auditor  as  saying, 
"  adeone  me  delirare  censes,  ut  ista  credam?"  "  Do  you 
think  me  so  mad  as  to  believe  these  things?"  And  again, 
"  quis  est  tam  vecors  quem  ista  moveant?"  "  Who  is  so 
senseless  as  to  be  moved  by  them?"  Nor  can  it  be  pre- 
tended, that  he  only  rejects  the  fabulous  representations 
made  of  these  things  bv  the  poets,  but  admits  the  moral 
of  those  fables,  or  what  they  were  designed  to  signify,  viz. 
that  there  shall  be  punishments  inflicted  upon  the  wicked 
after  death.  For  the  whole  argument 'of  that  book  is  so 
conducted  as  to  exclude  future  punishments.  His  professed 
design  is  to  fortify  men  against  the  fear  of  death,  by  prov- 
ing that  death  is  no  evil.  And  his  reasoning  turns  upon 
this  point,  that  either  our  souls  shall  be  extinguished  at 
death,  and  then  we  shall  have  no  sense  of  evil;  or  if  they 
survive,  and  depart  to  another  place  (as  he  endeavours  to 
prove  they  will)  we  shall  be  happy,  and  there  is  no  future 


Chap.  VII.  by  the  Philosophers.  371 

misery  to  fear.  And  indeed,  it  may  be  observed  concern- 
ing the  philosophers  in  general,  that  in  all  their  consola- 
tions against  death,  or  discourses  to  shew  that  death  is  not 
to  be  feared,  they  constantly  argue  thus.  That  death  shall 
be  either  an  extinction  of  being,  and  a  state  of  utter  insen- 
sibility, or  a  remove  to  a  better  place;  and  they  never  once 
put  the  supposition  of  the  souls  being  exposed  to  any  evil 
or  misery  in  a  future  state.  The  alternative  still  was  this, 
that  they  were  either  to  be  happy  after  death,  or  not  to  be 
at  all.  "  Si  maneant  beati  sunt,"  says  Cicero;  or  as  Seneca 
has  it,  "  Aut  beatus,  aut  nullus." 

What  little  regard   Cicero  himself,   or  even  the  Roman 
people  in  general,  had  to  the  doctrine  of  future  punish- 
ments, is   evident  from   that  noted   passage  in  his  oration 
for  Aulus    Cluentius,   delivered  before  the  judges,  .and  a 
public  assembly  of  the  people.  He  is  there  speaking  of  one 
Oppianicus,   whom   he  represents    as    the   worst  of  men, 
guilty  of  the   most,  atrocious  crimes,  of  repeated  murders 
of  his  wives  and   nearest  relations,  and  other  heinous  acts 
of  wickedness,  for  which  he  was  at  length  condemned  and 
banished.  And  he  observes,  that  if  he  had  been  a  man  of 
spirit,  he  would  have  chosen  rather  to  have  put  an  end  to 
his  own  life,  than  to  have  endured  the  miseries  of  his  exile. 
And  as  he  was  dead  at  the   time  when   Cicero  made  this 
oration,  he  asks,  "  What  evil  hath  death  brought  upon  him, 
except  we  are  induced  by  silly  fables  to  think  that  he  suf- 
fers the  punishments  of  the  wicked  in  the  infernal  regions, 
and  that  he  has  met  with  more  enemies  there  than  he  left 
behind  him   here?    and   that  by  the   punishments   inflicted 
upon  him  for  what  he  had  done  to  his  mother-in-law,  his 
wives,  his  brother  and  children,  he  is  precipitated  headlong 
into  the  abodes  of  the  wicked?  If  these  things  are  false,  as 
all  men  understand  them   to  be,  what  has  death  taken  from 


0T2        Future  Punishments  generally  rejected    Part  III. 

him  but  a  sense  of  pain  (z)?"  I  do  not  think  there  can  be  a 
more  express  declaration  against  future  punishments.  And 
certainly,  if  such  monsters  of  wickedness,  as  Oppianicus  is 
represented  to  have  been,  suffer  no  punishments  in  another 
world,  no  man  has  reason  to  fear  them. 

Seneca  has  a  very  strong  passage  to  the  same  purpose,  in 
which,  after  absolutely  rejecting  the  stories  of  future  tor- 
ments, as  fables  and  idle  terrors  invented  by  the  poets,  he 
asserts,  that  "the  dead  man  is  affected  with  no  evils." — 
'^  NuUis  defunctum  malis  affici:" — that  "  death  is  the  end 
and  a  release  from  all  our  pains  and  sorrows,  be\  ond  which 
our  evils  do  not  extend;  and  that  it  replaceth  us  in  the  same 
state  of  tranquillity  we  were  in  before  we  were  born  (/^)." 
The  observation  I  made  on  Cicero  holds  equally  with  re- 
spect.to  Seneca.  If  he  had  contented  himself  with  merely 
rejecting  and  ridiculing  the  poetical  fables,  he  might  have 
been  excused:  but  it  is  evident  that  both  these  philosophers 
rejected  the  very  substance  of  the  doctrine  itself,  and  al- 
lowed no  future  punishments  at  all.  The  same  may  be 
said  concerning  Epictetus  and  the  Stoics  in  general:  as  to 
which  I  refer  the  reader  what  is  observed  here  above,  p. 
150,  151.  et  p.  294,  295. 


(?)  "  Nam  nunc  qiiidem  quid  tandem  mali  illi  mors  attulit? 
Nisi  forte  ineptiis  ac  fabulis  ducimur,  ir  existimenuis  ilium  apud 
inferos  impiorum  supplicia  perferre,  ac  pluses  illic  ofFendisse  ini- 
micos  quam  hie  reliquisset?  A  socrus,  ab  uxoruni:  afratris  et  11- 
berorum  poetiis  actum  esse  praecipitem  in  iiupiorum  sedematque 
regionem;  qiiee  si  falsa  sint,  id  quod  omnes  intelligunt,  quid  ei 
tandem  alii'd  uiors  eripuit,  praeter  sensum  doloris?"  Orat.  pro  A. 
Clueniio,  cap.  61. 

{k)  "  IN'or^  omnium  dolorum  et  solutio  est  et  finis:  ultra  quam 
tnala  nobira  non  eweunt:  quae  nosin  ilium  tranquiililutem,  in  qua 
antequam  nascevemur  jacuimus,  reponit."  In  conbol.  ad  Mar- 
ciam,  cap.  19. 


Chap.  VII.  by  the  Philosophers*  373 

Plutarch  (as  was  observed  before)  in  his  treatise  De 
ser^  numinis  vindicta,  argues  for  the  immortality  of  the 
soul,  and  seems  to  assert  the  justice  of  God,  and  future  re- 
wards and  punishments;  yet  in  that  very  treatise  he  gives 
it  as  his  own  opinion,  that  the  wicked  need  no  other  pu- 
nishments, but  their  own  bad  lives  and  actions.  "  I  am  of 
opinion  (saith  he)  if  it  be  lawful  to  say  so,  that  wicked  men 
need  neither  the  gods  nor  men  to  punish  them:  but  their 
own  life,  being  wholly  corrupted  and  full  of  perturbation, 
is  a  sufficient  punishment  (/)•"  And  in  his  treatise  to  shew 
that  it  is  not  possible  to  live  pleasurably  according  to  the 
tenets  of  Epicurus,  he  calls  the  fear  of  punishment  after 
death  superstition;  and  afterwards  he  calls  it  to  T^etihiKov 
hciivo  3go5,  '*  that  childish  fear;"  and  represents  what  was  said 
of  them  as  "  fabulous  stories,  and  the  tales  of  mothers  and 
nurses  (w)." 

In  his  celebrated  tract  of  superstition,  he  expresses  him- 
self as  if  he  looked  upon  all  fear  of  God,  at  least  considered 
as  a  punishtr,  to  be  superstition:  and  that  the  man  that 
feareth  God,  who  is  every  where  present,  and  whom  no- 
thing can  escape,  must  be  miserable.  He  blames  those  who 
look  upon  the  evils  and  calamities  which  befal  them,  as  di- 
vine punishments  inflicted  upon  them  for  their  sins  (n).  But 


(/)  Plutarch.  Opera,  torn.  II.  p.  556.  D.  edit.  Xyl. 

(m)  Ibid.  p.    1104.  B,  C.  1105.  B. 

(n)  Those  no  doubt  are  in  the  wrong,  who  interpret  all  the 
misfortunes  of  human  life,  which  befal  themselves  or  others,  as 
divine  judgments.  But  that  in  many  cases  it  is  hip^lily  just  and 
proper  to  regard  the  afflictions  and  calamities  which  happen  to 
us,  as  sent  by  God  to  correct  and  punish  us  for  our  sins,  is  not 
only  the  doctrine  of  the  Holy  Scriptures,  but  perfectly  agreeable 
to  the  dictates  of  sound  reason,  on  supposition  there  is  a  God 
and  a  Providence;  and  if  really  believed,  must  have  a  good  ef- 
fect on  the  religious  and  moral  conduct.  And  that  Plutarch  had 


374        Future  Punishments  generally  rejected    Part  III, 

especially  he  censures  those  who  have  a  dread  of  future  pu- 
Bishments  and  torments  after  death,  and  condemns  all  fear 
of  that  kind  as  groundless,  and  the  effect  of  a  foolish  super- 
stition, without  making  any  distinction,  or  giving  the  least 
hint  that  there  are  punishments  prepared  for  wicked  men 
in  a  future  state.  He  finds  fault  with  superstition  for  not 
looking  upon  death  to  be  the  end  of  life,  but  extending  its 
fears  beyond  it,  and  for  connecting  with  death  the  imagina- 
tion of  immortal  evils.  ^wotTrrav  tZ  B-ccvdra  xetKtiv  eirivoixv  uB-ccva- 
rvv  (o).  I  would  observe  by  the  way,  that  this  treatise  of 
Plutarch,  which  is  written  in  a  very  elegant  and  artful 
manner,  and  has  been  very  much  admired,  and  often 
quoted  by  our  modern  sceptical  writers,  and  opposers  of 
Revelation,  has  been  very  well  answered,  and  the  false  rea- 
soning and  sophistry  of  it  exposed  by  the  learned  bishop  of 
Gloucester,  in  the  last  edition  of  his  Divine  Legation  of 
Moses  demonstrated  (/>). 

There  is  another  consideration  of  great  moment,  which 
has  been  strongly  urged  by  the  last-mentioned  celebrated 
author,  to  prove  that  the  philosophers  did  not  believe  fu- 
ture punishments.  It  is  drawn  from  a  remarkable  passage 
of  Cicero,  in  which  he  represents  it  as  the  opinion  of  all 
the  philosophers,  not  only  of  those  who  denied  a  Provi- 
dence, but  of  those  who  acknowledged  it,  that  God  is 
never  angry,  nor  hurts  any  person.  Some  learned  men,  who 
are  unwilling  to  admit  the  consequence  which  seems  na- 
turally to  follow  from  it,  are  of  opinion,  that  it  is  capable 
of  a  favourable  interpretation;  and  that  it  is  only  designed 
to  signify,  that  the  Deity  has  no  anger  or  passion  like  that 


a  notion  of  Divine  Justice  pursuing^  and  punishing  men  for  their 
sins,  appears  from  his  excellent  tract  De  sera  numinis  vindicta. 

(o)  Plutarch.  Opera,  torn.  II.  166.  F. 

(/?)  Vol.  II.  book  iii.  sect.  6.  p.  257,  et  seq. 


Chap.  VII.  by  the  Philosophers,  Z73 

which  is  in  us,  nor  is  ever  carried  by  it  to  do  hurt  to  his 
creatures.  But  Cicero  seems  to  carry  it  much  farther,  so 
as  not  only  to  exclude  all  perturbation  from  the  divine 
mind,  but  all  punitive  justice.  His  manner  of  introducing  it 
is  remarkable.  He  is  speaking  of  Regulus's  strict  regard  to 
the  oath  he  had  taken,  even  though  he  thereby  exposed 
himself  to  the  severest  torments  and  death.  And  then  he 
supposes  an  objection  made,  that  Regulus  acted  a  foolish 
part,  since  if  he  had  violated  his  oath  he  had  nothing  to 
fear  from  Jupiter.  ^'  For  it  is  a  principle  universally  held 
by  all  the  philosophers,  both  those  who  say  that  God  never 
meddleth  with  the  affairs  of  men,  and  those  who  think  he 
is  always  active  and  concerning  himself  about  us,  that  God 
is  never  angry,  nor  hurteth  any  one."  He  answers,  "  That 
in  an  oath  its  binding  force  is  to  be  considered:  for  an  oath 
is  a  religious  affirmation;  and  what  a  man  promises,  as  it 
were  calling  God  to  witness,  ought  to  be  kept;  not  out  o£ 
fear  of  the  anger  of  the  gods,  for  there  is  no  such  thing, 
but  out  of  regard  to  justice  and  fidelity  (jf)^  There  is  ano- 
ther passage  of  Cicero,  in  the  second  book  of  his  Offices, 
which  it  is  proper  to  mention  on  this  occasion.  Having 
proposed  to  treat  of  those  things  which  may  be  most  be- 
neficial or  hurtful   to  men,  he  observes  it  as  a  thing  gene- 


{q)  <*  Quid  est  igitur,  dixerit  aliquis,  in  jurejurando?  Num 
iratum  timemus  Jovem?  At  hoc  quidem  commune  est  omnium 
philosophorum;  non  eorum  modo  qui  Deum  nihil  habere  ipsum 
negotii  dicunt  nihil  exhibere  alteri,  sed  eorum  etiam  qui  Deum 
semper  agcre  aliquid  et  moliri  volunt,  nunquam  nee  irasci  Deum, 
nee  nocere.  Haec  quidem  ratio,  non  magis  contra  Regulum  quam 
contra  omne  jusjurandum  valet.  Sed  in  jurejurando  non  qui  me- 
tusj  sed  quae  vis  sit  debet  inte  ligi:  est  enim  jusjurandum  affirma- 
tio  religiosa.  Quod  auteiu  affirmate  quasi  Deo  teste  promiseris, 
id  tenendum  est:  jam  enim  non  ad  iram  deorum  quae  nulla  est, 
sed  ad  justitiam  ct  fidem  pertinet."  De  Offic.  lib.  iii.  cap.  28,  29. 


3r6        Future  Punishments  generally  rejected    Part  IIL 

rally  believed,  that  to  hurt  men  is  incompatible  with  the 
divine  nature;  and  seems  to  give  this  :^s  a  reason  for  taking 
no  particular  notice  of  the  gods  in  that  place  (r).  This 
may  be  compared  with  a  remarkable  passage  of  Seneca, 
which  I  mentioned  before,  but  which  ought  not  to  be 
omitted  here.  Having  observed  that  the  gods  are  carried 
to  do  good  by  the  goodness  of  their  own  nature,  he  adds. 
That  "  they  neither  will  nor  can  hurt  any  one:  they  can 
neither  suffer  an  injury  nor  doit;  for  whatsoever  is  capable 
of  doing  hurt,  is  capable  of  receiving  it.  That  supreme  and 
most  excellent  nature,  of  which  they  are  partakers,  both 
exempts  them  from  dangers  themselves,  and  renders  them 
not  dangerous  to  others  (^)."  Where  he  seems  to  affirm, 
that  no  hurt  or  danger  is  ever  to  be  apprehended  from  the 
gods,  as  being  contrary  to  their  nature.  Marcus  Antoninus, 
speaking  of  the  intelligence  which  governs  the  universe, 
saith,  that  no  one  is  hurt  by  it  {t)»  And  he  argues,  that  "  if 
there  be  gods,  then  leaving  the  world  is  no  such  dreadful 
thing,  for  you  may  be  sure  they  will  dp  you  no  hurt."  Upon 
which  Dacier  remarks,  that  "  the  Stoics  believed  there  was 
nothing  to  fear  after  death,  because  it  was  contrary  to  the 
nature  of  God  to  do  ill  to  any  one  (w)." 

It  must  be  acknowledged,  that  there  is  no  small  diffi- 
culty in  these  and  other  passages  of  the  like  kind,  which 


(r)  De  Offic.  lib.  ii.  cap.  3. 

(■«)  *'  Quae  causa  est  diis  benefaciendi?  Natura.  Errat  siquis 
putat  eos  nocere  velle  Non  possupt.  Nee  accipere  injuriani  que- 
unt,  nee  facere.  Laedere  enim  laedique  conjunctum  est.  Summa 
ilia  et  pulcherrima  omnium  natura,  qwos  periculo  exemit,  ne 
periculosos  quidem  facit."  Sen.  epist.  95.  See  also  Sen.  de  Ira, 
lib.  ii.  cap.  27.  quoted  above,  p.  15  1,  I  52. 

{t)  Anton.  Mtd.  book  vi.  sect.  I. 

(w)  See  Divine  Legation  of  Moses,  Vol.  II.  p.  186.  marg.  notCy 
4.tb  edit. 


Chap.  VII.  btj  the  Philosophers.  S7f 

occur  in  the  writings  of  the  antients.  If  they  are  to  be  takeri 
in  the  strictest  sense,  we  must  suppose  them  to  have  held, 
that  no  punishment  was  to  be  apprehended  from  God 
either  here  or  hereafter:  and  this  would  in  its  conse-^ 
quences  destroy  a  Providence^  which  yet  there  is  good 
reason  to  think  Cicero,  as  well  as  several  others  of  the 
philosophers,  and  particularly  the  Stoics,  believed.  In  the 
passage  above  cited  from  him,  he  supposes  God  to  be  a 
witness  of  the  oath,  and  yet  not  to  be  an  avenger  of  the 
perjury,  or  angry  at  it;  which  is  certainly  a  most  incon- 
sistent scheme,  less  defensible  than  that  of  Epicurus,  who 
supposed  the  gods  were  far  removed  from  our  world,  and 
knew  nothing  of  our  affairs,  nor  ever  gave  themselves  the 
least  concern  about  them.  A  very  learned  and  ingenious 
writer  has  endeavoured  to  account  for  this,  by  supposing 
that  when  Ciccro  represents  it  as  the  universal  doctrine  of 
the  philosophers,  that  God  is  never  angry,  nor  hurts  any 
one,  it  is  to  be  understood  of  the  highest  God,  who,  they 
supposed,  did  not  concern  himself  immediately  with  man- 
kind, but  committed  the  several  regions  of  the  universe  to 
the  vicegerency  and  government  of  inferior  deities:  and 
that  these  have  passions  and  affections,  and  by  them  alone^ 
according  to  their  opinion,  a  particular  providence  is  ad- 
ministered {x).  But  this,  I  am  afraid,  will  not  solve  the 
difficulty.  For  in  that  very  passage  Cicero  speaks  not 
merely  of  God,  but  of  the  gods,  "  Ira  deorum  nulla  est," 
— "  The  gods  have  no  anger."  And  it  is  of  the  gods  that 
Seneca  says,  in  the  passage  I  have  quoted  from  him,  that 
they  neither  will  nor  can  hurt  any  one,  nor  is  any  danger 
to  be  apprehended  from  them.  And  this  he,  as  well  as 
Cicero,  supposes  to  be  inseparable  from  the  clivine  nature, 


{x)  Divine  Legation  of  Moses,  Vol.  II.  p.  194, 
Vol,  II.  3  B 


o7S        Future  Punts hments  generally  rejected    Part  III. 

of  which  they  are  all  partakers.  Besides,  if  the  inferior 
gods,  to  whom  the  administration  of  things  relating  to 
mankind  was  committed,  were  supposed  to  be  angry,  and 
to  be  avengers  of  the  perjury,  it  would  destroy  the  force 
of  Cicero's  argument  as  here  managed:  since  on  this  sup- 
position the  fear  of  their  anger  or  of  punishment  from 
them,  might  be  supposed  to  have  had  an  influence  to  deter 
Regulus  from  violating  his  oath,  which  Cicero  will  not 
allow  (if).  For  it  is  to  be  observed,  that  he  here  all  along 
goes  upon  the  Stoical  scheme,  that  virtue  and  fidelity  is  to 
be  preserved  for  its  own  sake,  without  regard  to  any  re- 
ward or  punishment,  but  what  flows  from  the  nature  of 
the  actions  themselves. 

What  increases  the  difficulty  with  regard  to  that  passage 
of  Cicero,  is,  that  he  represents  that  maxim  that  God  or 
the  gods  are  never  angry,  nor  do  hurt  to  any  one,  as  com- 
mon to  all  the  philosophers,  both  to  the  Epicureans  who 
denied  a  Providence,  and  to  those  who  owned  it.  And 
every  one  knows,  that  Epicurus  intended  by  it  to  free  men 
from  all  fear  of  punishment  from  the  gods;  and  when 
Cicero  joins  the  other  philosophers  with  the  Epicureans, 
as  all  agreeing  that  there  is  no  anger  in  the  gods,   it  looks 


{y)  In  the  course  of  the  argument,  Cicero  takes  it  for  granted, 
that  Jupiter  himself,  if  he  had  been  angry,  and  had  punished  Re- 
gulus for  violating  his  oath,  could  not  have  inflicted  a  greater 
punishment  upon  'lim,  than  he  brought  upon  himself  by  keeping 
his  oath,  and  returning  to  the  Carthaginians,  who  put  him  to  a 
cruel  death.  This  seems  to  suppose,  that  it  is  riot  in  the  power 
of  God  himself  to  inflict  a  greater  punishment  upon  men  than 
ihey  can  inflict  upon  one  another:  and  that  temporal  and  bodily 
death  is  the  worst  any  man  has  to  fear  from  God.  This  puts  his 
displeasure  upon  an  equal  footing  with  that  of  an  earthly  prince; 
and  is  very' different  from  the  doctrine  taught  by  our  Saviour, 
Luke  xii.  4,  5. 


Chap.  VII.  bij  the  Philosophers,  379 

as  if  the  one  as  well  as  the  other  maintained,  thot  no 
punishment  is  to  be  feared  or  apprehended  from  them. 
And  yet  I  can  hardly  bring  myself  to  think,  that  those 
philosophers  who  really  believed  a  Providence,  intended 
by  that  maxim  to  signify,  that  the  gods  had  no  displeasure 
against  sin  and  wickedness,  nor  ever  chastised  men  on  the 
account  of  it.  Seneca  himself,  in  his  95th  epistle,  soon 
after  the  words  above  produced  from  him,  saith,  "  The 
gods  neither  cause  evil,  nor  suffer  evil:  yet  they  chastise 
some  persons,  and  restrain  them,  and  lay  penalties  upon 
them,  and  sometimes  punish  them  in  a  way  that  looks  like 
doing  them  hurt."—"  Hi  nee  dant  malum,  nee  habent: 
cseterum  castigant  quosdam  et  coercent,  et  irrogant  pcenas, 
et  aliquando  specie  mali  puniunt."  Where  he  represents 
the  gods  as  laying  chastisements  and  coercions  upon  men, 
and  as  sometimes  inflicting  punishments  upon  them,  which 
have  the  appearance  of  evil.  Stobaeus  gives  it  as  the  doc- 
trine of  the  Stoics,  that  "  since  the  gods  love  virtue  and  its 
works,  and  have  an  aversion  to  vice  and  the  things  which 
are  wrought  by  it,  and  sin  is  the  work  or  effect  of  vice,  it 
is  manifest  that  all  sin  is  displeasing  to  the  gods,  and  is  an 
impietv."— -Kfl6Tg<Pflf/VgTo  -srciv  kfAu^rv^fjLu.  civu^i^ov  S^goTj  vipu^^cy)  r^ro 
h  i^iv  XTiZn^ei.  It  is  added,  that  "  a  bad  man  in  every  sin  he 
commits  does  something  displeasing  to  the  gods."-— 'Aw-ag- 
i?oit  fi-TTctii^ioii.  And  yet  they  seem  to  allow  no  proper  pu- 
nishments of  evil  actions  from  the  gods,  but  what  flow  from 
the  nature  of  the  evil  actions  themselves  (z). 

There  is  a  passage  in  Plato's  Philebus,  in  which  he  re- 
presents the  gods  as  incapable  either  of  rejoicing  or  the 
contrary.  Its  ;c«/|Os<v  S-ss^  »Tg  to  Ivcivnov  (a^.  Aijd  yet,  in  his 


(z)  Stob.  Eclog.  Ethic,  lib.  ii.  p.  181.  edit.  Plantin. 
(a)  Platen.  Opera,  p.  81. 


380     Future  Punishments  generally  rejected        Part  III. 

tenth  republic,  he  represents  the  good  or  just  man  as  be- 
loved, and  the  wicked  or  unjust  man  as  hated  by  God  or 
the  gods;  which  surely  argues  his  being  pleased  or  taking 
a  complacency  in  the  one,  and  having  a  just  displeasure 
against  the  other  (Ji).  And  indeed,  to  say  he  hateth  the 
wicked,  seems  to  be  a  stronger  expression  than  to  say  he  is 
angry  at  him.  The  same  eminent  philosopher  mentions  it 
with  appro  ation  as  an  antient  tradition,  that  "justice 
always  accompanies  the  Deity,  and  is  a  punisher  of  those 
that  transgress  the  divine  law  (c)."  This  passage  is  cited 
by  Plutarch,  who  seems  to  approve  it.  («:/).  And  in  his 
treatise  De  sera  numinis  vindicta,  he  calls  God  the  author 
or  maker  of  justice,  2/>6>j5  hfim^yo^^  and  saith,  that  to  him  it 
belongs  to  determine  when,  and  in  what  manner,  and  to 
what  degree,  to  punish  every  one  of  the  wicked  (e). 

The  people  in  general  had  a  notion  of  the  divine  justice 
in  punishing  offenders,  and  of  avenging  deities.  And  in 
this  the  poets  generally  expressed  themselves  agreeably  to 
the  popular  sentiments.  And  as  a  sense  of  guilt  is  apt  na- 
turally to  create  uneasiness  and  anxious  fears,  this  gave 
occasion,  in  the  state  of  darkness  and  ignor^mce  they  were 
in,  to  much  superstition,  and  many  expedients  for  averting 
the  displeasure  of  the  gods.  The  Epicureans  pretended  an 
effectual  remedy  against  all  this,  by  denying  a  Providence, 
©r  that  the  gods  take  any  notice  of  men  or  their  actions. 
The  other  philosophers,  who  acknowledged  a  Providence, 
though  they  could  not  deny  that  vice  and  wickedness  was 
displeasing  to  the  Deity,  yet  endeavoured  to  make  them- 
selves and  others  easy,  by  making  such  representations  of 


{b)  Platen.  Oper.  p.  518. 

(c)  Ibid.  p.  600.  G.  See  the  passage  cited  above,  p.  364. 
{d)  Plutarch,  advers.  Colot.  torn.  II.  p.  1 124.  edit.  Xyl. 
(e)  Ibid.  p.  550.  A. 


Chap.  VII.  by  the  Philosophers,  381- 

the  Divine  Goodness  as  vvt^re  not  well  consistent  with  rec- 
toral  justice.  And  they  carried  their  notions  of  God's 
being  never  angry,  and  of  his  being  by  nature  incapable  of 
doing  hurt,  so  far  as  in  a  great  measure  to  take  av  ay  the 
fear  of  punishment.  Or  if  they  allowed  that  God  or  the 
gods  sometimes  inflict  punishments  upon  men  in  this  pre- 
sent state,  yet  they  seem  generally  to  have  rejected  those 
of  the  life  to  come.  It  is  true,  that  they  could  not  help  ac- 
knowledging that  it  was  useful  to  society  that  the  people 
should  believe  them;  and  accordingly  they  frequently  ex- 
pressed themselves  in  a  popular  way,  as  if  they  thought  it 
reasonable  to  admit,  that  there  are  punishments  prepared 
for  bad  men  after  death,  but  at  other  times  they  plainly 
discarded  them,  and  represented  all  fears  of  that  kind  as 
the  effects  of  superstition;  and  this,  as  shall  be  shewn  in 
the  next  chapter,  came  at  length  to  have  a  very  b<id  effect 
upon  the  people  themselves.  There  was  therefore  great 
need  of  a  Divine  Revelation,  to  awaken  in  men  a  sense  of 
the  Divine  Justice,  and  of  the  dreadful  consequences  of  a 
life  of  sin  and  disobedience.  The  great  usefulness  and  ex- 
cellency of  the  Gospel  Revelation  appears  in  this,  that  not 
only  the  future  happiness  of  the  righteous  is  placed  in  the 
most  glorious  light,  but  the  wrath  of  God  is  there  revealed 
from  heaven  against  all  ungodliness  and  unrighteousness 
pf  men. 


382  The  Disbelief  of  a  Future  State  Part  III. 


CHAPTER  VIII. 

The  generality  of  the  people,  especially  in  the  politer  nations  of  Greece  and 
Rome,  had  fallen  in  a  great  measure  from  the  belief  of  a  future  state  before  the 
time  of  our  Saviour's  appearing.  This  is  particularly  shewn  concerning  the 
Greeks,  by  the  testimonies  of  Socrates  and  Polybius.  The  same  thing  appears 
with  regard  to  the  Romans.  Future  punishments  were  disregarded  and  ridi- 
culed even  among  the  vulgar,  who  in  this  fell  from  the  religion  of  their  ances- 
tors. The  resurrection  of  the  body  rejected  by  the  philosophers  of  Greece 
and  Rome. 

W  E  have  pretty  largely  considered  the  sentiments  of  the 
philosophers  with  regard  to  the  immortality  of  the  soul 
and  a  future  state.  And  it  appears  that  instead  of  confirm- 
ing and  establishing  the  antient  traditions  concerning  it, 
which  had  spread  very  generally  among  the  nations,  they 
greatly  weakened  and  corrupted  it.  In  this  as  well  as  other 
instances,  whilst  they  pretended  to  an  extraordinary  pene- 
tration above  the  vulgar,  they  helped  to  lead  them  astray, 
and  subverted  some  of  the  most  important  principles,  which 
lie  at  the  foundation  of  all  religion.  Many  of  them  abso- 
lutely and  avowedly  rejected  the  doctrine  of  the  immor- 
tality of  the  soul,  and  a  future  state  of  rewards  and  punish- 
ments, and  treated  it  with  contempt  and  ridicule.  Others 
talked  very  waveringly  and  uncertainly  about  it.  This  had 
a  bad  influence  upon  the  people,  especially  in  Greece, 
where  they  affected  to  be  admirers  of  wisdom,  and  to  be 
thought  to  excel  the  rest  of  man'kind  in  knowledge. 

What  the  sentiments  of  the  Athenians  were  upon  this 
subject,  even  so  early  as  the  time  of  Socrates,  plainly  ap- 
pears from  several  passages  of  Plato's  Ph?edo.  One  of  So- 
crates's  disciples,  Cebes,  tells  him,  that  the  doctrine  he 
taught  concerning  the  immortality  of  the  soul  and  a  future 
state,  "  met  with  little  credit   among  men."  iIoaAjjj'  uTifUv 


Chap.  VIII.     became  very  general  among  the  Greeks,     383 

OT<»§g;^i^/  uv^^eoTFoiq,  That  "  most  men  seemed  to  think  that  the 
soul  was  immediately  dissolved  at  death,  and  that  it  vanish- 
ed and  was  dissipated,  like  the  wind  or  smoke,  or  became 
nothing  at  all:  and  that  it  needed  no  small  persuasion  and 
faith  to  believe  that  the  soul  exists,  and  has  some  power 
and  intelligence  after  the  man  is  dead  (y)."  Socrates  him- 
self had  said  the  same  thing  just  before,  that  his  doctrine 
was  not  believed  by  the  generality.  To7«  -sroxxoig  uwifUv  -sTx^iy^n. 
Simmias,  another  of  the  dialogists  in  the  Phsedo,  repre- 
sents it  as  the  opinion  of  many,  that  the  soul  is  dissipated 
when  a  man  dies,  and  that  this  is  the  end  of  its  existence  (^). 
And  Socrates,  speaking  of  the  soul's  being  blown  away, 
and  perishing  with  the  body,  declares,  that  this  was  what 
was  said  by  most  men,  a^  (p»<ri9  oi  T^oXXot  uvB-^a/Trot  (Ji), 

From  these  testimonies  it  plainly  appears,  that  the  mor- 
tality of  the  soul  was  a  doctrine  which  prevailed  among 
the  Athenians  in  the  time  of  Socrates,  who  were  looked 
upon  as  the  most  learned  and  polite  of  all  the  Grecians. 
This  shews,  that  the  representations  of  a  future  state  made 
in  the  mysteries  had  no  great  effect  among  the  Athenians, 
in  preserving  or  promoting  the  belief  of  a  future  state, 
though  there  were  no  people  who  professed  a  greater  vene- 
ration for  the  mysteries  than  they  did,  into  which  they  were 
generally  initiated.  And  indeed  those  representations  were 
little  fitted  to  beget  the  solid  belief  of  it  in  those  that  attend- 
ed upon  them.  A  future  state  was  not  taught  there  in 
grave  and  serious  discourses,  so  as  to  instruct  the  people  to 
form  proper  notions  concerning  it,  but  by  shews  and  re- 
presentations which  might  strike  the  senses,  and  make  some 


(/)  Plato.  Opera,  p.  380.  G,  H.  et  p.  381,  A.^'edit.  Lugd. 
(g)  Ibid.  p.  384.  C. 
(A)  Ibid,  p,  385.  G. 


384  The  Disbelief  of  a  Future  State  Part  IIL 

present  impression  on  the  imagination,  but  were  not  fitted 
to  enlighten  the  understanding,  and  produce  a  real  and 
lasting  conviction  in  the  mind.  And  there  is  no  great  reason 
to  think,  that  the  state  of  things  among  the  Athenians  grew 
better  afterwards,  but  rather  the  contrary.  Since  it  was 
after  the  days  of  Socrates,  that  the  Cyrenaics,  Cynics, 
Stoics,  arose  and  flourished,  and  the  wide  extended  sect  of 
the  Epicureans,  as  well  as  the  several  kinds  of  Sceptics,  all 
of  whom  either  absolutely  denied  a  future  state,  or  repre- 
sented ic  as  utterly  uncertain. 

And  as  to  those  of  the  people  who  believed  a  future  state^ 
and  some  kind  of  happiness  reserved  for  good  men  after 
death,  they  seem  to  have  entertained  no  very  encouraging 
notions  of  it,  and  to  have  had  low  and  mean  ideas  of  that 
future  felicity.  Though  they  represented  the  condition  of 
good  men  after  death  in  the  lower  regions  as  preferable  to 
that  of  the  wicked,  yet  they  looked  upon  it  to  be  uncom- 
fortable at  best,  and  that  the  state  of  those  who  continued  in 
life  was  much  more  desirable.  Thus  in  Homer's  Odysses, 
Achilles  (though  he  was  one  of  the  heroic  souls)  tells 
Ulysses,  who  met  him  in  the  shades  below,  that  he  had  ra- 
ther be  a  rustic  on  earth,  serving  a  poor  man  for  hire,  and 
having  but  scanty  fare,  than  to  have  a  large  empire  over  all 
the  dead.  There  are  other  passages  of  Homer  to  the  same 
purpose,  which  make  a  melancholy  representation  of  the 
state  of  the  dead  in  Hades,  even  those  of  them  that  were 
in  Elysium:  though  he  sometimes  represents  it,  as  Virgil 
does  afterwards,  as  a  delectable  region. 

Plato  in  the  beginning  of  hts  third  Republic,  takes  no- 
tice of  several  of  those  passages  in  Homer,  in  which  the 
souls  in  Hades  are  represented  as  disconsolate  and  lament- 
ing their  condition.  And  he  finds  fault  with  them  on  a  po- 
litical account,  as  tending  to  weaken  men's  courage,  and 
make  them  afraid  of  death.  But  the  authority  of  Homer, 
who  was  looked  upon  as  a  great  divine,  and  in  a  manner  in- 


Chap.  VIII.     became  very  general  among  the  Greeks,    385 

spired,  would  go  farther  with  the  people  than  that  of  Plato, 
whose  sublime  speculations  were  comparatively  little  re- 
garded. And  he  himselt  in  his  Cratylus,  where  he  endea- 
vours to  give  high  and  honourable  thoughts  of  Pluto  and 
Hades,  yet  represents  it  as  greatly  dreaded  by  the  vulgar, 
who  looked  upon  it  as  a  dismal  and  gloomy  abode.  So  that 
those  among  the  people  who  believed  a  future  state,  could 
not  be  properly  said  to  hope  for  it.  It  was  rather  to  them 
an  object  of  dread:  and  therefore  St.  Paul  justly  gives  it  as 
the  character  of  the  Heathens  in  general,  that  they  were 
"  without  hope  (i)." 

There  is  a  remarkable  passage  of  Polybius,  which  shews 
that  the  disbelief  of  a  future  state  was  in  his  time  become 
very  common  and  fashionable,  both  among  persons  of  su- 
perior rank,  and  among  the  lower  kind  of  people.  That 
sage  author  blames  the  great  men  and  magistrates  as  very 
much  wanting  in  true  policy,  in  that,  whereas  the  antients 
had  with  great  wisdom  propagated  the  belief  of  a  future 
state,  and  particularly  of  future  punishments  among  the 
multitude,  which  could  scarce  be  kept  in  order  but  by  the 
terror  of  those  punishments;  the  men  of  that  age  inconsi- 
derately and  absurdly  rejected  them,  and  thereby  encourag- 
ed the  people  to  despise  those  terrors.  And  to  this  he  at- 
tributes the  great  and  general  want  of  honesty  among  the 
Greeks,  and  the  little  regard  that  was  paid  to  an  oath  or  to 
their  trust  (/^).  The  learned  bishop  of  Gloucester,  who  has 
quoted  that  passage  at  large,  makes  this  just  observation 
upon  it,  that  Polybius  ascribes  the  approaching  ruin  of  the 
Greeks,  and  their  having  fallen  from  their  antient  virtue 
and   glory,  to  "  a   certain  libertinism,    which    had    spread 


(0  Eph.  ii.  12.   1  Thess.  iv.  13. 
Ik)  Polyb.  Hist.  lib.  vi.  cap.  54,  55. 
Vol.  II.  .1  C 


586       The  Romans  also  fell  from  their  antient     Part  III, 

amongst  the  people  of  condition,  who  piqued  themselves 
on  a  penetration  superior  to  their  ancestors  and  to  the  peo- 
ple, of  regarding,  and  preposterously  teaching  others  to 
regard,  the  restraints  of  religion  as  illusory  and  unman- 
ly (/)."  And  I  cannot  help  observing  that  Polybius  himself, 
who  considers  this  matter  merely  as  a  politician,  in  that 
very  passage  where  he  blames  the  great  men  among  the 
Greeks  for  encouraging  the  people  to  disbelieve  and  despise 
future  punishments,  represents  them  as  no  better  than  use- 
ful fictions:  and  how  could  it  be  expected,  that  the  people 
should  be  much  influenced  by  notions,  which  they  had  rea- 
son to  think  those  who  proposed  them  to  their  belief  did 
not  themselves  believe? 

Polybius  indeed,  in  the  passage  here  referred  to,  praises 
the  Romans  for  having  acted  in  this  matter  much  more 
wisely  than  the  Greeks,  and  shewing  a  greater  regard  to 
religion,  which,  he  observes,  had  a  good  effect  upon  the 
morals  of  the  people.  And  it  is  true,  that  in  the  antient 
and  most  virtuous  times  of  the  Roman  republic,  the  doc- 
trine of  a  future  state,  and  particularly  of  future  punish- 
ments, seems  to  have  been  generally  received  and  believed 
among  the  people.  But  afterwards  this  doctrine  fell  into 
discredit,  and  was  despised  in  the  more  learned  and  civiliz- 
ed, but  dissolute  ages  of  the  Roman  state,  when  they  became 
abandoned  to  vice  and  licentiousness.  In  proportion  as  the 
Greek  learning  and  philosophy  made  a  progress  among  the 
Romans,  the  antient  traditionary  belief  of  future  rewards 
and  punishments  was  rejected.  How  much  the  disbelief 
of  future  retributions  prevailed  among  the  great  men  and 
gentlemen  at  Rome  appears  from  what  Caesar  said  in  full 


(0  Div.  Leg.  Vol.  II.  book  iii.  sect.   1.  p.   79,80^  81.  4th 
edit. 


Chap.  VIII.         Belief  of  a  future  State.  387 

senate  in  his  speech  on  occasion  of  Catiline's  conspiracy, 
where  he  openly  declares,  "  to  those  that  live  in  sorrow 
and  misery,  death  is  a  repose  from  their  calamities,  not  a 
torment:  that  it  puts  an  end  to  all  the  evils  mortals  are 
subject  to:  and  that  beyond  it  there  is  no  place  left  for  an- 
guish or  joy."  "  In  luctu  atque  miseriis  mortem  aerumna- 
rum  requiem,  non  cruciatum  esse;  earn  cuncta  mortalium 
mala  dissolvere:  ultra  neque  curae  neque  gaudio  locum  esse 
(m)."  Here  he  probably  expresses  the  general  sentiments 
of  the  Roman  gentlemen  at  that  time,  as  well  as  his  own; 
or  else  he  would  not  have  delivered  himself  thus  on  that 
occasion,  when  it  was  his  interest  not  to  say  any  thing  which 
might  give  offence  to  his  hearers  (n),  Cato,  in  his  celebrat- 
ed speech  in  answer  to  Caesar,  slightly  passes  over  what  he 
had  said  against  a  future  state,  with  only  insinuating,  that 
"  Caesar  looked  upon  those  things  to  be  fables,  which  are  re- 
lated concerning  the  Inferi,  where  bad  men,  far  from  the 
mansions  of  the  virtuous,  are  confined  to  dreary  abodes, 
abominable  and  full  of  horrors."  "  Caesar  bene  et  composite 


(m)  Apud  Sallust.  Bel.  Catilin.  cap.  51. 

(n)  That  this  continued  to  be  the  prevailing  opinion  among  the 
gentlemen  of  Rome,  may  be  gathered  from  what  Pliny  the  fa- 
mous naturalist,  who  lived  a  considerable  time  after  Caesar,  con- 
fidently pronounces.  "  All  men  are  in  the  same  condition  after 
their  last  day  as  before  their  first;  nor  have  they  any  more  sense 
either  in  body  or  soul  after  they  are  dead,  than  before  they  were 
born."  "  Omnibus  a  supremo  die  eadem  quae  ante  primum;  nee 
magis  a  morte  sensus  uUus,  aut  corporis  aut  animae,  quam  ante 
natalem."  And  in  vi'hat  follows,  he  endeavours  to  .expose  the  ab- 
surdity of  that  opinion  which  attributes  immortality  to  the  soul: 
and  says,  "  these  are  childish  and  senseless  fi<;tions  of  mortals, 
who  are  ambitious  of  a  never  ending  existence." — "  Puerilium 
ista  deliramentorum,  avidaeque  nunquam  desinere  mortalitati^ 
commenta  sunt."  Hist.  Nat.  lib.  vii.  cap.  55. 


388  Future  punishments  despised  Part  III. 

paulo  ante  in  hoc  ordine  de  vita  et  morte  disseruit,  credo, 
falsa  existumans  ea  qu£e  de  Inferis  memorantur,  diverso  iti- 
nere  malos  a  bonis  loca  tetra,  inculta,  fccda,  atque  formido- 
losa  habere  (o).''  And  Cicero  in  his  fourth  oration  against 
Catiline,  spoken  on  the  same  occasion,  says  "  That  in  order 
to  deter  wicked  men,  the  antients  would  have  it  believed, 
that  punishments  were  prepared  for  the  impious  in  the  infer- 
nal regions,  that  they  might  be  under  the  influence  of  fear 
in  this  life,  because  they  were  sensible,  that  if  these  were 
taken  away  death  itself  was  not  to  be  dreaded."  "  Itaque  ut 
aliqua  in  vita  formido  improbis  esset  posita,  apud  inferos 
ejusmodi  qusedam  illi  antiqui  supplicia  impiis  constituta 
esse  voluerunt:  quod  videlicet  intclligebant,  his  remotis, 
non  esse  mortem  ipsam  pertimescendam  C/')."  It  is  observ- 
able that  both  Cato  and  Cicero  mention  the  doctrine  of  fu- 
ture punishments  as  held  by  the  antients;  but  neither  of 
them  charge  Caesar  with  falsehood  or  with  impiety  in  de- 
nying it:  nor  does  either  of  them  attempt  to  prove  the 
truth  of  that  doctrine,  or  offer  any  arguments  to  support 
it.  And  indeed  Cato,  who  was  a  rigid  Stoic,  if  he  followed 
the  opinions  of  his  sect,  could  lay  little  stress  on  future  pu- 
nishments, which  they  generally  discarded.  And  it  appears 
from  several  passages  before  produced,  that  Cicero  looked 
upon  them  to  be  vain  and  groundless  terrors.  What  Caesar 
said  in  the  senate,  Cicero  declared  more  fully  in  an  assem- 
bly of  the  Roman  people:  which  he  would  not  have  done, 
if  he  had  not  known  that  this  was  the  opinion  which  gene- 
rally prevailed  among  the  people  at  that  time  (^). 

It  has  been  already  observed',  that  in  his  first  book  of  the 


(o)  Sallust.  ubi  supra,  cap.  52. 
(Ji)  Orat.  in  Catilin.  4to.  sect.  4. 
(9)  See  here  above,  p.  371. 


Chap.  VIII.  even  by  the  Vulgar,  389 

Tusculan  Disputations,  where  he  argues  for  the  immortality 
of  the  soul,  he  represents  the  stories  of  future  punishments 
as  what  scarce  any  body  believed  at  Rome.  To  which  may 
be  added  what  he  says  in  the  person  of  Balbus  in  his  second 
book  of  the  Nature  of  the  Gods,  "  what  old  woman  can 
be  found  so  stnseless,  as  to  be  afraid  of  the  monstrous 
things  in  the  infernal  regions,  which  were  antiently  believ- 
ed?" "  Qiiae  anus  tam  excors  inveniri  potest,  quae  ilia,  qua 
quondam  credebantur,  apud  inferos  portenta  extimescat 
(rj?"  Juvenal,  who,  like  the  other  poets,  generally  speaks 
agreeably  to  the  popular  sentiments,  says  the  same  thing, 
and  represents  the  antient  accounts  of  the  infernal  regions 
as  universally  despised  and  disbelieved  even  by  the  meanest 
of  the  people. 

"  Esse  aliquos  manes,  et  subterranea  regna, 
Et  centum,  et  Stygio  ranas  in  gurgite  nigras, 
Atque  una  transire  vadum  tot  millia  cymba 
Nee  pueri  credunt,  nisi  qui  nondum  aere  lavantur  (s)" 

Sextus  Empiricus  indeed  pretends  that  there  was  as  general 
a  consent  in  believing  the  poetic  fables  of  hell,  as  in  believ- 
ing the  being  of  a  God  (f).  But  that  famous  sceptic  does 
not  represent  this  matter  fairly.  He  says  it  only  with  a  view 
to  weaken  the  argument  for  the  existence  of  a  Deity  drawn 
from  the  general  consent  of  nations  concerning  it.  For  the 
testimonies  which  have  been  produced  plainly  shew,  that 
at  the  time  when  he  writ,  the  stories  about  the  Inferi  met 
with  very  little  credit  in  the  world. 

I  would  observe  by  the  way,  that  the  poetical  represen- 
tations of  a  future  state,  especially  those  relating  to  future 


(r)  De  Nat.  Deer.  lib.  ii.  cap.  2. 
(*)  Juven.  Satyr  II.  lin.  149.  et  seq. 
(t)  Advers.  Physic,  lib.  viii.  cap.  2. 


390  Future  Punishments  despised  Part  III. 

punishments,  were  in  effect  the  same  that  Were  made  use  of 
in  the  mysteries,  and  which,  I  have  shewn,  were  then  little 
regarded  even  among  the  people.  It  is  true,  that  Celsus  in 
a  passage  cited  before,  pretends  that  the  doctrine  of  future 
punishments  was  equally  taught  among  the  Pagans  as  among 
the  Christians,  especially  by  those  who  were  the  interpreters 
of  the  sacred  rites,  and  the  mystagogues,  who  initiated  per- 
sons into  the  mysteries,  or  presided  in  them.  But  then  in 
what  follows  he  supposes,  that  though  both  the  mystagogues 
and  the  Christians  taught  future  punishments,  yet  they  dif- 
fered in  their  accounts  of  them;  and  that  the  question  was, 
which  of  their  accounts  were  truest.  Origen  in  his  reflec- 
tions on  this  passage  observes,  that  it  is  reasonable  to  think, 
that  they  had  the  truth  on  their  side,  whose  doctrine  on 
this  head  had  such  an  influence  on  their  hearers,  that  they 
lived  as  if  they  were  persuaded  of  the  truth  of  it:  that  the 
Jews  and  Christians  are  mightily  aff'ected  with  the  persua- 
sion they  have  of  the  future  rewards  of  good  men,  and  pu- 
nishments of  the  wicked.  But,  says  he,  '*  let  Celsus,  or  any 
other  man  that  pleases,  shew  any  persons  who  have  been 
wrought  upon  by  the  terrors  of  the  eternal  punishments  as 
represented  by  the  mystagogues:"  where  he  intimates,  that 
the  mysteries  had  very  little  effect,  and  made  small  impres- 
sions on  the  minds  of  men  (w).  And  he  elsewhere  observes, 
that  Celsus  thought,  that  the  Christians  only  feigned  the 
things  they  taught  concerning  a  future  state,  to  fill  the  vul- 
gar with  amazement,  and  did  not  declare  the  truth;  and 
compares  them  with  those  who  in  the  Bacchanalian  myste- 
ries produced  t«6  (puTfAum  tcxl  ^i^^eiru)  spectres  and  terrible  ap- 
pearances; where  Celsus  seems  plainly  to  intimate  that  the 
representations  made  of  these  things  in  the  mysteries  were 


(w)  Origen  cont.  Cels.  lib.  viii.  p.  408,  409.  edit.  Spenser, 


Chap,  VIII.  even  by  the  Vulgar.  391 

only  fictions  designed  to  frighten  the  people,  and  had  no 
foundation  in  truth  {x).  To  which  Origen  answers,  v;hether 
what  is  said  concerning  the  Bacchanalian  mysteries  be  cre- 
dible or  not,  let  the  Greeks  declare:  the  Christians  are 
only  concerned  to  defend  their  own  doctrines. 

Strabo,  an  author  justly  esteemed,  who  flourished  under 
the  reign  of  the  emperor  Augustus,  saith  of  the  Indian 
Brachmans,  that  they  composed  fables,  like  Plato,  concern- 
ing the  immortality  of  the  soul,  and  the  judgments  of  Ha- 
des; where  he  seems  to  pronounce  all  these  things  to  be  only 
fables  and  fictions  (z/).  Plutarch,  who  lived  some  time  after 
the  coming  of  our  Saviour,  in  his  treatise,  which  is  design- 
ed to  prove.  That  it  is  not  possible  so  live  pleasurably  ac- 
cording to  the  tenets  of  Epicurus,  observes,  that  the  vulgar, 
a(  woAAof,  the  most  of  mankind,  were  ready  to  admit,  what  he 
calls  "  the  fabulous  hope  of  immortality,  but  that  they  had 
no  fear  of  the  punishments  said  to  be  in  Hades," — »nv  (pi^a 
(urie)  T»y  Iv  «5«  (2).  And  again  he  says,  "  there  are  not  many 
that  fear  these  things:"  and  he  treats  them  as  fabulous  re- 
lations, and  the  talcs  of  mothers  and  nurses  («).  The  same 
author,  in  his  tract  De  sera  Numinis  vindicta,  having  said 
that  during  this  life  the  soul  is  in  a  conflict,  and  when  that 
is  over  receives  according  to  its  deserts,  adds  "  but  what 
rewards  or  punishments  the  soul  being  alone  [i.  e.  separated 
from  the  body]  receives  for  the  things  done  in  the  past  life, 
are  nothing  to  us,  who  are  alive,  but  are  disbelieved,  and 
hid  from  us," — ht^h  eiW  ^505  vif^u^  tjuvreti^  uXX*  uTr/^iivTett  xeci 
A«v^«v»o*<i/.  Where  he  shews  that  in  his  days  the  rewards 
and  punishments  of  a  future  state  were  little  regarded  or 


(x)  Grig,  contra  Cels.  lib.  iv.  p.  167,  ^ 

(y)  Strab.  lib.  xv. 

(z)  Plutarch.  Oper.  torn.  II.  p.  1104.  C.  edit.  Xyl. 
(a)  Ibid.  torn.  II.  p.  1 105.  B.  edit.  Xyl. 


392  Passages  of  the  Poets  Part  III. 

believed  by  the  generality  of  the  Heathens,  and  were  look- 
ed upon  as  things  that  did  not  concern  them.  And  the 
truth  is,  that  in  the  Pagan  theology,  provided  a  mnn  were 
diligent  in  observing  the  established  rites  of  worship,  to- 
wards the  popular  deities,  he  might  pass  for  a  religious 
man,  though  he  believed  nothing  at  all  of  the  world  to  come. 
But  no  sooner  did  they  embrace  Christianity,  but  it  wrought 
in  them  the  most  firm  and  solid  persuasion  of  a  future 
state  of  rewards  and  punishments,  which  neither  their 
boasted  mysteries,  nor  the  writings  of  their  ablest  philoso- 
phers, were  able  to  effect  before. 

I  have  hitherto  taken  little  notice  of  the  writings  of  the 
poets.  There  are  several  passages  in  them,  which  proceed 
upon  the  supposition  of  the  rewards  and  punishments  of  a 
future  state.  And  something  of  this  kind  made  a  part  of  the 
poetical  machinery;  yet  they  express  themselves  on  se- 
veral occasions,  as  if  they  thought  death  brought  an  utter 
extinction  of  being,  and  took  away  all  sense  of  evil.  Plutarch, 
in  his  Consolation  to  Apollonius,  quotes  this  passage  of  an 
antient  poet,  that  no  grief  or  evil  touches  the  dead, 

He  there  also  cites  another  passage  from  a  poet,  signifying 
that  the  dead  man  is  in  the  same  condition  he  was  in  before 
he  was  born  {b),  Stobseus  ascribes  the  first  of  these  pas- 
sages to  -^schylus.  There  are  passages  of  the  same  kind  in 
Epicharmus,  in  Sophocles,  Euripides,  and  Astydamas,  re- 
ferred toby  the  learned  Dr.  Whitby,  who  all,  says  he,  agree 
in  this,  that  the  dead  are  sensible  of  no  grief  or  evil  (c). 
As  to  the  Roman  poets,  I  need  not  mention  the  famous 


(a)  Plutarch.  Opera,  torn.  H.  p.  109.  E. 
(c)  Whitby's  Commentary  on  2  Tim.  i.  10. 


Chap.  VIII.         against  a  Future  State,  39^ 

Lucretius^  who  published  a  system  of  Epicureanism  which 
he  (rndeavoured  to  recommend  to  his  countrymen^  by  all 
the  charms  of  poetry,  and  particularly  extolled  his  philoso^ 
phical  hero  for  freeing  men  from  the  dread  of  punishments 
after  death.  And  it  is  well  known,  that  both  the  Greek 
and  Roman  poets  draw  arguments  from  this  consideration, 
that  life  is  short,  and  death  shall  put  an  utter  end  to  ouf 
existence;  to  urge  men  to  lay  hold  on  the  present  oppor- 
tunity for  giving  a  full  indulgence  to  their  appetites,  ac- 
cording to  that  libertine  maxim,  "  let  us  eat  and  drink,  for 
to-morrow  we  die."  Several  passages  of  this  kind  might 
be  produced  from  Strato  and  others  of  the  Greeks.  To  the 
same  purpose  is  that  noted  passage  of  Catullus, 

"  Vivamus,  mea  Lesbia,  atqua  amemus 
Soles  occidere  et  redire  possunt: 
Nobis  cum  semel  occidit  brevis  lux, 
Nox  est  perpetua  una  dormienda." 

And  Horace, 

"  Vitae  summa  brevis  spem  nos  vetat  inchoare  longam» 
Jam  nox  te  premet  fabulaeque  Manes.** 

Lib.  I.  Odeiv.  15. 

See  also  iib.  i.  Ode  11.  and  other  passages  of  the  same  kind. 
Persius  also  represents  it  as  the  language  of  many  in  hi« 
time, 

"  Indulge  genio:  carpamus  dulcia:  nostrum  est 
Quod  vivis;  cinis  et  Manes  et  fabula  fies/* 

Satyr.  V.  Isl,  1^1 

I  shall  only  add  one  passage  more  from  Seneca  the  Tra» 
gedian, 

"  Post  mortem  nihil  est,  ipsaque  mors  nihil — ^' 
Quaeris  quo  jaceas  post  obitum  loco, 
Quo  non  nata  jacent."  ^ 

1  would   conclude  with   observing,  that  as  to  the  resur- 
rection of  the  body,  neither  the  philosophers  nor  the  vulgar 

Vol.  IL  a  D  - 


39^  The  Resurrection  of  the  Body  Part  IIL 

among  the  Greeks  and  Romans  seem  to  have  had  any  no-:' 
tion  of  it.  When  St.  Paul  in  his  excellent  discourse  to  th€ 
Athenians  spoke  of  the  resurrection  of  the  dead,  we  are 
told  his  hearers  mocked  or  treated  it  with  contempt,  as 
a  strange  doctrine  which  they  had  never  heard  of  be- 
fore (fi^).  The  Epicureans  and  Stoics  are  particularly  men- 
tioned. But  it  was  equally  true  of  all  the  other  sects  of 
philosophers.  Those  who  argued  most  for  the  immortality 
of  the  soul,  as  the  Pythagoreans  and  Platonists,  held  the 
doctrine  of  the  resurrection  of  the  body  in  contempt.  And 
this  indeed  flowed  from  the  principles  of  their  philosophy. 
For  they  looked  upon  the  body  to  be  the  prison  and  sepul- 
chre of  the  soul,  into  which  it  was  sent  down  by  way  of 
punishment  for  sins  committed  in  a  former  state:  that  the 
happiness  of  the  soul  consisted  in  its  being  loosed  and  dis- 
engaged from  the  body:  and  that  a  resurrection  of  the 
body,  or  the  soul's  being  again  united  to  it,  if  it  were 
possible,  was  far  from  being  a  desirable  thing.  Celsus  calls 
it  the  hope  of  worms,  a  very  filthy  and  abominable,  as 
well  as  an  impossible  thing:  and  that  it  is  what  God  nei- 
ther can  nor  will  do,  as  being  base  and  contrary  to  na- 
ture (f).  But  it  is  to  be  observed,  that  the  latter  Platonists 
and  Pythagoreans,  after  Christianity  appeared,  supposed 
that  purified  souls  after  their  departure  from  the  body  were 
invested  with  shining,  agile,  celestial  bodies,  pretty  nearly 
answering  St.  Paul's  description  of  the  risen  bodies  of  the 
saints,  in  the  noble  account  he  gives  of  the  change  which 
shall  pass  upon  them  at  the  resurrection.  And  it  is  very 
probable,  that,  in  this  as  well  as  other  instances,  they  im- 
proved their  notions  from  the  Gospel  discoveries,  though 


(d)  Actsxvii.  18.  20.  32. 

(e)  Orig.  cent.  Cels.  lib.  v.  p.  340. 


Chap.  VIII.         rejected  by  the  Philosophers,  395 

being  no  friends  to  Christianity,  they  were  unwilling  to  ac- 
knowledge the  obligation.  See  Dr.  .Whitby,  in  his  Annota- 
tions on  1  Cor.  XV.  44. 

It  is  said,  indeed,  that  there  were  some  notion  of  the 
resurrection  of  the  body  among  the  antient  Persians.  And 
some  think  that  to  this  Diogenes  Laertius  has  a  reference, 
when  he  gives  it  as  a  part  of  the  doctrine  of  the  antient 
Magi,  uvuQicoffiirB-xt  TiSi  uvB-p^TTiiii  *^  iTiff^en  ttB-xveira^.'^J'^  That 
men  shall  live  again,  and  be  immortal  (^ )."  And  it  is  not 
improbable,  that  some  notion  of  the  resurrection  of  the  body 
might  have  been  part  of  the  original  tradition,  derived 
along  with  the  notion  of  the  immortality  of  the  soul  from 
the  first  ages.  That  it  obtained  among  the  Jews  a  conside- 
rable time  before  the  coming  of  our  Saviour,  appears  from 
the  account  given  us  of  Eleazar,  and  of  the  mother  and  her 
seven  sons,  who  were  put  to  the  most  cruel  torments  for 
their  religion  under  the  persecution  of  Antiochus  Epiphanes, 
and  who  comforted  themselves  with  the  hopes  that  God 
would  raise  them  from  the  dead  (^).  And  to  this  the  sa- 
cred writer  of  the  epistle  to  the  Hebrews  probably  refers, 
when  he  speaks  of  the  good  men  in  former  times,  who 
"  were  tortured,  not  accepting  deliverance,  that  they  might 
obtain  a  better  resurrection  (A)*"  From  several  passages  in 
the  New  Testament  it  is  evident,  that  this  was  a  doctrine 
generally  received  among  the  Jews,  at  the  time  of  the  first 
publishing  of  the  Gospel,  except  by  the  Sadducees,  who 
for  that  reason  had  an  ill  character  among  the  people.  But 
the  notions  the  Jews  generally  entertained  of  the  resur- 
rection seem  to  have  been  very  gross,  as  is  manifest  from 


(/)  Laert.  in  Prootm.  segm.  9, 
(g)  2  Maccab.  chap.  vi.  and  vii. 
{h)  Heb.  xi.  35. 


396  The  Resurrection  of  the  Body  Part  III. 

the  objection  of  the  Sadducets  against  it,  and  which  they 
were  at  a  loss  how  to  answer,  till  our  Saviour  taught  them 
to  form  more  just  and  sublime  notions  concerning  it. 

If  therefore  we  suppose  some  notion  of  the  resurrection 
of  the  body  to  have  been  communicated  to  mankuid  in  the 
lirst  ages,  it  became  soon  corrupted  and  obscurtd.  And 
some  learned  persons  have  suppos- d,  that  the  doctrine  of 
the  transmigration  of  souls,  which  became  v  ry  gene- 
ral, was  a  corruption  and  depravation  of  that  doctrine, 
and  at  length  greatly  contributed  to  destroy  the  true  no- 
tion of  it. 

Perhaps  also  it  was  owing  to  a  corruption  of  the  doctrine 
of  the  resurrection  of  the  bod)^,  that  in  many  parts  of  the 
world,  where  they  held  a  life  after  this,  the  notion  they 
had  of  it  seems  to  have  been  this,  that  it  shall  be  a  life 
perfectly  like  the  present,  with  the  same  bodily  wants,  the 
same  exercises  and  employments,  and  the  same  enjo\  ments 
and  pleasures,  uhich  they  had  here.  Hence  it  was  that 
among  some  nations  it  was  customary  for  the  women,  the 
slaves,  the  subjects  or  friends  of  the  deceased,  to  kill  them- 
selves, that  in  the  other  m  orld  they  might  serve  those  whom 
they  loved  and  respected  in  this.  Such  was  the  practice 
among  the  antient  Danes,  as  Bartholinus  informs  us,  in  his 
Danish  Antiquities.  Thus  also  it  still  is  in  Japan,  Macas- 
sar, and  other  places.  It  is  said  to  be  a  custom  in  Guinea, 
that  when  a  king  dies  many  are  slain,  and  their  bloody 
carcases  buried  him,  that  they  may  again  live  with  him 
in  the  other  world  (2).  It  was  formerly'a  well  known  cus- 
tom in  the  East  Indies  for  women  to  kill  themselves  after 
the  death  of  their  husbands,  that  they  might  accompany 
them  in  the  next  life.    And  so  lately  as  in  the  year  1710, 


(0  English  acquisitions  in  Guinea,  p.  22. 


Chap.  VIII.         rejected  by  the  Philosophers.  SOf 

when  the  prince  of  Morava  on  the  coast  of  Coromandel 
died,  aged  above  eighty  years,  his  wives,  to  the  number 
of  forty-seven,  were  burned  with  his  corpse  (^).  We  are 
told  also,  that  in  Terra  Firma  in  America,  when  any  of 
their  casiques  dies,  his  chief  servants,  men  and  women, 
kill  themselves  to  serve  him  in  the  other  world,  and  they 
bury  with  them  maize  and  other  provisions  for  their  sub- 
sistence (/).  And  it  is  said  concerning  the  disciples  of  Foe 
in  China,  that  some  of  them,  when  they  meet  with  obsta- 
cles to  their  passions,  go  together  to  hang  or  drown  them- 
selves, that  when  they  rise  together  again,  they  may  become 
husband  and  wife  (w). 

Mons.  de  Montesquieu,  who  mentions  some  of  these 
things,  is  of  opinion,  that  this  flows  not  so  much  from  a 
belief  of  the  immortality  of  the  soul,  as  of  the  resurrection 
of  the  body:  from  whence  they  drew  this  consequence,  that 
after  their  death  men  would  have  the  same  sentiments,  ne- 
cessities, and  passions  as  now.  I  do  not  deny  but  this 
might  have  been  occasioned  by  an  abuse  or  misunderstand- 
ing of  the  doctrine  of  the  resurrection  of  the  body.  But  it 
does  not  necessarily  follow,  that  they  believed  the  same 
body  that  died  would  rise  again,  though  probably  they 
thought  the  soul  would  have  bodies  of  the  like  kind,  or  cor- 
poreal vehicles,  which  would  have  the  same  wants,  neces- 
sities and  enjoyments,  as  they  have  at  present.  But  the  re- 
mark which  that  celebrated  author  makes  upon  the  whole 


(k)  There  is  a  particular  account  of  this  in  a  letter  from  F. 
Martin  to  F.  de  Villetie,  who  were  both  of  them  missionaries  in 
that  country.  Concerning  which,  see  Millar's  History  of  the  Pro- 
pagation of  Christianity,  Vol.  II.  p.  154,  155.    \ 

(/)  Perrier's  Collection  of  Voyages,  p.  194. 

(m)  See  a  tract  of  a  Chinese  philosopher  in  Du  Haide*s  His- 
tory of  China,  Vol.  III.  p.  272.  English  Translation. 


398     The  ^ross  Notions  of  a  Future  State^^c.     Part  IIL 

is  very  judicious.  "That  it  is  not  sufficient  that  religion 
should  establish  the  doctrine  of  a  future  state,  but  it  should 
also  direct  to  a  proper  use  of  it:  and  that  this  is  admirably- 
done  by  the  Christian  religion.  The  doctrine  of  a  future 
state  is  there  represented  as  the  object  of  faith,  and  not  of 
sense  or  knowledge:  and  even  the  resurrection  of  the  body, 
as  there  taught,  leads  to  spiritual  ideas  (^z)."  How  admira- 
bly our  Saviour  and  his  apostles,  who  writ  under  the  direc- 
tion of  his  Spirit,  have  provided  against  the  abuse  of  the 
doctrine  of  the  resurrection,  and  what  noble  ideas  they  have 
given  of  it,  will  be  evident  to  any  one  that  impartially  con- 
siders what  is  said  of  it  by  our  blessed  Lord,  Luke  xx.  35, 
36.  and  by  St.  Paul,  1  Cor.  xv.  from  the  42d  verse  to  the 
end;  and  1  Thess.  iv,  13—18. 


(n)  L*Esprit  de  Loix,  Vol.  IL  livre  xxiv.  chap.   19.  p.  167. 
edit.  Edinb. 


399 


CHAPTER  IX. 

Our  Lord  Jesus  Christ  brought  life  and  immortality  into  the  most  clear  and  opee. 
light  by  the  Gospel.  He  both  gave  the  fullest  assurance  of  that  everlasting  hap- 
piness which  is  prepared  for  good  men  in  a  future  state,  and  made  the  most  in- 
viting discoveries  of  the  nature  and  greatness  of  that  happiness.  The  Gospel 
also  contains  express  declarations  concerning  the  punishment  which  shall  be 
inflicted  upon  the  wicked  in  a  future  state.  The  necessity  and  impoi'tance  of 
this  part  of  the  Gospel  Revelation  shewn.  The  Conclusion,  with  some  general 
reflections  upon  the  whole. 

From  the  account  which  hath  been  given  of  the  state  of 
the  Heathen  world,  with  respect  to  the  belief  of  a  state  of 
future  rewards  and  punishments,  it  appears,  that  some  no- 
tion of  this  obtair.ed  among  the  nations  from  the  remotest 
antiquity:  that  the  most  eminent  Pagan  writers  represent  it 
as  a  tradition,  which  obtained  long  before  the  ages  of  learn- 
ing and  philosophy,  and  which  was  regarded  as  of  divine 
original:  that  in  process  of  time,  this  tradition  became 
greatly  corrupted,  and  was  mixed  with  fables  and  fictions 
by  the  poets  and  mythologists,  and  by  the  legislators  and 
civil  magistrates  too,  with  a  view  to  adapt  it  to  the  gross 
imaginations  of  the  people,  and  to  serve  political  purposes, 
and  the  interests  of  society  and  government:  that  after- 
wards, when  the  philosophers  arose,  who  pretended  to  an 
extraordinary  penetration  above  the  vulgar,  and  to  ex- 
amine every  thing  by  the  rules  of  strict  reasoning,  they  in 
this  as  well  as  other  instances,  corrupted  the  antient  tradi- 
tions, and  for  the  most  part  rejected  the  immortality  of  the 
soul,  and  a  state  of  rewards  and  punishments:  that  those 
of  them  who  professed  to  believe  it,  the  chief  of  whom 
were  the  Pythagoreans  and  Platonists,  generally  placed  it 
on  wrong  foundations,  and  argued  for  it  from  principles 
which  were  either  false  or  not  to  bQ  depended  upon:  that 


400      Our  Saviour  Jesus  Christ  hath  brought     Part  IIL 

those  who  sometimes  expressed  themselves  strongly  in  fa- 
vour of  the  immortality  of  the  soul  and  a  future  state,  at 
othc  r  times  said  things  which  seem  to  be  inconsistent  with 
that  belief:  or,  if  they  really  believed  it,  they  did  not  pre- 
tend to  a  certainty,  and  frequently  spoke  of  it  in  a  way 
which  shewed  they  had  not  attained  to  a  satisfying  convic-^ 
tion  concerning  it:  that  their  doctrine  of  future  rewards 
was  so  managed  as  to  yield  little  comfort  and  encourage- 
ment to  the  generality  of  good  and  virtuous  persons;  and  if 
they  sometimes  said  high  things  of  that  future  happiness, 
it  related  chiefly  to  some  eminent  and  privileged  souls, 
such  as  legislators,  heroes,  and  philosophers,  and  those  who 
distinguished  themselves  by  public  services,  and  by  their 
bravery  in  war:  that  as  to  future  punishments,  though  they, 
were  sensible  that  it  was  useful  to  society  to  have  them  be- 
lieved, yet  they  generally  rejected  them,  and  advanced  such 
notions  of  the  Divine  Goodness,  as  left  little  room  for  pu- 
nishments in  a  future  state;  and  they  frequently  treated  all 
fears  of  any  evil  after  death  as  the  effects  of  a  vain  and 
foolish  superstition. 

This  account  of  the  sentiments  of  the  antient  philoso- 
phers, especially  those  of  Greece  and  Rome,  with  regard 
to  a  future  state,  is  far  from  coming  up  to  the  high  idea 
many  have  conceived  of  them;  but  that  it  is  not  a  wrong 
charge,  has,  I  think,  been  sufficiently  shewn  in  the  fore- 
going part  of  this  treatise.  And  though  some  remains  of 
the  antient  traditions  concerning  a  future  state  of  retribu- 
tions were  still  to  be  found  among  the  people,  yet  they 
were  in  a  great  measure  worn  away,  and  had  lost  their 
force  and  influence,  even  among  the  vulgar  Pagans,  about 
the  time  when  the  Gospel  was  published  to  the  world. 

As  to  the  Jews,  we  have  the  testimony  of  our  blessed 
Lord  himself,  and  of  the  sacred  writer  of  the  epistle  to 
the  Hebrews,  that  the  doctrine  of  a  future  state  was  an 
article  of   the    religion  of  the    antient  patriarchs,  the  an^ 


Chap.  IX.       Life  and  Imrnortality  to  Light,  401 

cestors  of  their  nation  (o).  And  though  there  is  no  express 
mention  of  a  future  happiness  among  the  promises  of  the 
law  of  Moses,  taken  in  the  literal  sense,  yet  that  the  be- 
lief of  a  future  state  obtained  among  that  people,  appears 
to  me  for  several  reasons  highly  probable;  but  their  no- 
tions of  it  seem  to  have  been  mixed  with  much  obscurity. 
There  was  a  considerable  sect  among  them  at  the  time  of 
our  Saviour's  coming,  viz.  the  Sadducees,  who  professed  a 
strict  adherence  to  the  law  of  Moses,  and  yet  denied  a 
future  state.  And  though  the  body  of  the  Jewish  nation 
believed,  they  entertained  very  imperfect  and  gross  notions 
of  that  future  felicity,  and  particularly  of  the  resurrection 
of  the  body. 

In  these  circumstances  it  pleased  God  in  his  great  wis- 
dom and  goodness  to  grant  a  new  Revelation  of  his  will  to 
mahkind,  in  which  as  he  made  the  clearest  discoveries  of 
his  own  glorious  perfections  and  governing  providence,  to 
lead  men  to  the  right  knowledge  and  adoration  of  him  the 
only  true  God,  and  gave  them  the  most  holy  and  excellent 
precepts  to  guide  them  in  the  practice  of  universal  righte- 
ousness and  virtue;  so  the  more  effectually  to  animate 
them  to  their  duty,  he  hath  given  them  the  most  express 
and  certain  assurances  of  eternal  life,  as  the  reward  of 
their  sincere  and  persevering,  though  not  absolutely  per- 
fect, obedience.  We  are  not  left  merely  to  collect  it  by  de- 
ductions and  inferences,  which,  however  just,  are  apt  to 
leave  the  mind  in  doubt  and  uncertainty,  but  it  is  clearly 
and  directly  revealed  in  the  most  plain  and  explicit  terms 
possible,  and  which  admit  of  no  ambiguity  or  evasion.  I 
need  not  insist  upon  the  proof  of  this  to  any  that  have  the 
least  acquaintance  with  the  New  Testament.  It  is  well 
known  that  these  sacred  writings  every  where  abound  with 


(o)  Matt.  xxii.  29.  31,  32.  Heb.  xi.  9,  10.  13.  15,  16. 
V«L.  11.  3  E 


402      Our  Saviour  Jesus  Christ  hath  brought     Part  III, 

the  most  strong  and  positive  declarations  concerning  a  fu- 
ture everlasting  glory  and  blessedness  prepared  for  the 
good  and  righteous.  And  accordingly  one  chief  design  of 
the  Gospel  Revelation  is  to  teach  men  to  rise  in  their 
thoughts,  affections,  and  views,  above  this  vain  and  tran- 
sitory world,  to  that  future  heavenly  state,  to  fit  and  pre- 
pare them  for  it,  and  to  engage  them  to  act  as  the  heirs  and 
expectants  of  a  blessed  immortality.  This  is  the  proper  cha- 
racteristic and  distinguishing  glory  of  the  religion  of  Jesus. 
We  have  now  as  much  certainty  of  that  eternal  life,  as  we 
can  reasonably  expect,  till  we  ourselves  are  so  happy  as  to 
be  admitted  to  the  actual  possession  and  enjoyment  of  it. 
For  we  are  assured  of  it  by  the  express  word  and  promise 
of  God  himself,  brought  to  us  by  the  most  credible  and 
illustrious  messenger  that  could  be  sent  from  heaven  to 
mankind,  "  even  the  Only-begotten  of  the  Father,  full  of 
grace  and  truth,"  who  came  "from  his  bosom  to  declare 
him  to  us,"  and  who  is  justly  called  the  "  Amen,  the 
faithful  and  true  Witness  (^p  )."  All  the  attestations  which 
were  given  to  his  divine  mission,  which  were  as  great  as 
could  reasonably  be  expected  or  desired  (^),  may  also  be 
regarded  as  divine  attestations  to  the  truth  of  the  doctrine 
he  taught  in  his  heavenly  Father's  name,  and  especially  of 
the  doctrine  of  eternal  life,  which  was  the  main  scope  and 
ultimate  dtsign  of  the  revelations  he  brought.  His  testimony 
therefore  concerning  it  is  the  testimony  of  God  himself. 


{fi)  John  i.  14.  18.  Rev.  iii.  14.  *  And  what  adds  a  peculiar 
force  to  his  testimony  is,  that  he  is  not  only  the  publisher,  but  is 
constituted  by  the  Divine  Wisdom  and  Grace,  the  Author  and 
Giver  of  that  eternal  life  to  them  that  obey  him;  as  having  done 
and  suffered  all  that  was  required  of  him,  in  order  to  our  re- 
demption and  salvation.  See  Heb.  v.  9.  12.  John  vi.  x.  xvii. 

{q)  See  concerning  this  the  first  volume  of  this  work,  in  the 
last  chapter. 


Chap.  IX.       Life  and  Immortality  to  Light.  403 

"  I  have  not  spoken  of  myself  (saith  he)  but  the  Father 
which  hath  sent  me^  he  gave  me  commandment,  what  I 
should  say,  and  what  1  should  speak.  And  I  know  that  his 
commandment  is  liie  everlasting  (r)." 

But  that  which  gave  the  most  glorious  attestation  both 
to  his  divine  mission  in  general,  and  particularly  to  the 
truth  of  the  doctrine  concerning  the  resurrection  of  the 
dead  and  eternal  life,  was  his  own  rising  again  .from  the 
dead,  as  he  himself  had  promised  and  foretold.  "  He 
shewed  himself  alive  after  his  passion,"  to  his  apostles 
and  other  unexceptionable  witnesses,  by  "  many  infallible 
proofs,  being  seen  of  them  forty  days,  and  speaking  of  the 
things  pertainmg  to  the  kingdom  of  God  (5).'*  And  as  a 
farther  proof  of  his  resurrection  and  exaltation,  he  poured 
forth  upon  them,  according  to  his  promise,  his  holy  spirit 
from  on  high,  by  which  they  were  endued  with  extraor- 
dinary gifts  and  powers,  and  were  enabled  to  preach  the 
Gospel  among  the  nations,  in  the  name  of  a  crucified  and 
risen  Saviour:  "  God  bearing  them  witness  with  signs  and 
wonders,  and  divers  miracles,  and  gifts  of  the  Holy 
Ghost,  according  to  his  will  (?)."  And  eternal  life  was  a 
principal  article  of  the  Gospel  they  preached:  "  This  is  the 
record  (saith  St.  John)  that  God  hath  given  to  us  eternal 
life:  and  this  life  is  in  his  Son  (w)." 

As  our  Lord  Jesus  Christ  hath  assured  us  of  the  cer- 
tainty, so  he  hath  also  made  far  clearer  and  fuller  discoveries 
of  the  nature  and  greatness  of  that  future  happiness  than 
the  world  was  ever  favoured  with  before. 

It  is  not  only  represented  to  us  as  a  state  of  rest,  in 


(r)  John  xii.  49. 
(s)  Acts  i.  3. 
(0  Heb.  ii.  4. 
(m)  1  John  v.  1 1 


404     The  Gospel  snakes  the  clearest  Discoveries  Part  III. 

which  good  men  shall  be  absolutely  exempted  from  all  the 
evils  and  sorrows  to  which  they  are  now  obnoxious  (^x); 
but  as  including  the  full  perfection  of  our  nature,  in  the 
enjoyment  of  all  that  good  which  is  necessary  to  our  com- 
plete felicity.  The  "spirits  of  just  men  shall  then  be  made 
perfect  («/)."  They  shall  be  enlightened  with  divine  know- 
ledge. We  now  "  know  in  part  (saith  St.  Paul)  but  when 
that  which  is  perfect  is  come,  then  that  which  is  in  part 
fthall  be  done  away  (z)."  And  he  there  represents  our  pre- 
sent high  attainments  in  knowledge,  as  no  better  in  compa- 
rison than  the  crude  imperfect  ideas  of  a  child,  compared 
with  the  knowledge  of  a  man  arrived  to  a  full  maturity  of 
reason.  But  what  is  especially  to  be  considered  is,  that  the 
souls  of  the  righteous  shall  then  be  made  perfect  in  holi- 
ness, goodness,  and  purity,  which  is  the  highest  glory  and 
excellence  of  the  reasonable  nature;  and  not  only  shall  their 
souls  be  raised  to  a  high  degree  of  perfection  in  that  future 
state,  but  their  bodies  too.  Man  is  in  his  original  constitu- 
tion an  embodied  spirit.  Though  the  rational  soul  is  the 
noblest  part  of  our  nature,  yet  it  is  not  the  whole  of  it. 
Nor  could  the  whole  man  be  properly  said  to  be  made  per- 
fect in  bliss,  if  the  body,  which  was  from  the  beginning 
a  constituent  part  of  his  frame,  in  which  he  lived  and 
acted  during  his  abode  on  earth,  were  left  utterly  to  perish 
in  the  grave.  Eternal  life,  therefore,  as  it  signifies  the  hap- 
piness of  our  entire  nature,  takes  in  not  merely  the  immor- 
tality of  the  soul,  when  separated  from  the  body,  but  the 
resurrection  of  the  body  too,  and  the  immortal  existence 
of  the  whole  man,  body  and  soul  united,  in  a  state  of  feli- 


{x)  Heb.  iv.  9.  Rev.  xxi.  4. 

(7/)Heb.  xii.  23. 

{z)  1  Cor.  xiii.  9,  10,  11. 


Chap.  IX.       of  the  Nature  of  Future  Happiness,  405 

city  and  perfection.   And  of  this  our  Lord  Jesus  Christ 
hath  given  us  the  fullest  and  most  satisfying  assurance. 

The  Jews,  as  was  before  observed,  at  the  time  of  our 
Saviour's  coming,  generally  professed  to  believe  the  resur- 
rection of  the  body:  but  their  notions  of  it  seem  for  the 
most  part  to  have  been  very  rude  and  gross.  Our  Lord 
therefore  takes  occasion  to  raise  them  to  more  just  and 
sublime  conceptions  of  it.  He  declares,  in  answer  to  the 
objections  of  the  Sadducees,  That  "  the  children  of  this 
world  marry,  and  are  given  in  marriage,  but  they  that 
shall  be  accounted  worthy  to  obtain  that  world,  and  the  re- 
surrection of  the  dead,  neither  marry  nor  are  given  in 
marriage:  neither  shall  they  die  any  more;  for  they  are 
equal  unto  the  angels,  and  are  the  children  of  God,  being 
the  children  of  the  resurrection  («J."  And  elsewhere,  to 
signify  the  wonderful  splendor  with  which  their  glorified 
bodies  shall  be  arrayed,  he  saith,  "  The  righteous  shall 
shine  forth  as  the  sun  in  the  kingdom  of  the  Father  (^)." 
In  like  manner  St.  Paul,  speaking  of  the  difference  between 
our  bodies  in  this  present  state,  and  what  they  shall  be  at 
the  resurrection  of  the  dead,  saith.  That  the  body  which 
was  *'  sown  In  corruption,  shall  be  raised  in  incorruption;  it 
was  sown  in  dishonour,  it  shall  be  raised  in  glory;  it  was 
sown  in  weakness,  it  shall  be  raised  in  power;  it  was 
sown  a  natur^al  (or  animal)  body,  it  shall  be  raised  a  spi- 
ritual body  (c)."  And  again,  ''  This  corruptible  must  put 
on  incorruption,  and  this  mortal  must  put  on  immortality: 
so  when  this  corruptible  shall  have  put  on  incorruption, 
and  this  mortal  shall  have  put  on  immortality,  then  shall  be 
brought  to  pass  this  saying  that  is  written,  death  is  swal- 


(a)  Luke  xx.  34,  35,  36. 

(6)  Matt.  xiii.  43. 

(c)  1  Cor.  XV.  42,  43,  44. 


406     The  Gospel  makes  the  clearest  Discoveries  Part  III, 

lowed  up  in  victory  (<3^)."  I'he  same  apostle  afterwards 
assures  us,  That  "  Christ  shall  change  our  vile  body,  that 
it  may  be  fashioned  like  unto  his  glorious  body,  according 
to  the  working  whereby  he  is  able  even  to  subdue  all 
things  unto  himself  (^)." 

To  heighten  our  ideas  of  the  felicity  prepared  for  good 
men  in  the  heavenly  state,  the  place  of  their  residence  is 
represented  as  very  beautiful  and  glorious.  It  is  described 
by  metaphors  drawn  from  those  things  which  are  account- 
ed most  splendid  and  magnificent  here  on  earth:  but  to  shew 
that  it  is  to  be  understood  in  a  higher  sense,  far  transcend- 
ing the  glory  of  this  world,  it  is  declared,  that  the  heavenly 
city  "  hath  no  need  of  the  sun,  neither  of  the  moon  to  shine 
in  it.  For  the  glory  of  God  doth  enlighten  it,  and  the 
Lamb,"  by  which  we  are  to  understand  our  glorified  Re- 
deemer, "  is  the  light  thereof  (y )." 

It  is  further  signified,  that  as  they  shall  be  placed  in  de- 
lightful mansions,  so  they  shall  be  engaged  in  the  happiest 
exercises  and  enjoyments,  such  as  shall  be  every  way 
suited  to  their  perfected  natures.  They  shall  be  admitted 
to  the  blissful  and  improving  society  of  holy  and  glorious 
"  angels,  and  the  spirits  of  just  men  made  perfect,"  and  shall 
make  a  part  of  the  "  general  assembly  and  church  of  the 
first  born,  v/hich  are  written  in  heaven  (^),"  all  united 
in  holy  love  and  concord,  continually  giving  and  receiving 
mutual  unspeakable  satisfaction  and  joy. 

But  the  Gospel  raiseth  our  ideas  of  the  heavenly  felicity 
higher  still,  by  assuring  us  that  we  shall  then  be  admitted 
to  the  beatific  vision  and  fruition  bf  God  himself.  "  Blessed 


(d)   1  Cor.  XV.  53,  54. 
(<?)  Phil.  iii.  21. 
(/)  Rev.  xxi.  22,  23. 
(g)  Heb.  xii.  22,  23,  24. 


Chap.  IX.       of  the  Nature  of  Future  Happiness,  407 

are  the  pure  in  heart  (saith  our  Saviour)  for  they  shall  see 
God  (y?)."  Though  we  cannot  pretend  distinctly  and  fully 
to  explain  what  is  to  be  understood  by  this  expression  of 
seeing  God,  yet  this  we  may  be  sure  of,  that  it  signifies 
that  we  shall  then  be  admitted  to  a  far  clearer  and  more 
immediate  knowledge  and  intuition  of  the  divine  glory  and 
perfections,  than  we  are  capable  of  attaining  to  here  on 
earth.  "  Now  we  see  through  a  glass  darkly  (as  St.  Paul 
speaks)  bat  then  face  to  face:  now  I  know  in  part,  but 
then  I  shall  know  even  as  also  I  am  known  (i)."  It  is  such 
a  vision  as  shall  fill  us  with  the  highest  satisfaction  and  de- 
light, and  shall  have  a  transforming  influence  upon  us. 
"  We  shall  be  like  him  for  we  shall  see  him  as  he  is."  We 
shall  "-  behold  his  face  in  righteousness,"  so  as  to  be  "  sa- 
tisfied with  his  likeness  (^)." 

It  is  also  mentioned  as  a  delightful  ingredient  in  the 
heavenly  felicity,  that  there  we  shall  be  with  Christ  the 
great  Saviour  and  Lover  of  our  natures,  who  hath  redeem- 
ed us  unto  God  by  his  blood,  out  of  every  tribe,  and 
tongue,  and  family,  and  nation,  the  Captain  of  our  Salva- 
tion, appointed  by  the  Divine  Wisdom  and  Goodness  to 
bring  many  sons  unto  glory.  We  shall  rejoice  in  him  and 
the  wonders  of  his  love,  and  shall  with  unspeakable  satis- 
faction behold  his  glory,  and  be  sharers  in  it  (/). 

And  now,  upon  the  whole,  what  a  noble  idea  does  the 
Gospel  give  us  of  the  happiness  prepared  for  good  men  in 
the  heavenly  state!  It  appears  from  the  account  which  is 
there  given  of  it  to  be  a  state  of  wonderful  splendor  and 
glory,  of  consummate  bliss  and  joy,  and  of  perfect  purity 


{h)  Matt.  V.  8. 

{i)  1  Cor.  xiii.  12.  Psal.  xvi.  11.  xvii.  15, 
{k)  1  John  iii.  2.  Psal.  xvi.  1 1.  xvii.  15. 
(/)  John  xiv.  3.  xvii.  24.  Rev.  iii.  2L 


408     The  Gospel  makes  the  clearest  Discoveries  Part  III, 

and  holiness.  And  it  deserves  particular  notice,  that 
though  the  mansions  of  the  blessed  in  heaven  are  some- 
times described  by  images  and  representations  drawn  from 
sensible  and  worldly  objects,  yet  there  is  nothing  which 
intrenches  in  the  least  on  the  rules  of  the  strictest  purity. 
None  of  the  impure  delights  of  a  Mahometan  paradise,  and 
which  were  artfully  contrived  to  please  those  who  place 
their  happiness  in  sensual  gratifications,  enter  into  the  de- 
scription of  the  Gospel  felicity.  It  is  a  happiness  prepared 
for  the  "  pure  in  heart."  It  is  "  the  inheritance  of  the  saints 
in  light,"  or  "  of  them  that  are  sanctified  (w)."  We  are 
told,  that  it  is  "  unto  them  that  by  a  patient  continuance  in 
well  doing  seek  for  glory,  honour,  and  immortality,"  that 
God  will  give  "  eternal  life  {ji)^  And  that  "  without  holi- 
ness no  man  shall  see  the  Lord  (o)."  And  that  into  that  hea- 
venly Jerusalem  "  there  shall  in  nowise  enter  any  thing  that 
defileth,  neither  whatsoever  worketh  abomination,  or  maketh 
a  lie  (/>)."  AH  the  exercises,  all  the  enjoyments,  are  pure 
and  holy,  and  the  blessed  above  are  continually  employed 
in  praising  and  serving  God,  and  in  doing  his  will. 

The  last  thing  to  be  observed  concerning  that  future 
happiness  is,  that  it  shall  be  unchangeable,  and  of  ever- 
lasting duration.  Hence  it  is  so  often  described  to  us  under 
the  notion  of  eternal  life.  They  that  are  admitted  to  that 
heavenly  felicity,  shall  not  be  put  upon  any  new  hazards 
or  states  of  trial.  They  shall  be  raised  for  ever  above  all 
fe.ar  of  change,  or  of  losing  their  happiness,  and  shall  be 
kept  through  the  mighty  power  and  goodness  of  God,  who 


(w)  Matt.  V.  8.  Col.  i.  12.  Acts  xxvi.  18. 
{n)  Rom.  ii.  7. 
(o)Heb.  xii.  14. 

(/?)  Rev.  vii.  15.  xxii.  3.  compared  with  Psal.  ciii.  20,  21, 
Matt.  vi.  10. 


Chap.  XI.     of  the  IStature  of  Future  Happinessi  409i 

shall  niaintain   and  preserve  them  in  their  holy  aiid  happy- 
state  to  all  eternityi 

This  happiness  shall  commence  with  regard  to  the  soula 
-of  the  righteous,  in  a  lower  degree,  immediately  upon 
their  departure  out  of  the  body.  This  seems  to  be  plainly 
intimated  by  our  Saviour,  when  he  saith  concerning  La- 
zarus, that  "he  died,  and  was  carried  by  angels  into 
Abraham's  bosom,"  a  state  of  rest  and  joy  (^).  So  he  pro- 
mised the  penitent  thief,  that  he  should  "that  day,"  i;  eo 
the  day  of  his  death,  "be  with  him  in  paradise  (>')»"  And. 
dying  Stephen  prajed  to  the  Lord  Jesus  "to  receive  his 
spirit,"  i.  e.  to  be  with  him  in  bliss  and  glory  (.^).  St.  Paul 
saith  concerning  himself,  "  I  desire  to  depart,  and  to  be 
with  Christ:"  intimating  the  desire  and  hope  he  had  that 
he  should  be  with  Christ,  when  he  departed  out  of  this 
present  life  {t).  And  to  the  same  purpose,  after  having 
said,  that  whilst  "  we  are  at  home  in  the  body,  we  are 
absent  from  the  Lord,"  he  declares  in  his  own  name,  and 
that  of  all  true  Christians,  "  we  are  confident  and  willing 
rather  to  be  absent  from  the  body  and  present  with  the 
Lord  (w)."  Where  it  is  intimated,  that  when  the  souls  of 
good  men  are  absent  from  the  body,  and  consequently 
while  they  are  in  the  separate  state  before  their  being  re- 
united to  thtir  bodies  at  the  resurrection,  they  are  "pre- 
sent with  the  Lord,"  present  in  such  a  manner,  that  the 
nearest  communion  with  him  they  are  admitted  to  have  on 
earth,  may  be  regarded  as  comparatively  a  state  of  absence 
from  the   Lord.   Yet  notwithstanding  this,  it  is  not  till  the* 


{cf)  Luke  xvi.  22. 
(r)  Luke  xxiii.  4S. 
(«)  Acts  vii.  59. 
(0  Phil.  i.  23. 
\u)  2  Cor.  V.  6,  7,  8. 
Vol.  1 1.  3  F 


410     The  Gospel  makes  the  clearest  Discoveries  Part  II Ir 

general  resurrection,  that  the  happiness  of  the  righteous 
shall  be  completed.  It  is  at  the  time  of  Christ's  glorious 
appearing,  that  the  dead  shall  be  raised,  and  their  entire 
nature  consummated  in  bliss.  And  there  is  something  in- 
expressibly noble  and  sublime  in  the  account  M^hich  is 
given  us  of  the  glory  of  that  day,  when  the  saints  shall  be 
put  in  full  possession  of  their  heavenly  inheritance,  and  so 
shall  continue  to  all  eternity. 

Any  one  that  impartially  considers  this  account  of  future 
happiness  brought  to  us  by  the  Revelation  of  Jesus  Christ, 
will  see  the  greatest  reason  to  adore  the  Divine  Goodness, 
which  hath  favoured  us  with  such  glorious  discoveries* 
There  is  nothing  in  this  account,  when  once  it  is  revealed, 
but  what  is  worthy  of  God,  and  what  right  reason  duly 
exercised  will  approve,  yet  it  is  what  it  could  not  have  dis- 
covered with  any  certainty  by  its  own  unassisted  force. 
Men  of  fine  imaginations  might  form  pleasing  conjectures 
concerning  the  happiness  of  a  future  state,  in  some  in- 
stances nearly  resembling  the  accounts  given  in  the  Gospel, 
but  they  could  at  best  have  passed  for  no  more  than  agree- 
able visions  of  fancy,  w^hick  could  nor  yield  any  solid  as- 
surance or  conviction  to  the  mind.  And  indeed,  how  could 
any  man  pretend,  by  the  force  of  his  own  reason,  without 
the  assistance  of  Divine  Revelation,  to  explore  the  secrets 
of  the  invisible  world,  or  take  upon  him  to  determine  with 
certainty,  in  what  manner  or  degree  the  Supreme  Lord  of 
the  universe  will,  in  a  future  state,  reward  the  sincere 
though  imperfect  obedience  of  his  frail  creatures  here  on 
earth?  This  depends  upon  the  councils  of  his  own  infinite 
wisdom,  and  unobliged  grace  and  goodness,  which  such 
short-sighted  creatures  as  we  are  cannot  pretend  certainly 
to  know,  except  he  himself  should  declare  his  will  and 
purpose  concerning  it. 

No  doubt  the  goodness  of  God,  of  which  there  are 
many  proofs  in  the  course  of  his  providence  in  this  present 


Chap.  XL     of  the  Nature  of  Future  Happiness,  411 

world,  might  administer  grounds  of  comfort  on  supposition 
of  a  future  state.  But  then  it  is  not  his  goodness  alone 
which  is  to  be  considered,  but  his  wisdom  and  governing 
justice  too.  Let  us  suppose  him  never  so  good,  yet  if  we 
believe  him  to  be  also  perfectly  wise  and  just,  and  to  have 
a  sacred  regard  to  the  authority  of  his  government  and 
laws,  and  are  at  the  same  time  sensible  that  we  have  in 
many  instances  transgressed  his  holy  laws,  and  acted  con- 
trary to  the  duty  he  requireth  of  us,  might  We  not  have 
just  reason  to  apprehend  the  awful  effects  of  his  righteous 
displeasure?  Or,  to  make  the  most  favourable  supposition, 
upon  what  ground  could  we  hope  that  he  would  raise  us 
to  a  complete  eternal  felicity  in  a  future  state,  as  the  re- 
ward of  our  imperfect  obedience  in  this,  when  we  could 
not  have  pretended  to  lay  claim  to  such  a  reward  as 
strictly  due  to  us  in  a  way  of  merit,  even  though  we  had 
perfectly  obeyed,  and  never  in  any  one  instance  fallen  short 
of  our  duty?  But  if.  it  should  please  God  to  make  an  ex- 
press declaration  of  his  gracious  purpose  to  pardon  all  our 
iniquities,  upon  our  turning  to  him  by  a  true  repentance 
and  humble  faith,  and  to  crown  our  sincere  persevering 
obedience,  though  not  absolutely  sinless,  or  free  from 
failures  and  defects,  with  the  glorious  reward  of  eternal 
life,  this  would  lay  a  just  foundation  for  a  divine  hope  and 
joy.  And  this  is  our  unspeakable  comfort  and  privilege 
under  the  Gospel  Revelation. 

And  what  mightily  recommends  the  discoveries  there 
made  to  us  of  future  rewards,  is,  that  they  are  not  con- 
fined to  a  few  persons  of  distinguished  eminence.  The  Gos- 
pel-promises extend  to  all  righteous,  holy,  and  virtuous 
persons  of  whatsoever  condition  or  degree,  of  whatsoever 
tribe  or  tongue,  or  family  or  nation.  It  is^true,  that  it  is 
plainly  intimated  in  the  New  Testament,  that  there  shall 
be  different  degrees  of  glory  among  the  blessed  above,  in 
a  wise  and  fit  proportion  to  the  different  degrees  of  ^  their 


412       The  Gospel  Discovery  of  eternal  Life  is     Part  III 

holiness  and  usefulness  here  on  earth  (x).  But  yet  the  hap- 
piness shall  be  complete  in  all,  according  to  their  different 
nieasures  and  degrees;  all  shall  be  perfectly  pleased  and 
^atisfied,  and  admitted  to  those  holy  beatifying  exercises 
^nd  enjoyments,  which  tend  to  the  true  felicity  of  their  na- 
ture. Our  Saviour  declares  concerning  all  the  "righteous" 
in  general,  that  they  shall  "  go  into  life  eternal  (?/)."  We 
are  assured,  that  unto  them  that  by  a  "  patient  continuance 
in  w-ell-doing  seek  for  glory,  honour,  and  immortality," 
whatever  their  outward  condition  and  circumstances  may 
Jdp  here  on  earth,  whether  they  be  high  or  low,  rich  or 
poor,  learned  or  unlearned,  God  will  give  eternal  life. — ? 
Glory,  honour,  and  peace  to  every  man  that  worketh  good, 
to  the  Jew  first,  and  also  to  the  Gentile  (z)."  Thus  our 
Saviour  in  the  parable  represents  Lazarus,  who  was  a 
good  man,  but  reduced  to  the  lowest  degree  of  poverty,  as 
(Carried  at  his  death  by  angels  into  Abraham's  bosom  (a). 
And  St.  James  tells  us,  that  "  God  hath  chosen  the  poor 
pf  this  world,  rich  in  faith,  an(i  heirs  of  the  kingdom, 
which  he  hath  prepared  for  them  that  love  him  (^)." 
Christ  is  said  to  be  the  author  of  eternal  salvation  unto  all 
them  that  obey  him  (c).  Not  the  meanest  of  the  human 
race  shall  be  excluded  from  that  heavenly  felicity,  if  they 
go  on  in  the  practice  of  real  piety  and  virtue,  and  serve 
God  with  simplicity  and  godly  sincerity,  in  the  station  and 
circumstances  in  which  his  providence  hath  placed  them. 


(jr)  Luke  xix.  1 6 — 20. 
(j/)  Malt.  XXV.  46. 
(z)  Rom.  ii.  2.  10. 
(a)  Luke  xvi.  22. 
{b)  Jdm.  ii.  5. 
\c)  Heb.  V.  9. 


Chap.  IX.       of  the  most  beneficial  Tendency.  413 

And  now  how  justly  may  it  be  said,  that  our  Lord  Jesus 
Christ  hath  brought  life  and  immortality  to  light  by  the 
Gospel!  And  uhat  a  glorious  scene  doth  this  open  to  us! 
What  a  source  of  spiritual  and  divine  joy,  amidst  all  the 
adversities  and  tribulations  of  this  present  state!  For  the 
'*  sufferings  of  this  present  time  are  not  worthy  to  be  com- 
pared wiih  the  glory  which  shall  be  revealed  in  us  (<a^)!"  It 
hath  also  a  manifest  tendency  to  form  us  to  a  true  great- 
ness of  mind,  a  noble  and  god-like  temper.  He  that  has  a 
stedfast  hope  of  that  future  glory  and  happiness,  will  be 
able  to  look  down  with  a  superior  contempt  on  all  those 
short  lived  worldly  advantages  which  are  the  usual  objects 
of  ambition  and  avarice,  and  by  which  men  are  so  often 
tempted  to  act  contrary  to  the  rules  of  truth  and  justice, 
generous  honesty  and  fidelity.  The  impure  allurements  of 
sensual  pleasure  will  have  but  small  influence  upon  him 
that  has  such  glorious  hopes  and  views.  Nor  will  the  fear 
of  reproaches,  persecutions,  paia,  and  death,  be  able  to 
deter  him  from  his  dutv. 

In  sum,  nothing  can  have  a  greater  tendency  than  the 
Gospel-promise  of  eternal  life,  where  it  is  heartily  believed 
and  duly  considered,  to  animate  us  to  a  persevering  con- 
stancy and  progress  in  the  ways  of  holiness  and  virtue,  not- 
withstanding the  difficulties  and  discouragements  we  may 
meet  with  in  this  present  state.  It  is  far  from  arguing  a 
mean  and  mercenary  temper  to  have  such  a  reward  in  view, 
as  the  Gospel  represents  that  future  happiness  to  be.  On 
the  contrary,  to  aspire  after  it,  is  to  aspire  to  the  true  per^ 
fection  of  our  nature,  to  a  state  of  consummate  goodness  and 
purity,  and  to  the  nearest  conformity  to  God  hmiself,  the 
supreme  original  excellence.  It  may  therefore  be  justly  said, 


{d)  Rom.  viii.  18. 


^14)  J^unishments  of  the  Wicked  in  a  Future  State  Part  III. 

that  the  discovery  that  is  made  to  us  in  the  Gospel  of  a 
blessed  immortality,  and  of  the  way  that  leads  to  it,  and  the 
terms  upon  which  it  is  to  be  obtained,  is  of  such  vast  im- 
portance, that  all  the  wealth  of  this  world  is  not  to  be  com- 
pared with  it. 

But  it  is  proper  farther  to  observe,  that  the  doctrine  of  a 
future  state  includes  not  only  that  of  future  rewards,  or 
the  happiness  prepared  for  good  men  in  the  world  to  come; 
but  of  the  punishments  which  shall  be  inflicted  upon  the 
wicked.  And  indeed  the  latter  seem  no  less  necessary  in 
the  course  of  the  divine  administrations  than  the  former. 
What  confusion  and  disorder  would  follow,  if  vice  and 
wickedness  were  suffered  to  ravage  without  controul?  To 
what  purpose  would  it  be  to  make  laws,  if  those  laws  were 
left  without  authority?  And  what  authority  could  laws  have 
without  sanctions  of  punishments  against  the  transgres- 
sors? To  say,  with  some  of  the  antient  philosophers,  that 
vice  is  itself  its  own  punishment,  and  that  there  needs  no 
other,  seems  to  be  a  plausible  way  of  talking.  But  those 
must  know  little  of  the  world  or  of  mankind,  who  think  this 
alone  would  be  a  sufficient  restraint.  At  that  rate  legisla- 
tors and  governors  would  have  nothing  more  to  do  than  to 
represent  to  the  people  the  turpitude!  and  deformity  of 
fraud,  injustice,  violence,  debauchery,  and  intemperance, 
and  then  suffer  them  to  act  as  they  please.  But  what 
should  we  think  of  the  wisdom  of  any  government,  that 
should  content  itself  with  enacting  good  laws,  without  any 
other  sanctions,  than  the  leaving  men  to  the  natural  conse- 
quences of  their  own  actions?  Irl  all  well-policed  states, 
wheirever.  there  have  been  laws,  it  has  been  judged  neces- 
sary to  enforce  the  observance  of  them  with  sanctions  of 
positive  penalties  against  the  violators   of  those   laws  (e). 


{e)  The  Chinese  philosophers  talk  much  of  the  natural  re- 


Chap.  IX.        plainly  declared  in  the  Gospel.  415 

But  after  all,  civil  penalties  can  reach  no  farther  than  to 
the  outward  actions  and  behaviour:  they  can  at  best  only 
restrain  open  acts  of  wickedness.  But  if  bad  men  have  no- 
thing farther  to  fear  than  the  penalties  of  human  laws, 
these  can  have  no  influence  to  prevent  their  giving  way  to 
sinful  thoughts,  affections  and  dispositions,  which  do  not 
properly  come  within  the  reach  of  human  judicatories,  or 
to  hinder  them  from  committing  the  greatest  wickedness  in 
secret,  when  they  flatter  themselves  that  they  shall  escape 
detection,  or  that  by  fraud,  bribery,  interest,  or  power,  they 
shall  avoid  the  judgments  of  earthly  tribunals.  Or,  if  their 
crimes  should  expose  them  to  death,  they  may  despise  the 
penalty,  if  death  be  all  they  have  to  fear,  and  they  have 
nothing  to  apprehend  after  it.  But  if,  besides  all  this,  they 
should  really  believe,  that  there  is  a  supreme  governor  and 
judge,  of  infinite  power,  wisdom,  and  justice,  who  know- 
eth  all  their  actions,  and  even  their  most  secret  intentions 
and  thoughts,  and  will  call  them  to  a  strict  account;  and 
that  the  penalties  of  human  laws  and  governments  are  far 
from  being  the  worst  they  have  to  fear,  but  that  much 
greater  punishments  are  prepared  for  them  in  a  future  state, 
this,  if  really  believed,  must  needs  have  a  mighty  influence 
to  stem  the  violence  of  their  vicious  appetites  and  passions, 
and  to  awaken  them  to  serious  thoughts,  which  might  put 
them  in  way  of  better  impressions.  Human  laws  and  pe- 
nalties will  be  found  too  weak  to  restrain  men,  where  there 
is  no  fear  of  God  before  their  eyes,  no  regard  to  a  future 
state,  and  the  powers  of  the  world  to  come. 

It  has   been  already  shewn,  that  the  wisest  men  among 


wards  and  punishments  of  viirue  and  vice.  ButMhey  are  far  from 
trusting  to  this,  as  sufHcient  to  deter  evil  doers,  and  to  preserve 
good  order  in  the  state.  Nowhere  are  the  punishments  inflict- 
ed on  those  that  violate  the  laws  more  severe  and  rigorous. 


416  Punishments  of  the  Wicked  in  a  Future  State  Part  IIL 

the  Pagans  were  sensible,  that  it  was  necessary  for  the  ad- 
vantage of  society,  that  the  people  should  believe  the  pu- 
nishments of  a  future  state  (/")."  And  yet  certain  it  is,- 
that  at  the  time  of  our  Saviour's  coming  the  fear  of  those 
punishments  was  in  a  great  measure  lost  among  men.  This 
was  very  much  owing  to  the  libertine  principles  of  the  great 
men,  and  even  of  the  philosophers,  which  spread  among  the 
people.  And  this  may  well  be  regarded  as  one  principal 
cause  of  that  amazing  licentiousness,  which  then  prevailed 
among  the  Greeks  and  Romans,  the  most  knowing  and  ci- 
vilized of  the  Heathen  nations. 

To  awaken  men  therefore  to  a  sense  of  the  divine  judg- 
ments, and  to  restore  the  fear  of  God,  which  was  almost 
banished  out  of  the  world,  was  a  matter  of  great  importance. 
And  accordingly,  when  it  pleased  God  to  send  his  own  Son 
to  make  a  new  and  solemn  publication  of  his  laws  to  man- 
kind, and  also  to  make  a  clear  discovery  of  eternal  life,  as 


(/)  The  ingenious  Mr.  Hume,  whom  no  man  will  suspect  of 
being  governed  by  religious  prejudices,  speaking  of  the  receiv- 
ed notions,  "  That  the  Deity  will  inflict  punishments  on  vice^ 
and  confer  infinite  rewards  on  virtue,*'  says,  that  *'  those  who 
attempt  to  disabuse  them  of  such  prejudices,  may,  for  aughi  he 
knows,  be  good  reasoners,  but  that  he  cannot  allow  them  to  be 
good  citizens  and  politicians,  since  they  free  men  from  one  re- 
straint upon  their  passions,  and  make  the  infringement  of  the' 
laws  of  equity  and  society  in  one  respe'ct  more  easy  and  se- 
cure." Hume's  Philosophical  Essays,  p.  231.  And  Lord  Boling- 
broke  observes,  that  *'  the  doctrine  of  rewards  and  punishments 
in  a  future  state  has  so  great  a  tendency  to  enforce  the  civil  laws, 
and  to  restrain  the  vices  of  men,  that  reason,  which  (as  he  pre- 
tends) cannot  decide  for  it  on  principles  of  natural  theology,  will 
not  decide  against  it  on  principles  of  good  policy."  See  his  works« 
Vol.  V.  p.  323.  edit.  4to. 


Chap.  IX.        plainly  declared  in  the  Gospeh  41  f 

the  glorious  reward  of  their  sincere  and  dutiful  obedience^ 
nothing  could  b--  more  proper  and  necessary,  than  that  he 
should  at  the  same  time  d:  noance  the  most  awful  punish- 
ments against  those  that  should  p'-rsist  in  a  presump;uous 
course  of  vice  and  wickedness.  The  Gospel  therefore  not 
only  exhibited  the  most  glorious  discoveries  of  the  divine 
grace  and  mercy  that  were  ever  made  to  mankind,  but  the 
wrath  of  God  is  there  revealed  from  heaven  against  all  un- 
godliness and  unrighteousness  of  men.  And  this  is  no  less 
necessary  in  a  revelation  designed  for  common  use  than 
the  former. 

Whosoever  impartially  considers  the  discourses  of  our 
Lord  Jesus  Christ,  as  recorded  by  the  Evangelists,  will 
find  that  this  most  amiable  and  benevolent  Saviour,  who 
came  to  call  sinners  to  rtptntance,  and  display  all  the 
charins  of  the  divine  love  and  goodness  to  invite  them  to 
forsake  their  evil  ways,  and  to  come  to  him  for  happiness, 
doth  also  represent  in  the  most  striking  manner  the  just 
vengeance  which  shall  be  inflicted  on  obstinate  impenitent 
offenders.  And  in  this  he  was  faithfully  followed  by  the 
apostles,  who  were  animated  by  his  divine  spirit,  and  pub- 
lished his  Gospel  to  the  world.  Nothing  can  possibly  ex- 
ceed the  account  that  is  given  of  the  awful  solemnity  of  the 
future  judgment,  '^  when  the  secrets  of  all  hearts  shall  be 
revealed,  and  every  man  shall  receive  according  to  the 
things  done  in  the  body,  whether  good  or  evil."  The  pu- 
nishments to  be  inflicted  on  the  wicked  in  a  future  state  are 
described  in  the  most  strong  and  ardent  expressions,  and  in 
a  manner  fitted  to  strike  the  minds  of  the  most  hardened 
sinners  with  terror  and  amazement,  to  awaken  them,  if  pos- 
sible, to  a  sense  of  their  guilt  and  danger.  The  descriptions 
are  general,  and  it  is  wisely  oidered,  that  tljey  should  be 
so:  but  the  design  is  not  to  insinuate  that  all  bad  men  shall 
be  punished  with  an  equal  degree  of  severity.  There  are  se- 

Vol.  IL  3  G 


418  Punishme?its  of  the  Wicked  in  a  Future  State  Part  III. 

veral  passages  from  which  it  appears,  that  there  shall  be  a 
great  difference  made  between  some  and  others:  that  some, 
as  our  Saviour  speaks,  "shall  be  beaten  with  many  stripes,'' 
others  comparatively  "  with  few:"  that  even  amongst  hein- 
ous offenders  it  shall  be  more  tolerable  for  some  than  for 
others  in  the  day  of  judgment,  according  to  the  different 
aggravations  of  their  crimes.  We  are  no  where  informed 
what  shall  be  the  least  degree  of  punishment  which  shall 
be  in  inflicted.  Such  a  discovery  is  no  way  necessary,  and 
would  probably  be  abused.  But  this  we  are  sure  of,  that 
no  man  shall  be  punished  above  the  real  demerit  of  his 
crimes.  Infinite  Grace  and  Goodness  may  confer  a  glory 
and  felicity  upon  good  men  above  what  they  could  have 
pretended  to  claim  as  strictly  due  to  them.  But  a  just  and 
wise  and  good  God  will  never  inflict  a  punishment  upon 
sinners  greater  than  their  sins  really  deserve.  And  of  this 
certainly  he  must  be  acknowledged  to  be  the  properest 
judge.  Our  wisest  way  is  not  to  endeavour  to  diminish  the 
evil  of  sin  to  ourselves,  or  to  make  exceptions  against 
the  punishments  as  too  rigorous  and  severe,  but  to 
guard  against  those  evil  courses  which  would  expose 
us  to  the  threatened  penalties.  What  St.  Paul  saith  of 
human  laws  and  governors,  holds  proportionably  true  of 
the  divine:  "  Rulers  are  not  a  terror  to  good  works,  but 
to  the  evil.  Wilt  thou  not  be  afraid  of  the  power?  Do 
that  which  is  good,  and  thou  shalt  have  praise  of  the 
same  (^)'"  The  divine  threatenings  as  well  as  promises,, 
proceed  from  the  supreme  Wi&dom  and  Goodness  as  well 
as  Righteousness  and  Justice.'  The  original  intention  of 
promulgating  these  threatenings,  is  not  that  they  may  be  ex- 


{g)  Rom.  viii.  3, 


Chap.  IX.         plainly  declared  in  the  Gospel.  419 

ecuted,  but  that  the  execution  of  them  may  be  prevented:  it 
is  to  hinder  us  from  destroying  ourselves,  and  persisting  in 
those  sinful  courses  which  will  end  in  misery  and  ruin.  The 
design  of  all  is  to  promote  the  universal  good,  and  to  main- 
tain the  peace,  order,  and  harmony  of  the  moral  world. 
Turn  thou  from  those  evil  practices,  which,  if  there  were 
no  threatenings  against  them,  thou  oughtest  to  avoid  from 
a  regard  to  the  will  of  God,  and  to  the  true  perfection,  dig- 
nity, and  happiness  of  thy  own  nature,  and  thou  needest  not 
to  fear  those  threatenings,  but  hast  glory  and  immortality 
before  thee.  But  if,  notwithstanding  all  the  warnings  that 
^re  given  us,  we  will  still  go  on  in  the  way  which  leadeth 
to  destruction,  and  for  a  little  present  worldly  gain,  or  the 
gratifications  of  a  vicious  appetite,  forfeit  eternal  glory,  and 
run  the  hazard  of  the  greatest  misery  in  a  future  state,  what 
can  it  be  charged  upon  but  our  own  inexcusable  guilt 
and  folly? 

Those,  therefore,  who  make  the  doctrine  of  future  pu- 
nishments an  objection  against  Christianity,  act  a  very  un- 
reasonable part.  If  the  Gospel  spoke  only  smooth  things, 
peace  to  the  wicked,  the  vicious,  and  the  profligate,  it  might 
indeed  please  the  corrupt  part  of  mankind,  who  are  desir- 
ous to  give  a  full  indulgence  to  their  exorbitant  lusts  and 
appetites,  but  it  would  be  of  the  worst  consequence  to  the 
cause  of  virtue,  piety,  and  righteousness,  and  would  furnish 
an  unanswerable  objection  against  the  truth  and  divinity  of 
the  Christian  Revelation.  If  it  be  so  hard,  with  all  the 
threatenings  and  restraints  that  can  be  laid  upon  men,  to 
keep  them  within  any  tolerable  bounds,  what  would  it  be 
if  those  restraints  should  be  removed?  I  do  not  see  upon 
what  foundation  they  can  pretend  to  be  friends  to  their 
country  and  to  mankind,  who  at  the  same  time  that  they  en- 
deavour to  deprive  good  men  of  those  hopes  of  future  hap- 


420  The  PunishmeJitsoftheWtched^^c.     Part  III. 

pinfss,  which  are  the  most  powerful  supports  of  virtue,  and 
the  greatest  comfort  of  their  lives,  take  pains  to  set  wicked 
men  loose  from  the  fears  of  future  punishment,  when  we 
find  bv  experience,  that  all  is  little  enough  to  stem  the  tor^ 
fent  of  prevailing  corruption. 


THE  CONCLUSION. 


1   HAVE  now  gone  through  what  I  intended,  and  shall 
conclude  with  a  few  observations  upon  the  whole. 

1.  We  may  hence  see,  that  reason,  if  left  merely  to  itself 
in  the  present  state  of  mankind,  is  not  a  safe  and  certain 
guide  in  matters  of  religion.  The  proof  which  hath  been 
given  of  this  from  fact  and  experience  is  of  the  greatest 
weight.  We  have  not  proceeded  in  this  inquiry  upon  spe- 
culative notions  of  what  human  reason  might  be  supposed 
to  be  capable  of  attaining  to  by  its  own  unassisted  force, 
but  have  endeavoured  to  form  the  judgment  of  what  may  be 
expected  from  it,  from  what  it  has  actually  done.  And  we 
have  considered  it  not  merely  as  it  has  been  found  among 
the  vulgar,  but  as  it  has  appeared  among  the  greatest  mas- 
ters of  reason  in  the  Pagan  world.  And  the  conclusion 
this  will  lead  us  to  will,  I  am  afraid,  be  different  from  that 
which  a  learned  and  ingenious  author  has  drawn  from  the 
representation  he  has  given  of  the  state  of  the  Heathen 
world,  with  respect  to  the  points  we  have  been  considering. 
"  From  hence  (says  he)  it  will  follow,  that  the  light  of 
reason  is  not  that  uncertain,  weak,  insufficient,  inconsis- 
tent thing,  that  is  by  some  pretended,  nor  ought  it  to  be 
treated  as  something  carnal  and  dim  (A)."  That  "reason 
has  done  and  may  do  great  things,  when  duly  exercised. 


(A)  See  Dr.  Sykes's  Principles  and  Connection  of  Natural  and 
Revealed  Religion,  p.  357,  358. 


422  The  Conclusion. 

and  under  a  proper  guidance,  I  readily  allow;  and  that  it 
may  be  of  signal  use  for  defending  and  confirming  sacred 
truth,  and  detecting  superstition  and  error,  in  opposition  to 
the  frauds  and  impositions  of  designing  men.  Reason  is  a 
valuable  gift  of  God,  and  it  highly  concerneth  us  to  endea- 
vour to  improve  and  not  to  abuse  it.  Nor  is  any  thing  to 
be  admitted  that  is  contrary  to  its  plain  and  evident  dic- 
tates. But  it  was  never  designed  to  be  our  only  guide  ex- 
clusive of  Divine  Revelation.  And  if  we  must  judge  from 
experience,  we  shall  not  be  apt  to  form  a  very  advantageous 
idea  of  the  powers  of  human  reason,  when  trusting  to  its 
own  perspicacity  in  things  spiritual  and  divine  without  a 
higher  assistance  (J),  It  was  therefore  a  great  instance  of 
the  wisdom  and  goodness  of  God  towards  mankind,  that 
he  favoured  them  with  the  light  of  Divine  Revelation  from 


(i)  It  is  a  just  observation  of  Lord  Bacon,  that  "  the  only 
cause  and  root  of  almost  all  errors  in  the  sciences  is  this,  that 
whilst  we  falsely  admire  the  force  and  abilities  of  the  human  mind, 
we  do  not  seek  out  the  true  and  proper  assistances  for  it." — 
"  Causa  et  radix  sere  omnium  ntalorumin  scientiis,eauna  est,  quod 
dum  mentis  humanae  vires  falso  miramur,  vera  ejus  auxilia  non 
quseramus.*"  What  that  great  man  seems  here  to  have  particu- 
larly in  view,  is,  that  philosophers  in  all  ages,  from  a  too  high 
opinion  of  the  force  and  extent  of  their  own  genius,  have  been  apt 
to  depend  upon  schemes  and  hypotheses  of  their  own  framing, 
without  a  due  attention  to  experiments,  and  those  helps  which 
might  have  led  them  to  a  better  knowledge  of  the  nature  of 
things.  In  like  manner,  it  has  often  happened  that  through  an 
overweening  conceit  of  the  strength  of  their  own  powers,  men 
have  neglected  and  despised  the  helps  afforded  them  by  Divine 
Revelation;  or  they  have  not  kept  close  to  its  instructions,  but 
have  attempted  to  be  wise  above  that  which  is  written;  "intru- 
ding into  things  which  they  have  not  seen,  vainly  puffed  up  by 
their  fleshly  minds,"  as  the  apostle  speaks,  Col.  ii.  18. 

•  Bacon.  Nov.  Organ.  Scientiar.  aphor.  9. 


The  Conclusion.  423 

the  beginning  of  the  world,  which,  if  carefully  adhered  to, 
and  duly  improved,  would  have  been  of  the  most  signal 
use.  And  afterwards  he  was  graciously  pleased  to  in- 
terpose by  renewed  discoveries  of  his  will,  for  recovering 
mankind  from  their  darkness  and  corruption  to  the  right 
knowledge  and  practice  of  important  truth  and  duty.  And 
if,  notwithstanding  these  advantages,  men  have  generally 
fallen  from  the  knowledge  of  God  and  true  religion,  and 
have  corrupted  it  with  gross  superstitions  and  idolatries, 
this  is  no  argument  that  Revelation  is  of  no  use  or  signi- 
ficancy.  On  the  contrary,  it  furnisheth  a  convincing  proof 
of  the  weakness  of  human  reason  in  the  present  depraved 
state  of  mankind;  and  we  may  justly  conclude,  that  if,  even 
with  the  helps  it  has  received  from  Divine  Revelation,  it  is 
still  so  prone  to  fall  into  error  in  matters  of  great  impor- 
tance, much  more  would  it  be  apt  to  lead  men  astray,  if 
left  entirely  destitute  of  that  assistance. 

This  leads  me  to  observe, 

2dly,  That  we  should  set  a  high  value  on  the  Gospel  of 
Jesus,  which  is  the  perfection  of  all  the  divine  revelations 
that  have  been  given  to  mankind,  and  to  which  the  several 
prior  revelations  were  designed  to  be  preparatory.  It  has 
every  thing  in  it  that  is  necessary  for  guiding  men  in  the 
way  of  salvation.  The  idea  there  given  us  of  the  Deity  is 
the  most  worthy  and  sublime  that  can  be  imagined,  admi- 
rably fitted  to  fill  us  with  the  highest  love  to  God,  and  the 
most  thankful  admiration  of  his  infinite  grace  and  goodness, 
and  at  the  same  time  with  the  most  awful  veneration  of  his 
unchangeable  righteousness,  justice,  and  parity.  The  Gos- 
pel discoveries  have  also  a  manifidSt  tendenty  to  beget  in 
us  an  ingenuous  trust  and  confidence  in  him,  and  to  encour- 
age us  to  draw  near  to  him  with  an  humble  freedom,  through 
that  great  Mediator,  who   by  his  wise  and  sovereign  ap- 


424  The  Conclusion, 

pointment  hath  made  expiation  for  bur  sins,  and  obtained 
eternal  redemption  for  us. 

Again,  nothing  can  be  more  holy  and  excellent  than  the 
laws  and  precepts  which  are  there  given  us.  Our  duty  is 
set  before  us  in  its  just  extent*  Morality  is  carried  to  its 
noblest  height,  without  running  into  extravagancies  or  un- 
natural extremes.  The  design  of  all  its  precepts,  doctrines, 
and  ordinances,  is  to  form  us  by  a  life  of  holiness  and  vir- 
tue here,  for  a  state  of  ptrfect  goodness  and  purity  in  a 
better  world.  The  motives  which  are  proposed  to  animate 
us  to  obedience,  are  the  most  powerful  that  can  be  imagin- 
ed, drawn  from  the  charms  of  the  divine  love  and  goodness, 
and  from  a  regard  to  our  own  highest  interest  and  happi- 
ness: we  are  raised  to  the  most  glorious  privileges  and  sub- 
lime hopes,  and  have  the  most  perfect  and  lovely  example 
of  the  Son  of  God  in  our  nature  proposed  to  our  imitation. 
Besides  which,  the  gracious  assistances  of  the  Holy  Spirit 
are  promised  and  provided.  And  finally,  eternal  life  is 
brought  into  the  most  clear  and  open  light.  The  most  ra- 
vishing discoveries  are  made  of  that  everlasting  happiness 
and  glory  which  is  prepared  for  good  men  in  the  heavenly 
state.  And  that  nothing  might  be  wanting  to  render  the 
Revelation  complete  for  moral  purposes,  as  the  glad  tidings 
of  pardon  and  salvation  are  published  to  penitent  returning 
sinners,  who  forsake  their  evil  ways,  and  yield  themselves 
unto  God  in  sincere  and  dutiful  obedience^  so  on  the  other 
hand  the  awful  solemnities  of  the  future  judgment  are 
there  also  displayed  in  the  most  striking  manner,  and  dread- 
ful punishments  are  denounced  against  those  who  reject 
offered  mercy,  and  obstinately  persist  in  vice  and  wicked- 
ness. 

This  leads  to  another  observation  proper  to  be  made  on 
this  occasion;  and  that  is,  that  Christianity  duly  believed 
and  practised  tends  to  the  advantage  of  society,  to  promote 
the  welfare  of  kingdoms  and  states,  and  to  preserve  good 


The  Conclusion,  425 

order  in  the  world.  If  men  followed  the  sacred  precepts  and 
directions  it  gives,  what  a  happy  world  this  would  be!  Im- 
partial justice,  generous  honesty,  exact  fidelity,  extensive 
benevolence,  and  a  peaceful  harmony  and  concord  would 
generally  prevail.  The  irregular  passions  and  sensual  affec- 
tions would  be  brought  under  a  due  subjection  to  religion 
and  reason;  every  one  would  be  content  in  his  station,  and 
diligent  in  performing  the  duties  of  it.  The  state  would  be 
as  one  large  family,  all  united  in  mutual  love,  rejoicing  in 
one  another's  welfare,  and  desirous  to  promote  it.  Kings,  if 
they  were  governv  d  by  the  precepts  of  Christianity,  would 
act  as  the  fathers  of  their  people:  righteousness  and  judg- 
ment, clemency  and  mercy,  would  be  the  stability  of  their 
throne;  rulers  supreme  and  subordinate  would  be  just,  rul- 
ing in  the  fear  of  God.  Subjects  would  be  submissive  and 
obedient  to  the  higher  powers,  and  render  all  due  allegiance 
and  fidelity  for  conscience  sake.  The  Gospel,  properly  at- 
tended to,  would  check  and  restrain  the  abuse  of  liberty, 
and  keep  it  within  proper  bounds,  that  it  might  not  run  into 
licentiousness.  Husbands  and  wives,  parents  and  children, 
masters  and  servants,  pastors  and  their  flocks,  would  fulfil 
the  duties  of  their  several  relations;  and  a  stop  would  be 
put  to  that  torrent  of  corruption,  that  inundation  of  vice 
and  sensuality,  which  threatens  ruin  to  states  and  king- 
doms, and  tends  to  the  utter  subversion  of  all  order  and 
good  polity. 

It  cannot  be  denied,  that  what  has  been  now  mentioned 
is  the  natural  tendency  of  the  Christian  precepts,  as  laid 
down  in  the  Holy  Scriptures,  wherever  this  religion  is 
sincerely  believed  and  embraced.  I  shall  on  this  occasion 
subjoin  the  testimony  of  a  great  author,  whom  I  mentioned 
before,  and  who  must  be  acknowledged  to  l^e  a  very  able 
judge  of  these  matters,  and  was  far  from  a  narrow  way 
of  thinking;  it  is  the  celebrated  M.  de  Montesquieu.  As, 
in  a  passage  before  cited,  he  extols  the  morality  of  the  Gos- 

VOL.  II.  3   H  .  ' 


426  The  Conclusion. 

pel,  and  declares  it  to  be  one  of  the  most  excellent  gifts  of 
God  to  mankind,  so  on  another  occasion  he  takes  notice  of 
its  good  influence  considered  in  a  political  view.  Having 
observed  that  Mr.  Bayle  takes  upon  him  to  affirm,  that  a 
state  made  up  of  real  Christians,  acting  according  to  the 
rules  of  Christianity,  could  not  subsist,  he  asks,  "  Why  not? 
The  citizens  would  have  a  clear  knowledge  of  their  several 
duties,  and  a  great  zeal  to  fulfil  them:  they  would  have  a 
just  notion  of  the  right  of  natural  defence:  and  the  more 
they  thought  they  owed  to  religion,  the  more  sensible  they 
would  be  of  what  they  owed  to  their  country."  He  adds, 
that  "the  principles  of  Christianity,  deeply  engraven  upon 
the  heart,  would  be  of  infinitely  greater  force  than  the  false 
honour  of  monarchies,  the  human  virtues  of  republics,  and 
the  servile  fear  of  despotic  states  (^)."  The  same  author 
mentions  it  as  "  an  admirable  thing,  that  the  Christian  reli- 
gion, which  seems  to  have  for  its  object  only  the  happi- 
ness of  another  life,  does  also  make  up  our  happiness  in 
this(/)." 

It  were  easy  to  enlarge  upon  this  last  observation,  and 
shew  what  a  tendency  the   Christian  religion   has   to  pro- 


(it)"  Ce  seroient  des  citoyens  infiniment  eclaires  sur  leurs  de- 
voirs, et  qui  auroient  un  tres  grand  zele  pour  les  remplir:  lis 
sentiroient  tres  bien  les  droits  de  la  defence  naturelle:  plus  ils 
croiroient  devoir  a  la  religion,  plus  ils  penseroient  devoir  a  la 
patrie.  Les  principes  du  Christianisme  bien  graves  dans  le  coeur 
seroient  infiniment  plus  forts,  que  ce  faux  honneur  des  monar- 
chies, ces  vertus  humaines  des  republiques,  et  cette  crainte  ser- 
yile  des  etats  despodques."  De  TEsprit  des  Loix,  tome  II.  livre 
xxiv.  chap.  6.  p.  154.  edit.  Edinb.  See  also  to  the  same  purpose, 
ibid.  chap.  8.  p.  152. 

(/)  "  Chose  admirable!  la  religion  Chretienne,  qui  ne  semble 
avoir  d'objet  que  la  felicite  de  Tautre  vie,  fait  encore  notre  bon- 
heur  dans  celle-ci."  Ibid.  p.  151. 


The  Conclusion^  427 

mote  our  present  happiness,  and  how  vastly  it  contributes 
to  the  real  satisfaction  of  life.  Its  admirable  precepts,  when 
duly  practised,  lay  a  foundation  for  inward  tranquillity, 
peace,  and  self-enjoyment.  Even  those  of  its  precepts, 
which  seem  most  harsh  and  grievous  to  the  sensual  appe- 
tites and  passions,  manifestly  tend  to  the  true  perfection 
and  felicity  of  our  nature,  and  to  recover  the  soul  from  its 
ignominious  servitude  to  vicious  lusts,  to  a  noble  spiritual 
and  moral  liberty.  It  doth  not  impose  upon  us  any  of  those 
unnatural  hardships  and  severities  which  superstition  hath 
often  laid  upon  its  votaries:  nor  doth  it  forbid  any  plea- 
sures, but  what  are  base  and  vicious  in  their  nature,  or  ex- 
cessive in  their  degree.  It  directs  and  assists  us  in  the  true 
enjoyment  of  the  blessings  of  Providence,  with  a  most 
thankful  sense  of  the  Divine  Goodness.  And  its  glorious 
promises  and  sublime  hopes  open  the  way  for  us  to  plea- 
sures of  a  still  nobler  and  sublimer  nature,  the^appy  pre- 
libations  of  invisible  and  immortal  joys. 

The  design  I  had  in  view  has  led  me  chiefly  to  consider 
those  principles  and  duties  which  are  usually  looked  upon 
as  comprehended  in  what  is  called  natural  religion,  and 
which  are  in  some  degree  discoverable  by  human  reason. 
And  it  has  been  shewn,  that  in  fact,  through  the  cor- 
ruption of  mankind,  these  principles  and  duties  were  so 
perverted  and  obscured  as  to  render  an  extraordinary  Reve- 
lation from  God  highly  needful,  for  setting  them  in  the 
most  convincing  light,  and  enforcing  them  by  a  divine 
authority.  It  appears  from  what  has  been  observed,  that 
the  Christian  Revelation  has  done  this  to  the  greatest  ad- 
vantage. And  if  we  should  proceed  farther  to  a  particular 
consideration  of  those  more  peculiar  doctrines  of  Chris- 
tianity, which  reason  could  not  at  all  have  discovered  if  they 
had  not  been  revealed,  especially  those  relating  to  the  me- 
thods of  our  redemption  through  Jesus  Christ,  here  a  glo- 
rious scene  would  open  to  us,  fitted  to   fill  owv  minds  with 


428  The  Conclusion, 

the  highest  admiration  of  the  divine  wisdom  and  righteous- 
ness, and  love  to  mankind.  Christianity  considered  in  this 
view,  is  a  dispensation  of  grace  and  joy,  and  hath  brought 
the  best,  the  happiest  tidings  that  were  ever  published  to 
the  world.  But  I  have  already  far  exceeded  the  bounds  I 
originally  intended,  and  therefore  shall,  without  farther 
enlargement,  conclude  with  observing,  that  we,  who  have 
the  benefit  of  the  Gospel  Revelation,  are  under  indispensa- 
ble obligations  to  endeavour  to  make  a  good  use  of  our  ad- 
vantages, and  to  receive  with  the  greatest  veneration  and 
thankfulness  the  glorious  discoveries  it  brings.  We  should 
be  grateful  to  Divine  Providence  for  the  other  advantages 
we  enjoy,  for  our  trade  and  commerce,  for  the  flourishing 
of  arts  and  sciences  among  us,  and  for  the  enjoyment  of 
civil  liberty.  But  the  most  valuable  of  all  our  privileges  is, 
that  we  have  the  Holy  Scriptures  in  our  hands,  and  the 
Christian  Revelation  clearly  published  amongst  us,  which 
hath  instructed  us  in  the  right  knowledge  of  the  Deity,  hath 
set  our  duty  before  us  in  its  just  extent,  and  furnished  the 
noblest  motives  and  assistances  for  the  performance  of  it, 
and  hath  raised  us  to  such  sublime  hopes  of  a  complete 
eternal  felicity.  Surely  this  calls  in  a  particular  manner  for 
our  adoring  thankfulness  to  God,  to  whose  rich  grace  and 
mercy  we  owe  it  that  we  are  called  out  of  darkness  into 
his  marvellous  light.  It  is  astonishing  to  think,  that  there 
should  be  persons  found  among  us,  who  seem  desirous  to 
extinguish  this  glorious  light,  and  to  return  to  the  antient 
darkness  of  Paganism  again:  who  seem*  weary  of  the  Gos- 
pel, and  with  a  preposterous  zeal  ^endeavour  to  subvert  its 
proofs  and  evidences,  and  to  expose  it,  as  far  as  in  them 
lies,  to  the  derision  and  contempt  of  mankind.  But  the  at- 
tempts of  such  men  against  our  holy  religion  should  only 
quicken  our  zeal  and  heighten  our  esteem  for  it,  and  make 
us  more  earnestly  desirous  to  build  up  ourselves  in  our 
most  holy  faith,  and  to  adorn  it  by  an  exemplary  conver- 


The  Conclusion.  429 

sation  becoming  the  Gospel  of  Christ,  Christianity  is  not  a 
bare  system  of  speculative  opinions,  but  a  practical  institu- 
tion, a  spiritual  and  heavenly  discipline,  all  whose  doctrines, 
precepts,  promises,  and  ordinances,  are  designed  to  form 
men  to  a  holy  and  virtuous  temper  and  practice.  The  most 
effectual  way,  therefore,  we  can  take  to  promote  its  sacred 
interests,  is  to  shew  the  happy  influence  it  hath  upon  our 
own  hearts  and  lives,  by  abounding  in  the  fruits  of  piety, 
righteousness,  and  charity,  and  thus  making  an  amiable 
representation  of  it  to  the  world. 


INDEX 


TO 


THE  SECOND  VOLUME. 


(]Cj='  The  letter  N.  refers  to  the  Notes  at  the  bottom  of  the  page. 

A 

J1jVT0J\/'IA''US,  Marcus — the  emperor  and  philosopher,  speaks 
of  the  gods  as  the  authors  of  all  good  things,  and  that  to  them  we 
ought  to  offer  up  our  prayers  for  assistance  in  duty,  and  our 
thanksgivings  for  the  blessings  we  enjoy,  page  146.  The  good- 
ness of  his  nature  sometimes  got  the  better  of  his  stoical  prin- 
ciples, 171.  He  represents  all  sin  and  wickedness  as  owing  to 
ignorance  and  error,  174 — and  as  necessary  and  unavoidable, 
176.  His  doctrine  of  forgiving  injuries  in  several  respects  ex- 
cellent, but  carried  in  some  instances  to  an  extreme,  and 
placed  on  wrong  foundations,  182.  He  allowed,  and  in  some 
cases  advised,  self-murder,  195.  His  arguments  for  the  ab- 
solute indifferency  of  all  external  things  considered,  218,  219. 
He  excelled  the  other  philosophers  in  the  sense  he  had  of  the 
strict  obligation  of  truth,  and  held  that  he  who  utters  a  lie  wil- 
lingly is  guilty  of  impiety,  227.  He  every  where  expresses  him- 
self doubtfully  about  the  immortality  of  the  soul,  295.  Some- 
times supposes  it  to  be  resumed  into  the  universal  soul  immedi- 
ately upon  its  quitting  the  body.  ibid.  He  never  gives  the  least 
hint  that  men  shall  be  judged  after  death  for  their  conduct  in 
this  life,  or  that  the  wicked  shall  be  punished  in  a  future  state, 
296.  376.  He  represents  duration  as  of  no  moment  to  happi- 
ness, 357. 


432  INDEX. 

jlpathy^  Stoical — doctrine  of  it  considered,  167. 

Aristififius — held  that  nothing  is  by  nature  jusi  or  unjust,  honour- 
able or  base,  but  only  by  \\x\s  and  custom,  85.  He  and  the  Cyre- 
naics  his  followers  asserted  that  corporeal  pleasure,  which  ac- 
tually moves  and  strikes  the  senses,  is  the  chiefest  good,  and 
highest  end  of  man,  88,  89.  He  is  ranked  by  Cicero  with  So- 
crates as  a  man  of  extraordinary  and  divine  endowments,  yet 
■was  very  loose  in  his  morals,  188,  N. 

Aristotle — approves  and  prescribes  the  exposing  and  destroying 
weak  and  sickly  childrerv,  49 — encourages  revenge,  and  seems 
to  blame  meekness  and  forgiveness  of  injuries,  127 — leaches 
that  virtue  is  the  greatest  good,  but  that  external  advantages 
are  necessary  to  complete  happiijess,  216.  N. — varies  in  his 
doctrine  with  respect  to  the  immortality  of  the  soul,  and  some- 
times seems  absolutely  to  deny  it,  284. 

Attic  laws — Some  of  them  probably  derived  from  those  of  Mo- 
ses, 41. 

B 

Bacon^  Lord — A  remarkable  aphorism  of  his,  that  the  cause  of 
almost  all  evils  in  the  sciences  is  the  entertaining  too  high  an 
opinion  of  the  powers  of  the  human  mind  to  the  neglect  of 
proper  assistances,  422  N. 

Barbeyrac^  I^h\ — of  opinion  that  men  generally  come  to  the 
knowledge  of  morals  by  custoni  and  education,  15. 

Bayle,  Mr. — sets  himself  to  shew  the  uncertainty  of  morals,  84. 
N. — says,  that  the  forgiveness  of  injuries  is  contrary  to  the 
law  of  nature,  129 — pleads  for  the  community  of  wives^  and 
for  men's  lending  them  to  one  another,  as  having  nothing  in  it 
disagreeable  to  reason,  137   N. 

Bolingbroke^  Lord — asserts  that  the  whole  law  of  nature,  from  the 
•first  principles  to  the  last  conclusions,  is  naturally  and  neces- 
sarily known  to  every  man,  4 — yet  acknowledges  that  the  law 
of  nature  is  hid  from  our  sight  by  the  variegated  clouds  of  civil 
laws  and  customs,  and  can  yield  but  a  dubious  light  to  those 
that  have  the  clearest  sight,  till  those  interpositions  are  re- 
moved, 69 — and  that  they  who  make  tlie  highest  pretences 
are  unable,  on  many  occasions,  to  deduce  from  the  laws  of 
their  own  nature,  with  precision  and  certainty,  what  these  re- 
quire of  them,  and  what  is  right  or  wrong,  just  or  unjust  for 
them  to  do,  120.  N.  He  asserts,  that  there  is  no  moral  precept 


INDEX.  433 

in  the  whole  Gospel  but  what  was  taught  by  the  philosophers, 
and  yei  represents  it  as  the  law  of  nature,  that  G<  cl  only  is  to 
be  worshipped  and  adored:  which  was  not  taught  or  prescribed 
by  any  of  them,  74,  et  115.  N. 

C. 

Casar^  Julius — declared  in  open  senate  that  there  is  nothing  to 

be  hoped  or  feared  after  death,  387. 
Casaubon^Dr.  Mcric — His  assertion,  that  there  is  no  evangelical 
duty  which  wise  men  among  the  Heathens  have  not  taught  by 
the  mere  strength  of  natural  reason,  considered,  74,  et  seq. 

Cato  of  Utica — cried  up  as  a  perfect  model  of  virtue,  lent  his 
wife  to  Hortensius,  137 — carried  his  grief  for  the  death  of  his 
brother  Cepio  to  an  excess,  171,  admired  for  his  inflexible  se- 
verity, 186 — addicted  to  excessive  drinking;  but  Seneca  will 
not  allow  that  this  was  a  fault  in  him,  191.  He  taught  and  prac- 
tised self-murder,  192. 

Children — The  exposing  those  of  them  that  were  weak  and  de- 
formed prescribed  by  a  law  of  Lycurgus,  45 — very  common 
in  Greece,  and  other  parts  of  the  Pagan  world,  48 — approved 
by  Plato  and  Aristotle,  49 — prescribed  by  Romulus,  and  con- 
tinued to  be  practised  at  Rome  for  many  ages,  59,  60. 

Chinrse — highly  extolled  by  some  authors  as  having  the  prefer- 
ence to  Christians  in  all  moi^al  virtues,  63.  Their  laws  well 
contrived  to  preserve  public  order,  but  insufficient  to  furnish 
a  complete  rule  of  morals,  ibid — unnatural  lusts  common 
among  them,  64 — they  account  drunkenness  to  be  no  crime, 
ibid. — take  as  many  concubines  as  they  can  keep,  ibid. — lend 
and  pawn  their  wives  upon  occasion,  ibid. — and  dissolve  mar- 
riaiies  for  slight  causes,  f^zo?.  Their  cruel  custom  of  exposing 
and  destroying  their  female  children,  65 — exceeding  liti- 
gious and  revengeful,  ibid.  Their  tribunals  full  of  fraud  and 
injustice,  66.  N.  See  also  299.  N.  The  most  cheating  nation 
upon  earth,  66.  See  Learned  Sect  in  China. 

Christian  Revelation — was  published  at  a  time  when  mankind 
were  sunk  into  the  most  amazing  corruption  with  regard  to 
morals,  230,  231 — brought  the  most  perfect \scheme  of  mo- 
rality that  was  ever  given  to  the  world,  and  enforced  it  by  the 
most  powerful  motives.  See  Morality.  The  uniform  tendency 
of  the  whole  to  promote  the  practice  of  holiness  and  virtue,  is 

Vol.  II.  3  1 


434  INDEX. 

a  strong  argument  of  its  divine  original,  216,  et  seq.  Life  and 
immortality  is  brought  by  it  into  the  clearest  and  fullest  light, 
400,  et  seq.  It  has  given  the  strongest  assurances  of  the  cer- 
tainty of  future  happiness,  401 — and  makes  the  most  inviting 
discoveries  of  the  nature  of  that  happiness,  404,  et  seq.  The 
idea  there  given  of  it  is  the  noblest  that  can  be  conceived,  and 
the  best  fitted  to  promote  the  practice  of  righteousness  and 
true  holiness,  406,  407.  It  also  makes  the  most  awful  and 
striking  representations  of  the  judgment  to  come,  and  of  the 
punishments  which  shall  be  inflicted  upon  the  wicked  in  a  fu- 
ture state,  416,  417.  It  is  the  perfection  of  all  the  divine  Reve- 
lations that  were  ever  given  to  mankind,  and  therefore  to  be 
received  with  the  highest  veneration  and  thankfulness,  and  to 
be  valued  as  the  greatest  of  all  our  privileges,  423,  et  seq. 
When  duly  understood  and  practised  it  is  of  great  advantage 
to  kingdoms  and  states,  and  has  a  tendency  to  promote  good 
order  in  the  world,  and  public  as  well  as  private  happiness,  424. 

Christianity — in  many  instances  raised  its  professors  to  a  height 
of  fortitude  and  patience,  which  the  Stoics  boasted  of,  but  could 
not  attain  to,  221. 

Christians,  primitive — the  most  pious  and  virtuous  body  of  men 
that  ever  appeared  in  the  world,  261.  The  purity  and  inno- 
ccncy  of  their  lives  acknowledged  by  the  Pagans  themselves, 
360,  361.  Glorious  effects  produced  by  their  hopes  of  a  blessed 
immortality,  ibid. 

Chrysipfius,  the  famous  Stoic  philosopher — Arrogant  strains  of 
his,  equalling  the  wise  man  with  Jupiter  in  virtue  and  happi- 
ness, 155.  He  reckoned  the  most  incestuous  mixtures  and  im- 
purities among  indiflFerent  things,  189— held  the  community 
of  women,  ibid. — gave  obscene  interpretations  of  the  Pagan 
tnythology,  zdiflJ. — was  addicted  to' drunkenness,  and  died  of 
it,  190. 

Cicero — bestows  the  highest  encomiums  on  the  usefulness  and 
excellency  of  philosophy,  especially  with  regard  to  morals,  73 
—yet  observes,  that  it  was  by  many  not  only  neglected  but 
reproached,  82 — passes  a  severe  censure  on  those  that  make 
sensual  pleasure  the  chief  good,  86.  He  derives  the  original  of 
law  from  the  sovereign  wisdom  and  authority  which  governs 
the  universe,  107.  This  law  he  sometimes  represents  as  natu- 
rally and  necessarily  known  to  all  men  without  instruction  or 


INDEX.  ,  435 

an  interpreter,  109.  The  contrary  is  proved  from  his  own  ac- 
kno'R'ltrdgnients,  i  10.  He  sends  men  to  the  contemplation  of 
the  works  of  nature,  especially  of  the  heavens,  for  instruction 
in  moral  duty,  111.  What  he  seems  principally  to  rely  upon  is, 
that  the  natural  law  is  made  known  by  the  reason  of  the  wise 
man,  which  he  supposes  to  be  the  same  with  the  reason  of 
God  himself,  113.  He  makes  little  mention  of  God  in  his 
Book  of  Offices,  where  he  treats  of  ethics,  120.  He  encourages 
retaliation  of  injuries,  127 — pleads  for  fornication  as  hav- 
ing nothing  blameable  in  it,  and  as  universally  allowed  and 
practised,  139.  Sometimes  he  seems  to  condemn  suicide,  at 
other  times  commends  and  justifies  it,  202 — prefers  the 
Stoical  scheme  of  morals,  in  his  Book  of  Offices,  to  that  of  the 
Peripatetics,  216.  His  account  of  the  Honestum  considered, 
223.  He  argues  excellently  for  the  immortality  of  the  soul 
in  several  parts  of  his  works,  319 — yet  sometimes  in  his 
familiar  letters  to  his  friends  represents  death  as  putting  an 
end  to  all  sense  of  good  or  evil,  320,  321.  Even  where  he 
seems  to  plead  most  strenuously  for  the  immortality  of  the 
soul,  he  does  not  pretend  to  a  certainty,  but  talks  doubtfully 
about  it,  345.  It  is  not  clear  whether  he  held  the  soul  to  be 
properly  a  part  of  the  Divine  Essence;  but  he  argued,  that  it 
must  be  necessarily  eternal  by  the  force  of  its  own  nature, 
332.  He  makes  no  use  of  the  doctrine  of  the  immortality  of  the 
soul  for  moral  purposes,  either  for  supporting  men  under 
troubles  and  adversities,  or  for  engaging  them  to  the  pursuit 
and  practice  of  virtue,  352.  The  notion  of  future  punish- 
ments is  absolutely  rejected  by  him,  both  in  his  philosophical 
treatises,  and  in  a  public  oration  before  the  Roman  people, 
371.  He  so  explains  the  maxim  of  the  philosophers  that  the 
gods  are  never  angry,  as  to  exclude  all  fear  of  punishments  af- 
ter death,  374,  et  seq. 

Civil  laws,  and  customs  that  had  the  force  oj  laws — not  adequate 
rules  of  moral  duty,  37.  69.  Instances  in  which  they  were 
contrary  to  good  morals,  40,  et  seq. 

Clerc,  Mr.  Le — thinks  it  probable  that  several  of  the  usages,  and 
institutions,  which  were  common  to  the  Egyptians  and  He- 
brews, were  derived  to  them  from  the  earliest  ages,  and  ori- 
ginally of  divine  appointment,  25.  N, 

Community  of  wives — allowed  by  many  of  the  philosophers,  par- 


436  INDEX. 

ticulaiiy  by  Plato,'the  Cynics,  and  Stoics,  1S3.  136,  137.  189.— 
praciised  by  many  nations,  133.  N. 

Confucius^  the  famous  Chinese  philosopher — did  not  pretend  to 
be  himself  the  author  of  the  moral  precepts  he  delivered,  but 
to  have  derived  them  from  wise  men  of  the  greatest  antiquity, 
26.  N.  He  carried  the  custom  of  mourning  for  dead  parents 
to  an  extreme  that  is  prejudicial  to  society,  172.  N.  He 
makes  no  mention  of  the  immortality  of  the  soul,  and  the  re- 
wards and  punishments  of  a  future  state,  297.  This  doctrine 
rejected  by  his  disciples.  See  Learned  Sect. 

Le  Conservateur — a  periodical  paper  published  at  Paris,  attempts 
to  justify  the  laws  of  some  nations,  which  ordered  old  and  in- 
firm persons  to  be  put  to  death,  67.  N. — pretends,  that  sui- 
cide is  not  contrary  to  reason,  though  it  is  forbidden  by  re- 
ligion, 204. 

Customs^  barbarous  and  impure — of  several  nations,  mentioned 
by  Eusebius,  from  which  they  were  reclaimed  by  Christianity, 
67. 

Cynics — professed  to  make  morals  their  whole  study,  yet  shewed 
little  regard  to  modesty  and  decency,  135 — denied  the  im- 
mortality of  the  soul,  283. 

Cyi'enaics,  Sect  of- — hold  sensual  pleasure  to  be  the  chief  good 
of  man;  and  that  the  pleasures  of  the  body  are  greater  than 
those  of  the  mind,  and  its  pains  and  griefs  worse,  89.  Difference 
between  them  and  the  Epicureans,  96.  See  ^ristijifius.  They 
denied  the  immortality  of  the  soul,  283. 

D. 

Deists,  modern — find  fault  with  the  Gospel  doctrine  of  for- 
giving injuries,  and  loving  our  enemies,  in  which  they  fall 
short  of  some  antient  Heathens,  129.  They  are  generally 
very  loose  in  their  doctrines  concerning  the  gratification  of 
the  sensual  passions,  and  allow  gi^at  liberties  to  incontinence 
and  impurity,  142.  Some  of  them  pretend  that  the  im- 
mortality of  the  soul,  and  a  future  state  of  retributions,  is  so 
evident,  that  there  needs  no  revelation  to  assure  us  of  it;  others 
treat  it  as  a  popular  error,  or  at  best  as  absolutely  uncertain, 
and  as  having  no  solid  foundation  in  reason  to  support  it,  267, 

Diogenes  the  Cynic — admired  by  Epictetus  as  a  perfect  pattern  of 
virtue,  and   sent  by  God  to  instruct  and  reform  mankind, 


INDEX.  437 

lo5.  He  held  the  community  of  women,  and  that  marriage  is 
nothing,  idid.  His  shameful  filthiness  and  incontinence,  ibid. 
et  136. 

Dionysiu's  Halicarnasseus — An  observation  of  his,  that  if  the  soul 
be  dissolved  at  death,  those  men  cannot  be  accounted  happy 
who  have  perished  on  account  of  their  virtue,  355,  356. 

Discours  sur  la  vie  heureuse — a  tract  under  that  title — is  design- 
ed to  shew  that  happiness  consists  only  in  the  gratification  of 
the  fleshly  appetites;  and  asserts,  that  we  ought  to  take  care 
of  the  body  rather  than  of  the  soul,  and  to  culiivate  the  mind 
only  to  procure  advantages  for  the  body,  89.  N. — confidently 
pronounces,  that  it  is  demonstrated  by  a  thousand  arguments 
that  there  is  no  other  life  but  this;  and  that  the  mortality  of  the 
soul  was  the  general  doctrine  of  all  the  philosophers  from  the 
beginning,  275.  N. 

Dissolutions  and  Renovations  of  the  world  perpetually  returning 
at  certain  periods — taught  by  many  of  the  antient  philosophers, 
particularly  by  the  Stoics,  290— and  by  the  Learned  Sect  in 
China  at  this  day,  ibid.  N. 

E. 

Eastern  Sages — famous  for  their  maxims  derived  to  them,  not  in 
a  way  of  reasoning  and  philosophy,  but  by  tradition  from  the 
most  antient  times,  26.  N. 

Education  and  Instruction — the  ordinary  way  of  communicating 
to  men  the  knowledge  of  morals,  13,  et  seq. 

Egy/itian  laivs  and  customs — admired  by  the  antients,  39,  A  re- 
markable custom  of  theirs,  with  reflections  upon  it,  40.  Their 
laws  and  customs  in  several  instances  of  an  immoral  tendency, 
ibid,  et  seq. 

Elysium — the  reward  of  it  but  temporary,  338. 

Epicurus — held  pleasure  to  be  the  chief  good,  and  highest  hap- 
piness of  man,  89,  His  morals  highly  commended  both  by 
some  of  the  antients  and  moderns,  ibid.  It  is  an  essential  de- 
fect in  his  scheme  of  morals,  that  it  had  no  regard  to  the  Deity, 
or  to  a  divine  authority  and  law;  and  yet  he  writ  books  about 
piety  and  sanctity,  89.  His  morality  defective  with  respect  to 
the  duties  we  owe  to  mankind,  ibid.  He  taught  that  business 
and  cares  do  not  consist  with  happiness;  and  that  a  wise  man 
ought  not  to  marry,  or  to  concern  himself  with  public  aff*airs, 
90.  He  gives  excellent  precepts  of  moderation,  temperance. 


438  INDEX. 

and  the  government  of  the  passions,  ibid,  et  92  represents 
the  inconvenience  of  indulginj^  venereal  pleasures:  and  de- 
clares, that  the  pleasures  he  recommends,  are  not  those  of 
luxury  and  excess,  but  such  as  are  under  the  conduct  of  pru- 
dence, ibid,  et  93— yet  is  said  to  have  had  several  mistresses, 
94.  The  virtues  he  prescribes  are  resolved  wholly  into  a  man's 
own  private  advantage,  without  regard  to  the  excellence  of 
virtue,  or  a  divine  command,  93 — declares,  that  he  could  not 
understand  what  good  there  is,  but  the  pleasure  of  the  senses, 
94— forbids  injustice  and  other  crimes,  not  for  any  evil  there 
is  in  them  in  themselves  considered,  but  for  fear  of  human 
punishments,  96.  He  valued  himself  upon  instructing  men  in 
the  nature  of  true  happiness,  and  directing  them  how  to  obtain 
it,  97.  He  taught  that  happiness  consists  in  indolence  of  the 
body,  and  tranquillity  of  mind,  ibid.  Some  of  the  means  he  pro- 
posed to  that  end  were  fit  and  proper,  98  But  what  he  chiefly 
insisted  upon  as  necessary  to  make  them  happy,  was  the  de- 
livering them  from  the  fear  of  the  gods,  and  the  fear  of  death. 
His  remedy  against  the  first  was  to  deny  a  providence  that 
conccrnelh  itself  with  human  affairs,  99.  The  considerations 
he  offered  to  free  men  from  the  fear  of  death,  vain  and  insuffi- 
cient, 99.  His  glorious  pretences  to  fortitude  and  a  contempt 
of  pain,  considered  and  exposed,  lOQ,  et  seq.  His  pride  and  vain- 
glory even  in  his  dying  moments,  101.  His  contempt  of  other 
philosophers,  and  envy  at  their  reputation,  103,  Honours  done 
him  by  his  country,  104. 

Ejdcureans — their  great  veneration  for  the  memory  of  Epicurus 
— they  in  effect  made  a  god  of  him,  104 — and  looked  upon  it  to 
be  an  impious  thing,  to  bring  in  any  other  tenets  than  those 
which  he  taught  them,  ibid.  They  were  very  numerous,  and 
continued  when  other  sects  of  philosophers  failed,  105 — 
highly  favoured  by  the  great  men  in  Rome,  by  the  emperors 
and  the  people,  ibid. — yet  severe  ^decrees  were  made  against 
them  by  some  cities  and  states,  ibid. 

£/nct€tus— His  observation  concerning  the  great  difficulty  of  ap- 
plying general  preconceptions  to  particular  cases,  119.  He 
allows  no  sanctions  of  rewards  and  punishments,  but  what  flow 
from  the  nature  of  the  actions  themselves,  150 — asserts,  that 
man's  will  and  choice  is  unconquerable  by  God  himself,  153 
— carries  the  Stoical  doctrine  of  apathy  to  a  degree  of  extrava- 


INDEX.  439 

gance,  168 — represents  all  wickedness  as  owing  to  igno- 
rance and  a  wrong  persuasion,  174 — will  not  allow  that 
any  injury  can  be  done  to  a  good  man,  178 — advises  to  suicide 
in  some  cases,  194.  No  philosopher  ever  more  strongly  as- 
serted the  absolute  indifferency  of  all  external  things,  209.  He 
complains,  that  he  never  met  with  a  true  Stoic,  220.  He 
never  speaks  of  a  future  state  of  retributions,  295 — rejects  the 
doctrine  of  future  punishments,  ibid. 

UEsfirit^  De — The  author  of  the  book  so  called  makes  the  laws 
of  the  state  the  rule  and  measure  of  virtue  and  duty,  38.  N.  He 
brings  many  instances  of  impure  customs  among  the  nations, 
and  seems  to  approve  them,  68 — makes  the  love  of  pleasure 
the  chief  incentive  to  virtue;  and  affirms,  that  the  perfection  of 
legislation  consists  in  exciting  men  to  the  noblest  actions  by 
fomenting  and  gratifying  the  sensual  passions,  87,  et  seq.  N. — 
will  not  allow  that  gallantry  is  a  fault  or  vice  in  a  nation 
where  luxury  is  necessary,    ibid. 

Eternal  life  to  all  good  men — not  taught  by  the  most  eminent  of 
the  Pagan  philosophers,  340,  et  seq.  It  commences  with  res- 
pect to  the  souls  of  the  righteous  immediately  after  their  de- 
parture from  the  body;  but  includes  the  resurrection  of  the 
body,  and  shall  then  be  completed,  404.  408.  We  could  not 
be  assured  of  eternal  happiness  as  the  reward  of  our  imper- 
fect obedience,  but  by  an  express  Divine  Revelation,  410. 
It  is  promised  in  the  Gospel  to  all  good  men  without  exception^ 
411,412. 

Exoteric  and  Esoteric  doctrine  of  the  antients,  348,  et  seq.  The 
same  distinction  obtains  among  the  Chinese,  350,  N. 

F. 

Fall  of  Man — New  duties  required  of  men  in  consequence  of  it, 
concerning  which  God  discovered  his  will  in  the  first  ages, 
21. 

Fontenelle^  Mr, — looked  upon  the  wickedness  of  men  without 
bitterness,  as  being  the  effect  of  an  eternal  necessary  chain, 
177.  N.  Reflections  upon  this,  ibid. 

Forgiveness  of  injuries — recommended  by  some,pf  the  philoso- 
phers, but  contradicted  by  others,  127 — and  by  many  of  our 
modern  Deists,  128.  The  excellency  of  the  Gospel  doctrine 
on  this  head,  129.  184.  244. 

Fornication — not  accounted  a  sin  among  the   Pagans  in  the  men, 


440  INDEX. 

though  they  acknowledg:ed  a  turpitude  in  women's  prostitu- 
ting themselves,  137,  etseq.  The  philosophers  practised  and 
pleaded  for  it,  ibid.  It  is  expressly  proiiibited  in  the  Gospel;  and 
the  prohibition  enforced  by  the  most  powerful  arguments  and 
motives,  140. 
Fruity  forbidden — The  injunction  concerning  it  virtually  contain- 
ed a  considerable  part  of  the  moral  law,  20. 

G. 

Galen — professed  to  be  quite  ignorant  of  the  nature  of  the  hu- 
man soul,  but  suspected  it  to  be  corporeal,  285,  286. 

Gassenduf. — :arries  his  aj)ology  for  Epicurus  so  far  as  to  praise 
him  for  his  disinterested  piety,  90.  N  — gives  it  as  the 
general  opinion  of  the  ant  ents,  that  human  souls  are  par  s  of 
the  divine  essence,  and  that  at  death  they  lose  their  individu- 
ality, and  are  resolved  into  the  substance  of  the  universal  soul, 
308.  N. 

Ge7itiles — In  what  sense  it  is  to  be  understood  that  they  had  the 
law  written  in  their  hearts,  28.  N.  The  pious  among  them 
acknovv'ledged  by  the  Jews  to  have  a  portion  in  the  world  to 
come,  23.  See  Heathens. 

Gloucester^  Blshofi  of- — shews,  that  the  laws  of  civil  society  alone 
considered,  are  insufficient  lo  secure  the  cause  of  virtue,  or  to 
prevent  or  cure  moral  disorders,  39.  N.  His  observation  on  a 
passage  of  Terence  concerning  the  custom  of  exposing  chil- 
dren, 60.  He  observes,  that  the  great  utility  of  the  do  tnne 
of  future  rewards  and  punishments  is  no  small  argument  of 
its  truth,  278 — exposes  the  sophistry  and  false  reasoiiing  of 
Plutarch  in  his  tract  of  Superstition,  374. 

GOD,  the  knowledge  of — is  the  great  foundation  of  morality,  29. 
Noble  idea  of  God  i^iven  in  the  Holy  Scriptures,  and  of  the 
duty  we  owe  him,  234,  et  seq. 

Gods — The  noblest  acts  of  piety  prescribed  by  the  philosophers, 
were  directed  to  be  rendered  not  to  one  God  only,  but  to 
the  gods,  120.  148.  It  was  an  universal  maxim  among 
the  philosophers  that  the  gods  are  never  angry,  nor  hurt 
any  one,  374.  This  was  carried  by  many  of  them  so  far  to 
exclude  all  divine  punishments  for  sin,  ibid,  et  376 — yet 
others  of  them  acknowledged,  that  the  gods  have  a  displea- 
sure against  sin,  and  chastise  or  punish  men  on  the  account 
of  it,  378 — uncertainty  and  inconsistency  on  this  head,  380. 


INDEX.  441 

Gosfiel  Disfiensation — opened  with  a  full  and  free  pardon,  to  peni- 
tent returning  sinners,  of  all  their  past  iniquities;  and  at  the 
same  time  laid  them  under  the  strongest  obligations,  and  gave 
them  the  best  directions  and  assistances  for  a  holy  and  virtu- 
ous practice,  232.  It  contains  the  clearest  discoveries,  and 
makes  the  most  glorious  promises  of  eternal  life,  401,  et  seq. 
The  light  of  the  Gospel  is  the  greatest  of  all  our  privileges, 
and  calls  for  our  highest  thankfulness,  427,  et  seq. 

Gosp.el  Scheme  of  morality.     See  Morality. 

Grecians^  antient — accounted  among  the  most  knowing  and  civi- 
lized nations  of  antiquity,  41 — had  excellent  institutions,  yet 
many  of  their  laws  and  customs  were  contrary  to  good  morals, 
42,  et  seq. 

Grotius — of  opinion  that  the  law  was  communicated  to  Adam 
the  first  father  of  mankind  by  divine  revelation,  and  from  him 
transmitted  to  the  human  race,  21.  N. — mentions  some  insti- 
tutions and  customs  common  to  all  men,  which  he  ascribes  to 
a'  perpetual  and  almost  uninterrupted  tradition  from  the  first 
ages,  25.  N. 

Gymnosofihists — a  sect  of  Indian  philosophers  mightly  admired 
among  the  antients  for  their  wisdom  and  virtue,  198.  They 
made  a  wrong  use  of  a  noble  principle,  the  immortality  of  the 
soul,  by  voluntarily  putting  an  end  to  their  own  lives,  ibid.  In- 
stances of  the  same  kind  among  other  nations,  199.  N. 

H. 

Hapfiiness — Men  are  generally  very  apt  to  form  wrong  judg- 
ments of  what  is  conducive  to  true  happiness,  13.  The  philoso- 
phers proposed  to  lead  men  to  perfect  happiness  in  this  present 
life,  209,  et  seq.  They  held,  that  a  man  may  be  completely- 
happy  under  the  greatest  torments  merely  by  the  force  of  his 
own  virtue,  without  regard  to  a  future  recorapence,  211.  The 
generality  of  people  among  the  Pagans  had  very  mean  notions 
of  the  happiness  of  good  men  in  a  future  state,  384. 

iifea^/^ens— God  did  a  great  deal  in  the  course  of  his  Providence 
to  preserve  a  sense  of  morals  among  them,  if  they  had  been 
duly  careful  to  make  a  right  use  of  the  advantages  afforded 
them,  27,  et  seq.  When  they  fell  from  a  right  knowledge  of 
God,  they  fell  also  in  important  instances,  from  a  just  know- 
ledge of  moral  duty,  29.  They  had  some  general  notions  of  God 
Vol.  IL  3  K  ' 


442  INDEX. 

and  a  Providence,  and  of  the  moral  diflferences  of  things, 
which  furnished  encouragements  to  virtue,  and  tended  to  res- 
train vice  and  wickedness,  34.  That  part  of  the  moral  law 
which  relates  to  civil  and  social  virtue  was  in  a  considerable 
degree  preserved  among  them,  as  far  as  was  necessary  to  the 
peace  and  order  of  society,  34.  et  126.  But  they  were  greatly 
deficient  in  that  part  of  it  which  relates  to  the  duty  we  more 
immediately  owe  to  God,  and  in  that  which  relates  to  the  re- 
strainingf  and  governing  the  fleshly  concupiscence,  34,  et 
120.  129,  et  seq.  They  were  universally  abandoned  to  unclean- 
ness  and  impurity,  140 — and  were  sunk  into  an  amazing  cor- 
ruption, both  in  their  notions  and  practice,  with  regard  to  mo- 
rals at  the  time  of  ourSaviour's  coming,  230,et  seq. No  sufficient 
remedy  was  to  be  expected  from  their  religion,  their  civil  laws, 
or  the  instructions  of  their  philosophers,  ?6/(/.  There  was  need 
of  an  extraordinary  revelation  to  give  them  a  complete  rule 
of  moral  duty,  enforced  by  a  divine  authority,  and  the  most  im- 
portant motives;  and  the  Christian  revelation  was  admirably 
fitted  for  that  purpose,  232,  et  seq.  A  divine  revelation  was 
also  needful  to  give  them  a  clear  discovery  and  full  assurance 
of  a  future  state.  See  Immortality. 

Heraclitus  the  philosopher — admired  by  the  Stoics,  164.  His  vain 
glorious  boasting  of  himself,  ibid. 

Corner— teaches  punishments  for  the  wicked  in  a  future  state, 
366.  He  represents  good  men  and  heroes  themselves  as 
disconsolate  in  a  future  state,  lamenting  their  condition,  and 
preferring  the  meanest  condition  on  earth  to  the  most  eminent 
station  in  Hades,  384. 

Honestum^  to  xaAev — regarded  by  many  of  the  antients  as  the  true 
criterion  of  virtue,  223  The  philosophers  were  not  agreed  in 
their  notions  concerning  it,  224.  et  314. 

Humble  and  Humility — The  Stoical  resignation  different  from 
that  humble  submission  to  God  which  Christianity  requires, 
161,  162.  N.  Humility  was  generally  understood  in  an  ill  sense 
among  the  Pagans,  especially  the  Stoics,  165 — taken  in  the 
evangelical  sense  as  recommended  by  our  Saviour,  it  had  pro- 
perly no  place  in  the  Pagan  systems  of  piety  and  morality, 
166, 


INDEX.  443 

I. 

Idolatry — had  a  bad  influence  in  corrupting  both  the  notions  and 
practices  of  mankind  with  regard  to  morals,  29. 

7^7^.9— had  holy  and  excellent  laws  given  them  in  the  principal 
articles  of  moral  duty,  30 — at  the  time  of  our  Saviour's  com- 
ing they  had  perverted  the  moral  law  by  their  traditions,  232, 
233.  The  belief  of  the  immortality  of  the  soul  and  a  future  state 
was  very  general  among  them  when  the  Gospel  was  published, 
though  denied  by  the  sect  of  the  Saducees,  395.  400.  They 
also  generally  believed  the  resurrection  ot  the  body,  but  had 
very  imperfect  and  gross  notions  of  it,  ibid,  et  405. 

Ignorance — All  men's  evil  actions  resolved  by  Epictetus  and  Mar- 
cus Antoninus  wholly  into  their  ignorance,  and  mistaken  judg- 
ments of  things,  174. 

Iminortality  of  the  soul^  and  a  future  state, —'The  importance  of 
that  doctrine  shewn,  266.  Natural  and  moral  arguments 
in  proof  of  it  are  of  great  weight,  268,  et  seq. — but  it  is  by 
divine  Revelation  that  we  have  the  fullest  assurance  of  it,  271. 
Some  notion  and  belief  of  it  obtained  among  mankind  from 
the  most  antient  time,  and  spread  generally  among  the  nations, 
272,  et  seq.  This  was  not  originally  the  mere  eflfect  ©f  human 
wisdom  and  reasoning,  but  was  derived  by  a  most  antient  tra- 
dition from  the  earliest  ages,  and  probably  made  a  part  of  the 
primitive  religion  communicated  by  divine  revelation  to  the 
first  parents  of  the  human  race,  279,  et  seq.  The  belief  of  it 
was  countenanced  and  encouraged  by  the  wisest  legislators, 
ibid. — but  was  much  weakened  by  the  disputes  of  the  philoso- 
phers; many  of  whom  absolutely  denied  it,  283,  et  seq. — and 
those  of  them  that  professed  to  believe  it,  often  spoke  of  it 
with  great  doubt  and  uncertainty,  or  argued  for  it  upon  insuf- 
ficient grounds.  See  Philoso fibers.  In  the  days  of  Socrates  it 
met  with  little  credit  among  the  generality  of  the  Greeks, 
382 — and  Polybius  complains,  that  in  his  time  it  was  reject- 
ed both  by  the  great  men  and  many  of  the  people;  and  on 
this  he  charges  the  great  corruption  of  their  "manners,  384. 
The  disbelief  of  it  became  very  common  among  the  Romans 
in  the  latter  times  of  their  state,  who  in  this  fell  from  the  reli- 
gion of  their  ancestors,  385,  et  seq.  The  world  stood  in  great 
need  of  an  extraordinary  Revelation  from  God  at  the  time  of 
our  Saviour's  appearance,  to  assure  men  of  the  immortality  of 


444  INDEX. 

the  soul,  and  a  future  state,  400.  Life  and  immortality  is  clear- 
ly and  fully  brous^ht  to  light  by  the  Gospel,  401,  et  seq.  The 
happy  effects  of  this  doctrine  where  it  is  sincerely  believed 
and  embraced;  it  tends  to  comfort  us  under  all  the  tribulations 
of  this  present  state;  to  beget  in  us  a  true  greatness  of  soul, 
and  animate  us  to  a  continual  progress  in  holiness  and  virtue, 
412,  413.   See  also  360,  361. 

Imfiurity  and  Incontinence — contrary  to  the  law  of  nature,  and  of 
pernicious  consequence  to  society,  47.  N.  et  141 — universal  in 
the  gentile  world,  and  particularly  among  the  philosophers, 
138,  139.  To  recover  men  from  it  one  noble  design  of  the 
Gospel,  140.  249,  250.  Many  of  our  modern  Deists  seem  toen- 
courage  this  licentiousness,  instead  of  correcting  it,  142,  143. 

Inquiry^  critical — into  the  opinions  and  practice  of  the  antient 
philosophers-,  concerning  the  nature  of  the  soul,  and  a  future 
state — a  learned  and  judicious  treatise,  289 — referred  to,  291. 
307.  309.  350. 

Juives  Lettres,  the  author  of — declares,  that  the  greatest  adver- 
saries of  Christianity  must  own,  that  the  moral  precepts  of 
the  first  preachers  of  the  Gospel  were  infinitely  superior  to 
those  of  the  wisest  philosophers  of  antiquity,  264. 

L. 

Lacedemonians — were  for  sacrificing  probity,  justice,  and  every 
other  consideration  to  what  they  thought  the  good  of  the  state 
required,  43.  Many  of  their  laws  and  customs  contrary  to  hu- 
manity, 44.  Their  cruelty  to  their  slaves,  ibid.  Others  of 
their  laws  inconsistent  with  modesty  and  decency,  46.  They 
were  a  people  admired  by  all  antiquity  for  their  wisdom  and 
virtues,  and  yet  in  several  respects  of  a  bad  character  47,  48. 

Lactantius — observes,  that  those  among  the  Pagans  who  instruct- 
ed them  in  the  worship  of  the  gods,  gave  no  rules  for  the  con- 
duct of  life,  and  regulating  men's  j^nanners,  35.  N. 

La'iv — The  heathens  generally  agreed  in  deriving  the  original  of 
law  from  God,  26.  108. 

Law,  moral — not  naturally  and  necessarily  known  to  all  men  in 
its  just  extent,  without  instruction,  4.  The  knowledge  of  it  com- 
municated to  mankind  in  various  ways,  5,  et  seq.  viz.  by  the 
moral  sense,  5,  6. — by  a  principle  of  reason  judging  from  the 
nature  and  relations  of  things,  8,  9*— by  education  and  human 


INDEX.  445 

ihstruction,  12,  13 — and  by  Divine  Revelation,  16.  It  was  for 
substance  known  in  the  patriarchal  times,  24 — expressly  pro- 
mulgated with  great  solemnity  under  the  Mosaical  dispensa- 
tion, 29,  30 — prescribed  and  enforced  in  its  highest  perfection 
by  the  gospel,  232,  et  seq. 

Laws — There  were  laws  given  to  mankind  before  the  flood, 
the  transgression  of  which  brought  that  awful  judgment  upon 
them,  23. 

Laws  of  civil  Society — imperfect  measures  of  moral  duty,  37. 
See  Civil. 

Laws  of  the  twelve  tables — preferred  by  Cicero  to  all  the  laws  of 
Greece,  and  to  all  the  writings  ot  the  philosophers,  58.  borne 
of  those  laws  extremely  severe,  particularly  an  inhuman  one 
concerning  debtors,  58,  59 — another  for  the  exposing  and 
destroying  deformed  children,  ibid. 

Laws  unwritten — common  to  all  mankind.  See  Socrates. 

Learned  Sect  among  the  Chinese — confine  the  rewards  of  good 
and  punishments  of  bad  men  to  this  present  life,  and  suppose 
them  to  be  the  necessary  physical  effects  of  virtue  and  vice, 
297 — they  universally  reject  the  rewards  and  punishments  of 
a  future  state,  298,  299 — the  bad  effects  of  this  upon  their  own 
conduct,  299.  N. 

Legislators — The  most  antient  pretended  to  have  received  their 
laws  from  God,  that  they  might  have  the  greater  authority 
with  the  people,  81. 

Locke,  Mr. — An  excellent  passage  from  him  to  shew,  that  a 
complete  rule  of  duty  could  not  be  had  among  the  Heathen 
philosophers,  79.  He  observes,  that  human  reason  failed  in  its 
great  and  proper  business  of  morality,  and  never  from  unques- 
tionable principles  made  out  an  intire  body  of  the  law  of 
nature,  228,  229 — and  that  it  should  seem  by  that  little  that 
has  been  hitherto  done  in  it,  to  be  too  hard  a  task  for  unassisted 
reason  to  establish  morality  in  all  its  parts  with  a  clear  and 
convincing  light,  ibid. 

Love,  imfiure,  of  boys — very  common  in  Greece,  49,  et  seq. — in 
some  places  prescribed  by  their  laws,  50 — avowed  and  prac- 
tised by  the  most  eminent  persons  among  then},  54 — it  prevail- 
ed much  at  Rome,  63 — and  in  China,  64.  Many  of  the  philoso- 
phers greatly  addicted  to  it,  130,  et  seq. 

Lycurgu$ — pronounced  by  the  oracle  to  have  been  rather  a  god 


446  INDEX. 

than  a  man,  42.  His  laws  highly  celebrated  both  by  antients 
and  moderns,  yet  fitted  rather  to  render  men  valiant  than  just> 
43.  Several  of  his  institutions  contrary  to  the  rules  of  a  sound 
morality,  43,  et  seq.  See  Laced(£monian8. 

M. 

Man — a  moral  agent,  and  designed  to  be  governed  by  a  law,  2,  3 
— nor  left  at  his  first  creation  merely  to  fix  a  rule  of  moral 
duty  to  himself,  19.  God  made  early  discoveries  of  his  will  to 
him  concerning  his  duty,  19  et  seq. 

Meng-Zu — esteemed  the  second  great  Chinese  philosopher  after 
Confucius,  297 — never  makes  the  least  mention  in  his  wri- 
tings of  the  immortality  of  the  soul,  and  a  future  state,  ibid. 

Mixtures,  incestuous^  and  unnatural  lusts — common  among 
many  of  the  Heathen  nations,  116,  117.  N. — reckoned  by  many 
of  their  antient  wise  men  among  things  indifferent,  129.  188. 
224. 

Montesquieu,  Mons.  de — commends  the  laws  of  Lycurgus,  43. 
A  good  observation  of  his  to  shew,  that  incontinence  is  con- 
trary to  the  law  of  nature,  and  ought  to  be  restrained  by  the 
magistrate,  46,  47.  N.  et  141 — gives  a  disadvantageous  charac- 
ter of  the  Chinese,  66 — is  a  great  admirer  of  the  Stoics,  145, 
146 — declared  with  his  dying  breath,  that  the  Gospel  morality 
was  the  most  excellent  present  which  could  possibly  have  been 
made  to  man  from  his  Creator,  264,  265.  He  observes,  that  the 
belief  of  future  rewards  without  future  punishments  would  be 
a  great  prejudice  to  society,  363.  He  attributes  the  wrong  no- 
tions which  have  obtained  among  some  nations,  as  if  the  future 
state  was  to  be  in  all  respects  like  the  present,  to  a  corruption 
and  abuse  of  the  doctrine  of  the  resurrection  of  the  body,  397. 
His  judicious  observation,  that  it  is  not  sufficient  that  a  religion 
should  teach  the  doctrine  of  a  future  state,  but  that  it  should 
also  direct  to  a  proper  use  of  it;  and  that  this  is  admirably  done 
by  the  Christian  religion,  398 — and  that  the  resurrection  there 
taught  leads  to  spiritual  ideas,  ibid.  He  shews,  that  the  Chris- 
tian religion,  considered  in  a  political  view,  is  of  great  advan- 
tage to  civil  government,  424. 

Moral  Law.  See  Law. 

Moral  sense — implanted  in  the  human  heart,  5 — not  equally 
strong  in  all  men,  ibid. — weak  and  depraved  in  the  present  state 


INDEX.  447 

of  mankind,  6,  7,  8 — not  designed  to  be  alone  an  adequate 
guide  in  morals,  or  to  preclude  the  necessity  of  instruction, 
8.224,225. 

Morality — taken  in  its  just  extent,  comprehends  the  duties  we 
more  immediately  owe  to  God,  as  well  as  those  that  respect 
our  neighbours  and  ourselves,  33,  34. 

Morality^  Pagan.  See  Heathens. 

Morality^  Goafiel  scheme  of- — exceeds  what  had  ever  been  pub- 
lished to  the  world  before,  232,  233.  A  summary  representa- 
tion of  the  Christian  morality,  with  respect  to  the  duties  re- 
quired of  us  towards  God,  our  neighbours,  and  ourselves, 
233,  et  seq.  It  is  in  nothing  deficient,  but  complete  in  all  its 
parts,  256 — raised  to  an  high  degree  of  purity,  yet  does  not 
carry  it  to  an  unnatural  or  superstitious  extreme,  ibid.  This  is 
shewn  in  several  instances,  257,  258  See  also  172.  183.  199. 
218.  It  is  enforced  by  the  most  powerful  motives,  far  superior 
to  any  that  were  urged  by  the  most  celebrated  antient  moralists, 
258,  et  seq.  It  is  so  admirable,  that  all  attempts  in  after-ages 
to  add  to  its  perfection,  have  fallen  short  of  its  original  ex- 
cellency, and  only  tended  to  weaken  and  corrupt  it,  263. 

Moses,  law  of- — was  designed  to  instruct  men  in  morals,  as  well 
as  to  lead  them  to  the  right  knowledge  and  worship  of  the  one 
true  God,  29,  30.  The  fame  of  it  spread  to  other  nations,  and 
was  probably  in  several  respects  of  use  to  them,  30.  "^ 

Mysteries,  antient  Pagan — became  at  length  greatly  corrupted 
to  the  general  depravation  of  manners  in  the  Pagan  world,  70. 
They  had  little  effect  in  preserving  the  sense  of  a  future  state, 
and  especially  of  future  punishments  among  the  Greeks  and 
Romans,  383.  388, 

N. 
ATavarette — His  account  of  China  seems  to  be  an  impartial  one, 

63 — referred  to,  ibid  et  64.  291.  350. 
JVbah — had  th^  divine  law  made  known  to  him,  which  was  from 

him  transmitted  to  his  descendants,  23. 
JSfoahy  sons  q/^— Jewish  tradition  concerning  the  precepts  given  to 

them,  25. 

O. 

Oaths.    See  swearing. 

Orac/e«— The  philosophers  directed  the  people  to  consult  and 


448  INDEX. 

obey  the  oracles  of  the  gods  in  all  matters  relating  to  religion 
and  divine  worship,  112.  This  was  Socrates's  own  practice, 
and  his  advice  to  others,  ibid.  Plato  ascribes  the  greatest  and 
most  excellent  laws  to  the  oracle  of  Apollo  at  Delphi,  ibid. 

P. 

Parents — A  custom  among  some  of  the  Heathen  nations  to  ex- 
pose or  destroy  their  sick  and  aged  parents,  67.   '16. 

Peripatetics — They  held  as  well  as  the  Stoics,  that  a  wise  and 
good  man  is  happy  under  the  severest  tornients,  but  would 
not  allow  that  he  is  haj)py  in  the  highest  df:gree,  210.  The 
difference  between  them  and  the  Stoics  about  the  absolute  in- 
differency  of  all  external  things  considered,  2?4,  etseq.  Some 
of  them  denied  the  immo'tality  of  the  soul  and  its  subsistence 
in  a  separate  state,  284.  They  are  blamed  by  Cicero  for  sup- 
posing that  some  things  may  be  profitable  which  are  not 
honest,  354. 

Philosojihy — High  encomiums  bestowed  upon  it  by  many  of  the 
antients,  as  of  the  greatest  use  with  regard  to  morals,  72,  73 — 
and  as  the  only  infallible  way  to  make  men  completely  happy? 
211,212. 

Philosofihers,  Pagan — Some  of  them  said  excellent  thinajs  con- 
cerning moral  virtue,  and  their  instructions  were  probably  in 
several  instances  of  considerable  use,  73  The  pretence  that 
there  is  no  moral  precept  in  the  Gospel,  but  what  the  philo- 
sophers had  taught  before,  examined,  74,  et  seq.  No  proof 
can  be  given  that  they  derived  all  they  taught  merely  from 
their  own  reason,  without  any  help  from  antient  tradition,  or 
the  light  of  Divine  Revelation,  76.  They  were  universally 
wrong  in  encouraging  polytheism,  nor  did  any  of  them  pre- 
scribe the  worship  of  the  one  true  God,  and  of  him  only,  78, 
79.  A  complete  system  of  morality  not  to  be  found  in  the  writ- 
ings of  any  one  philosopher,  79 — nor  in  them  all  collectively 
considered,  ibid.  Their  sentiments,  for  want  of  a  proper  divine 
authority,  could  not  pass  for  laws  obligatory  to  mankind,  80, 
8 1 .  Many  of  the  philosophers  were  wrong  in  the  fundamental 
principles  of  morals,  83.  Some  of  them  denied  that  any  thing 
is  just  or  unjust  by  nature,  but  only  by  human  law  and  cus- 
tom, 84,  85 — others  made  man's  chief  good  consist  in  sensual 
pleasure,  85,  et  seq.  The  sentiments  of  those  who  are  account^ 


INDEX.  445 

cd  the  best  of  the  Pagan  philosophers  and  moralists  consider- 
ed, 107,  et  seq.  They  held,  that  law  is  right  reason;  but  they 
generally  derived  the  original  of  law,  and  its  obliging  force> 
from  God,  or  the  gods,  108,  109.  They  sent  the  people  to  the 
oracles  to  know  the  law  ot  God,  especially  with  respect  to  di- 
vine worship,  112 — and  gave  it  as  a  general  rule,  confirmed 
by  the  oracles,  ihat  ah  men  should  conform  to  the  laws  and  re- 
ligion of  their  country,  ibid  But  the  way  they  seem  chiefly  to 
propose  for  men's  coming  at  the  knowledge  of  the  divine  law 
is,  by  the  doctrines  and  instructions  of  wise  men,  i.  e.  of  the 
philosophers,  112,  113.  They  spoke  nobly  of  virtue  in  gene- 
ral, but  when  they  came  to  particulars  differed  in  their  notions 
of  what  is  virtue  and  vice,  and  what  is  agreeable  to  the  law  of 
nature  and  reai>on,  or  contrary  to  it,  114,  115.  Some  of  tha 
most  eminent  of  them  passed  wrong  judgments  in  relation  to 
several  important  points  of  the  law  of  nature,  1 17.  They  often 
erred  in  applying  general  rules  to  particular  cases,  1 19.  They 
were  for  the  most  part  deficient  and  wrong  with  respect  to  the 
duty  and  worship  proper  to  be  rendered  to  God,  which  yet 
they  acknowledged  to  be  of  the  highest  importance,  120.  They 
all  encouraged  the  worship  of  a  multiplicity  of  deities,  121. 
Swearing  by  the  creatures  was  not  forbidden  by  them,  123, 
et  seq.  They  gave  good  precepts  and  directions  about  civil  and 
social  duties,  124,  125.  Some  of  them  said  excellent  things 
concerning  the  forgiveness  of  injuries,  but  were  contradict- 
ed by  others  of  great  name,  127.  They  were  generally 
wrong  in  that  part  of  morals  which  relates  to  purity  and  con- 
tinence, and  the  government  of  the  sensual  passions,  109,  et 
seq.  Many  of  them  chargeable  with  unnatural  lusts  and  vices, 
which  they  reckoned  among  things  of  an  indifterent  nature, 
130,  et  seq.  They  generally  allowed  of  fornication,  as  having 
nothing  in  it  sinful,  or  contrary  to  reason,  137,  138,  139. 
Many  of  them  pleaded  for  suicide  as  lawful  and  proper  in  some 
cases,  192.  204.  N.  They  made  high  pretensions  of  leading  men 
to  perfect  happiness  in  this  present  state,  abstracting  from  all 
regard  to  a  future  reward,  211.  223.  Notwithstanding  they 
said  such  glorious  things  of  virtue,  they  did  n^t  clearly  explain 
what  they  understood  by  it,  ibid.  They  were  generally  loose 
in  their  doctrine  with  regard  to  the  obligation  of  truth,  and 
thought  lying  lawful  when  it  was  profitable,  225,  226. 
Vol.  1 1.  3  L  '  ' 


450  INDEX. 

Philosofihers — the  great  corrupters  of  the  antient  tradition  con- 
cerning the  immortality  of  the  soul  and  a  future  state,  238. 
There  were  whole  sects  of  them  that  professedly  denied  it, 
ibid.  They  who  set  up  as  advocates  for  it  placed  it  for  the 
most  part   on  wrong  foundations,  234.  It  was  a  general  notion 
among  them,  that  the  human  soul  is  a  portion  oT  the  divine 
essence,  325,  et  seq.  They  universally  held  the  pre-existence 
of  the  soul,  and  from  thence  argued  its  immortality,  327,  328. 
Some  of  their  arguments  tended  to  prove  that  the  soul  is  na- 
turally and  necessarily  eternal,  332,  333.  Hence  their  doctrine 
of  the  natural  immortality  of  the  soul  was  censured  by  some 
of  the  primitive  fathers  of  the  Christian  church,  333.  They 
also  taught  the  transmigration  of  souls,  which  tended  greatly 
to  deprave  the  doctrine  of  a  future  state,  336.  Those  of  them 
who  talked  in  the  highest  terms  of  the  future  happiness  were 
for  confining  it  to  souls  of  special  eminence;  and  did  not  teach 
the  d 'Ctrine  of  eternal  life  and  happiness  to  all  the  good  and 
righteous  without  exception,  338,  et  seq.  The  best  of  the  phi- 
losophers, amidst  all  their  arguings,  often  spoke  doubtfully 
about  a  future  state,  343,  et  seq.  In  their  consolations  to  their 
friends,  and  in  their  discourses  against  the  fear  of  death,  they 
generally  expressed  themselves  in  a  way  of  alternative,  345, 
346.  Their  fluciu  tions  and  seeming  contradiciions,  were  not 
merely  owing  to  the  distinction  between  the  exoteric  and  eso- 
teric doctrine,  but  to  the  uncertainty  of  their  own  minds,  351, 
352.  They  did  not  apply  the  doctrine  of  a  future  state  to  its 
proper  ends  and  uses;  and  laid  little  stress  on  future  rewards 
in  iheir  exhortations  to  virtue,  ibid,  et  seq.  To  supply  the 
want  of  this,  they  cried  up  the  self-sufficiency  of  virtue  as  its 
own  reward,  abstracting  from  all   consideration  of  a  future 
recompence,  352,  353.   With  the  same  view  they  asserted, 
that  a  short  and  temporary  happisiess  is  as  good  as  an  eternal 
one,  356,  357.  They  did  not  generally  believe  future  punish- 
ments. See  Puniiihments. 
p/a/o— directs  to  follow  the   Delphian  Apollo  as  the  best  guide 
in    matters   of    religion,    112 — seems    to   advise  the  abstain- 
ing from  oaths,   and  yet  oaths  are  very  frequent  in  all  his 
works,    123.   He  would  -have  the   Greeks  behave  in  a  very 
friendly  and  brotherly  manner  towards  one  another,  but  ap- 
proves their  regarding  and  treating  the  Barbarians,  a  name 


INDEX.  451 

they  bestowed  upon  all  other  nations  but  their  own,  as  by  na- 
ture their  enemies,  126,  127 — prescribes  a  community  of 
wives  in  his  commonwealth,  133 — gives  great  liberties  to 
incontinency,  not  reconcileabie  to  the  rules  of  modesty  and 
decency,  134.  He  allows  and  in  some  cases  prescribes  the  ex- 
posing and  destroying  children,  ibid  See  also  48.  Teaches, 
that  lying  is  lawful  when  it  is  profitable,  and  in  a  fitting  or 
needful  season,  225,  226.  He  pleads  in  all  his  works  for  the 
immortality  of  the  soul,  315 — and  often  represents  the  re- 
wards and  punishments  of  a  future  state  in  a  popular  and 
poetical  manner,  ibid.  He  also  speaks  of  them  in  a  more  re- 
fined and  philosophical  sense,  ibid,  et  316.  The  transmigra- 
tion of  souls  is  what  he  frequently  asserts,  317.  He  also 
maintains  the  pre-existence  of  the  human  soul,  and  from 
thence  endeavours  to  prove  its  immortality,  328.  He  some- 
times argues,  as  if  he  thought  the  soul  was  properly  eternal 
by  the  necessity  of  its  own  nature,  332.  He  manages  his  doc- 
trine of  a  future  state  so  as  to  answer  political  ends  and  pur- 
poses, 339— but  represents  the  belief  of  it  as  of  great  impor- 
tance to  the  cause  of  virtue,  357,  358.  The  doctrine  of  future 
punishments,  is  recommended  by  him  as  a  most  antient  and 
sacred  tradition,  273.  364.  He  frequently  insists  upon  those 
punishments,  and  asserts  some  of  them  to  be  eternal,  ibid,  et 
365 — yet  he  sometimes  expresses  himself  in  a  manner  that 
seems  not  to  admit  of  punishments  in  a  future  state;  and  finds 
fault  with  those  representations,  as  tending  to  discourage  the 
people,  and  make  them  afraid  of  death,  368,  369. 

Pleasure — The  scheme  of  those  philosophers  who  made  sensual 
pleasure  the  chief  good  considered,  85,  et  seq.  Some  of  our 
moderns  have  carried  this  doctrine  farther  than  Epicurus 
himself,  88,  8^  N.  93. 

Pliny^  the  natural  historian thinks  a  timely  death  one  of  the 

greatest  blessings  of  nature,  and  that  it  is  what  every  man 
may  procure  for  himself,  193,  He  openly  declares  and  ar- 
gues against  the  doctrine  of  the  immortality  o^  the  soul,  and 
a  future  state,  387.  N. 

Plotinus — talks  in  the  same  extravagant  strain^with  the  Stoics, 
of  self  sufficiency  and  apathy,  and  the  absolute  indifferency  of 
all  external  things,  165.  A  proud  saying  of  his,  ibid. — seems 
to  approve  self-murder  in  some  cases,  204.  N.—— supposes 


452  INDEX. 

the  human  soul  to  be  of  the  same  nature  with  the  soul  of 
the  world,  326,  527. 

Plutarch — looks  upon  Lycurgus  to  have  been  a  divine  man, 
42 — expresses  a  great  esteem  and  admiration  of  his  institu- 
tions and  laws,  not  excepting  those  of  them  which  have  an 
appearance  of  being  contrary  to  good  morals,  45.  47.  136.  He 
represents  the  immortality  of  the  soul  as  a  matter  of  antient 
tradition,  and  which  ought  to  be  believed,  and  produces  ar- 
guments for  it,  322 — yet  at  other  times  he  speaks  dubiously 
about  it,  and  as  if  he  looked  upon  it  to  be  only  an  agreeable 
fable,  not  founded  on  any  solid  reasons,  347.  He  represents 
the  remarkable  effects  which  the  hope  of  future  happiness 
had  upon  them  that  believed  it;  and  the  account  he  gives 
suits  the  primitive  Christians,  but  seems  not  well  applicable 
to  the  antient  Pagans,  360,  361.  He  rejects  future  punish- 
ments, and  treats  the  fear  of  them  as  vain  and  childish,  and 
the  effect  of  a  foolish  superstition,  373,  374. 

Poets — The  most  antient  of  them  represent  the  immortality  of 
the  soul,  and  a  future  state,  as  generally  believed  among  the 
nations,  273.  They  often  speak  of  future  punishments,  366 — 
yet  there  are  many  passages,  both  of  the  Greek  and  Latin 
poets,  which  speak  of  death  as  putting  a  final  period  lo  our 
existence,  and  extinguishing  all  sense  of  good  and  evil,  392, 
393. 

Polybius — blames  the  great  men  and  magistrates  among  the 
Greeks  for  rejecting  the  doctrine  of  a  future  stale,  and  espe- 
cially of  future  punishments,  and  propagating  the  disbelief  of 
it  among  the  people,  384,  385.  To  this  he  attributes  the  great 
want  of  honesty  among  fhe  Grecians;  yet  he  himself  repre- 
sents these  things  under  the  notion  of  useful  fictions,  ibid, 
et  385. 

Prayer — A  general  practice  among  the  Pagans,  but  chiefly  in- 
tended for  obtaining  outward  advantages,  not  for  wisdom  and 
virtue,  158.  N. 

Priests^  Heathen — It  was  not  looked  upon  as  their  proper  office 
to  teach  men  virtue,  34,  35. 

Puffendorff—oi  opinion,  that  men  usually  come  to  the  know- 
ledge of  natural  law  by  education  and  custom,  14 — and  that 
the  chief  heads  of  that  law  were  originally  communicated  to 
Adam  by  divine  Revelation,  and  from  him  transmitted  to  his 


INDEX.  453 

descendants,  17.  N.  He  proves,  that  a  vague  and  licentious 
commerce  between  the  sexes  out  of  marriage  is  contrary  to 
the  law  of  nature,  141. 

Punishments — The  Stoics  seem  to  have  denied  that  any  proper 
punishments  are  inflicted  upon  men  by  the  gods,  either  here 
or  hereafter,  150.  375,  376. 

Punishments^  future — The  doctrine  of  future  rewards  neces- 
sarily connotes  future  punishments,  568 — the  belief  of  the 
former  without  the  latter  would  be  of  pernicious  consequence, 
ibid.  The  wisest  of  the  Heathen  legislators  and  philosophers 
sensible  of  the  great  importance  and  necessity  ot  the  doctrine 
of  future  punishments,  364,  et  seq.  Celsus  represents  it  as  a 
doctrine  taught  by  Heathens  as  well  as  Christians,  that 
■wicked  men  shall  be  subject  to  eternal  punishments,  366, 
367 — yet  it  appears  that  the  most  celebrated  philosophers 
really  rejected  that  doctrine  of  future  punishments,  the  belief 
of  which  they  owned  to  be  necessary  to  society,  367,  et  seq.  The 
philosophic  maxim  that  the  gods  are  never  angry,  nor  hurt 
any  person,  was  generally  so  understood  as  to  exclude  the 
punishments  of  a  future  state,  374.  380,  381.  The  notion  of 
future  punishments  seems  to  have  been  generally  discarded 
among  the  Greeks  in  the  time  of  Polybius,  384.  It  was  be- 
lieved among  the  Romans  in  the  most  antient  times  of  their 
state,  but  was  afterwards  rejected  and  discarded  even  by  the 
vulgar,-  385,  et  seq.  The  Christian  doctrine  of  a  future  state 
includes  not  only  the  rewards  that  shall  be  conferred  upon  the 
righteous,  but  the  punishments  which  shall  be  inflicted  on  the 
wicked  in  the  world  to  come,  413.  The  usefulness  and  impor- 
tance of  this  part  of  the  Gospel  Revelation  shewn,  and  that 
this  doctrine  as  there  taught  is  both  reasonable  and  neces- 
sary, 415,  et  seq. 

Pythagoras — held,  that  the  human  soul  is  a  part  of  the  divine 
substance,  and  that  therefore  it  is  immortal,  302,  303 — and 
that  after  its  departure  from  the  body  it  is  resolved  into  the 
universal  soul,  ibid. — yet  he  maintained  the  doctrine  of  the 
transmigration  of  souls,  which  he  learned  of  the  Egyptians, 
ibid.  He  supposed  it  to  be  physical  and  necessary,  but  endea- 
voured to  apply  it  to  moral  purposes,  303,  According  to  Ovid 
he  rejected  future  punishments,  304.  He  excepted  some  emi- 
nent souls   from  a  necessity  of  transmigration,  and  supposed 


454  INDEX. 

them  to  go  immediately  to  the  gods,  306.  It  is  hard  to  form 
a  right  notion  of  his  scheme,  which  seems  not  to  have  been 
well  consistent  with  itself,  ibid.  The  doctrine  of  the  immor- 
tality of  the  soul,  as  he  taught  it,  of  little  advantage  to  man- 
kind, 309.  He  held  periodical  revolutions  of  the  world,  and 
that  the  same  course  of  things  shall  return,  and  all  things 
that  have  been  done  shall  be  done  over  again,  ibid.  See  also 
303.  We  cannot  be  sure  of  his  real  sentiments,  as  he  made  no 
scruple  to  impose  upon  his  hearers,  309. 

Reason — arguing  from  the  nature  and  relations  of  things,  may 
be  of  great  use  to  lead  men  to  the  knowledge  of  moral  duty, 
9nd  to  shew  that  it  has  a  real  foundation  in  nature,  8,  9 — but 
this  is  not  the  ordinary  way  in  which  the  bulk  of  mankind 
come  to  the  knowledge  of  morals,  10.  Reason  is  apt  to  be  influ- 
enced by  the  passions  to  form  wrong  judgments  in  things  of 
a  moral  nature,  1 1,  et  seq  Reason  alone  has  not  properly  the 
force  of  a  law  to  mankind,  without  the  interposition  and  autho- 
rity of  a  superior,  107,108.  If  left  merely  to  itself  in  the  present 
state  of  mankind,  it  is  not  a  safe  and  certain  guide  in  matters 
of  religion  and  morality,  421 — yet  it  is  a  valuable  gift  of  God, 
and  in  many  respects  of  great  advantage,  especially  when  as- 
sisted by  Divine  Revelation,  ibid.  Men's  having  too  high  an 
opinion  of  the  powers  of  their  own  reason,  has  often  had  a  bad 
effect  both  in  religion  and  philosophy,  422.  N. 

Religion — when  it  is  of  the  right  kind,  and  considered  in  its  most 
comprehensive  notion,  takes  in  the  whole  of  moral  duty,  and 
enforces  it  by  a  divine  authority,  and  the  most  important  mo- 
tives, 34. 

Religion,  Heathen — as  established  by  the  laws,  had  no  proper  ar- 
ticles of  fuiih  necessary  to  be  believed,  nor  proposed  any  set- 
tled rule  of  moral  duty  for  directing  and  regulating  the  prac- 
tice, 34,  35.  It  consisted  properly  in  the  public  rites  and  cere- 
monies which  were  to  be  observed^in  the  worship  of  the  gods, 
i()id.  The  rites  of  their  worship  had  in  several  respects  a  bad 
influence  on  the  morals  of  the  people,  36. 

Resurrection  of  the  body — denied  and  ridiculed  by  the  philoso- 
phers of  Greece  and  Rome,  394.  Some  notion  of  it  said  to 
have  obtained  among  the  Eastern  Magi,  ibid.  It  might  have 
been  part  of  the  original  tradition  derived  from  the  beginning 
together  with  the  immortality  of  the  soul,  ibid.    It   obtained 


INDEX.  455 

among  the  Jews  long  before  the  time  of  our  Saviour,  but  their 
noiions  of  it  obscure  and  gross,  ,394,  395.  The  tenet  of  the 
transmigration  of  souls  might  have  arisen  from  a  corruption 
of  the  doctrine  of  the  resurrection  of  the  body;  as  also  the  no- 
tion, which  obtained  among  many  nations,  that  after  their 
death  they  would  have  ihe  same  bodily  wants  and  be  in  the 
same  condition  which  they  are  in  at  present,  395,  396.  The  no- 
tion of  the  resurrection  taught  by  our  Saviour  and  his  apostles 
noble  and  sublime,  and  leads  to  spiritual  ideas,  397.  405. 

Revelation^  divine — one  way  of  communicating  to  men  the  know- 
ledge of  morals,  12.  The  great  usefulness  of  the  Christian  re- 
velation for  that  purpose,  31.  232,  et  seq.  See  Morality. 

Reunion — or  refusion  of  the  soul  at  death,  or  soon  after  it,  into  the 
universal  soul,  taught  by  the  Stoics  and  other  philosophers, 
289.  296.  307,  308 — not  to  be  understood  of  a  moral  but  a  phy- 
sical union,  289.  It  is  quite  different  from  the  Christian  doc- 
trine of  the  beatific  vision  and  enjoyment  of  God,  307,  308.  It 
was  supposed  to  be  common  to  all  souls  without  distinction, 
not  peculiar  to  the  innocent  and  righteous,  ibid.  If  there  was 
any  happiness  provided  for  departed  souls,  it  was  supposed 
to  be  previous  to  the  reunion  in  which  souls  lost  their  indivi- 
dual subsistence,  ibid. 

Romans^  antient — their  character,  29.  S7 .  The  custom  of 
exposing  children  continued  long  among  them,  60— their 
cruel  treatment  of  their  slaves,  ibid. — their  gladiatory  shews 
contrary  to  humanity,  and  destroyed  more  men  than  the 
wars,  76zrf.-— unnatural  lusts  very  common  among  them, 
especially  in   the   latter   times  of  their  stale,  62. 

S. 

^acrZ/Jces— a  part  of  the  primitive  religion,  originally  of  divine 
appointment,  21. 

Sages.)  Eastern.     See  Eastern. 

Sce/itics"-deiued,  that  any  thing  is  in  its  own  nature  honest  or 
dishonest,  base  or  honourable,  but  only  by  virtue  of  the  laws 
and  customs  which  have  obtained  among  men,  84. 

Seneca — says,  it  is  a  narrow  notion  of  innocencyv  to  measure  a 
man's  goodness  only  by  the  laws,  38 — asserts,  that  no  man  in 
his  sound  reason  fears  the  gods,  151 — and  that  it  is  neither  in 
their  power  or  inclination  to  hurt  any  one,  ibid.  Extravagant 


456  INDEX. 

strains  of  Stoical  pride  and  arrogance  in  his  writings,  15 5-- 
raises  a  wise  man  to  an  equality  with  God  in  virtue  and  hap- 
piness, ibid. — seems  to  make  prayer  unnecessary,  yet  at  other 
times  advises  to  it,  157,  ISS—justifies  Cato*s  drunkenness, 
191— pleads  for  self-murder,  163— uncertain  in  his  notions 
about  the  immortality  of  the  soul,  and  a  future  state,  291.  He 
sometimes  speaks  nobly  of  future  happiness,  z^zV/.— at  other 
times  expresses  himself  doubtfully  about  it,  ibid. — and  some- 
times positively  affirms,  that  the  soul  is  void  of  all  sense  after 
death,  and  that  a  man  is  then  in  the  same  condition  he  was  in 
before  he  was  born,  292,  293.  He  absolutely  rejects  tuture  pu- 
nishments as  vain  terrors  invented  by  the  poets,  and  asserts 
that  a  dead  man  is  affected  with  no  evils,  ibid,  et  372 .  373. 

Shaftesbury,  Earl  of- — A  passage  of  his  relating  to  the  clearness 
of  the  moral  sense  examined,  7. 

Sin — according  to  the  principles  laid  down  by  Marcus  Antoni- 
nus, necessary  and  unavoidable,  176,  177 — can  do  no  hurt, 
either  to  pariicular  persons,  or  to  the  whole,  179 — contributes 
in  the  Stoical  scheme  to  the  harmony  of  the  universe,  ibid. 

Socrates — the  first  among  the  Greeks  that  made  morak  the  pro- 
per and  only  subject  of  his  philosophy,  and  brought  it  into 
common  life,  83 — was  wont  to  consult  the  Oracles,  to  know 
the  will  of  the  gods,  1 12 — takes  notice  of  some  unwritten  laws 
which  he  supposes  to  be  of  divine  original,  and  common  to  all 
mankind,  ll5,et  seq. — represents  the  worshipping,  not  one 
God  only,  but  the  gods,  as  the  first  and  most  universal  law  of 
nature,  ibid.  It  was  a  custom  with  him  to  swear,  but  espe- 
cially to  swear  by  the  creatures,  123.  He  is  charged  with  in- 
continence, and  making  use  of  prostitutes,  137.  He  taught  the 
immortality  of  the  soul,  and  a  future  state,  190,  et  seq.  He 
sometimes  gives  a  noble  account  of  future  happiness,  but 
seems  to  confine  it  principally  to  those  who  had  made  a  great 
progress  in  wisdom  and  philosophy,  311 — mixes  his  doctrine 
of.a  future  state  with  that  of  the  transmigration  of  souls,  ibid, 
— gives  a  mean  idea  of  the  happiness  reserved  for  the  com- 
mon sort  of  good  and  virtuous  men  after  death,  312.  Cicero's 
summary  of  Socrates's  doctrine  concerning  a  future  state,  312, 
313.  None  of  his  disciples,  but  Plato  and  his  followers,  taught 
the  immortality  of  the  soul  as  the  doctrine  of  their  School, 
319.  Most  of  the  arguments  produced  by  him  in  the  Phsedo 


INDEX.  457 

For  the  immortality  of  the  soul,  weak  and  inclusive,  334.  lie 
expresses  his  hope  of  it  in  his  last  discourse  when  he  was 
going  to  die,  but  does  not  pretend  to  a  certainty,  344.  He  re- 
presents the  belief  of  it  as  of  great  importance  to  the  cause 
of  virtue,  358,  359 — but  says,  it  was  disbelieved  by  most  of 
the  people  among  the  Athenians  and  Greeks  in  his  time,  3U2, 

Soul  of  Man — strange  diversity  of  opinions  among  the  philoso- 
phers about  the  nature  of  the  human  soul,  285.  The  most  emi- 
nent of  them  from  the  time  of  Fythagoras,  maintained  that  it 
is  a  portion  of  the  divine  essence,  325,  326.  N. 

Sfiarta^  and  Sfiartans.  See  Lacedamonians. 

Stoics — the  most  eminent  teachers  of  morals  in  the  Pagan  world, 
145 — highly  admired  and  extolled  both  by  antiquity  and  mo- 
derns, ibid  et  146.  Observations  on  their  maxims  and  pre- 
cepts with  regard  to  piety  towards  God,  147;  et  seq.  One 
great  defect  in  all  their  precepts  of  piety,  is,  that  they  gene- 
rally run  into  the  polytheistic  strain,  and  are  referred  promis- 
cuously to  God  and  the  gods,  147,  148.  Their  scheme  tended 
to  take  away  the  fear  of  God  as  a  punisher  of  sin,  149,  et  seq. 
and  advanced  such  a  notion  of  the  divine  goodness  as  is  scarce 
consistent  with  punitive  justice,  150.  They  proposed  to  raise 
men  to  a  state  of  self  sufficiency  and  independency,  152,  153, 
Extravagant  strains  of  pride  and  arrogance  in  some  of  the 
principal  Stoics,  154,  155.  Confession  of  sin  before  God,  and 
sorrow  for  it,  made  no  part  of  their  religion,  159,  160.  The 
resignation  to  God,  for  which  they  are  so  much  admired,  was 
in  several  respects  diff'ercnt  from  that  meek  submission  to  the 
divine  will  which  Christianity  requires,  160.  161,  N.  Evange- 
lical humility  had  not  properly  a  place  in  their  system  of  mo- 
rals, 166.  They  gave  many  good  precepts  concerning  benevo- 
lence and  social  duties,  but  their  doctrine  of  apathy  was 
not  well  consistent  with  a  humane  disposition  and  a  charitable 
sympathy,  167,  et  seq.  They  said  excellent  things  concerning 
forgiveness  of  injuries,  and  bearing  with  other  men's  faults, 
but  in  some  instances  carried  it  to  an  extreme,  and  placed  it  on 
wrong  foundations,  173,  et  seq.  Their  pretence  that  no  injury 
can  be  done  to  a  good  man,  leaves  no  pro'^er  room  for  his 
forgiving  injuries,  178,  179  Some  of  the  Stoics  taught  that 
pardoning  mercy  was  inconsistent  with  the  character  of  a  wise 
man,  184,  185.  They  talked  in  high  strains  of  governing  the 

Vol.  II.  3  M  .        ' 


458  INDEX. 

fleshly  appetites,  and  yet  the  heads  and  leaders  of  that  sect 
were  very  loose,  both  in  their  doctrine  and  practice,  with  re- 
spect to  purity  and  chastity,  and  gave  great  indulgence  to  the 
sensual  passions,  187,  et  seq.  See  also  138,  139.  They  were 
favourable  to  drunkenness,  190,  191 — allowed,  and  even  in  se- 
veral cases  prescribed  self-murder,  193,  et  seq.  They  propos- 
ed lo  lead  men  to  perfect  happiness  in  this  present  life,  with- 
out regard  to  a  future  state;  and  to  this  end  asserted  the  ab- 
solute self-sufficiency  of  virtue,  and  the  indifferency  of  all 
external  things,  208,  et  seq.  It  was  a  principle  with  them  that 
a  wise  man  is  happy  in  the  highest  degree,  merely  by  the 
force  of  his  own  virtue,  under  the  severest  torments,  209,  210. 
Their  scheme  in  several  respects  not  consistent  with  itself: 
and  they  were  obliged  to  make  concessions  which  cannot  be 
well  reconciled  to  their  principles,  214,  215.  Their  philoso- 
phy in  its  rigour  not  reducible  to  practice,  and  had  little  influ- 
ence either  on  the  people  or  on  themselves,  219,  220.  They  did 
not  give  a  clear  idea  of  the  nature  of  that  virtue  of  which  they 
said  such  glorious  things,  221,  et  seq.  They  taught  that  lying 
in  words  is  lawful  and  allowable  on  many  occasions,  225.  The 
immortality  of  the  soul  was  not  a  doctrine  of  their  school,  286, 
287.  Some  of  them  held,  that  the  soul  is  absorbed  at  death 
into  the  soul  of  the  world,  and  then  loses  its  individual  subsist- 
ence, 288 — others  supposed  it  to  subsist  for  some  time  after 
death,  but  that  it  shall  be  dissolved  and  resumed  into  the  soul 
of  the  universe  at  the  conflagration,  289.  Their  doctrine  of 
successive  periodical  dissolutions  and  conflagrations  of  the 
world,  and  the  restitution  of  all  things  precisely  to  the  state 
they  were  in  before,  not  well  consistent  with  a  state  of  future 
retributions,  290,  291.  N.  They  held,  that  some  great  and 
eminent  souls  after  death  became  gods,  but  that  even  these 
were  to  be  dissolved  at  the  conflagration,  290.  It  was  a  maxim 
with  them,  that  duration  is  of  no  importance  to  happiness,  and 
that  a  temporal  felicity  is  as  good  as  an  eternal  one,  356,  357, 
They  maintained,  that  nothing  is  profitable  but  what  is  honest; 
which  is  true,  if  a  future  recompence  be  taken  into  the  ac- 
count, but  does  not  always  hold  if  confined  only  to  this  present 
life,  354,  355. 
Suicide — recommended  by  many  of  the  philosophers  and  especi- 
ally by  the  Stoics,    192,  et  seq>— censured  by  some  philoso- 


« 


INDEX.  459 


phers,  and  condemned  in  some  countries  by  the  laws  of  the 
state,  200,  201.  The  Roman  laws  gave  too  great  allowances 
to  it,  201.  Some  of  our  modern  Deists  plead  for  it,  204.  The 
absurdity  and  pernicious  consequences  of  it  shewn,  205, 
206. 

Svjearing — common  among  many  of  the  philosophers,  123,  124, 
125.    None  of  them  forbid  swearing  by  the  creatures,  ibid. 

Sykesy  Dr, — lays  it  down  as  a  principle,  that  the  right  knowledge 
of  the  one  true  God  is  the  great  foundation  of  morality,  29— 
asserts,  that  the  light  of  natural  reason,  merely  by  its  own 
force,  discovered  to  the  Heathens  the  whole  of  moral  duty, 
without  any  assistance  from  Divine  Revelation,  75,  76 — says 
that  it  was  the  philosophic  notion  among  the  Greeks  from  the 
time  of  Pythagoras,  that  the  human  soul  is  a  portion  or  sec- 
tion of  the  divine  substance,  325,  326.  N. 

T. 

Tables^  laws  of  the  twelve.  See  Laws» 

Theofihrastus — held,  that  the  suffering  great  outward  evils  and 
calamities  is  incompatible  with  a  happy  life,  211 — for  which 
he  was  blamed  by  the  other  philosophers,  ibid. 

Timaus  Locrus — held  the  transmigration  of  souls;  and  that  it  is 
necessary  to  instil  into  the  people  the  dread  of  future  punish- 
ments; yet  seems  not  to  have  bplieved  them  himself,  304. 

Tradition — There  were  several  customs  derived  by  a  most  an- 
tient  tradition  from  the  first  ages,  and  common  to  all  nations, 
and  which  probably  had  their  original  from  a  Divine  appoint- 
ment. 25.  N. 

Transmigration  of  souls — taught  by  the  Egyptians,  who  represent- 
ed it  as  the  effect  of  a  physical  necessity,  yet  apphed  it  to 
moral  purposes,  303.  It  was  maintained  by  all  the  philoso- 
phers who  taught  the  immortality  of  the  soul,  335.  It  was  a 
great  corruption  of  the  doctrine  of  a  future  state  of  retributions, 
and  tended  to  weaken  and  defeat  the  good  effects  of  it,  336. 

Truth — Many  of  the  philosophers  looked  upon  .truth  to  be  no 
farther  obligatory  than  as  it  is  profitable;  and  lying  to  be  lawful 
when  itis  so,  225,226.  Some  of  our  modern  Deistsof  the  same 
sentiments,  227. 


* 
460  INDEX. 

V. 

Virtue — The  doctrine  of  the  absolute  self-sufficiency  of  virtue  to 
happiness,  even  under  the  severest  torments,  examined,  212, 
2  J  3.  The  philosophers  generally  supposed  virtue  to  consist 
in  living  according  to  nature;  but  did  not  clearly  explain  what 
is  to  be  understood  by  it,  22 1,  et  seq.  Many  of  them  represent- 
ed it  to  be  equivalent  to  the  to  kuXov,  or  honestum,  but  were 
far  from  being  agreed  as  to  what  actions  come  under  that 
character,  228,  229. 

Virtue y  divine — of  the  Platonists,  considered,  121,  122,  123.  N. 

Voltaire^  Mons.  cle — says  that  nature,  attentive  to  our  desire, 
leads  us  to  God  by  the  voice  of  pleasure,  87.  N.  Purity  and 
chastity  seems  not  to  enter  into  his  scheme  of  the  religion  and 
law  of  nature,  142. 

W. 

IViveSf  community  of.  Siee  Community,  Custom  of  lending  their 
wives  common  at  Sparta,  and  prescribed  by  Lycurgus,  47 — 
approved  by  Plutarch,  ibid,  et  136 — and  by  the  Stoics,  ibid, — 
pleaded  for  by  Mr.  Bayle,  ibid. 

Worship — of  one  God,  and  of  him  only,  not  taught  by  any  of  the 
philosophers,  77^  78  The  worship  of  the  gods  represented 
by  Socrates  as  the  first  law  of  nature,  1 1 5. 

Zeno — ^the  father  of  the  Stoics,  extolled  as  a  man  of  eminent 
virtue,  and  had  great  honours  decreed  him  on  that  account  by 
the  magistrates  and  people  of  Athens,  yet  was  chargeable  with 
great  vices,  and  unnatural  impurities,  188.  He  held  the 
community  of  women,  189 — and  the  indifferency  of  incestu- 
ous mixtures,  137 — and  put  an  end  to  his  own  life,  197. 


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